Questions About Japanese Air Power - 1943

[taly01]

About Japanese Air Power in 1943, My main interest lately has been the New Guinea campaign in 1943-44. Basically the JAAF built up a decent size force during 1943 but were soon very outnumbered by USAF and RAAF build ups. The largest problem for the JAAF in New Guinea was long range bomber raids on their distant "safe" bases by B-24's followed within an hour later by low level B-25 gunships dropping parachute-fragmentation bombs, all escorted by P-38's.

Without radar the interception of the raids was unreliable, and even if the Japanese fighters managed to scramble they were outnumbered around 5:1. However the JAAF continued replacing losses and these in turn were quickly destroyed, close to 70% of all JAAF aircraft losses in New Guinea were on the ground to these raids!

Maybe with radar or a more advanced ground observer system they may have had a chance (although camping in the deep jungle was not easy), also aircraft dispersal was poor as they thought the distant bases were safe (again building a base in the jungle not easy).

 

[DarrenW]

About Japanese Air Power in 1943, My main interest lately has been the New Guinea campaign in 1943-44. Basically the JAAF built up a decent size force during 1943 but were soon very outnumbered by USAF and RAAF build ups. The largest problem for the JAAF in New Guinea was long range bomber raids on their distant "safe" bases by B-24's followed within an hour later by low level B-25 gunships dropping parachute-fragmentation bombs, all escorted by P-38's.

Without radar the interception of the raids was unreliable, and even if the Japanese fighters managed to scramble they were outnumbered around 5:1. However the JAAF continued replacing losses and these in turn were quickly destroyed, close to 70% of all JAAF aircraft losses in New Guinea were on the ground to these raids!

Maybe with radar or a more advanced ground observer system they may have had a chance (although camping in the deep jungle was not easy), also aircraft dispersal was poor as they thought the distant bases were safe (again building a base in the jungle not easy).

View attachment 491333

Thanks taly01, your detailed information focuses like a laser beam on the topic at hand.

And that's one cool shot of those low-flying B-25s!!!

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The crippling hit on an A6M's wing is going to be no more terminal in the immediate case than the same hit on an F6F's wing.

I beg to differ. Did you read Horikoshi's book about designing the Zero? In order to save weight he shaved the structural safety margins rather thin. When you lighten a stressed skin structure by thinning the skin, you're eating into its damage tolerance. I very much doubt that a Zero hit the way that Hellcat in the picture was would trap back on the boat, and if it did I doubt it would be considered repairable. I think it would join Davy Jones airforce right quick.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[KiwiBiggles]

I beg to differ. Did you read Horikoshi's book about designing the Zero? In order to save weight he shaved the structural safety margins rather thin. When you lighten a stressed skin structure by thinning the skin, you're eating into its damage tolerance. I very much doubt that a Zero hit the way that Hellcat in the picture was would trap back on the boat, and if it did I doubt it would be considered repairable. I think it would join Davy Jones airforce right quick.
Cheers,
Wes

My point was that that level of damage would have the same effect on the immediate combat. That is, irrespective of whether the machine was able to return to base, that level of damage would remove the machine from combat immediately. The tactical effect of the damage is the same; the strategic effect varies, due to the differing pilot survival.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

That is, irrespective of whether the machine was able to return to base, that level of damage would remove the machine from combat immediately.

After enlarging and inspecting that photo closely, I revise my judgement. That damage would remove a Zero from combat instantly and permanently, in other words, a shoot down. It would become uncontrollable and the resulting gyrations would cause a stress failure of the already weakened wing. The pilot would be unable to escape even if he wanted to. He would be pinned against the side of the cockpit by crushing G forces.
Now the likelihood of that exact configuration of damage being delivered by a cannon-less F6F is another question entirely.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Shinpachi]

These were ended as experimental models.
The longer rocket is for the OHKA 11 to compare.

