parsifal
Colonel
Don't believe it. Not saying you are categorically wrong, but I don't believe it.
That's OK. You could be right, but the combat reports don't show it. In any case, the result is known.
We've had pilots at the Planes of Fame events that said they flew many mission in late 1944 / early 1945 and never saw a German fighter ... just flak. These pilots have no axe to grind ... it was 65 - 66 years ago. You may think they disremember, but they remember their aircraft serial numbers, their service numbers, and give very detailed accounts of strafing on the way home just to use up ammo. And ... from major targets.
And they have photocopies of actual combat reports describing the same events.
Went away and had a bit of a think about how i might show just how much of the USAACs strength was retained in the rear areas during the war.
Thought this link may be of assistance. Its the US Army Air forces Statistical Digest....basic stuff, but is shows the numbers of combat groups deployed overseas, and the numbers retained at home, as well as numbers retained at home as reserves, and in the training commands
Army Air Forces in World War II
If we take January 1944 as the sample month....a month that is neither at the beginning of the war or at the end, but right in the middle of the critical periods when the US was hammering the LW for air supremacy, we find the following
Gps deployed (total/fighter)
1.= Overseas
2.= Europe
3.=Home Deployment (Home Active + Training + Strategic Reserves + manning Cmd or ferry cmd) ,
4.= Total Includes everything including dployment to Japan.
(fractions of gps are rounded)
Jan 44;Feb 44; Mar 44; Apr '44
1.= 148/49;161/50;175/53;193/63
2.= 104/34;116/34;130/38;145/45
3.= 141/34;117/33;88/26;60/26
4.=218/66, 218/66, 218/66, 223/67,
To determine the percentage of groups deployed to Europe, we need to divide the gps sent to Europe (line 2) by the totals (line 4). Again the figures are expressed as Total/fighters
Percentage Of Groups sent to Europe
48/51, 53/51, 60/58, 65/67
Looking at January at that time the total number of aircraft attached to the overseas groups (218) amounted to 12719 combat A/C. Of that total a little over half were assigned to the USAAC forces serving in the ETO. Approximately 17 of the 34 Fighter Groups were assigned to the US 8th AF, and I believe of that 17 groups, only four were equipped with P-51s. This remained the situation until after April I believe. There were a few P-38 equipped units, and some P-47s. but neither the p-47 or the P-38 were really suitable for long range deep penetration escorts. this could at that time only be undertaken by the p-51 units.
If the P-51s were the only fighters capable of providing long range escort, and there were just four groups of them, then approximately 300 were available as at january 1944 for long range escort operations. These are approximate figures.
So what was the approximate strength of the LW at this time. in December 1943 there were 1561 SE engined fighters, By the beginning of March this figure had climbed to 1696 a/c. Approximately 1175 fighters were allocated to the Reich defences in December increasing by about 100 in January, to around 1275 fighters. Contrary to earlier claims, the LW was not dissipating its efforts on other theatres....just about everything they had was being used to defend the Reich . So, here we have approximately 300 LR allied fighters engaging appropximately 1200 LW fighters. Sure there were 17000 other fighters based in England and able to totally dominate france, but over Germany, the numbers still favoured the germans. The Americans, incidentally had about 4000 strategic bombers in Europe, nearly all of them B-17s and B-24s.
German figures do not include Night fighters, which were often thrown into the daylight battles. There were about 260 German Night Fighters at this time.
So, tell me again how it is the allies achieved local superiority in fighters over Germany in january 1944?????