SBD Dauntless Discussion Group

[Glider]

The Colossus and Majestic classes were really good examples of someone sitting down with a problem and coming up with a pragmatic solution. Its an interesting story which I have outlined below.
The RN needed carriers and they needed them quickly. We didn't have the Naval shipyards to build sufficient numbers of large carriers. The CVEs which as we know were basically converted merchant ships were coming on stream, were serving well but were of course too small and slow.
So the design for the Colossus was finalised.
The ships were built to Merchant Navy standards enableing them to be built in non naval shipyards.
The non armour protection, compartmentation, damage control, sprinklers, fireproof curtains, ventilation etc was as good as the best but the armour was missing.
The engines were standard destroyer engines and machinery for ease of supply
AA defense was very good but only short range. The carriers main AA defence was its aircraft, secondly its escort then its AA. They didn't carry any 20mm just 40mm and 2pdr. 20 mm lack the range to hit and destroy an attacking plane before it drops its weapons, hence the emphasise on the 40mm guns.
As a result you had a small ship that could carry a good number of aircraft at speed to keep up with our capital ships of the time. It was also cheap and easy to produce.
Its a formula that worked as after the war a number were purchased by other countries.
France, Netherlands, Australia, Argentina, India, Brasil all bought examples.

 

[Nonskimmer]

Canada too. We were loaned the Warrior for a time, of the Colossus class, and the Magnificent which was a Majestic class. We later bought one of the Majestics (the planned HMS Powerful) which was updated and commissioned as HMCS Bonaventure. Six Majestic class carriers were planned, but none were ever commissioned into the Royal Navy. The war ended and they were considered surplus to requirements.

 

[syscom3]

The more I read up on the Dauntless and the Helldiver, the more I appreciate the SBD.

Too bad the USN just didnt put in larger engines as an upgrade, and not waste time with the "2C"

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The SBD was also very maneuvable and scored Zero Kills, now here I go lighting the "fire," I read that an SBD empty, with a good pilot could trun INSIDE a Zero using it's dive brakes in the turn....

COMMENTS?!?

 

[evangilder]

But what good would an empty plane do in a dogfight? Seriously, I suppose it is possible, but I would think it would be a bit foolhardy to mix it up with a Zero while flying an SBD.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

But what good would an empty plane do in a dogfight? Seriously, I suppose it is possible, but I would think it would be a bit foolhardy to mix it up with a Zero while flying an SBD.

Sorry Eric, I should of said clean (no bombs). As far as mixing it up with a Zero, there were times I think SBDs didn't have a choice!

 

[lesofprimus]

On the second day of the Battle of the Coral Sea, Lt. "Swede" Vejtasa was leading 4 of the 8 Douglas SBDs assigned anti-torpedo patrol duty. He suddenly found himself alone and under attack by 8 Mitsubishi Zeros. A wild dogfight ensued, with no quarter given by either side. Remembering lessons his skipper had emphasized, "Swede" defended himself. Turning into every attack, he was able to increase the angle of deflection for the enemy fighters and maneuver into position to use his own forward-firing .30 caliber guns. He downed three Zeros that day; but when the dogfight was over, only half of the SBDs returned to the USS Yorktown.

 

[syscom3]

I think one of the escape choices for the SBD if it had altitude, was to deploy the dive brakes and go vertical. The zero couldnt follow the plane down.

 

[evangilder]

Wow, guys, amazing stories. I would have figured that an SBD would just try and beat feet outta there if attacked by Zeros. I guess there are times when you have to fight your way out.

 

[syscom3]

.....A wild dogfight ensued, with no quarter given by either side. Remembering lessons his skipper had emphasized, "Swede" defended himself........He downed three Zeros that day.......

No doubt he turned into the Zero's..... but I seriously doubt he got into a dogfight with them. Maybe he put some holes into the zero's when he had the chance, but to shoot down three?

Think about it, a dive bomber dogfighting the most maneauverable fighter of that stage of the war?