Source:
4式補助噴進器 テスト " 海軍航空技術廠 " 艦上爆撃機 彗星43型試作機 " さっきあげた実験機の緑色塗装したやつで、これは胴体後部下に3本装着した機体です。 後部にある偵察席の窓を塞いだり、尾翼が角ばったりとちょっと変わってます。 このあと量産された彗星43型はロケット装着のため胴体後部下に切り裂きがあります。 " 下に4式補助推進装置(ロケット)をアップにしました。 上は桜花11型についてる噴進器で、下は彗星などについてる補助推進器です。 " " #飛行機 #イラスト #海軍 #彗星 #爆撃機 #航空機 #航空技術廠 #ロケット #軍用機 #japanese #japanesebomber #bomber #battle #warplane #WW2 #aircraft #japaneseaircraft #日本 #空技廠 #海軍航空技術廠 - tamamichi8749
4式補助噴進器 テスト " 海軍航空技術廠 " 艦上爆撃機 彗星43型試作機 " 詳しくはわかりませんが加速用につけたロケットの実験機で、これは機首2本、胴体後部下に3本の計5本装着した機体です。 (この機体は後に緑色に塗装しロケット3本つけたので、このあと上げます。) 彗星43型はロケット装着のため胴体後部下に切り裂きがあります。 " 下に4式補助推進装置(ロケット)をアップにしました。 上は桜花11型についてる噴進器で、下は彗星などについてる補助推進器です。 " " #飛行機 #イラスト #海軍 #彗星 #爆撃機 #航空機 #航空技術廠 #ロケット #軍用機 #japanese #japanesebomber #bomber #battle #warplane #WW2 #aircraft #japaneseaircraft #日本 #空技廠 #海軍航空技術廠 - tamamichi8749

 

[Dan Fahey]

For all the discussion that the Japanese were beaten in the air.
To me is a bit of an exaggeration. It was a war of attrition !
Their biggest weakness was logistics and supply and maintenance of a long war.
The European's learned this lesson a longtime ago, especially after WW1.
On top of that the men had to forage or steal their own food.
Historical data discuss major illnesses of pilots and ground crew which made getting into the cockpit and fighting and issue.

The Japanese planes when they were well maintained were equal to the US and Allies.
Been reading about how their field conditions were horrible.
Japanese were typically a lot shorted and composition of the soil/surface caused a lot of unnecessary accidents compared to US air fields.

During training in Japan they did not have this issue.
Add to the fact the Japanese fighters were 1 to 2 ton or more lighter made landing a lot easier.
Japanese planes did not have the narrow landing gear of the Wildcat, P36, or P40.

When the Allies took over Indonesia and Philippines they uncovered crated engines a various remote locations.
Then noticed there were lightly damaged aircraft some with missing engines.

In China they did the same thing hording and storing war material to avoid them from Allied air attack.
The Russian's came in at end of the war and took a lot of this war material and gave it to Mao.

There was so much usable Japanese war material and useable aircraft the Dutch, French, British reconditioned the Japanese fighters and bombers.
Flew them for a few years against the insurgents trying to take their land back form the Colonial powers.

If Japan had a better logistics and supply system the Allies would have had a much harder brutal time.
As it was Japan was almost competed its conquest of China by the end of 1945.
However were so weakened that the Russians ran over them easily.

Air combat over China was frantic with a lot of Japanese Aces created.
The US, British and CACW (Chinese America Composite Wing) did well.
But Chinese only units suffered badly.
Interesting issue about logistics, enough was sent to the Allies in China to keep British Oil ports open in Burma.

 

[taly01]

The Japanese planes when they were well maintained were equal to the US and Allies.

For 1943-44 period with "ace" pilots the Ki-61 and A6M5 did have some unique abilities but required skill to use them, where as for average pilots the US planes even in 1943 was a superiour plane, the speed and dive advantage meant allied pilots could always enter and leave combat at will.
But I do not believe the late war japanese pilots overall were much inferior as often claimed, but the combination of less training, slower planes than the enemy and been outnumbered was fatal.

