Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen.

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I don't think the Mig-9 was going to be an issue. A good video about it here.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QP_Qyh6fZCg

I like this video. From my point of view - a very high quality product, in some places the author slightly simplifies in details, but without distorting the overall picture. Without a doubt, it can be recommended for viewing. I just have to mention that the major part of the video is not documentary, but taken from movies.
 
Agree. The Soviet PVO (air defence) demonstrated a lack of ability to learn and adapt even after such disasters as German bombings of the industry and fuel stocks in May-June 1943 (Operation Carmen II of Luftwaffe).
One year later - the complete failure of PVO in Poltava:
Agreed. It took the USN over two years to developed an effective fighter control capability and that was with access to British experience. Without a sophisticated control system the best pilots and aircraft in the world are useless.
As aside far and away the best interceptor the Soviets' possessed was the Spitfire LF IX. As I tirelessly point out the LF IX was not relegated to low levels. Its performance at high altitudes was as good as any aircraft of its era.
A webpage documenting the IX in Soviet service
 
Of course after LL is cancelled those LF IX's are going to wear out without replacements and parts. I think we all know that I just wanted to sound intelligent in here for once.
You have a valid point and one that has to be factored in, here.

Lend Lease supplied more than just aircraft to the Soviet Union, it included raw materials like steel, aluminum, other metals and rubber. It also included lumber, clothing (including blankets) and food.

They also recieved locomotives/rail stock, trucks, fuel, oil and more important: replacement engines for their aircraft.

Lend Lease terminated with Japan's surrender and the last shipments arriving in September 1945.

With the advent of a full-scale war against the West, just how well would the Soviet Union be able to compensate for that absence of support, since their agriculture and industry was still recovering from the mauling it took from Germany?

Also wanted to add that they would have few additional resources available from captured countries in Eastern Europe, too.
 
Lend Lease supplied more than just aircraft to the Soviet Union, it included raw materials like steel, aluminum, other metals and rubber. It also included lumber, clothing (including blankets) and food.
They also recieved locomotives/rail stock, trucks, fuel, oil and more important: replacement engines for their aircraft.
Don't forget powder and chemical components for its manufacturing.
Lend Lease terminated with Japan's surrender and the last shipments arriving in September 1945.
Everything is clear with lend-lease deliveries. As is the fact that the USSR is not capable of winning any prolonged war, especially with systematic bombing of its very vulnerable industry. But the Soviets have already accumulated huge forces and have the reserves to fight for several months. During this time, the Soviets can greatly displace the Allies in Europe and sign a military alliance with Japan. Even if the Soviets do not directly participate in the war against the United States, the participation of the Kwantung Army will cost the Americans huge casualties in the landing attempt on the Japanese islands and prolong the war indefinitely. That is, either the Americans must temper their pride (which is not difficult) and outrun the Soviets by offering the Japanese a separate peace with the promise of Soviet territories (North Sakhalin), or they must reckon with hundreds of thousands (at least) of additional casualties. In case the USSR is ahead, the use of B-29s in Europe is unlikely, which also leads to a prolongation of the war.
Without political compromises, the war cannot be ended quickly. And it is unlikely that it would have ended in total defeat for the USSR. Yes, the Soviets had nothing to counter the B-29s, but the ground forces were powerful, there were reserves of fuel and ammunition, and the Allies would be split because of the difference in priorities.
Also wanted to add that they would have few additional resources available from captured countries in Eastern Europe, too.
For example, in Romania?

The biggest problem for the Soviets would be high-octane aviation gasoline - without Allied supplies it would not last long, taking into account that the Soviets would now be facing not the weak Luftwaffe of the Eastern Front, but the armada of Allied planes with well-trained pilots. The question of how long the reserves will last is a complicated one, and it is necessary to determine the exact date of the end of the Lend-Lease deliveries.
 
[...] the Kwantung Army will cost the Americans huge casualties in the landing attempt on the Japanese islands and prolong the war indefinitely.

The atomics will still come into play a little later in 1945, and likely be used against Soviet ground forces first, while the submarines continue to starve the Japanese out. That Kwangtung Army's gonna have a hard time getting to the homeland through that blockade.
 
