Questions About Japanese Air Power - 1943

[taly01]

Not a few Japanese who led, and lead, Japan, including Emperor himself, originated in Korea and China in the history. The continent was their homeland to be back to.

Thanks Shinpachi this is the sort of fundamental information that unfortunately doesn't get into modern military history books.

The USA support for 1940's China is ironic as it led to Communist China with the change of support to Mao post-WW2 by many high level US politicians leading public and media opinion as the preferred option over Chiang Kai-Shek. The 1945-53 Truman administration was even more infiltrated with communists than Roosevelts 1933-45 one was and Eisenhowers 1953-61 administration was not much better, hence the McCarthy "inquistion" and McCarthy slogan that the US administration had "twenty years of treason" with communism is hard to refute with todays knowledge.

 

[ThomasP]

I have found this thread very interesting.

I would like to bring up two factors which have not(?) been stressed in this thread so far.


The first is purely operational at a strategic level and revolves around who is on the offensive. At the start of the war the IJN and USN were on a rough parity in ability to fight large scale naval battles and amphibious warfare. The Japanese were on the offensive at sea in an organized and largely pre-planned way until about the end of 1942 or beginning of 1943. The tie(?) at Coral Sea and Japanese loss at Midway put a serious crimp in the IJN's offensive plan and ability. The US quickly gained the offensive in 1943.

A general rule of warfare is that in a maneuver war whoever is on the offensive has an advantage, at least temporarily.

Examples of this are common in the PTO, ETO, MTO, and Eastern Front. In the ETO we saw the successful German attack on France, and the initially successful attack on the Eastern Front against the Russians. In the MTO we saw the see-saw war in the desert between the UK and the Italians or Germans. In the PTO we saw the Japanese successes in the Philipines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Dutch East Indies, etc. In most of these cases the attacking forces accomplished the objectives against equal or superior numbers of enemy - mostly because of superior planning and the fact that the enemy was not given time to recover once the attack began. Once the offense was stopped, if the enemy could go on the offensive the advantage switched to the enemy.


The other factor is the ratio of forces. I figure most of the readers of this thread are at least generally aware of the change in ratio of IJN to USN carriers beginning in 1942 after Midway, and the start of the deployment of large number of land based USAAF and Marine aircraft into the PTO.

In the intital engagements between the F4F and the Zero, the F4F faired poorly in kill-to-loss ratio. Once the USN was on the offensive, where the numbers were equal or in favor of the F4F, the kill-to-loss ratio improved. I do not remember the exact numbers claimed/comfirmed kill-to-loss ratio but I believe it was approximately 2:1 overall. (I am seperating the F4F/FM-1 stats from the later war FM-2 stats. The FM-2 was a much better performing model operating in a very different operational environment from that of the early-war model F4F/FM-1.)


In the current(?) subject of the thread, ie Japanese airpower and what was the reason for the apparent drastic change in capability in late-1942 thru 1943, I believe the answer lies mainly in a combination of the above two factors. The introduction of the P-38, F4U, F6F, etc. simply magnified the effect.


Of interest perhaps is the following:

There is a common myth in US tribal lore that the 'Thatch Weave' was some amazingly new method of aerial combat that turned the tide of war in the air, or at least allowed the F4F pilots to survive when outnumbered against the Zero. Neither of these statements is true.

Maybe it was a new tactic to the US, but the concept of mutual support between wing men - or at least members of the same flight/squadron - was not new to the IJN/IJA, Luftwaffe, or RAF/FAA (I would assume it was not new to the French, Italian, or Russians either but I do not know enough about their training and experience early-war to venture any categorical statement). The value of the 'Thatch Weave' (ie mutual support) really only became broadly evident when the US began to outnumber the IJA/IJN during engagements.

Compared to the F4F the Zero was as fast or faster in level flight, had a superior climb rate, a hugely superior turn rate, a higher roll rate at dog-fight speeds, and better visibility from the cockpit. The only area of maneuver the F4F had an advantage in was in dive speed. (I leave out the marginal superior speed at very high altitudes over about 20,000 ft as ther was almost no combat at those heights in the early war.)

