Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen.

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Probably, there would be a race for Tehran at the start of hostilities since both armies were located outside of it, the Soviets in the north, the British - in the south and southwest.
My impression was that there were not many roads from the Soviet Union to Iran and further in Iran to supply Soviet troops, their capacity was low and they were very vulnerable.
 
A key point in post VE day US deployments in Europe is the replacement of "high points" men with newly trained people, even if the unit remained its combat effectiveness dropped, think more an under trained police force than combat.

The US had 68 divisions in Europe after the 86th and 97th infantry arrived in February 1945, redirected from being sent to the Pacific as a result of the Ardennes attack.

June 1945 saw the 85th, 95th, 97th and 104th infantry shipped out, the 86th and 97th making it to the Pacific in September. July saw 6 infantry and 1 armoured division depart, August saw 6 infantry, 2 armoured, 1 airborne and 1 mountain division depart/disband, end September the US army in Europe was down to 35 divisions, the US was down to 77 Army and 6 Marine divisions from the peak of 95.

With the USAAF heavy bombers in Europe post VE day the story is the rapid removal of the B-24 groups. The 8th Air Force had 26 B-17 and 12 B-24 groups, the first B-24 group left in April, by end May down to 25 B-17 and 9 B-24, end June it was 19 and 5, end July it was 17 B-17, end August it was 7 B-17 where it stabilised until mid December. The aircraft were being employed as transports including in North Africa. The fighter groups started departing in October.

The 15th Air Force had 6 B-17 and 15 B-24 groups, the first 2 B-24 group departures were in April 1945. In May another 8 B-24 groups departed including 4 seconded to the ATC, by end July the force was down to 5 B-17 and 1 B-24 group, to 3 B-17 by end September. Again the fighters moved later, starting in August.

There is also the reality the number of aircraft per unit was cut post war. Similar for Bomber Command which had a nominal 23 heavy bomber squadrons by end 1945, down from 74 operational heavy bomber squadrons in April 1945

The war with Japan was well within Russian living memory in 1945, Stalin added the expansion of communism dependent on the USSR into Asia as another goal, he had permission to attack in the east until mid/late August 1945 and he would not jeopardise that, especially as he needed naval power to retake what the Japanese had taken, then more. Sometime after that would come a collision that spread into a USSR versus west war for the unthinkable scenario to become a reality.

As of January 1945, before the obvious end of the war in Europe caused aircraft order cancellations, the USAAF Very Heavy Bomber program was for 10,521 aircraft built by mid/late 1946, of which under 1,500 had been accepted, both numbers being mostly B-29. The 13 YB-35 from Northrop Hawthorne were unscheduled, there were 100 B-36 ordered from Consolidated Fort Worth with 69 expected by end 1946, the last Fort Worth B-24 was accepted in December 1944, the factory had its first B-32 accepted in September 1944 with the program due to end in June 1946 after 873 were built. While at San Diego B-24 production was scheduled to end in July 1945, B-32 in May 1946.

The first B-36A was accepted in August 1947, the second in June 1948. First acceptance of a B-45A was in April 1948, of a B-50A in October 1947.
 
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FWIW the US had 25,000 - 30,000 troops in Iran from late-1943 through early-45. The core of the logistics, engineering, and railroad units, were specialized troops, but the majority of the troops were non-specialized troops drawn from infantry and motor transport units.

There is a pretty good history of the USMIM (U.S. Military Iranian Mission), IISC (Iran-Iraq Service Command), and PGSC (Persian Gulf Service Command), in the official History of the United States Army series, but I do not think it is available online. A brief description of the British involvement followed by a summary of the US involvement can be found here:

"US Army TS Transportation 3: Chapter 9: The Persian Corridor"

Note that the above description is a relative clean summary and does not cover (for the most part) the worst behavior of the Allies in Iran and Iraq.

As an interesting side note, for many years after the war and through the 1990s (at least) there was a definite attempt to keep knowledge of the history of the WWII US involvement in Iran and Iraq, as well as knowledge of the US involvement after the war, from the citizenry of the US. Presumably because those in power felt it would not play well to the US citizenry when the image the US government and US oil industry were trying to sell to the public was of a benevolent US facing dastardly and ungrateful Iranian and Iraqi regimes/peoples who could not possibly have any reason to dislike the US.

In a 2003 survey, it was found that less than 0.2% of the US adult population, and only about 1.5% of the population who were adults during WWII, were aware that the US had been involved in the invasion of Iran and Iraq during WWII.
You might be interested in this

Still in my "to read" pile!!!
 
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My impression was that there were not many roads from the Soviet Union to Iran and further in Iran to supply Soviet troops, their capacity was low and they were very vulnerable.
It is a good point. However, the Soviet invasion in 1941 was very fast and involved hundreds of vehicles and tanks. And there is a so-called Persian Corridor, part of it is already in the Soviet-controlled territory.
 
re

FWIW the US had 25,000 - 30,000 troops in Iran from late-1943 through early-45. The core of the logistics, engineering, and railroad units, were specialized troops, but the majority of the troops were non-specialized troops drawn from infantry and motor transport units.