 

[syscom3]

I found this unique pix I took at Chino this spring (2005).

TBM, Wildcat and SBD warming up for the mornings's fly by.

 

[R Leonard]

now here I go lighting the "fire," I read that an SBD empty, with a good pilot could trun INSIDE a Zero using it's dive brakes in the turn....

Oh, aren't you an evil man

I wouldn't touch that line with a 10 foot pole.

But, let's talk about the SBD a little bit. The SBD first flew on August 1935 and entered service with VB-5 (Bombing Squadron 5) on April 11, 1938. The last SBD in US naval service was in the Pacific Fleet Pool and was stricken from service on September 30, 1945. The last of some 5,321 SBDs was delivered to the Navy in August 1944. SBDs were in combat from December 1941 into late July 1945. Pilots executing attacks from SBDs were solely responsible for sinking five aircraft carriers and were partially responsible for another carrier, a battleship, a cruiser and other smaller warships and numerous merchant vessels.

Over the course of the war SBDs flew some 52,687 combat sorties. Of those, 6,048 were in Navy squadrons off aircraft carriers, 5,283 were in Navy squadrons based ashore, 40,872 were in Marine Corps squadrons, also based ashore, and another 484 sorties were from land based SBDs for which, for whatever reason, the post war Navy statisticians could not identify as definitively Navy or Marine Corps. Roughly 22,942 tons of bombs were dropped on targets in these sorties; 2,524 from carrier-based aircraft, 2,185 from USN land-based aircraft, 18,147 from USMC land-based, and the balance, 86 tons, from the unknown service group.

In US service, SBD losses for the entire war in combat theaters were 654. These losses can be broken down several ways. USN carrier-based SBD losses in combat sorties were 40 to enemy AA fire and 43 to enemy aircraft for a total of 83 losses directly attributed to combat action. Also in the course of combat operations there were an additional 48 SBDs lost in operational accidents, giving us a total of 131 combat related losses, or 38.42% of all combat related losses with a loss per hundred combat sorties rate of 2.17. An additional 65 carrier-based SBDs were lost in non-combat flights. Another 35 were lost aboard ship, mostly in the losses of USS Lexington, USS Yorktown, USS Wasp, and USS Hornet.

USN land-based SBD losses in combat sorties were 17 to enemy AA fire and 12 to enemy aircraft for a total of 29 losses directly attributed to combat action. Also in the course of combat operations there were an additional 4 SBDs lost in operational accidents, giving us a total of 33 combat related losses, or 9.68% of all combat related losses with a loss per hundred combat sorties rate of 0.62. An additional 55 land-based SBDs were lost in non-combat flights. Another 19 were lost on the ground, most to Japanese naval and land gunfire and air raids on Guadalcanal and others to routine ground accidents.

USMC land-based SBD losses in combat sorties were 96 to enemy AA fire and 24 to enemy aircraft for a total of 120 losses directly attributed to combat action. Also in the course of combat operations there were an additional 56 SBDs lost in operational accidents, giving us a total of 176 combat related losses, or 51.61% of all combat related losses with a loss per hundred combat sorties rate of 0.43. An additional 104 land-based SBDs were lost in non-combat flights. Another 36 were lost on the ground, somewhat more than half of these to Japanese naval and land gunfire and air raids in the course of the Guadalcanal campaign and the balance to routine ground accidents.

Of the unknown service group, there was only one combat related operational loss, accounting for 0.29% of all combat related losses. This group had a loss per 100 combat sorties rate of 0.21.

In total, US naval service SBD losses in combat sorties were 153 to enemy AA fire and 79 to enemy aircraft for a total of 232 losses directly attributed to combat action. There were an additional 109 SBDs lost in combat related operational accidents, making a total of 340 combat related losses, or 52.06% of all SBD losses from all causes in combat theaters. Overall, the SBD had a loss per 100 combat sorties rate of 0.65. This rate was the second lowest for the major USN/USMC type aircraft, behind only the PBJ (0.36). Comparatively, though, 6.28 times more combat sorties than the PBJ.

