Agreed on this being the more likely scenario. In a pinch, Vals can easily handle Swordfish and Albacores while Zeros take on bigger faster prey.
Set a Ceylon trap for Nagumo, March 1942
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
- Start date
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You never know, miracles do happen. Just to show that I'm not anti British or anti Royal Navy, I actually think Midway was a lucky victory for the US do to the lack of working torpedos, obsolete torpedo planes, new untested pilots on Midway Island and the Zero completely outclassing the F4F-4
This is from Wikipedia and it seems an accurate summary:
"Nagumo evades Somerville
Somerville launched four Albacores from Indomitable at 1400 to search an arc to the northeast out to 200 miles (320 km). Nagumo's southeasterly course would have taken the Japanese fleet right through the centre of the arc. However, at 1500 or 1530, Nagumo changed course to the southwest. Carrier Division 2 did not immediately follow; it performed a series of kinking manoeuvres starting at 1500 that initially took it northwest.[21] Carrier Division 2 was spotted by the two northerly Albacores around 1600. Hiryū launched Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters to intercept the scouts; one Albacore was damaged at 1604, and the other shot down at 1628 without reporting.[22] The two southernmost Albacores missed Nagumo's main body.[21]
Somerville did not receive the damaged Albacore's sighting report until 1655; the report gave the position of Carrier Division 2 with reasonable accuracy, placed the Japanese 125 miles (201 km) away, but contained no other data. At 1700 he received signals intelligence (SIGINT) from Colombo reporting the Japanese course at 1400 as southwesterly at 24 knots. Somerville ordered a course change to the southwest at 1726, not knowing that Nagumo's main body was 120 miles (190 km) away, and that Carrier Division 2 was only 100 miles (160 km) away. The course change was presumably to maintain distance between a superior enemy that was believed to be still closing, or to cover Port T from attack, but it also meant the British lost an opportunity to meet the enemy; had Force A continued on its easterly course, Carrier Division 2 would have passed right in front of it at 2100 at range of about 20 miles (32 km).[22]
The damaged Albacore landed at 1745, less than a half-hour before sunset, and the crew was debriefed. There were two resulting revisions to the 1600 sighting, which were transmitted to Somerville at 1800 and 1817 respectively, and differed significantly from the other and the original report. The final revision correctly identified the two carriers of Carrier Division 2 – which Somerville likely realized to be only part of the enemy force – but also claimed they were heading toward the northwest at a position 25 miles (40 km) or the original sighting. The course heading conflicted with the first revision, which suggested a course toward the southeast. Late on 5 April, FECB decrypted a JN 25B message containing Nagumo's planned movement on 6 April, but this did not aid Somerville as the transmission to the fleet was garbled. Somerville declined to launch a strike based on poor information, and opted to head northwest in pursuit. One radar-equipped aircraft was launched to search a northern arc out to 200 miles (320 km). Later, aircraft were sent to search the easterly arc. By this time it was too late to reestablish contact with the Japanese.[23]
For the Japanese, too, there was a lost opportunity to find the British before night fell. Nagumo did not order a search for the British carriers at the appearance of British carrier-based aircraft. Search aircraft might require homing signals from the carriers to return, homing signals which the enemy could use to locate the Japanese. The Japanese continued southeast at 20 knots completely unaware of the presence of Force A.[24] Carrier Division 2 rejoined the main body's track at 1800[25], and caught up at 2200 180 miles (290 km) due east of Force A.[23] The Japanese circled wide to the south and then east in preparation for striking Trincomalee. Along the way, from 6 April to 8 April, they conducted searches for the British carriers, which were by that time far to the west[18]; the dawn search on 6 April was not comprehensive.[26]"
Indian Ocean raid - Wikipedia
Sunset was at ~18:10, and this is just about when the strike would arrive if ordered to launch at ~16:30, if the damaged Albacore had gotten off a timely message. Additionally, if the recon aircraft had been Fulmars they would have had a better chance of not being intercepted.
We can see how only modest additions to Somerville's forces would have increased his recon capability. Somerville could have attacked Hiryu and Soryu with a high probability of success near sunset on 5 April. A strike by 40 Albacores, each armed with 2 x 500lb and 2 x 250lb bombs, could annihilated both carriers in short order.
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It is a reasonable plan. Boggles the mind that Nagumo didn't search for the British. If Nagumo had found the British fleet in time to launch a strike Somerville would have been annihilated. The Japanese has the best torpedos, torpedo planes and pilots in the world at the time
The same would have been true at Midway if all four IJN carriers had been able to strike the USN carriers, but we have to remember that Nagumo is unlikely to launch a strike that requires a night strike and/or recovery after dark. Also the RN has pretty good radar GCI and they had a fair probability of destroying IJN recon aircraft before they could make visual contact.
