Saburo Sakai Zero vs Bf-109

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Well, I've noted the mis-information at the aces web site before.

Unfortunately, the timeline works against the entire theory. Production and flight dates come from USN and Grumman records. A6M restoration and flight dates from USN records as well as Jim Reardon's "Cracking the Zero Mystery" which also covers quite well the recovery and transport of the plane to San Diego. What you're finding is folks repeating the legend.

Suggest you also look at Barrett Tillman's "The F6F in World War II."

Again, I've personally read the reports of fighter combat for the first six months of the war. Combat reports do not led themselves to aeronautical analysis. The USN fighters had only run into the A6M twice, Coral Sea and Midway. Again, the timeline for those reports works against their being of any consideration in the F6F development, and their contents certainly do not provide any insight that would be usable in aircraft design.

Regretfully the internet is a great place to repeat what someone else puts on a web site that they got from another web site, from another web site. Once a mistake receives enough coverage it becomes damn difficult to stamp it out with the facts.

Don't mean to be contentious, but really, the 4593/F6F connection is non-existent.

Rich
 
I understand what you are saying and I don't use the internet as my definitive source. I do remember seeing it in a book at some point as well, but am not sure which one.

You are correct that the timelines do make it suspicious. Either way, the Navy was looking to update the Wildcat, which with proper tactics was actually holding it's own against the Zero when properly used. By developing the Hellcat, they produced a very capable aircraft to counter the Zero and proved itself quite well against them.
 
I dont see why it is so hard to understand that the Hellcat did not come out of this. It may have been designed before this incident but it could have been changed and upgraded because of it. This has happened to many aircraft from time to time from many nations.
 
Rich,

What makes you think that there were no changes to the F6F from the XF6F based upon information gleaned from one or both captured Zero's or the post-combat reports? While it is true the XF6F-1 first flight was June 26, 1942, and the XF6F-3 (redesignated from the XF6F-2) on July 30th. The very first F6F-3's rolled out of the factory at the end of Sept. or the beggining of Oct. and the first one flew on Oct. 30th, 1942. However, only 10 production units were delivered by the end of the 1942, owing mostly to a series of design changes.

It was not until March 1943 that VF-9, the first fighter group equipped with Hellcats, was certified as "ready for combat". Many changes occured on the production line based upon tests and combat experiance right up to nearly the end of the -3 production run.

The Koga Zero was not available for testing until about the end of September 1942 but that still left pleanty of time to institute changes in the F6F based upon the information aquired, and apparently the F6F-3 was recieving a lot of fiddling during its first few months of production.

=S=

Lunatic
 
What makes you think that there were no changes to the F6F from the XF6F based upon information gleaned from one or both captured Zero's or the post-combat reports?
Click to expand...

After some reflection, no, I don't think so . . . And even if there were, a major design change based on some examination of the Koga Zero, something that would have caused a major change to performance, that would have required a contract change order (there isn't one to my knowledge) and that would have required a nomenclature change, i.e., to F6F-4. There was only one F6F-4 (b/n 02981) modified from the original XF6F-1, but it was not a production model.

Again, I have the combat reports for Coral Sea and Midway. Looked at them again last night. There is nothing in them that is of value to someone designing an airplane. I have BuAer interview transcripts of Jimmy Thach and Noel Gayler. The most you can get out of them is that the F4F is inferior in climb, turn, and speed performance compared to the to the Zero. Big deal.

No, confident with Grumman's design, the Navy ordered production of the F6F on 20 June 1941 slightly more than a year before the first one ever took off. After the first flight (all done at the Bethpage NY facility) of the XF6F-3, the order was increased. Production, however, was somewhat delayed as Grumman did not have a building in which to set up the assembly line. Grumman had to stand in line for construction materials just like everyone else. Eventually, things started moving; in fact, work was started on production models with the roof and only three of the four walls of the F6F production facility, Plant Number 3, in place. The first production model F6F-3 (b/n 04775) flew on 3 October 1942, two weeks after Eddie Sanders took the air in the Koga Zero. VF-9 was the first squadron to get the F6F-3, taking their first delivery on 16 January 1943, a little over 18 months from the initial contract order. F6F-3 production increased rapidly. As you can see, there wasn't a heck of a lot of time for design changes between the June test flight and the deliver of the first F6F-3 in October.

