Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen.

[bf109xxl]

Germany was out of fuel and food. They had no reserve manpower. Their industry was in ruins and their infrastructure was nearly non-existant.

The main German problem was Hitler's volutnarism - the Germans were fighting very well at this time in the Ardennes. Hitler personally rejected the possibility of a Soviet offensive in Poland, which was the second important reason for the Soviet successes. The Germans fought to the last man - both the Allies and the Soviets suffered significant losses.

The reason why the operation was shelved, was not solely based on Red numbers, but other factors, such as he Soviets allying with Japan in the Pacific, the onset of winter and so on.

These are all much less significant factors than the two I already mentioned.

Once again, we have to look beyond numbers and examine how each side would use their equipment and logistics to best effect.

The Soviets have experience in using tank armies to break through the front. They have a huge fleet of trucks - thanks to Lend-Lease. The density of roads in Germany is high. After the impassable swamps of Belarus and the mud of Central Russia, these are almost ideal conditions for the Soviets. In the air in the first month will probably be parity. So, the conditions are quite suitable for a powerful strike.

in addition. The question arises, why would the Soviets need to attack? I think the Soviets also realized that they would lose any long war and any war with the Allies in general, but could try to achieve better conditions in the peace negotiations. As a result, it cannot be ruled out that they would be returned to the same "Yalta" borders. In other words, nothing would be changed, just a few million more people would be killed.

 

[Luft.4]

A note on Soviet logistics, they managed to build/return to operation oil pipelines to captured areas of operations extremely quickly because they hooked up captured oil refineries to them. Oil refineries in Hungary were up and running ~1 month after they were overrun. Not to mention, the Soviets had there own oil fields, Romanian, Hungarian, and Austrian oil fields at their disposal. The last 3 of which could be well within the range of B-29s.
Given such, rather than attack Moscow as previously mentioned (which is extremely far from where the B-29 could operate), the Western Allies might have wanted to hit these refineries again as opposed to some big city far away. They were, in fact, rather experienced in hitting oil targets.

 

[33k in the air]

Before you complain about motes . . .

Crazy Eddie!

 

[Peter Gunn]

*SNIP*

The Soviets have experience in using tank armies to break through the front. They have a huge fleet of trucks - thanks to Lend-Lease. The density of roads in Germany is high. After the impassable swamps of Belarus and the mud of Central Russia, these are almost ideal conditions for the Soviets. In the air in the first month will probably be parity. So, the conditions are quite suitable for a powerful strike.

in addition. The question arises, why would the Soviets need to attack? I think the Soviets also realized that they would lose any long war and any war with the Allies in general, but could try to achieve better conditions in the peace negotiations. As a result, it cannot be ruled out that they would be returned to the same "Yalta" borders. In other words, nothing would be changed, just a few million more people would be killed.

Not sure I can agree on the supply lines for the Russians, if I'm wrong let me know but aren't they still having to run transport through Belarus and Central Russia before they get to Germany? Also, those LL trucks are going to start A). Running out of parts/tires and B). start to be decimated by the 2nd TAF and the 9th AF fighter bombers and light/medium bombers.

However, from a personal standpoint of having had to listen to Russian blustering bullshit and smugness from the 1960's on, and as tempting as it is to see that all wiped away with a good ass kicking, it isn't worth the life of one American or British (or any allied) soldier to accomplish it. I personally think that behind closed doors, Soviet leadership knew what the score was, if not, than they were dumber than they looked. And yes, I always thought the looked dumb with every inch of their uniforms covered in "medals".

 

[bf109xxl]

Not sure I can agree on the supply lines for the Russians, if I'm wrong let me know but aren't they still having to run transport through Belarus and Central Russia before they get to Germany? Also, those LL trucks are going to start A). Running out of parts/tires and B). start to be decimated by the 2nd TAF and the 9th AF fighter bombers and light/medium bombers.

At least as far as Poland/Hungary/Slovakia, delivery will be by rail. I don't think Allied airpower will prevent it in the first month.

However, from a personal standpoint of having had to listen to Russian blustering bullshit and smugness from the 1960's on, and as tempting as it is to see that all wiped away with a good ass kicking, it isn't worth the life of one American or British (or any allied) soldier to accomplish it. I personally think that behind closed doors, Soviet leadership knew what the score was, if not, than they were dumber than they looked. And yes, I always thought the looked dumb with every inch of their uniforms covered in "medals".

