- Thread starter
-
- #41
DarrenW
Staff Sergeant
Thanks eagledad I knew you'd understand! And I'm in full agreement concerning the USSB data....
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
According to the san diego air and space museum's website, F6Fs Hellcats claimed more than 5,000 "confirmed air victories" over enemy aircraft during the war, resulting in a 19:1 kill ratio. Some sources have gone even higher. ive seen one or two running at 6500, just for hellcats.
If that were correct, the F6F would have brought down of caused the destruction of (something like) over 30000 enemy aircraft. P-51s over Germany in 1944 were credited with 2500 victories to give some perspective to this........ You would need to factor into that equation both operational losses and non-operational losses, aircraft scrapped due to damage and aircraft lost on the ground.
In other words its a statistical impossibility shot down over 5000 enemy aircraft in air combat. They have destroyed 5000 enemy aircraft overall, including about 2000 aircraft expended as kamikazes after 1944.
Furthermore the Hellcat losses are bases on their own confirmed losses in the air, (ie losses to enemy air action, not including losses such as to enemy ground fire) whilst the enemy losses are on the basis of total aircraft losses and are based on claims data alone. this claims data does not accord to the best available Japanese records. . its a comparison of apples to oranges in other words. In actual fact, to all causes, I have read from various sources that Hellcat losses to all sources (within a combat theatre, losses at home spiralled even higher) during the war ran to about 2400 airframes. I would have to work a bit harder to get a better figure, but that is at least within the ballpark.
There are a couple of different ways you can make sense of this. The first is to analyse the claims data. From other more carefully investigated campaigns like the BoB we know that overclaiming ran to about 3:1 up to about 4:1 and as low as 2:1. The degree of overclaining usually was a function of the level of confusion in the air, and battles in the pacific in 1944-45 were about as confused as they could get. Conversely the USN had the most experienced cadre of pilots in the world by 1944, so one could assume that their error rate in claims might be better than expected. I would accept overclaiming adjustments of 3:1 as a valid estimate.
On that basis, if the 5000 claims are correct, and the overclaiming was running at 3:1, one can expect actual air victories for the hellcat equipped squadrons to be in the order of 1600 a/c. If Hellcat losses to achieve those victories were 263 a/c, then the exchange ratio is in fact is about 6:1.
If the 5000 mentioned by the museum is in fact an expression of Japanese losses to Hellcat actions, to get some semblance of sanity in the data, we should really try as best we can to compare apples to apples. That would seem to me to compare total Hellcat losses to the total Japanese losses overall.
On that basis, there were about 2500 Hellcats lost in order to destroy 5000 Japanese losses. A loss rate of 1;2. however, if the hellcat victories include about 2000 Kamikazes, either in the air or on the ground, the US to Japanese losses for conventionally used a/c run at about 2500:3000 or 5/6.
Certianly a long way from 19:1.
Somebody is just bemused by the excessive enthusiasm shown for the Hellcat, when any objective look at it takes off a lot of gloss.Somebody has a h-rd on for the Hellcat.....
Somebody is just bemused by the excessive enthusiasm shown for the Hellcat, when any objective look at it takes off a lot of gloss.
If that were correct, the F6F would have brought down of caused the destruction of (something like) over 30000 enemy aircraft.
In other words its a statistical impossibility shot down over 5000 enemy aircraft in air combat.
I have read from various sources that Hellcat losses to all sources (within a combat theatre, losses at home spiralled even higher) during the war ran to about 2400 airframes.
On that basis, there were about 2500 Hellcats lost in order to destroy 5000 Japanese losses.
and the overclaiming was running at 3:1,
A loss rate of 1;2. however, if the hellcat victories include about 2000 Kamikazes, either in the air or on the ground, the US to Japanese losses for conventionally used a/c run at about 2500:3000 or 5/6.
Ok parsifal you win, I submit to you and your minions. For the sake of the adults that visit this forum daily, let's just stop the insults and end the combative nature of this thread right here and now. Can we just shake hands and start discussing real honest to goodness facts from this point forward, please?
Just so my position is clear, I consider the hellcat to be the best carrier fighter of the war. A 6:1 kill loss ratio is still rermarkable. a 19:1 kill/loss ratio is just fantasy.
I have two issues that frequently get me into hot water over the hellcat. First is the claim that it destroyed Japanese air parity, second is that it shot down 5000 Japanese aircraft for the loss of 263 of its own. both claims are gross distortions of the truth.
DarrenW,
For a good understanding you have to grasp how the Japanese pilot training was conducted. Pre-war is was very intensive and the pilots in first line units at the beginning of the war had 1000s of flying hours, many with combat experience in China, and for the IJA, Nomanhan. As these pilots were lost, their replacements lacked the experience. This was lamented as early as the second half of 1942, when commanders at Rabaul complained that the replacement pilots arriving lacked experience in the A6M, having trained only on the A5M. Also, the military culture extolled aggressive, offensive action and disdained self preservation, as seen in decisions to fly without parachutes, and the ideal of a virtuous self-sacrificing death in the face of bad odds. Hata and company, in Japanese Naval Fighter Aces, reports on the quality levels of the various fighter units during the war. By the time the Hellcat arrives on scene the experience levels have fallen to a point where most pilots in a unit are considered category C, that is barely trained.
Training didn't suffer at first. But the Japanese flying schools could not make up for the loss of veteran pilots. New pilots did not get the years of seasoning that the pre-war pilots had enjoyed. One of the problems that the Japanese were dealing with was a shortage of trained aircrew to replace losses suffered in the Battle of the Coral Sea. This kept Shokaku and Zuikaku out of the Midway fight while their air complements were reconstituted. Midway intensified the problem, and the New Guinea/Guadalcanal fighting resulted in a constant drain on trained manpower. Meanwhile, the air establishment had to expand to meet the needs of defending the newly acquired territories, further diluting the trained cadres.So Japanese pilot quality was in the decline roughly six months after Pearl Harbor huh? Very interesting. I didn't know that training suffered so early on. Good to know....
OK, I'll let you off. But this time, only, lol...I fully understood what you were saying and on a lighter note I appreciate the offer to hold you, but I'm good!
Before I respond, do you have anything to support your claim?
Yeah, you...
Total kills by the P-38 in the PTO comes to 1,700 - this figure is a total from it's first combat sortie to it's withdrawel from combat service.
I don't have a year by year breakdown.
My basis is, the F6F's weakness was, it couldn't turn
There's no doubt about that, Greg. And it figured into the war, and prominently. By contrast, has anyone ever seen any film on the American "home front?" Those were mostly women in those factories. And in engineering and design, too. Grumman even had a woman test pilot on the XF6F. As Japan was going down, we were going in the other direction, gearing up.DarrenW,
For a good understanding you have to grasp how the Japanese pilot training was conducted. Pre-war is was very intensive and the pilots in first line units at the beginning of the war had 1000s of flying hours, many with combat experience in China, and for the IJA, Nomanhan. As these pilots were lost, their replacements lacked the experience. This was lamented as early as the second half of 1942, when commanders at Rabaul complained that the replacement pilots arriving lacked experience in the A6M, having trained only on the A5M. Also, the military culture extolled aggressive, offensive action and disdained self preservation, as seen in decisions to fly without parachutes, and the ideal of a virtuous self-sacrificing death in the face of bad odds. Hata and company, in Japanese Naval Fighter Aces, reports on the quality levels of the various fighter units during the war. By the time the Hellcat arrives on scene the experience levels have fallen to a point where most pilots in a unit are considered category C, that is barely trained.