Bureau number (b/n) production sequence was
F6F-3
04775 to 04958 delivered 10/42 to 4/43
08789 to 09047 delivered 4/43 to 6/43
25721 to 26195 delivered 6/43 to 8/43
65890 to 66244 delivered 8/43 to 9/43
39999 to 43137 delivered 9/43 to 4/44
F6F-5
58000-58999 delivered 4/44 to 6/44
69992 to 72991 delivered 6/44 to 12/44
77259 to 80258 delivered 12/44 to 6/45
93652 to 94521 delivered 6/45 to 11/45

And, indeed, yes, there were small tweaking changes made during the production runs, but they were superficial for the most part: The big change was the change in engine, R2800-10 to R2800-10W, between the F6F-3 and the F6F-5. Other changes were:

- On b/n's 04775 to 04958, 08789 to 09047, and 25721 to 26195 (these being the first 909 F6F-3s built had a radio mast that canted forward, subsequent production radio masts were straight up from the horizontal.

- Additionally on all of those just mentioned and on b/n's 65890 to 66244 and 39999 to 41294 (these being the first 2,560 F6F-3's) the radio mast was slightly offset to the right of centerline.

- Starting with b/n 41295, masts were offset slightly to the left of centerline.

- The first 909 F6F-3s also had fairings over the two inboard guns on each wing. This was discarded in subsequent production.

- Landing lights on the port wing were eliminated starting with b/n 08886 except for designated night fighters (F6F-3N and F6F-5N).

- Lower cowl flaps were omitted starting with b/n 39999

- Bulge fairing over lateral exhausts omitted starting with b/n 40235

- Access panel for ADI system fluid tank installed on 40634 and all subsequent

- Starting with b/n 42185 all F6Fs were HVAR capable

- All F6F-5 production had provision for either 3 .50 cal machine guns in each wing or 1 20mm cannon and 2 .50 cal machine gun. Some late production F6F-5Ns utilized the mixed battery.

- The rear vision window to the rear of the cockpit, left and right, appeared on all F6F-3 and between 1500 and 2000 of the F6F-5. B/n of change is unknown.

- Dorsal recognition lights eliminated starting with b/n 70289.

- All F6F-3 had one controllable trim tab on the left aileron and a fix tab on the right. All F6F-5 had one servo tab and one fixed tab on each aileron; the left tab was controllable from the cockpit.

- On F6F-3 the bullet resistant pane was mounted the laminated plate glass windshield with space between to allow for heating/defrost. On the F6F-3N, F6F-5, and F6F-5N the laminated plate glass was eliminated and the bullet resistant pane was incorporated as an integral part of the canopy.

And then there's the obvious question . . . exactly what features were incorporated into the F6F design that resulted from flights tests conducted in California while the first production models were being built on Long Island? The first F6F-3 rolled out less than a month after Koga's Zero was airworthy. Just what did Sanders and company find that would make Leroy Grumman go running back to the drawing board while the approved design was already in production?

Just what was so earth shattering about the A6M2 design? Answer, nothing . . . that's the point no one gets. There was no rocket science here. The design was not some miracle. Examination of the aircraft and test flights explained its performance, but there was nothing earth shattering about the design once you figured out what the Japanese wanted to be able to do with the airplane. (Fair warning, this paragraph is a paraphrase from the words coming from an F4F ace - with 2 A6Ms to his credit - who also flew the Koga Zero and was a post war Navy test pilot.)