The Soviets had no real plans for a war of aggression in Europe in 1945 (headquarters always plan something, but politically there were no prerequisites). They were well aware of the situation, were quite happy with what they had achieved and did not want any continuation. But, apparently, they received information about the plan for Operation Unthinkable.
Even in 1950, Stalin was well aware of the weakness of the USSR and was extremely reluctant to support North Korea in the war. He was very angry with Kim in general.

 

[Dimlee]

Damn, I'd really hoped you have serious arguments.
I am not interested in American documents - they are completely irrelevant in this case. MiG losses can only be calculated from Soviet documents, which has already been done. In reality, B-29 crews shot down from 1 to 4 Soviet MiGs, of which 1 turned out to be Chinese, and two can be credited to the escort. How many B-29 gunners shot down Chinese MiGs - I don't know, I don't think it was much more.

Until we get the Chinese (and North Korean) loss statistics, all estimates of the loss/kill ratio in the Korean War remain incomplete. It concerns the bomber vs fighter debate as well.
As for the Soviet documents, we should keep in mind not only "innocent" errors but also political and other biases. By the way, such biases are common also for many post-Soviet Russian historians, including those who published several books about the Korean War as Seidov, Krylov, etc.

 

[Dimlee]

The Soviets had no real plans for a war of aggression in Europe in 1945 (headquarters always plan something, but politically there were no prerequisites).

Let me chime in and paraphrase. The Soviets had no such plans...that were found in the archives until today.
The documents confirming the Soviet offensive plans of 1941 were not published until 2010-2012.

 

[bf109xxl]

Until we get the Chinese (and North Korean) loss statistics, all estimates of the loss/kill ratio in the Korean War remain incomplete. It concerns the bomber vs fighter debate as well.
As for the Soviet documents, we should keep in mind not only "innocent" errors but also political and other biases. By the way, such biases are common also for many post-Soviet Russian historians, including those who published several books about the Korean War as Seidov, Krylov, etc.

We're not evaluating pilots, we're evaluating airplanes. Therefore, the losses of the Chinese and Koreans will not fundamentally change anything - we will assume that on the Soviet data we reach the asymptote, which, in fact, we are interested in. A well-trained pilot could attack unescorted B-29s without much risk. All combats with B-29s are reflected in Soviet documents, which were not written to create a distorted impression 60 years later.
The book by Tepsurkayev and Krylov leaves the impression of a quite adequate and unbiased approach, unlike Seydov's books.

 

[bf109xxl]

Let me chime in and paraphrase. The Soviets had no such plans...that were found in the archives until today.

Judging by the speed with which the Soviets were cutting back on military production, they had no intention of going to war with the Allies in either 1945 or 1946.

The documents confirming the Soviet offensive plans of 1941 were not published until 2010-2012.

Which exactly documents were published in 2010-2012?

 

[Reluctant Poster]

We have to consider only losses due to enemy action - losses due to technical failures, etc. depends non-linearly on the number of planes taken into account, and this value was totally different.

I just mentioned that we should mix values for daylight and night attacks for correct statistical interpretation. In night rides the altitude had no significant impact on losses.

A loss is a loss is a loss. It doesn't matter if enemy action caused or if the extra stress on the engines caused by the climb to 30,000 feet caused. The crew in a dinghy off the coast of Japan doesn't care what brought them down they are just hoping to be rescued.

 

[bf109xxl]

A loss is a loss is a loss. It doesn't matter if enemy action caused or if the extra stress on the engines caused by the climb to 30,000 feet caused.

No, it's not. If we consider the effect of altitude over the target (i.e. enemy impact), we should not distort it by losses due to other factors. The essence of statistical analysis is to determine the role of each factor separately so that the resulting data can be used for forecasting/planning.
The flight altitude profile did not vary much except for a segment near the target.

The crew in a dinghy off the coast of Japan doesn't care what brought them down they are just hoping to be rescued.

For planning of operations it is absolutely irrelevant what the crew in the dinghy off the coast of Japan hope for, or whether they hope at all.

 

[GrauGeist]

That literally makes no sense...

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Let me chime in and paraphrase. The Soviets had no such plans...that were found in the archives until today.
The documents confirming the Soviet offensive plans of 1941 were not published until 2010-2012.

Interesting, what were the 2010/12 publications? Much earlier there was icebreaker by Suvorov, the man who gave Stalin a million man parachute army, a pen name for an ex KGB officer who published a series of books on what the USSR was up to. When the archives opened it was clear most of his books were more fiction than fact.