The F4F was also less likely to catch fire after the -4 model entered service with self-sealing FTs in late(?)-1942, and the pilot was perhaps more likely to survive hits due to armor being fitted.

When facing equal numbers of enemy aircraft that are that superior in maneuver to yours, the 'Thatch Weave' would simply have ended in two Zeroes tailing two F4Fs and shooting them down. The 'Thatch Weave' primarily worked when two F4F were being tailed by one Zero, the second F4F having a chance to interfere with the Zero safely getting a shot on the first F4F.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Re: the Thatch Weave -
All air forces practiced some form of mutual support. The RAF and Armee de l'Air used "weavers" as a way to protect their relatively rigid early war formations. They were not particularily successful, since no one was protecting the weaver, and as the Germans noted, the weavers attracted the attention of German fighters more readily than a formation not weaving.
The "Beam Defense" tactic, as Thatch referred to it was to be performed only when the enemy had committed to an attack, at which point the pair was to break into each other, so that the defenders could scare the tailer away and possibly result in an opposite attack if the tailer pursued.
Thatch and other USN pilots noted that the Japanese used fairly predictable attack procedures, and by capitalizing on this were able to counter them.
F4F-4s were first used in combat at Midway. The first F4F-4s had arrived in the fleet with VF-8 on Hornet in April 1942. Most USN pilots were not happy with the reduced performance compared to the F4F-3. The F4F-4 was heavier, with the same power as the earlier model. The F4F-3s were all retrofitted with self-sealing tanks by Coral Sea. After Coral Sea, the surviving F4F-3s were put ashore and exchanged for F4F-4s, the on board complement of VF being raised from 18 to 27, due to the space saving of folding wings.

 

[ThomasP]

Hi Greg, thanks for the info on the 'weavers'.

Also, thanks for the info on the transition from the F4F-3 to the -4 model. I had not known that the -3 model had been fitted with SSFT by Midway.

re the info on the 'Thatch Weave' aka 'Beam Defense', I could not tell if it supported or contradicted what I had posted? maybe both? Either way could you expand or rephrase?

 

[tomo pauk]

If I'm not mistaking it badly, the T-W was trying to employ two pairs at least (not that it would not work with two A/C total). Leader of the pair was to look forward and a bit towards the other pair, while wingman of the starboard pair was scaning to the right, and wigman of the port pair was scaning to the left. Upon seeing the enemy, say on the left, the port pair will make turn to the right, thus a) keeping the distance vs. enemy, and b) alerting the other pair so that pair turns to the left, and fire into enemy in a head-on pass. Head-on pass cancels out maneuverability advantage one side might posses, while favoring the side that has better protection and firepower.
Another advantage of 'loose pairs' is that they will still be flying pretty fast, unlike what will happen in a classic dogfight.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Everything I learned about the Weave I got from Lundstrom's The First Team. If you haven't read it, I highly recommend it.

 

[nuuumannn]

Offensives were timed for the harvest season.

The Royal New Zealand Air Force operated Grumman Avengers, but not as torpedo bombers, so they operated primarily as attack aircraft against land targets. One task they carried out was crop dusting of Japanese crops with aviation fuel! Post war, Kiwi Avengers were used in crop dusting trials with a more productive outcome.