The design of the A6M2 was the result of the kind of war the IJN wanted to fight, the way they wanted to fight it. The F6F was designed to meet the USN's requirements for the kind of war they wanted to fight, the way they wanted to fight it. There was nothing there. US builders were perfectly capable of building an airplane that could perform in the same manner as the A6M2 *if they had a customer who asked for it*. These are two fundamentally different aircraft that represent diametrically opposing mentalities and doctrine and practices. Their only similarities were that they could fly, sat one pilot, and could land on an aircraft carrier. There was nothing in the A6M2 design that was needed in the F6F and the F6F was designed and approved before the Koga Zero fell into US hands. This whole issue is wrapped up in the postwar super plane A6M mentality fostered by Martin Caidin and the corresponding IJN super pilot nonsense. Get away from the wartime propaganda, the breath taking "gee whiz," and look at the cold hard facts of designing airplanes to meet the customer's specifications.

This is analogous to fencing. My opponent prefers to use a foil, an elegant lightweight weapon that requires point contact on the trunk of the body, only, to score. I like to use a saber that allows edge of blade, top and bottom, and point contact anywhere from the waist up including arms and heads. Mu opponent is very good with a foil and even may score some points, but in the long run I'll beat the crap out of him with my saber. So, he says, "I'll use an improved foil!" and he switches to an epee. Heavier, with the entire body as a target area, but still only point contact. He'll probably do a little better because I have more to think about on the defense, but, again, with a saber I have more directional attack options and, in the long run, he will lose. So he says "the hell with this" and he switches to a saber and now we're operating under the same rules, I'll still win because he has too many bad habits left over from using a foil in the first place.

Get an understanding of training, doctrine, and practice of the adversaries. Look into the warrior culture of the adversaries. That's the key to understanding the Pacific War in the air.

Here, give me a hand and help me climb down from this here soap box, I'm likely to bust my butt.

oh, and here's a nice shot of the restored Koga Zero taken at North Island NAS in the late summer of 1944. This is an official USN photo, one of several taken at the same time, from my collection.

irdkcleon_7.jpg


Regards,

Rich
 
R Leonard said:
What makes you think that there were no changes to the F6F from the XF6F based upon information gleaned from one or both captured Zero's or the post-combat reports?
Click to expand...

After some reflection, no, I don't think so . . . And even if there were, a major design change based on some examination of the Koga Zero, something that would have caused a major change to performance, that would have required a contract change order (there isn't one to my knowledge) and that would have required a nomenclature change, i.e., to F6F-4. There was only one F6F-4 (b/n 02981) modified from the original XF6F-1, but it was not a production model.

Again, I have the combat reports for Coral Sea and Midway. Looked at them again last night. There is nothing in them that is of value to someone designing an airplane. I have BuAer interview transcripts of Jimmy Thach and Noel Gayler. The most you can get out of them is that the F4F is inferior in climb, turn, and speed performance compared to the to the Zero. Big deal.

No, confident with Grumman's design, the Navy ordered production of the F6F on 20 June 1941 slightly more than a year before the first one ever took off. After the first flight (all done at the Bethpage NY facility) of the XF6F-3, the order was increased. Production, however, was somewhat delayed as Grumman did not have a building in which to set up the assembly line. Grumman had to stand in line for construction materials just like everyone else. Eventually, things started moving; in fact, work was started on production models with the roof and only three of the four walls of the F6F production facility, Plant Number 3, in place. The first production model F6F-3 (b/n 04775) flew on 3 October 1942, two weeks after Eddie Sanders took the air in the Koga Zero. VF-9 was the first squadron to get the F6F-3, taking their first delivery on 16 January 1943, a little over 18 months from the initial contract order. F6F-3 production increased rapidly. As you can see, there wasn't a heck of a lot of time for design changes between the June test flight and the deliver of the first F6F-3 in October.

Bureau number (b/n) production sequence was
F6F-3
04775 to 04958 delivered 10/42 to 4/43
08789 to 09047 delivered 4/43 to 6/43
25721 to 26195 delivered 6/43 to 8/43
65890 to 66244 delivered 8/43 to 9/43
39999 to 43137 delivered 9/43 to 4/44
F6F-5
58000-58999 delivered 4/44 to 6/44
69992 to 72991 delivered 6/44 to 12/44
77259 to 80258 delivered 12/44 to 6/45
93652 to 94521 delivered 6/45 to 11/45

And, indeed, yes, there were small tweaking changes made during the production runs, but they were superficial for the most part: The big change was the change in engine, R2800-10 to R2800-10W, between the F6F-3 and the F6F-5. Other changes were:

- On b/n's 04775 to 04958, 08789 to 09047, and 25721 to 26195 (these being the first 909 F6F-3s built had a radio mast that canted forward, subsequent production radio masts were straight up from the horizontal.