As far as air to air results are concerned, we already know that some 79 SBDs were lost to enemy aircraft. The post war USN statistics report that aircraft carrier based, USN SBDs were credited with 106 enemy aircraft shot down, dividing these into 31 bombers and 75 fighters; this for 43 carrier-based air-to-air SBD losses. For USN land-based SBDs, credits were totaled at 10, all fighters versus 12 losses. I'll come back to these numbers later. Land-based USMC SBDs were credited with 22, all fighters, in trade for 24 SBD losses. In sum, for the 79 SBDs lost in aerial combat, the Navy credited 138 enemy aircraft shot down in return, 107 fighters and 31 bombers.

Of the 52,687 action sorties flown by SBDs only 464 actually involved engaging enemy aircraft in combat. Best estimates are that SBDs engaged a total of 78 bombers and 708 fighters. In those engagements we know that losses were 79, or 17% of those SBDs engaging in aerial combat. SBDs damaged, but not lost, in these encounters were 92 or 19.8%. These results can also be shown for USN carrier-based SBDs and in combination for land-based USN and USMC SBDs.

Of the 6,048 action sorties flown by SBDs from carriers, 301 including engaging enemy aircraft in combat. SBDs were estimated to have engaged a total of 76 bombers and 357 fighters. In those engagements we know that losses were 43, or 14.3% of those carrier SBDs engaging in aerial combat. Carrier SBDs damaged, but not lost, in these encounters were 66 or 21.9%.

Of the 46,639 action sorties flown by SBDs from land bases, 163 including engaging enemy aircraft in combat. Land-based SBDs were estimated to have engaged a total of 2 bombers and 351 fighters. In those engagements we know that losses were 36, or 22.1% of those land-based SBDs engaging in aerial combat. Land-based SBDs damaged, but not lost, in these encounters were 26 or 16.0%.

In terms of anti-aircraft fire, 4,316 action sorties flown by carrier-based SBDs faced enemy AA fire or about 71.36% of all action sorties. We already know that this cost 40 aircraft or 0.93% of those carrier SBDs encountering AA fire. Another 257 carrier SBD's were damaged, or 5.95%. On the average, about 13.47% of carrier SBDs hit by AA fire were lost. Land-based SBD action sorties facing enemy AA fire numbered 23,760 or about 51.48% of all sorties. We already know that this cost 113 aircraft or 0.48% of those land-based SBDs encountering AA fire. Another 918 land-based SBD's were damaged, or 3.86%. On the average, about 10.96% of land-based SBDs hit by AA fire were lost.

In total, 28,076 action sorties flown by SBDs encountered AA fire or about 53.29% of all action sorties. Enemy AA fire cost 153 SBDs or 0.54% of all SBDs encountering AA fire. A total of 1,175 SBD's were damaged, or 4.19%. On the average, then, about 11.52% of SBDs hit by AA fire were lost.

I can't particularly comment on USMC SBD aerial victory claims as I have no other ready data the USN statistical studies. I have, though, looked at USN SBD aerial victory claims and can add to our body of knowledge on the subject. First of all, a review of the action reports (in USN/USMC parlance the ACA Report) shows that there is a slight discrepancy between the USN post war analysis and what we can count today. I believe the differences can be attributed to several causes, probably in combination: incomplete data in the original compilation, keying errors (the original 1946 analysis was done on some of the early punch card systems), and either a quality control miscue or a philosophical difference in what constitutes a credit.

In any event, as we know from the post war statistical analysis, Navy SBDs, carrier-based and land-based, combined, were credited with 116 enemy aircraft shot down, 31 bombers and 85 fighters. Well, maybe not. Consider that if you count up the claims, this putting a squadron, name, date, time, enemy aircraft identification, and general location, you get a somewhat different answer. First of all, we need to divide the combat results in to three categories: actual credits, probable credits, and damaged; that is, shot down for sure, probably shot down, but can't say for sure, and put some holes in it, but it got away or was lost from sight.