In the 1930's Red Army leadership and doctrine was purged. The new socialist man, fortified by his belief in socialist justice, lead by such living gods as Stalin, would easily repel the capitalist lackeys, so lacking in morale that they needed machines like tanks to fight. In any case as the oppressed workers that made up the conscripted invading army saw the worker's paradise they would rebel and join the glorious revolution. There is a reason the Red Army performed badly in 1941 despite recalling officers from Gulags and reforms based on experience in Finland and reports of the fighting in western Europe. The Soviet doctrine called for immediate counter attacks against an invader. The Soviet command assumed a much higher level of ability on the part of the Red Army, so that it would not be shattered, but seal off the initial penetrations.

Gosplan was the Soviet economic planning agency, it was purged along with the army during the great terror. The third 5 year plan was up until 1942, it was approved in March 1939, after the terror. The worst case plans for the defence of the USSR, the ones about defence in depth, were abandoned at this time as being "defeatist".

In his speech of May 5, 1941, Stalin explained to graduate officers of military academies, "Permit me to make a correction. A peace policy keeps our nation at peace. A peace policy is a good thing. At one time or another we have followed a line based on defence. Up until now we have not re-equipped our army nor supplied it with modern weapons.

But now that our army is undergoing reconstruction and we have become strong, it is necessary to shift from defence to offence.

In providing the defence of our country, we must act in an offencist [nastupatel'nym] way. Our military policy must change from defence to waging offensive actions. We must endow our indoctrination, our propaganda and agitation, and our press with an offencist spirit. [nastupatel'naya armiya]"

A N Yakovlev (editor) 1941, god. Dokumenntry (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniy Fond "Demokratiya", 1998) page 162. This is used as proof Stalin was ready to attack.

There are no OKW/OKH documents concerned about an attack by the USSR and any such build up would be spotted by the Luftwaffe aircraft continually overflying the USSR. You would think as a minimum the USSR would insist on keeping the Luftwaffe out if it was planning an attack, as well as sending the Red Air Force to spy on the Germans.

The plans for Barbarossa began being formed in mid 1940, as "Otto", it became Barbarossa with the detailed plans set out in directive 21 of 18 December 1940. The Soviets kept supplying goods even though the Germans fell behind in both payment and co-operation.

In mid 1941 the Red Army was building fortifications, cannibalising the old border defences to set up the new border defences, keeping its aircraft on the Soviet side of the border and the USSR was promptly sending resources to Germany. On the German side the Heer was preparing for an attack, the Luftwaffe was violating Soviet airspace and the Nazis were stalling on shipments to the USSR.

From Niall Ferguson - Sunday Telegraph, London

"In Grand Delusion, Gabriel Gorodetsky has performed an invaluable service to scholarship by destroying once and for all Suvorov's theory (the evidence for which always seemed to me exceedingly thin). Not only that, but he has taken our understanding of the Russian misreading of German policy beyond Churchill's - by intrepid research in an impressive range of hitherto inaccessible or unused Russian and Balkan sources. This really is a classic of the new, post-Cold War history." Book published in 1999.

Form the new republic, The Evils by John Lukacs

"Ten years later a spate of more reputable German historians turned to a more subtle attempt at the rehabilitation of Hitler, advancing two arguments: first, that Communism was as bad as Nazism, and so the Holocaust was in many ways a response to the Gulag; and second, that Stalin was about to attack Germany anyhow.

The latter argument was taken up by Gunther Gillessen, in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and then by the Austrian Ernst Topitsch (who claimed that World War II "was essentially a Soviet attack on the Western democracies, in which Germany ... served only as a military surrogate"), and the German military historian Joachim Hoffmann, and Werner Maser (one of Hitler's biographers), and even by an American, R.C. Raack. These writers got substantial support from Suvarov, a Soviet defector; by the very dubious former secret policeman Pavel Sudoplatov, and by the Russian historian V.A. Nevezhin. The purpose of this denigration of Stalin (and there is plenty to denigrate there) has been, alas, an ingenious mitigation of Hitler--again, that the latter's invasion of Russia was but a reaction to Stalin's plan to attack him.