- Additionally on all of those just mentioned and on b/n's 65890 to 66244 and 39999 to 41294 (these being the first 2,560 F6F-3's) the radio mast was slightly offset to the right of centerline.

- Starting with b/n 41295, masts were offset slightly to the left of centerline.

- The first 909 F6F-3s also had fairings over the two inboard guns on each wing. This was discarded in subsequent production.

- Landing lights on the port wing were eliminated starting with b/n 08886 except for designated night fighters (F6F-3N and F6F-5N).

- Lower cowl flaps were omitted starting with b/n 39999

- Bulge fairing over lateral exhausts omitted starting with b/n 40235

- Access panel for ADI system fluid tank installed on 40634 and all subsequent

- Starting with b/n 42185 all F6Fs were HVAR capable

- All F6F-5 production had provision for either 3 .50 cal machine guns in each wing or 1 20mm cannon and 2 .50 cal machine gun. Some late production F6F-5Ns utilized the mixed battery.

- The rear vision window to the rear of the cockpit, left and right, appeared on all F6F-3 and between 1500 and 2000 of the F6F-5. B/n of change is unknown.

- Dorsal recognition lights eliminated starting with b/n 70289.

- All F6F-3 had one controllable trim tab on the left aileron and a fix tab on the right. All F6F-5 had one servo tab and one fixed tab on each aileron; the left tab was controllable from the cockpit.

- On F6F-3 the bullet resistant pane was mounted the laminated plate glass windshield with space between to allow for heating/defrost. On the F6F-3N, F6F-5, and F6F-5N the laminated plate glass was eliminated and the bullet resistant pane was incorporated as an integral part of the canopy.

And then there's the obvious question . . . exactly what features were incorporated into the F6F design that resulted from flights tests conducted in California while the first production models were being built on Long Island? The first F6F-3 rolled out less than a month after Koga's Zero was airworthy. Just what did Sanders and company find that would make Leroy Grumman go running back to the drawing board while the approved design was already in production?

Just what was so earth shattering about the A6M2 design? Answer, nothing . . . that's the point no one gets. There was no rocket science here. The design was not some miracle. Examination of the aircraft and test flights explained its performance, but there was nothing earth shattering about the design once you figured out what the Japanese wanted to be able to do with the airplane. (Fair warning, this paragraph is a paraphrase from the words coming from an F4F ace - with 2 A6Ms to his credit - who also flew the Koga Zero and was a post war Navy test pilot.)

The design of the A6M2 was the result of the kind of war the IJN wanted to fight, the way they wanted to fight it. The F6F was designed to meet the USN's requirements for the kind of war they wanted to fight, the way they wanted to fight it. There was nothing there. US builders were perfectly capable of building an airplane that could perform in the same manner as the A6M2 *if they had a customer who asked for it*. These are two fundamentally different aircraft that represent diametrically opposing mentalities and doctrine and practices. Their only similarities were that they could fly, sat one pilot, and could land on an aircraft carrier. There was nothing in the A6M2 design that was needed in the F6F and the F6F was designed and approved before the Koga Zero fell into US hands. This whole issue is wrapped up in the postwar super plane A6M mentality fostered by Martin Caidin and the corresponding IJN super pilot nonsense. Get away from the wartime propaganda, the breath taking "gee whiz," and look at the cold hard facts of designing airplanes to meet the customer's specifications.