Interesting issue about logistics, enough was sent to the Allies in China to keep British Oil ports open in Burma.

Burma is interesting as JAAF performed very well until 1944, but they were facing Hurricane and P-36 until almost 1944. But on the "south pacific Front" they faced P-38 and Corsair from early 1943!

 

[Dan Fahey]

For 1943-44 period with "ace" pilots the Ki-61 and A6M5 did have some unique abilities but required skill to use them, where as for average pilots the US planes even in 1943 was a superiour plane, the speed and dive advantage meant allied pilots could always enter and leave combat at will.
But I do not believe the late war japanese pilots overall were much inferior as often claimed, but the combination of less training, slower planes than the enemy and been outnumbered was fatal.



Burma is interesting as JAAF performed very well until 1944, but they were facing Hurricane and P-36 until almost 1944. But on the "south pacific Front" they faced P-38 and Corsair from early 1943!

There were only a few P36's in China and were gone by 1940. Hurricane stayed until 1943. Most of the air war was with P40's and some P43's by Chennault. The Chinese had a good batch of P40's but also the P66's and rest of the P43's. Later Mustang, Lightning and Thunderbolts. There were some Spitfires but

 

[fubar57]

WHAT????

 

[Greg Boeser]

Burma, China, India...
what's the difference?

 

[GrauGeist]

There were only a few P36's in China and were gone by 1940. Hurricane stayed until 1943. Most of the air war was with P40's and some P43's by Chennault. The Chinese had a good batch of P40's but also the P66's and rest of the P43's. Later Mustang, Lightning and Thunderbolts. There were some Spitfires but

There were no USAAC P-36 aircraft west of Pearl Harbor, the P-36s at Pearl Harbor having been delivered to Hawaii early in 1941. The US Far East Airforce in the Philippines had on hand: the P-26, P-35A and P-40B/E.

The Curtiss Model 75 types that saw action in the CBI were the British Mohawk Mk.I through Mk.IV (seized French ordered Hawk 75A-1 through A-4) and those served through 1944.
Chennault flew a Chinese Hawk 75H as his personal hack. The Chinese airforce had Hawk 75Ms and 75Qs plus manufactured several under license as the 75A-5, which ended up serving with the RAF and RIAF in India.

The Dutch operated Hawk 75A-7s beyond 1941 and Thailand operated several Hawk 75Ns before and during the war.

American fighters used by the Chinese in the early years of the war, were:
Curtiss-Wright CW-21
Boeing P-26
Vultee P-66
Curtiss BF2C
Hawk 75A-5/M/Q
Republic P-43
Curtiss P-40

 

[taly01]

Burma, China, India...what's the difference?

Its the golden (or is it bermuda triangle) of WW2 combat

The Chinese Air Force early Curtiss Hawk 75's with fixed landing gear is a strange bird!

The variants of the P-36/Hawk 75 and where they all ended up is almost impossible to follow. All the Finnish ones ended up getting Swedish made Twin Wasps of 1065hp due to the low octane fuel Finland used.

 

[GrauGeist]

The CBI is more like the land battle of the Pacific war, whereas the PTO was more of the naval aspect.

With the exception of the occasional Tropical storm or Cyclone, the PTO was a hot, calm-weather naval campaign with intermittent island actions and thus, mostly a Naval theater.

The CBI had a wide range of weather conditions, terrain complications (including the Himalayas), urban warfare and was mostly a land (Army) theater.

 

[Shortround6]

Burma, China, India...
what's the difference?

Curry?

more serious, see
Warren Weidenburner CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
for maps.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Sorry, guys. I forgot to put the ironic icon on my last post.

 

[parsifal]

The China Theatre was different to the Burma/India TO, moreso in the land war. With a land area greater than Germany, France, and the Low Countries. The Japanese had about 25 divisions to hold this area. there were a further 15 divisions or so on garrison in Manchuria. Five divisions remained in the home islands, 10 Divs in the Pacific and the east indies/Malaya/ Indochina. There were just 2 divs in Burma in 1943.