The main merit of Gorodetsky's book is his documentation that such an attribution of Stalin's motives is thoroughly false. The evidence in this book fleshes out a picture of Stalin in which he is not merely deluded by others, but also suffers from an extraordinary measure of self-deceit. The wish is the father of the thought; and, in this instance, it was Stalin's wish to trust Hitler. The psychic dimension of the Hitler-Stalin relationship is a gruesomely fascinating story. They respected--if not admired --each other throughout the war. "

People like David Glantz have looked at the Red Army in 1941 and it was clearly not ready for an offensive. See When Titans Clashed, The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, or John Erickson in Road to Stalingrad

The figures say only 3,800 out of 14,200 tanks with the Red Army troops were serviceable. Some 29% of the tank park in army hands needed major overhaul and 44% needed "medium repair". The total Soviet inventory in June 1941 is put at 22,600 of which 21,200 were classified as light. Few radios, lots of mechanical problems, ergonomics issues, basically the Soviet park consisted of nearly every tank built in the previous 10 years. Total German inventory in June 1941 is put at 5,154, 877 mark I, 1,074 mark II, 350 mark III 37 mm gun, 1,090 with a 50mm gun, 517 mark IV, 746 38t, 170 35t and 330 command tanks.

So 4.4 to 1 comparing like totals with like totals. The odds drop when the axis allied tanks strengths are added, but not by much. Now take away all the Soviet tanks, the majority, that were not working. That makes a big difference. Additional problems like Soviet tank corps without ammunition, artillery without prime movers as examples.

The entire Soviet military as of June 1941 came to 5,370,000 personnel. The German forces had 7,200,000 personnel, plus of course the axis allied forces. One was at war and mobilised, one was still at peace. In June 1940 it was Soviet 4,200,000, Germany 5,600,000.

When it comes to the forces on the border then,

The Figures from Great Battles on the Eastern Front by T.N. Dupuy and Paul Martell give the USSR forces as Northwest 25 divisions (4 tank), Western 44 divisions (12 tank) (the Dupuy figures include reserves located at Vitebsk), Southwest 59 divisions (16 tank) and South 22 divisions (4 tank), again these figures include reserves deployed well away from the borders.

All in all the Dupuy and Martell figures give the Germans as having 149.5 divisions plus Hungarian, Romanian and Finnish divisions from North Cape to Black sea, versus 170 Soviet divisions, 19 Panzer divisions versus 36 tank divisions. They conclude the Germans slightly outnumbered the Soviet troops on the borders, outnumbered the Soviets in operational tanks by around 2 to 1 but were outnumbered nearly 5 to 1 by Soviet artillery. The same reference gives the combat strength of the Soviet forces in the far east as 703,714 men, there were 32 divisions (8 tank) there.

Slightly different figures, starting from Brest Litovsk, which is almost due south of Bialystok, on the border, you have the West front, of 38 divisions, including 6 back at Minsk, then guarding the rest of the Prussian border you have the North West Front, with 24 divisions. The two fronts almost exactly match the German Army groups when it comes to borders, Army Group North had 26 divisions, Army Group Centre had 51. There were another 72 Red Army divisions on the border south of the Pripet marshes, that is against Hungary and Romania, not Germany. So something like 62 north of the Pripets, counting the 6 at Minsk versus 72 south. More than half of the Soviet forces on the western border were south of the Pripets. Explains why the southern front held quite well, along with the leadership of Kirponos, while the northern front was soon shattered.

It appears there were major coal mines around Moscow that were lost or shut down by operation Typhoon in 1941 and they became a high priority rebuild in December 1941 as soon as the Red Army had pushed the German's back. In 1942 the Mosbass coal fields produced 8.5 million tons of coal versus 10 million tons in 1940. In January 1942 coal reserves in some parts of the country were down to 1 days consumption, iron and steel works 3 to 4 days, wood and other fuels were substituted for coal wherever possible. The USSR appears to have had a regular winter coal crisis most of the war years, in many ways like England, but worse.

 

[bf109xxl]

Interesting, what were the 2010/12 publications? Much earlier there was icebreaker by Suvorov, the man who gave Stalin a million man parachute army, a pen name for an ex KGB officer who published a series of books on what the USSR was up to. When the archives opened it was clear most of his books were more fiction than fact.
...

Agree. In addition.
The debate about the aggressive plans of the USSR to invade Europe has been going on for decades - mainly in the former USSR, while historians in Europe have long since passed this stage. In Germany, for example, the debate quieted down at the end of 1980 and the first half of 1990. German historians rejected the version of "preventive war" and only marginalists, who did not have much weight in historical science, still continued to insist on this version without presenting any facts.
While I do not have the slightest sympathy for the Soviet regime, I still try to be objective and not go beyond a scientific approach. The publications of Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun (pseudonym - Viktor Suvorov) are completely outside of this framework and were long ago recognized by the scientific community as historically untenable. I cannot completely deny the absence of plans for Soviet aggression - not all archives in Russia are really accessible - but judging by the huge number of indirect signs, aggression was not planned until at least 1942, if at all. There are plans for an offensive operation - there was an attempt to get ahead of the Wehrmacht deployment, but it was much too late, and the plans were not put into action (and most likely the attempted offensive would have ended even more sadly than it did in reality). Plans for an offensive operation against an enemy about to attack were not plans for aggression against Europe, it was more an act of desperation.

