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My impression was that there were not many roads from the Soviet Union to Iran and further in Iran to supply Soviet troops, their capacity was low and they were very vulnerable.Probably, there would be a race for Tehran at the start of hostilities since both armies were located outside of it, the Soviets in the north, the British - in the south and southwest.
Keep in mind, that penetration into Soviet held Eastern Europe and Russia proper would have to be at higher altitudes, as the Red Airforce was ill-equipped for high altitude operation.
Unless the bombers had a solid escort, the La-7s and Yak-9s would maul them.
You might be interested in thisre
FWIW the US had 25,000 - 30,000 troops in Iran from late-1943 through early-45. The core of the logistics, engineering, and railroad units, were specialized troops, but the majority of the troops were non-specialized troops drawn from infantry and motor transport units.
There is a pretty good history of the USMIM (U.S. Military Iranian Mission), IISC (Iran-Iraq Service Command), and PGSC (Persian Gulf Service Command), in the official History of the United States Army series, but I do not think it is available online. A brief description of the British involvement followed by a summary of the US involvement can be found here:
"US Army TS Transportation 3: Chapter 9: The Persian Corridor"
Note that the above description is a relative clean summary and does not cover (for the most part) the worst behavior of the Allies in Iran and Iraq.
As an interesting side note, for many years after the war and through the 1990s (at least) there was a definite attempt to keep knowledge of the history of the WWII US involvement in Iran and Iraq, as well as knowledge of the US involvement after the war, from the citizenry of the US. Presumably because those in power felt it would not play well to the US citizenry when the image the US government and US oil industry were trying to sell to the public was of a benevolent US facing dastardly and ungrateful Iranian and Iraqi regimes/peoples who could not possibly have any reason to dislike the US.
In a 2003 survey, it was found that less than 0.2% of the US adult population, and only about 1.5% of the population who were adults during WWII, were aware that the US had been involved in the invasion of Iran and Iraq during WWII.
It is a good point. However, the Soviet invasion in 1941 was very fast and involved hundreds of vehicles and tanks. And there is a so-called Persian Corridor, part of it is already in the Soviet-controlled territory.My impression was that there were not many roads from the Soviet Union to Iran and further in Iran to supply Soviet troops, their capacity was low and they were very vulnerable.
Thanks for the link! Persian corridor is very interesting subject.re
FWIW the US had 25,000 - 30,000 troops in Iran from late-1943 through early-45. The core of the logistics, engineering, and railroad units, were specialized troops, but the majority of the troops were non-specialized troops drawn from infantry and motor transport units.
There is a pretty good history of the USMIM (U.S. Military Iranian Mission), IISC (Iran-Iraq Service Command), and PGSC (Persian Gulf Service Command), in the official History of the United States Army series, but I do not think it is available online. A brief description of the British involvement followed by a summary of the US involvement can be found here:
"US Army TS Transportation 3: Chapter 9: The Persian Corridor"
Note that the above description is a relative clean summary and does not cover (for the most part) the worst behavior of the Allies in Iran and Iraq.
As an interesting side note, for many years after the war and through the 1990s (at least) there was a definite attempt to keep knowledge of the history of the WWII US involvement in Iran and Iraq, as well as knowledge of the US involvement after the war, from the citizenry of the US. Presumably because those in power felt it would not play well to the US citizenry when the image the US government and US oil industry were trying to sell to the public was of a benevolent US facing dastardly and ungrateful Iranian and Iraqi regimes/peoples who could not possibly have any reason to dislike the US.
In a 2003 survey, it was found that less than 0.2% of the US adult population, and only about 1.5% of the population who were adults during WWII, were aware that the US had been involved in the invasion of Iran and Iraq during WWII.
Lovely. Goes to my wish list. The Kindle edition is cheaper on the US site.You might be interested in this
Still in my "to read" pile!!!
It was suggested a few posts back, that offensive ops should start with fighter-bombers and medium bombers along the western areas of Soviet control, along with heavies before the B-29s work up in numbers.That's not a change in our operations, which over Germany were 22 - 28,000 feet. It's our doctrine.
It was suggested a few posts back, that offensive ops should start with fighter-bombers and medium bombers along the western areas of Soviet control, along with heavies before the B-29s work up in numbers.
This would mean operating at an altitude at which the Red Airforce is superbly equipped and well experienced and the Western coalition better bring it's "A" game.
No major jet stream action at least in the eastern USSR where all the big cities and industries are.Le May took the raids against Japan to low altitude at night because the jet stream made high altitude accurate bombing futile and the Japanese night air defenses were essentially worthless. I doubt the Soviet defenses would be even as "good" as the Japanese ones.
I'm not a meteorologist but have learnt enough from the TV weather forecasts to know that the jet stream is not some fixed river in the sky. It moves about and affects the weather patterns around it. Couple of diagrams here showing movements over Asia under different conditions.No major jet stream action at least in the eastern USSR where all the big cities and industries are.
So they could also go in high 30,000+ feet and use that for their defensive protection.
Very strange, taken into account the strike power of the Soviets - I would exclude all airbases up to the Rhine, at least.I came across this map, marked Top Secret, which apparently was taken from an Aug 1945 USAAF plan for attacking the USSR using B-29s and B-36s. It is very poor quality, but does highlight their proposed bases. It has appeared in a recent publication on the B-36. Going anti-clockwise we have:-
Bremen, Germany
A Labor government wouldn't allow it?Given the above discussion there are a few points of interest.
1. No bases in Britain
How long would it take considering the invulnerability of these sites from the Soviet air force? I think the engineering units would have managed in weeks to create minimally acceptable conditions for B-29 operations.3. Crete & Dhahran require creation of bases virtually from scratch
Problems with Labor in the UK again?5. No bases in Iran or Iraq, where of course Britain held the oil concessions
It is not quite clear how the sector orientation and angle were chosen. The radius from Stavanger, Bremen, Foggia, Crete is enough to reach any point in the European part of the USSR. Why, for example, Gorky was not included in the sector? It was one of the highest priority targets for the B-29. Or was it a target exclusively for the B-36?Anyone got the document this map came from?
I assume that supply during the construction of an airbase in Crete and Saudi Arabia will be fundamentally easier and faster than in the Marianas.I think you underestimate the task of building a B-29 base, not just surveying the site, building the runways but hard standings for the aircraft, bomb dumps, fuel storage, maintenance buildings, briefing huts, admin & weather huts, accommodation for air & ground crews (even if it was in Quonset huts), laying water, sewage and drainage pipes etc etc. The list goes on. And they need to take into account the particular needs of each site.
I would put it at longer. So we will have to agree to differ.Summarizing, the construction of the airbase can be estimated at about two months.
I would put it at longer. So we will have to agree to differ.
And you also need to figure in the length of time it is going to take to relocate the neccessary engineering assets in terms of men and machinery from where they were (many in the Pacific building airfields on Okinawa and Kyushu) to the new locations. Some will be available in Europe.
Seems like the absence of GULAG seriously diminished US military capabilities.I would put it at longer. So we will have to agree to differ.
Operation Unthinkable should begin immediately, and the plans for war with Japan would have to be radically changed - up to a separate peace with the transfer of Northern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to Japan on condition of participation in the war against the USSR.... and if Unthinkable begins immediately after the German surrender, many of those assets will be retained in the Pacific until and possibly after the Japanese surrender.