This is analogous to fencing. My opponent prefers to use a foil, an elegant lightweight weapon that requires point contact on the trunk of the body, only, to score. I like to use a saber that allows edge of blade, top and bottom, and point contact anywhere from the waist up including arms and heads. Mu opponent is very good with a foil and even may score some points, but in the long run I'll beat the crap out of him with my saber. So, he says, "I'll use an improved foil!" and he switches to an epee. Heavier, with the entire body as a target area, but still only point contact. He'll probably do a little better because I have more to think about on the defense, but, again, with a saber I have more directional attack options and, in the long run, he will lose. So he says "the hell with this" and he switches to a saber and now we're operating under the same rules, I'll still win because he has too many bad habits left over from using a foil in the first place.

Get an understanding of training, doctrine, and practice of the adversaries. Look into the warrior culture of the adversaries. That's the key to understanding the Pacific War in the air.

Here, give me a hand and help me climb down from this here soap box, I'm likely to bust my butt.

oh, and here's a nice shot of the restored Koga Zero taken at North Island NAS in the late summer of 1944. This is an official USN photo, one of several taken at the same time, from my collection.

irdkcleon_7.jpg


Regards,

Rich
Click to expand...

You present a very good argument but I still believe that changes could have been made because of it. I am not saying the overall design just as you said tweaking to it. It just makes sense since pretty much everybody did it when they had the opportunity.
 
You make a very good argument Rich. And I am no fan of the Zero either.

However, part of your argument is flawed. The June 20th order was based upon flight tests of an R2600 powered XF6F-1, so it was clear the USN was going to order the plane regaurdless.

Also, the "04775 to 04958 delivered 10/42 to 4/43" production run is misleading. According to various sources I've read, of that lot of 183 planes, only 10 were built in 1942, all the rest in the first 4 months of 1943, which implies that most were built in late Feb, March and April as the production line would have been increasingly productive towards the end of that batch. While not false, this production information is... not very accurate as it implies a consistant 15 planes a month across those 6 months, when in fact the production was heavily loaded toward the end of that period.

I think that after the tests the speed goal of +30 mph in all fight conditions was established, and whatever tweaking may have been needed to ensure this was done. It is at least suspicious that at exactly this time the NACA and ALCOA suddenly put a major rush on a project to develop and fully test a satisfactory flush riviting machine/process for duraluminum starting in the late Summer of 1942. Also, NACA wind-tunnel canopy studies that look surprisingly like that of the Hellcat were conducted at this time. And further Wind Tunnel studies were suddenly conducted involving the effect on paint types/methods and aircraft speed - and then the Hellcat got a very different paint job than earlier USN fighters conforming exactly to the NACA results. The results of these projects could well have benefited the Hellcat without requiring a major redesign or change of contract by the manufacturer, and would also explain some of the early production delay.

=S=

Lunatic
 
I stumbled on this thread while looking for performance information on the "de-navalized" Bf-109t and became absolutely fascinated by the spirit of discussion in this thread. I would however have to believe that Rich's information is probably the more accuarate. This is not only due to the fact that his sources on all things Grumman VS. IJN are impeccalbe, but more importantly, in a knife fight like this, Rich would show up with a pistol, but would probably keep it holsterd and use a sabre just for s***ts and grins.
 
Chiron said:
The famous Japanese ace, Saburo Sakai , once stated that if Germany had Zeros instead of Bf-109, the outcome of Battle of Britain would be very different. He believed Zero's superior range will enable Germans to strike deep into the interior of Britain.

Whats your opinions on that?
Click to expand...

Somebody correct me if I'm wrong, but when the Battle of Britain took place (the RAF's official start and stop dates were July 10-Oct. 31, 1940), didn't Japan have only a handful of Zeros (which I think would've been a batch of A6M1's), and the majority of Japan's fighters would've been fixed landing gear A5M Claudes and Ki-27 Nates?
 
Sakai in my opinion was probably correct. Consider a few salient points. The british in 1940 were trained to dogfight, which was a major tactical advantage over the germans. Spitfires and Hurricanes could out-dive and out-turn an Me 109, whereas the Me 109 could outclimb, and had the firepower advantage. British pilots were trained to to try and dogfight the germans, because the 109 turned like a mule (comparatively speaking).