 

[Dimlee]

Judging by the speed with which the Soviets were cutting back on military production, they had no intention of going to war with the Allies in either 1945 or 1946.

Which exactly documents were published in 2010-2012?

Maybe so. Or maybe some intentions didn't make their way into the plans after another consideration or after the Bomb in Japan. Or maybe plans didn't survive or they changed, etc.
Attempts "to probe" the Allies were made, for example, in Northern Iran. Turkey was bullied, etc.
My Dad graduated from the Naval College in 1945. Their study program was abruptly changed just months before graduation and cadets were sent to train as marines and to practice landings on the beaches of the Caspian Sea. They learned to drive lend leased Jeeps, fired machine guns etc. Then they were back to their studies and exams. It has never been explained.

In 2010-2012, several Genshtab documents with maps were discovered in central archives. Military games of 1940-1941 and invasion plans. Mark Solonin has covered this subject extensively in his last books and articles.

 

[Dimlee]

I noticed that Suvorov (Rezun) was mentioned. I will not turn this thread into another holy war that was so popular 20-25 years ago especially in the post-Soviet Russian language media.
Just let me state the facts: after years of ridiculing Suvorov's theory, a number of his critics in the Russian historical community after they got access to archives in the late 1990s-2000s have (silently) agreed that the USSR did plan to strike first. And discussion moved on - to the possible dates, areas of operations, etc. Mikhail Meltukhov was one of the most reputable names on that list.
Saying all above, Suvorov made many mistakes, indeed and he recognised them.

 

[bf109xxl]

Maybe so. Or maybe some intentions didn't make their way into the plans after another consideration or after the Bomb in Japan. Or maybe plans didn't survive or they changed, etc.
Attempts "to probe" the Allies were made, for example, in Northern Iran. Turkey was bullied, etc.

It has nothing to do with the planning of the aggression in Europe.

My Dad graduated from the Naval College in 1945. Their study program was abruptly changed just months before graduation and cadets were sent to train as marines and to practice landings on the beaches of the Caspian Sea. They learned to drive lend leased Jeeps, fired machine guns etc. Then they were back to their studies and exams. It has never been explained.

The explanation may be not so complicated: the Soviets were informed about the plans of the Operation Unthinkable in May 1945.

In 2010-2012, several Genshtab documents with maps were discovered in central archives. Military games of 1940-1941 and invasion plans.

Which exactly documents with invasion plans? Military games cannot be recognized as invasion plans.

Mark Solonin has covered this subject extensively in his last books and articles.

Solonin does not follow a scientific approach and is not a serious historian. He is very biased and manipulates facts. Despite his education as an aeronautical engineer, even in this field he reveals dilettantism.

 

[bf109xxl]

ust let me state the facts: after years of ridiculing Suvorov's theory, a number of his critics in the Russian historical community after they got access to archives in the late 1990s-2000s have (silently) agreed that the USSR did plan to strike first.

That's not true.

And discussion moved on - to the possible dates, areas of operations, etc. Mikhail Meltukhov was one of the most reputable names on that list.

Some of Meltyukhov's theses were not supported by documents or facts. I have read his books, and in some places he makes rather strange assumptions and suppositions, which are not justified. But he is undoubtedly a researcher, which means you can debate with him.

Saying all above, Suvorov made many mistakes, indeed and he recognised them.

V.B.Rezun's ideas have been rejected in the scientific community - at least in Europe, in Russia, as I know, too.

 

[GrauGeist]

Military games cannot be recognized as invasion plans.

Well...

https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/10/europe/ukraine-russia-news-thursday-military-exercises-intl/index.html

 

[bf109xxl]

Well...

https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/10/europe/ukraine-russia-news-thursday-military-exercises-intl/index.html

This is a deployment under the guise of a military exercise, not a command staff exercise ( military games), several of which took place in 1940-1941. The Soviets exercised different scenarios, mainly plans for an offensive operation after repulsing an enemy strike. The purpose of the event was to train the command staff.
The state of Soviet forces in the western military districts, reserves, and logistical planning rejected any possibility of preparing an aggression. In 1941 the USSR was rearming, massively building concrete runaways on airfields to provide all-year-round training of pilots. The supply of aviation gasoline was at the level of 30% of the needs. It is hardly serious to discuss plans of aggression in such a state of the army and industry.