When we make this analysis, we end up with something like 96 credits, 16 probables, and 17 damaged. If you were to add the 96 credits to the 16 probables you get 112, a difference of 4, or 3.45%, between the USN post war statistics and a modern look at the numbers. This is well within the average variance I've found of about 4.5%. This leads me to believe that in the post war statistics, at least for SBDs, probables were given credit as actuals. On the other hand, if you take all the shared credits (the .5 or .25 or .20 and so on where more that on aircraft was involved in a particular shoot down) and credit each as a full credit, lo and behold actual credits are suddenly up to 115 without considering the probables. In either case I suspect a lack of firm guidance in the original 1946 statistical compilation that allowed for either probables recorded as actuals or shared credits as whole, full credits.

Be that as it may, we can determine some interesting data in the combat results if we break them down further, for example, how many enemy aircraft were shot down by SBD pilots as opposed to radioman/rear gunners? Or exactly what were the enemy plane types shot down?

SBD credit breakdown:

Shooter -- Actual Credits -- Probables -- Damaged
Carrier Based Pilots: 41.0 -- 12.0 -- 16.0
Carrier Based Gunners: 52.0 -- 3.0 -- 1.0
Total Carrier Based: 93.0 -- 15.0 -- 17.0

Land Based Pilots: 0.0 -- 1.0 -- 0.0
Land Based Gunners: 3.0 -- 0.0 -- 0.0
Total Land Based: 3.0 -- 1.0 -- 0.0

All Pilots: 41.0 -- 13.0 -- 16.0
All Gunners: 55.0 -- 3.0 -- 1.0
Total: 96.0 -- 16.0 -- 17.0

This shows us that about 57.3% of actual credits for SBD shoot downs were given to the guys in the back seat.

Enemy types noted as shot down were:

Type -- Actual Credits -- Probables -- Damaged
Mitsubishi Type 00 VF, A6M (Zeke): 55 -- 5 -- 14
Aichi Type 99 VB, D3A (Val): 8 -- 5 -- 3
Nakajima Type 97 VTB, B5N (Kate): 8 -- 0 -- 0
Mitsubishi Type 96 VF, A5M (Claude): 5 -- 2 -- 0
Mitsubishi Type 01 VB/VR, G4M (Betty): 5 -- 1 -- 0
Aichi Type 00 Float VSO, E13A (Jake): 3 -- 0 -- 0
Kawanishi Type 94 Float VSO, E7K (Alf): 3 -- 0 -- 0
Kawanishi Type 97 VP, H6K (Mavis): 2 -- 0 -- 0
Kawanishi Type 2 VP, H8K (Emily): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Mitsubishi Type 0 Float VSO, F1M (Pete): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Mitsubishi Type 99 VB(M), Ki-51 (Sonia): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Nakajima Type 2 Float VF, A6M2-N (Rufe): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Nakajima Type 95 Float VSO, E8N (Dave): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Unidentified Japanese Transport Aircraft: 1 -- 0 -- 0
Martin Type VB(M) DB.7 (Vichy French): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Kawasaki Type 03 VF, Ki-61 (Tony): 0 -- 2 -- 0
Nakajima Type 2 VF, Ki-44 (Tojo): 0 -- 1 -- 0

So, if we look at this list, that breaks down as:

Fighters: 61 -- 10 -- 14
Bombers: 23 -- 6 -- 3
Float Scout/Observers: 8 -- 0 -- 0
Flying Boats: 3 -- 0 -- 0
Unidentified: 1 -- 0 -- 0

Kind of a funny oddity in the post war statistics is that they tend to include float planes in the fighter category and flying boats in the bomber category. So, if we roll those numbers into the fighter and bomber categories we get:

Fighters: 69 -- 10 -- 14
Bombers: 26 -- 3 -- 6
Unidentified: 1 -- 0 -- 0

And if we add credits and probables together, that leaves us with 79 fighters and 29 bombers as shot down which is not all that far off from what was reported in the post war statistics, short 6 fighters and 2 bombers. And if we go the other way and record shared credits as full credits we end up with 77 fighters and 37 bombers and the single unidentified.