 

[nuuumannn]

I very much doubt that a Zero hit the way that Hellcat in the picture was would trap back on the boat

Zeroes could take a lot more punishment that what most people realise. They were not structurally weak, contrary to popular opinion. A light weight structure doesn't mean a weak structure. Yes, Horikoshi carried out lightening measures, which included lightening holes in everything, but it wasn't structurally weak. In Sakai's book Samurai (admittedly embellished a bit by Caidin, unfortunately) he discusses occasions where Zeroes returned back to the carriers completely shot up, their pilots wondering how they made it back in the condition they were in. The following is from a report written for an aviation magazine during the war on the A6M3 Model 32;

"Nothing has been spared to keep weight down, neither excessive manhours to manufacture complex units, nor increasing maintenance difficulties for ground crews. Lightening holes, for example, are used prolifically— even in the pilot's seat—and diameters as small as half an inch are found throughout the craft. Outstanding of the weight saving measures is complete elimination of protective armor and self-sealing fuel tanks. It all results in a plane that is extremely vulnerable despite good maneuverability at medium speeds.
This weight-saving design would indicate that the craft is flimsily built but such is not the case, for its strength compares favorably with many American-built planes."

 

[GrauGeist]

The Royal New Zealand Air Force operated Grumman Avengers, but not as torpedo bombers, so they operated primarily as attack aircraft against land targets. One task they carried out was crop dusting of Japanese crops with aviation fuel! Post war, Kiwi Avengers were used in crop dusting trials with a more productive outcome.

The Avengers were used quite often as bombers later in the war, as their Torpedo Bombing role diminished.

Here's a TBF being loaded for a strike against Japanese held positions.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

A light weight structure doesn't mean a weak structure. Yes, Horikoshi carried out lightening measures, which included lightening holes in everything, but it wasn't structurally weak.

Obviously not, or it wouldn't have withstood the violent aerobatics for which it was famous, but the issue here isn't structural strength per se, but damage tolerance. Reread "Eagles of Mitsubishi". When you apply the Horikoshi method of weight reduction (increasing the allowable structural elastic deformation at limit load), you are eroding the fatigue life of the structure and reducing the available redundant load paths.
It's the redundant load paths that determine whether a structurally compromised outer wing panel, stabilizer, control surface, engine cowling, etc, stays attached or parts company in flight after being hit. Any product of the Grumman Iron Works is well endowed in this department.
Add to this, the Zeke had a one piece wing, which meant that all the sheet metal reconstruction had to be done in place, taking up valuable hangar space. The Hellcat's damaged wing, as mentioned in the post, was unbolted at the fold line and a new one bolted on, and the bird probably made it on deck for the last cycle of the day. The Zeke, OTOH, if it made it back to the ship at all, might well join Davey Jones Air Force if the time, space, manpower, parts, or residual cannibalisation value aren't worthy of the effort of rebuilding it.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Ivan1GFP]

American fighters used by the Chinese in the early years of the war, were:
Curtiss-Wright CW-21
Boeing P-26
Vultee P-66
Curtiss BF2C
Hawk 75A-5/M/Q
Republic P-43
Curtiss P-40

Hello GrauGeist,
I believe there were also a bunch of Curtiss Hawk III and other assorted Curtiss biplanes in service at various times.

Regarding the general discussion of Japanese pilot quality:
It is worth noting the number of Japanese aces that finished their training before the outbreak of the war as compared with the number that completed their training after the war started. That is a pretty good indication that training and replacement pilot quality during the war were significantly inferior to pre-war.

- Ivan.

 

[BiffF15]

Hello GrauGeist,
I believe there were also a bunch of Curtiss Hawk III and other assorted Curtiss biplanes in service at various times.

Regarding the general discussion of Japanese pilot quality:
It is worth noting the number of Japanese aces that finished their training before the outbreak of the war as compared with the number that completed their training after the war started. That is a pretty good indication that training and replacement pilot quality during the war were significantly inferior to pre-war.

- Ivan.

Ivan,

That would be correct if your adversary did not improve. Newer, better planes along with better trained pilots / tactics will result in a skewing of the data. I agree the quality decreased on the Japanese side however counting aces is only one part of the equation.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[P-39 Expert]

We are like kindred spirits my friend. I knew when I saw your moniker that you would be amongst the most intelligent and learned of them all......

Okay, what does that say about me???

 

[P-39 Expert]

Curry?

more serious, see
Warren Weidenburner CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
for maps.

My Dad served in Burma in WWII.