The atomics will still come into play a little later in 1945, and likely be used against Soviet ground forces first
1. The Soviets are not the Japanese, they are well aware of both the rate of accumulation of fissile material and the number of bombs.
2. Even a nuclear strike on Moscow will not give the required effect - in a huge city, the plants are scattered, there was a backup control center near Kuibyshev.
3. As a result, the Soviets will have a drastic change in motivation - their attitude toward the Americans will probably be somewhat worse than that of the North Koreans. This will also cost many American lives - most likely no American soldiers will be taken prisoner anymore. Judging by the memories of the Soviet aces of the Korean War, they did not feel the same hate for the Americans as for the German pilots, some said they perceived the combat with the Americans rather as a sport competition.
Thus, it's not really clear why the Americans should do this. This is exactly the example of different priorities among allies.
while the submarines continue to starve the Japanese out. That Kwangtung Army's gonna have a hard time getting to the homeland through that blockade.
It is difficult for me to judge how effective the blockade would have been if the USSR had entered the war. The Soviet Pacific Fleet apparently cannot be considered as a serious force, but it could play a role.
 
1. The Soviets are not the Japanese, they are well aware of both the rate of accumulation of fissile material and the number of bombs.

All the intelligence in the world is meaningless if you cannot address the threat.

2. Even a nuclear strike on Moscow will not give the required effect - in a huge city, the plants are scattered, there was a backup control center near Kuibyshev.

Which is one reason I don't think Moscow would be targeted.

3. As a result, the Soviets will have a drastic change in motivation - their attitude toward the Americans will probably be somewhat worse than that of the North Koreans. This will also cost many American lives - most likely no American soldiers will be taken prisoner anymore. Judging by the memories of the Soviet aces of the Korean War, they did not feel the same hate for the Americans as for the German pilots, some said they perceived the combat with the Americans rather as a sport competition.
Thus, it's not really clear why the Americans should do this. This is exactly the example of different priorities among allies.

"[...] why the Americans should do this." Is "this" nuking Soviet armies, going to war itself, or what?

It is difficult for me to judge how effective the blockade would have been if the USSR had entered the war. The Soviet Pacific Fleet apparently cannot be considered as a serious force, but it could play a role.

My point is that the Kwangtung Army is pretty much useless against the Americans in countering a home-island invasion because they've got to get home in safety past American submarines.
 
All the intelligence in the world is meaningless if you cannot address the threat.
A couple of 15-20 kt explosions would not have had such an intimidating effect on the Soviets - the centers of Soviet cities were mostly built up with stone houses, and there were prepared bomb shelters in the basements. And knowledge of the details makes it possible to soberly assess the degree of threat.
Which is one reason I don't think Moscow would be targeted.
Good options are Saratov, Rybinsk, Perm, Gorky. Even about Baku I am not sure - the shock wave could extinguish the fires caused by the flash. But a strike on any of the listed targets other than Baku would have had no immediate consequences.
"[...] why the Americans should do this." Is "this" nuking Soviet armies, going to war itself, or what?
I once even dealt with calculating the effects of tactical nuclear strikes at the corps level. Unfortunately, I have almost already forgotten everything. There were three or four nuclear bombs (5-20 kt) dropped on one corps. And something I remember is that I was not at all impressed with the casualty estimates at the time. In general, I have great doubts that two bombs could cause serious damage to troops, while cities could.
My point is that the Kwangtung Army is pretty much useless against the Americans in countering a home-island invasion because they've got to get home in safety past American submarines.
My question was how effective this blockade was and whether the USSR could influence its effectiveness. I don't know much about the navy.
 
A couple of 15-20 kt explosions would not have had such an intimidating effect on the Soviets - the centers of Soviet cities were mostly built up with stone houses, and there were prepared bomb shelters in the basements. And knowledge of the details makes it possible to soberly assess the degree of threat.

Good options are Saratov, Rybinsk, Perm, Gorky. Even about Baku I am not sure - the shock wave could extinguish the fires caused by the flash. But a strike on any of the listed targets other than Baku would have had no immediate consequences.

I once even dealt with calculating the effects of tactical nuclear strikes at the corps level. Unfortunately, I have almost already forgotten everything. There were three or four nuclear bombs (5-20 kt) dropped on one corps. And something I remember is that I was not at all impressed with the casualty estimates at the time. In general, I have great doubts that two bombs could cause serious damage to troops, while cities could.

My question was how effective this blockade was and whether the USSR could influence its effectiveness. I don't know much about the navy.
These are interesting observations, however, reality was much different.

Dropping a Mark 3 (Fat Man) on Moscow with a comparable air burst to that of Nagasaki without warning, would be catastrophic.

It is true that Japan's residential structures were wood, but the military and civic building were stone and/or concrete and suffered considerable or total damage.

Humans (and animals) that were near the epicenter, were vaporized, some left permanent shadows behind, seared into stone or concrete.