These tactics were precisely the wrong tactics against the zero. There is no doubt that the zero could be beaten in a "shoot and scoot" engagement, which is basically how the Americans defeated the Japanese in the air battles after 1942. Japanese piloits and equipment were outstanding at the dogfight melee, as the spitfire pilots in the pacific found to their cost. the spitfire was an outstanding dogfighter...except when put up against a zero.

In addition, having the range of a zero would have given the germans enormous flexibility to attack the British anywhere in the british Isles. The British would have been forced to disperse their fighters, which meant the odds against them would be even longer than they were.

As for the vulnerability of the Zero, the zero was no more vulnerable than the Me-109 E-3 versions. the early marks of the 109 (including most of those used in the BoB, did not have armour, and structurally were a bit weak. A zero compared to this equipmentwas not that much worse. I am not sure whether the 109s had fire supressant equipment. the Zero certainly did not. by comparison the RAF fighters generally did have armour, but this was not resistant to 20mm AP shells. the germans used AP ammunition in their 20mm fitouts, the Japanese did not.

My opinion is that in the end the advantages of having zeroes instead of 109s in the BoB would outweigh the disadvantages.
 
Sakai in my opinion was probably correct. Consider a few salient points. The british in 1940 were trained to dogfight, which was a major tactical advantage over the germans. Spitfires and Hurricanes could out-dive and out-turn an Me 109, whereas the Me 109 could outclimb, and had the firepower advantage. British pilots were trained to to try and dogfight the germans, because the 109 turned like a mule (comparatively speaking).

These tactics were precisely the wrong tactics against the zero. There is no doubt that the zero could be beaten in a "shoot and scoot" engagement, which is basically how the Americans defeated the Japanese in the air battles after 1942. Japanese piloits and equipment were outstanding at the dogfight melee, as the spitfire pilots in the pacific found to their cost. the spitfire was an outstanding dogfighter...except when put up against a zero.

In addition, having the range of a zero would have given the germans enormous flexibility to attack the British anywhere in the british Isles. The British would have been forced to disperse their fighters, which meant the odds against them would be even longer than they were.

As for the vulnerability of the Zero, the zero was no more vulnerable than the Me-109 E-3 versions. the early marks of the 109 (including most of those used in the BoB, did not have armour, and structurally were a bit weak. A zero compared to this equipmentwas not that much worse. I am not sure whether the 109s had fire supressant equipment. the Zero certainly did not. by comparison the RAF fighters generally did have armour, but this was not resistant to 20mm AP shells. the germans used AP ammunition in their 20mm fitouts, the Japanese did not.

My opinion is that in the end the advantages of having zeroes instead of 109s in the BoB would outweigh the disadvantages.
 
There is no doubt that the additional range of the Zero would have made a huge difference. There is also no doubt that the Zero was a much better dogfighter than any aircraft in the BOB.
However a lot of 109's made it home after suffering damage that would have destroyed a Zero. This is something that the Japanese were aware of. Indeed there was a reccomendation from the Japanese air attaches in both the London and Berlin embassys that future Japanese aricraft be fitted with armour and sealing tanks, advice needless to say, that was not followed.
The actual report stated 'The German planes are well protected, with good protection for the pilots, even the fuel tanks are protected. So German planes have durability even in disadvantageous combat positions. The Imperial Japanese navy should reflect this point and consider adapting better protection'.
Its worth noting that the Japanese air attache was a Naval officer Lt Commander Genda Minoru and his title was Assistant Naval Attache and Special Air Attache.
It my belief that the advantages of the additional range would not have been sufficient. The Japanese losses would have been higher than the German losses of the 109 due to their poor protection. The ability of the Zero to dogfight would have been countered by the additional performance of the Spitfire and a change in tactics. It is often pointed out correctly that the Spit V did not score well against the Zero, it isn't often mentioned that the Seafire, which is a heavier Spit V with less performance did do well against the Zero. The difference being the tactics. A Spit I or II in the BOB still had the extra speed.

Jerry Louper is correct in pointing out that the argument is in some way academic, as the only Zero's in service were pre production prototypes. In fact the IJN was still equiping with Zeros when the was started in December 1941. A better comparison time line wise is the Spit V, not the Mk I and II in the BOB.
 
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