In China there was never a "font line" as such. The Japanese tended to garrison the urban centres, and the Chinese armies (there were at least two, KMT and CCCP, with numerous private armies under local warlords, some who would fight for either side) amounting to an estimated 500 divs (a div in china could be as few as 200 men, or as much as 40000, if such a thing as a typical KMT division existed, it was about 7000 men, with no logistic tail, no MT no Heavy weapons and no artillery) .

Most of the actual fighting was actually done by Mao's so called "cadres", another euphemism for armed partisans. these groups never conquered much territory, but they kept the IJA tied down and unsupplied for nearly 5 years. The result was in China a stalemate developed. In 1944, the Japanese raised additional troops and launched aseries of ofensives codenamed Operation Kogo (battle of Central Henan) , Operation Togo 1 (Battle of Chanheng), and Operations Togo 2 and Togo 3, or the Battle of Gulin /Liazhou, . These were all lumped under the one operational plan, Ichi-Go, ahich had two objectives; open a land route to French Indochina, and capture air bases in southeast China from which American bombers were attacking the Japanese homeland and shipping.

This offensive was a vicious affair, with Chinese peasants more often attacking the KMT. The KMT suffered more than 5000000 casualties, with the civilian casualties estimated to be 1bout 1.5million deaths. Japan and her local allies suffered about 75000 casualties (we don't know actual IJA casualties),

After the complete withdrawal from Burma, completed by May 1942, there was no contact between the Allied armies and the IJA. The monsoons from June to Late November brought mobile operations to a halt. Further the wholesale transfer of Indian rolling stock to enable the southern lend lease route to the souther Russian border in the Caucasus had led to large scale famines in Bengal, teetering on revolt, which tied down British forces for months. Eventually, however, some offensive moves on a very limited basis were organised into the Arakan Peninsula. The so called Arakan offensive, lasting from December 1942, through to May 1943, was in reality a small scale affair, involving up to 9 Indian army Brigadeds (under the control of 14th Indian Infantry Div) on the attack, being resisted by a single IJA regiment. Later the IJA switched over to attack, and their forcesd were increased to a full division. it was a disastrous campaign, revealing serious weaknesses in the Indian army and their british leadership. Fortunately for the allies, In June 1943, the monsoons intervened again and save their bacon . Some Indian army brigades were so poorly trained they had not even completed their basic training. most of the trained Indian army manpower of the home army was on garrison in Iraq or carrying out the conquest of iran. The 4 divs of the expeditionary forces were in the middle east and north Africa.

The operations of the chindits, the long range penetration group, was a brigade sized operation, aimed at cutting the Burma railway in northern Burma. A second brigade was added later. It was a substitute for the cancelled main offensive with the group commencing operations February 1943, and commencing withdrawal in April. Many troops, however took months to return

In comparison to what was going on in central China, the Burma theatre was small potatoes. The airlift operations didn't really have much effect until 1943, though the Japanese were very sensitive to any supplies reaching the KMT, understandable really given how badly they were outnumbered. in reality however, the gross corruption within the KMT meant that in reality the resources poured into supporting the KMT were a poor return for the effort. . in many ways those supplies would have been better used in building up and training the indian army

 

[taly01]

Thanks parsifal for the summary of CBI, i have tried a few times to get some idea whats going on and its very complex.

China seems an enormous land mass for the barely mechanised forces of WW2 Japan, It also looks like China used Fabian tactics (due to their weakness). I am not sure if there were even worthwhile resources Japan gained for their efforts.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Offensives were timed for the harvest season. Once the rice was in, the Japanese would attack, seize the harvest and then withdraw to the coastal cities.

 

[Shinpachi]

I am not sure if there were even worthwhile resources Japan gained for their efforts.

There were huge land and enormous number of people to build up a new empire in China like Mongorians and Manchurians used to do it too.
Not a few Japanese who led, and lead, Japan, including Emperor himself, originated in Korea and China in the history.
The continent was their homeland to be back to.