Anyway, fun with numbers.

By USN squadrons, SBD aerial scores looked like:

Squadron -- Credits -- Probable -- Damaged
VB-16 -- 19 -- 2 -- 13
VS-10 -- 13 -- 0 -- 0
VS-2 -- 10.5 -- 1 -- 0
VB-2 -- 6 -- 3 -- 0
VS-5 -- 6 -- 0 -- 1
VS-71 -- 6 -- 0 -- 0
VB-8 -- 5 -- 0 -- 0
VS-6 -- 5 -- 0 -- 0
VS-3 -- 3 -- 3 -- 1
VB-12 -- 3 -- 1 -- 2
VB-11 -- 3 -- 1 -- 0
VB-10 -- 3 -- 0 -- 0
VB-9 -- 3 -- 0 -- 0
VB-3 -- 2 -- 2 -- 0
VB-5 -- 2 -- 0 -- 0
VB-6 -- 2 -- 0 -- 0
VS-72 -- 2 -- 0 -- 0
VGS-29 -- 1 -- 0 -- 0
VS-8 -- 1 -- 0 -- 0
VB-13 -- 0.5 -- 3 – 0

My eyes are getting crossed. I'll do some real work tomorrow to take my mind off all this and then maybe tomorrow night see if I can conjure up anything else interesting.

Regards,

Rich

 

[syscom3]

Do you know if Japanese records or eyewitness's correlate those claims of aircraft shotdown?

 

[jernst]

I'll do some real work tomorrow to take my mind off all this and then maybe tomorrow night see if I can conjure up anything else interesting

Very interesting. Thank you Rich.

 

[plan_D]

That was an excellent read, Rich. Thanks for taking the time.

 

[Nonskimmer]

Yes indeed. Great post Rich.

 

[evangilder]

Once again, Rich, great info!

 

[R Leonard]

Do you know if Japanese records or eyewitness's correlate those claims of aircraft shotdown?

Two parts . . .

1. Do I know ". . . if Japanese records . . . correlate those claims of aircraft shot down?"

2. Do I know ". . . if . . . eyewitnesses correlate those claims of aircraft shot down?"

For the first, no I have no such records at hand, nor do I read Japanese. In return, I'd ask if you have any such records that would disprove the credited claims? And, if you don't have them either, what, exactly, would be your point? Certainly nothing you could prove, then, eh? And if you do have corresponding Japanese loss reports, please enlighten me, but, remember, facts, reports, and reasoned analysis, not just opinion.

Seriously, if you really want to go there, wouldn't an equally obvious question be: Are there any US records that would corroborate any of the claims for such Japanese stalwarts as, say, their top 5 naval aces, Nishizawa Hiroyoshi (87), Fukumoto Shigeo (72), Sugita Sho-ichi (70), Iwamoto Tetsuzo (66), or Sakai Saburo (62) or their top 5 Army aces, Nakada Yoshihiko (45), Kamito Sumi (40), Anabuki Satoshi (39), Kamae Morichiki (32), or Sasaki Isamu (32), against US, or anyone else for that matter, adversaries? Do you really want to know the answer to that question?

Second part. It helps to have a working knowledge of USN scouting and bombing doctrine as it relates to such aircraft as the SBD. Since there's not a great many SBD pilots left from whom you could gather this information in person, though I know not just a few of those still left, I suggest you try to get a copy of the USF-74 manual for a complete discussion of doctrine and tactics. Briefly, generally, and to avoid going into some sort of PhD dissertation, scouting doctrine called for two-plane sections to go out on a particular bearing for A number of miles, make a turn to the left or right (usually right), go for B number of miles, and return to base or point option on some other bearing, normally about 20 degrees off the outgoing leg. Two planes, two pilots, two gunners, eight eyes, plenty of witnesses.