The Japanese were aware of the American's atomic program, as were the Germans, but knowing about it and preparing for it are two completely different things (as the Japanese found out).

The Americans had three Atom bombs in August '45, two were used, the third, intended to be deployed on 19 August, was not used.
Three more Mark 3 bombs were ready by September and three more by October.

And just as a point of interest, had the Japanese not surrendered after the second bomb, the third was to be dropped, but the remainder were to be held in reserve in case Operation Downfall was put into motion.
 
These are interesting observations, however, reality was much different.
Dropping a Mark 3 (Fat Man) on Moscow with a comparable air burst to that of Nagasaki without warning, would be catastrophic.
What reality? How many atomic bombs were dropped on Moscow? These are not observations, these are estimates.
It is true that Japan's residential structures were wood, but the military and civic building were stone and/or concrete and suffered considerable or total damage.
The proportion of such houses was very low; they were only destroyed within a relatively short range.
Humans (and animals) that were near the epicenter, were vaporized, some left permanent shadows behind, seared into stone or concrete.
Soviet cities had many more bomb shelters in the basements of houses.
The Japanese were aware of the American's atomic program, as were the Germans, but knowing about it and preparing for it are two completely different things (as the Japanese found out).
There is a big difference between what the Soviets knew and what was available to the Japanese.
The Americans had three Atom bombs in August '45, two were used, the third, intended to be deployed on 19 August, was not used.
Three more Mark 3 bombs were ready by September and three more by October.
And then a long break would be required. I'm not impressed.
And just as a point of interest, had the Japanese not surrendered after the second bomb, the third was to be dropped, but the remainder were to be held in reserve in case Operation Downfall was put into motion.
I guarantee that even after six bombs, the Soviets would not surrender. But too bad for Europe...
 
Soviet Pacific Fleet Aug 1945 per Wiki.

"By August 1945, the Pacific Fleet consisted of two cruisers, one destroyer leader, ten destroyers, two torpedo boats, 19 patrol boats, 78 submarines, ten minelayers, 52 minesweepers, 49 "MO" anti-submarine boats (MO stands for Малый Охотник, or "little hunter"), 204 motor torpedo boats and 1459 war planes."

But at least some of those came from the US during summer 1945. See Project Hula.
www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Hula

In the summer months the Soviet Pacific Fleet could be reinforced from ships of the Northern Fleet being transferred via the high arctic route.

Japanese Army
There are two forces on the asian mainland to be considered.

Kwantung Army
Based in northern China and Manchuria. Its route back to mainland Japan was across the Sea of Japan.

IJA in southern China
The Japanese offensive in southern China was stopped and reversed in spring 1945 as Japanese forces withdrew north. Their retreat was flanked by the South China Sea south of Formosa / Taiwan and the East China Sea north of that. With the US forces established on Luzon & Okinawa withdrawal by sea became impossible. Their only route out was via land up to Korea where the Eea of Japan ports could be used.

Sea of Japan
The access to this area of ocean was controlled from the south by the heavily mined Tsushina Straits between Korea & Japan. It had been off limits since late 1943, something that only changed in summer 1945. US subs did penetrate those waters but it was not easy. Mines and Japanese AS escorts were a headache. At least one sub was lost there in summer 1945 - Bonefish. See Operation Barney.
 
A couple of 15-20 kt explosions would not have had such an intimidating effect on the Soviets - the centers of Soviet cities were mostly built up with stone houses, and there were prepared bomb shelters in the basements. And knowledge of the details makes it possible to soberly assess the degree of threat.

Good options are Saratov, Rybinsk, Perm, Gorky. Even about Baku I am not sure - the shock wave could extinguish the fires caused by the flash. But a strike on any of the listed targets other than Baku would have had no immediate consequences.

I once even dealt with calculating the effects of tactical nuclear strikes at the corps level. Unfortunately, I have almost already forgotten everything. There were three or four nuclear bombs (5-20 kt) dropped on one corps. And something I remember is that I was not at all impressed with the casualty estimates at the time. In general, I have great doubts that two bombs could cause serious damage to troops, while cities could.

My question was how effective this blockade was and whether the USSR could influence its effectiveness. I don't know much about the navy.

I think we'll need to agree on disagreeing at this point, except --

On your last point, the blockade was very effective. Japan was projected to suffer famine by the spring of 1946 because not only had most ocean-going hulls been sunk, but most inter-island shipping, which was the main food-distribution network, was also sunk. Additionally, B-29s had extensively mined not only the Inland Sea and Tokyo Bay, but significant portions of the Japanese west coast.