There is a pretty good history of the USMIM (U.S. Military Iranian Mission), IISC (Iran-Iraq Service Command), and PGSC (Persian Gulf Service Command), in the official History of the United States Army series, but I do not think it is available online. A brief description of the British involvement followed by a summary of the US involvement can be found here:

"US Army TS Transportation 3: Chapter 9: The Persian Corridor"

Note that the above description is a relative clean summary and does not cover (for the most part) the worst behavior of the Allies in Iran and Iraq.

As an interesting side note, for many years after the war and through the 1990s (at least) there was a definite attempt to keep knowledge of the history of the WWII US involvement in Iran and Iraq, as well as knowledge of the US involvement after the war, from the citizenry of the US. Presumably because those in power felt it would not play well to the US citizenry when the image the US government and US oil industry were trying to sell to the public was of a benevolent US facing dastardly and ungrateful Iranian and Iraqi regimes/peoples who could not possibly have any reason to dislike the US.

In a 2003 survey, it was found that less than 0.2% of the US adult population, and only about 1.5% of the population who were adults during WWII, were aware that the US had been involved in the invasion of Iran and Iraq during WWII.
Thanks for the link! Persian corridor is very interesting subject.
 
That's not a change in our operations, which over Germany were 22 - 28,000 feet. It's our doctrine.
It was suggested a few posts back, that offensive ops should start with fighter-bombers and medium bombers along the western areas of Soviet control, along with heavies before the B-29s work up in numbers.

This would mean operating at an altitude at which the Red Airforce is superbly equipped and well experienced and the Western coalition better bring it's "A" game.
 
It was suggested a few posts back, that offensive ops should start with fighter-bombers and medium bombers along the western areas of Soviet control, along with heavies before the B-29s work up in numbers.

This would mean operating at an altitude at which the Red Airforce is superbly equipped and well experienced and the Western coalition better bring it's "A" game.

With B-26s and A-26s at 10-14,000 ft, not to mention Mosquitoes and T-bolts for lower-level/strafing work, I think that's a pretty good A-game. The VVS still has good experience and kit, true, but lacking up-to-date radar and shorter-ranged fighters, they've got their work cut out for them. Dash-climbs burn fuel fast. Bombers are probably headed home by the time those Soviet fighters get up there; Allied mediums are a bit faster than Luftwaffe meds.

Me, I'd throw 8th AF heavies against those airfields too if need be, or Kenney-style parafrag raids. My larger point is that we have worked out the basics of seizing air control by both attacking airfields and blanketing with fighters.
 
Le May took the raids against Japan to low altitude at night because the jet stream made high altitude accurate bombing futile and the Japanese night air defenses were essentially worthless. I doubt the Soviet defenses would be even as "good" as the Japanese ones.
No major jet stream action at least in the eastern USSR where all the big cities and industries are.

So they could also go in high 30,000+ feet and use that for their defensive protection.
 
I came across this map, marked Top Secret, which apparently was taken from an Aug 1945 USAAF plan for attacking the USSR using B-29s and B-36s. It is very poor quality, but does highlight their proposed bases. It has appeared in a recent publication on the B-36. Going anti-clockwise we have:-

Stavanger, Norway
Bremen, Germany
Foggia, Italy (home to 15th AF in WW2)
Crete
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
Lahore, India
Okinawa (home to 8th AF in final days of WW2)
Shimushiru, Kurile Islands (now generally known as Simushir Island)
Adak, Aleutian Islands
Nome, Alaska

Given the above discussion there are a few points of interest.
1. No bases in Britain
2. Use of Stavanger in southern Norway allows routing around the south of Sweden to reach Baltic targets if Sweden stays neutral
3. Crete & Dhahran require creation of bases virtually from scratch
4. USA was courting Saudi Arabia in WW2 for its oil potential after US companies found it there in 1938 and obtained concessions
5. No bases in Iran or Iraq, where of course Britain held the oil concessions
6. Shimushiru in the Kuriles is interesting because they were occupied by the Soviets in Aug 1945 and remain part of Russia today. These had changed hands between Japan and Russia on several occasions in the previous century. At Yalta the Allies had agreed that these, like Manchuria would be under Soviet influence, if not completely handed over to the Soviets (I'm not clear exactly what was intended for these islands at Yalta). But having seized them the Soviets moved the Japanese population out by early 1946. Today, Japan's territorial claims extend only to the more southerly Kuriles.

Anyone got the document this map came from?
 
No major jet stream action at least in the eastern USSR where all the big cities and industries are.

So they could also go in high 30,000+ feet and use that for their defensive protection.
I'm not a meteorologist but have learnt enough from the TV weather forecasts to know that the jet stream is not some fixed river in the sky. It moves about and affects the weather patterns around it. Couple of diagrams here showing movements over Asia under different conditions.


There is now an interactive global jetstream forecaster on internet showing predicted movements for the next month or so. Interesting to see how it moves.
 