For bombing missions VB and VS squadrons, say, in 1942 and 1943, usually made up of 18 aircraft, were generally divided into three six-plane divisions of two three-plane sections each. This organization was designed to provide maximum protection and support in the event of an attack. So, in any given section there are three pilots and three gunners, twelve eyes. Again, plenty of witnesses, especially in view of the USN's almost fanatical preoccupation with section integrity.

Further, I'd point out the analysis of SBD sorties engaging enemy aircraft and the results thereof. Of all SBD sorties, some 52,687 in all, but 464 actually engaged enemy aircraft, or only 0.88% of all SBDs in combat, less than 1%. These 464 SBDs engaged an estimated (remembering of course the estimates of enemy aircraft engaged is not the same as enemy aircraft shot down and, often, a little difficult for the individual aviator to discern as he is usually a little busy at the time) 786 enemy planes. Of the estimated enemy planes engaged, a total of 138 were claimed, or 17.5%. Compared to other USN aircrafts' percentage of engaged to claimed, F4F (37.8%), FM (59.4%), F6F (55.4%), F4U (40.4%), SB2C (15.4%), and TBF/TBM (16.1%), I don't see the SBDs 17.5% as particularly unusual, especially considering the operating environment, and especially in the 1942-1943 time period. Indeed, I might describe it as fairly typical. And oddly enough, the 17.5% engaged claims rate is quite close to the 17% engaged loss rate of the SBD. Tends to firm up my thinking on the subject.

So, yeah, I'm fairly comfortable with the USN reports. Just as the Japanese reported what they thought they saw, so then did the US aviators. I prefer to leave it at that. See, I told you, no PhD dissertation.

If you have some alternative, then, please, be my guest. Pursue it to your heart's content, both sides, though, and bring back your results. I would be most interested in seeing them and grateful, indeed, gratified, for your efforts.

Regards,

Rich

 

[R Leonard]

More SBD esoterica . . .

With regard to action sorties flown by SBDs in the course of the war, most of such can be broken down by type of target attacked.

For carrier-based SBDs action sorties actually attacking targets, by target type were:
Airfields - - 1,765
Land transportation targets - - 20
Harbor areas - - 37
Other military land targets - - 2,338
Other or unknown land targets - - 86
Armored warships - - 639
Unarmored warships - - 157
Merchant vessels over 500 tons - - 726
Merchant vessels under 500 tons - - 77
Unidentified ship type - - 57

For land-based SBDs action sorties actually attacking targets, by target type were:
Airfields - - 5,368
Land transportation targets - - 1,345
Harbor areas - - 484
Other military land targets - - 34,075
Other or unknown land targets - - 689
Armored warships - - 155
Unarmored warships - - 471
Merchant vessels over 500 tons - - 483
Merchant vessels under 500 tons - - 759
Unidentified ship type - - 41

For all SBDs action sorties actually attacking targets, by target type were:
Airfields - - 7,133
Land transportation targets - - 1,385
Harbor areas - - 521
Other military land targets - - 36,413
Other or unknown land targets - - 775
Armored warships - - 794
Unarmored warships - - 628
Merchant vessels over 500 tons - - 1,209
Merchant vessels under 500 tons - - 836
Unidentified ship type - - 98

Bearing in mind that the USN/USMC did not reliably record ammunition expenditures prior to August 1943 and, therefore, numbers for ammunition expended are for August 1943 though August 1945, carrier-based SBDs expended 1,888 tons of bombs on land targets and 410,000 rounds of ammunition. Against warships and merchant targets, carrier SBDs expended 636 tons of bombs and 93,000 rounds of ammunition. For the land-based SBDs, land targets were visited with 19,733 tons of bombs, 6,581,000 rounds of ammunition and 144 rockets; warships and shipping targets received 685 tons of bombs, 123,000 rounds of ammunition, and 88 rockets.

Rich

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Rich you're amazing!