On top of that, the fuel shortages in Japan meant that even their ships which could fight were largely laid up for want of oil. Slow troops carriers (for which the Japanese largely used merchant hulls, not liners or purpose-built troop transports) with little or no naval escort would be easy pickings for USN submarines. And that's not even counting the USN's 5th Fleet, as the most powerful naval force ever assembled. About 14-15 carriers, 8 modern battleships, roughly seventy cruisers, and a few hundred destroyers.

Japanese troops in China will be largely be remaining there so long as a state of war exists between Japan and America -- unless the USSR brings them west, to Europe to fight there, and I doubt the Japanese would want to do that if the home islands are under threat of invasion.

There's many reasons I think this alt-history scenario is a rabbit hole.
 
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I guarantee that even after six bombs, the Soviets would not surrender. But too bad for Europe...

Fortunately, the U.S. would have another thirteen to fifteen atomic bombs available for use by the end of 1945.

3 in August (2 of which were used)
3-4 in September
3-4 in October
5 in November
7 in December

According to NUKEMAP a Nagasaki-style attack (I.e. 20 kiloton yield detonated 500m above the ground) would:

> have a fireball 222m in radius
> heavily built concrete buildings within a 760m radius are severely damaged or destroyed
> everyone within a 830m radius receives a 100% fatal radiation dose (death within 4-6 days)
> dry wood within a 1.06km radius probably ignites
> everyone within a 1.27 km radius receives an 80% fatality rate radiation dose (death within a month)
> most residential buildings within a 1.72 km radius collapse; chances of fire starting in damaged commercial and residential buildings are high
> unprotected persons within a 2.21km radius receive 3rd degree burns

These effects are certainly not inconsequential.
 
Fortunately, the U.S. would have another thirteen to fifteen atomic bombs available for use by the end of 1945.

3 in August (2 of which were used)
3-4 in September
3-4 in October
5 in November
7 in December

According to NUKEMAP a Nagasaki-style attack (I.e. 20 kiloton yield detonated 500m above the ground) would:

> have a fireball 222m in radius
> heavily built concrete buildings within a 760m radius are severely damaged or destroyed
> everyone within a 830m radius receives a 100% fatal radiation dose (death within 4-6 days)
> dry wood within a 1.06km radius probably ignites
> everyone within a 1.27 km radius receives an 80% fatality rate radiation dose (death within a month)
> most residential buildings within a 1.72 km radius collapse; chances of fire starting in damaged commercial and residential buildings are high
> unprotected persons within a 2.21km radius receive 3rd degree burns

These effects are certainly not inconsequential.
Referring back to Moscow, one atom bomb would only impact about 20% of the city. Four of five well-placed atom bombs would destroy most of the city.
 
Referring back to Moscow, one atom bomb would only impact about 20% of the city. Four of five well-placed atom bombs would destroy most of the city.

I think you underestimate the effects. An atomic bomb punches a brutal hole into the city.: 1.82 square kilometers has suffered heavy blast damage, everyone in a 5.1 square kilometer area has suffered a fatal or severe dose of radiation, fires burn widely, massive numbers of people need immediate medical attention, the strain on civil services would be enormous.

NUKEMAP estimates such an attack on current-day Moscow would kill some 89,000 and injure over 245,000 people. No city could cope with that level of carnage inflicted on a single day; even a nation would face difficulties mustering the amount of resources needed to respond to a sudden disaster of that magnitude.
 
Fortunately, the U.S. would have another thirteen to fifteen atomic bombs available for use by the end of 1945.

3 in August (2 of which were used)
3-4 in September
3-4 in October
5 in November
7 in December
Source of the numbers? According to Ellsberg the US possessed 9 bombs by June 30, 1946. That seems much closer to reality to me

According to NUKEMAP a Nagasaki-style attack (I.e. 20 kiloton yield detonated 500m above the ground) would:

> have a fireball 222m in radius
> heavily built concrete buildings within a 760m radius are severely damaged or destroyed
> everyone within a 830m radius receives a 100% fatal radiation dose (death within 4-6 days)
> dry wood within a 1.06km radius probably ignites
> everyone within a 1.27 km radius receives an 80% fatality rate radiation dose (death within a month)
> most residential buildings within a 1.72 km radius collapse; chances of fire starting in damaged commercial and residential buildings are high
> unprotected persons within a 2.21km radius receive 3rd degree burns

These effects are certainly not inconsequential.
Absolutely. But for a city like Moscow, it is not fatal. That's why the American plans from 1945 required 5-6 bombs - according to the same Ellsberg.
 
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