I came across this map, marked Top Secret, which apparently was taken from an Aug 1945 USAAF plan for attacking the USSR using B-29s and B-36s. It is very poor quality, but does highlight their proposed bases. It has appeared in a recent publication on the B-36. Going anti-clockwise we have:-

Bremen, Germany
Very strange, taken into account the strike power of the Soviets - I would exclude all airbases up to the Rhine, at least.
Given the above discussion there are a few points of interest.
1. No bases in Britain
A Labor government wouldn't allow it?
3. Crete & Dhahran require creation of bases virtually from scratch
How long would it take considering the invulnerability of these sites from the Soviet air force? I think the engineering units would have managed in weeks to create minimally acceptable conditions for B-29 operations.
5. No bases in Iran or Iraq, where of course Britain held the oil concessions
Problems with Labor in the UK again?
It is not quite clear how the sector orientation and angle were chosen. The radius from Stavanger, Bremen, Foggia, Crete is enough to reach any point in the European part of the USSR. Why, for example, Gorky was not included in the sector? It was one of the highest priority targets for the B-29. Or was it a target exclusively for the B-36?
 
I think you underestimate the task of building a B-29 base, not just surveying the site, building the runways but hard standings for the aircraft, bomb dumps, fuel storage, maintenance buildings, briefing huts, admin & weather huts, accommodation for air & ground crews (even if it was in Quonset huts), laying water, sewage and drainage pipes etc etc. The list goes on. And they need to take into account the particular needs of each site.

Isley Field on Saipan. Captured 18th June 1944. P-47 operations began a few days later on the remains of a patched up Japanese base, but it was 12 Oct before the base received its first B-29. 2 runways.

North Field Tinian. While it took just 45 days from 24 July 1944 to get an old Japanese runway repaired & extended, new runways were required for B-29 operations with a different orientation. Initially 2, then a third and then a fourth added in May 1945. They moved nearly 1 million cubic yards of earth & coral to build it. Ground crews started arriving Nov and the B-29s in Dec, but IIRC it was Jan 1945 before the first missions were flown.

West Field Tinian. Again built on a site of an old Japanese airfield that needed total reconstruction. It was readied for the 58th BW arriving from India in spring 1945, first missions flown in May IIRC.

North Field Guam. Construction started Nov 1944. First B-29 arrived late Jan 1945. At that point they were living in tents and had to assist in assembling Quonset huts.

North West Field Guam. Built from 8 Jan to 1 June 1945. The B-29s arrived between mid-April and mid-May 1945.

Each of these was designed to accommodate a full Bomb Wing. So 180 B-29 + reserves, so up to maybe 260.

Even building a Class A airfield in Britain to support a single Bomb Group was measured in months, sometimes years. An awful lot depends on what materials were to hand and how much earth needs moving. Class A involved, on average, moving 500,000 cubic yards. What was done in the Marianas was a true feat of engineering.
 
I think you underestimate the task of building a B-29 base, not just surveying the site, building the runways but hard standings for the aircraft, bomb dumps, fuel storage, maintenance buildings, briefing huts, admin & weather huts, accommodation for air & ground crews (even if it was in Quonset huts), laying water, sewage and drainage pipes etc etc. The list goes on. And they need to take into account the particular needs of each site.
I assume that supply during the construction of an airbase in Crete and Saudi Arabia will be fundamentally easier and faster than in the Marianas.
The weather conditions there allow the crews to live even in tents - at least in Crete.
I think that corals are one of the most difficult soil options for airbase construction, the conditions in Crete and Saudi Arabia will most likely be easier.
No Soviet U-boats will appear in the Mediterranean or Persian Gulf.
Summarizing, the construction of the airbase can be estimated at about two months.
 
Summarizing, the construction of the airbase can be estimated at about two months.
I would put it at longer. So we will have to agree to differ.

And you also need to figure in the length of time it is going to take to relocate the neccessary engineering assets in terms of men and machinery from where they were (many in the Pacific building airfields on Okinawa and Kyushu) to the new locations. Some will be available in Europe.
 
A good example of the Jet Stream's changes, would be the typical winter course which passed over Japan and then towards the Pacific Northwest of North America.

The Japanese used this winter time pattern for their Fu-Go operation.
While a good idea on paper, it also happens that the wet winter months virtually eliminated any chance of catastrophic forest fires the Japanese hoped for.
 
I would put it at longer. So we will have to agree to differ.

And you also need to figure in the length of time it is going to take to relocate the neccessary engineering assets in terms of men and machinery from where they were (many in the Pacific building airfields on Okinawa and Kyushu) to the new locations. Some will be available in Europe.

... and if Unthinkable begins immediately after the German surrender, many of those assets will be retained in the Pacific until and possibly after the Japanese surrender.
 
... and if Unthinkable begins immediately after the German surrender, many of those assets will be retained in the Pacific until and possibly after the Japanese surrender.
Operation Unthinkable should begin immediately, and the plans for war with Japan would have to be radically changed - up to a separate peace with the transfer of Northern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to Japan on condition of participation in the war against the USSR.
Geopolitically, this would be an interesting alternative - at the same time, the Japanese would be forced to fight against the Chinese Communists.
But from the point of view of justice and humanism, of course, it is an extremely ugly alternative.
 

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