I agree 100% that if the Japanese had spotted the American fleet at Midway and launched a full strike, they would very likely have severely damaged or outright sunk all 3 carriers in the first strike. I don't think the US carriers had nearly enough Wildcats to defend the fleet against a full strike
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
I'm not too sure about that, fleet defense for the IJN, however good the Zeros and their pilots were, left a lot to be desired in early '42. As I recall, there were penny packets of strike aircraft harassing Nagumo all morning in June. Read Shattered Sword for the major deficiencies in IJN CAP procedures. I doubt they would have been better BEFORE Midway.
Especially if the RN executes a night torpedo attack, which I believe they were planning on.
- Thread starter
- #48
Admiral Beez
Major
The RN has its planned night attack, but what are we doing with the amassed force of RAF torpedo, dive and level bombers, plus fighters that have been sent and prepared for this day? Does the RN strike first, or does the RAF hit Nagumo during the day? One of these will be the surprise, the other will meet prepared resistance.
RW Mk. III
Airman 1st Class
The best bet is the land-based strike. Numbers and weight of attack is better, and you can reasonably assume Trincomalee is the target of any raid into the Indian ocean. Much the same as midway would be an obvious target. The carriers have to come under the ground-aircraft umbrella to launch the attack. If you can maintain a picket line of, whatever you like, fishing boats with observers, radar, reconnaissance flights. And catch the planes early in the sortie flight (now they are committed the carrier's can't very well turn tail and leave without ahandon either the attack, or the carrier wing.
As I mentioned before, you need your ground based attack aircraft all in state of absolute pilots in cockpits readiness. And sufficient runways to fly them off very quickly.
The land based aircraft have a bit of a benefit too in that they don't have the fuel anxiety of finding their bases on the return leg, they just need to find the Island of Sri Lanka and either crash land, ditch close to the shore, or simply bail out.
This is a bit of a one shot deal so personally I would tell the aircrews to run it to the wire in seeking out and destroying the enemy, recovering the airframe is secondary so long as the crew can be recovered.
- Thread starter
- #50
Admiral Beez
Major
There are several RAF and FAA airstrips on Ceylon. That should be possible, with the right preparation, intel, forewarning and most importantly leadership. Is 222 Group's Air Marshal Sir John Henry D'Albiac up to this job? We need someone to understand what went wrong six weeks earlier with Operation Fuller and apply those lessons.
Were there any American forces that could be invited to join in?
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RW Mk. III
Airman 1st Class
Two other huge difficulties in this rather difficult scheme.
You need heaps of pathfinders. They have to find a mark the carriers, the carrier force is going on an a-b trip to a fixed location on the shore of an island. They have an easier job in that regard. As I see it if you have a dozen at least mosquitoes on the runway, hot like the attack aircraft and you're sorted. They have the range in reconnaissance configuration. They have the high cruise speed to leave just ahead of the attack flight and still do meaningful forward recon and target marking. And they're fast enough that I think they could shadow the carrier's with a navigation beacon lighting them up, while making intercept by zeros very problematic.
Can we get these mosquitoes to Trincomalee or Columbo at this time? No other aircraft will come close in utility in the role at the time.
Second issue is the British need to abandon their torpedo fetish. Everyone knows the carriers are the ticket. Pearl harbour has happened. Taranto has happened. And now here you are with the opportunity to replay pearl harbour but this time it isn't a total surprise.
Bomb the carrier's. Even if you don't sink them or burn them to the waterline, if you can suspend their flight ops the RN carriers can now run away with it. It's easier to hole a deck and burn the hangers than to land killing blows with torpedoes.
- Thread starter
- #52
Admiral Beez
Major
If we can extend their usual 1,300 mile range with ferry tanks in the bomb bay, they could be flown there. Cornwall to Gibraltar, with a generous diversion around Spain is about 1,000 miles. The Germans are still strong in North Africa, so two things to consider. The local British commander will be demanding to keep the Mosquitos to help stop the Axis advance on El Alamein. It will take Churchill to stop that, but best to keep the Mossies away from the North African campaign. So fly southeast to Nigeria, and then skipping from small RAF bases and airfields eastward to Ceylon. However these aren't modern engines, and the Mosquitos' Merlins will be reaching their TBO (time between overhauls).
Kevin J
Banned
Wouldn't we be better off with HP Hampdens as they had a 1720 mile range, Beaufort 1600, Mosquito 1300.
RW Mk. III
Airman 1st Class
.
Not for the advanced recon and pathfinding necessary to actually put the land based attack aircraft (probably hampdens I think) on the carriers. It requires speed to get out and find them on short warning/getting in front of the attack wave.
Kevin J
Banned
You use Catalinas to find the Japanese Fleet as they have a much longer range. You don't get Hampden TB 1s until April 1942 in the UK, but I don't see why they can't enter service earlier. As for the Mosquito, I'm not aware they ever carrier torpedoes. I thought any photos of them carrying them was to fool the Japanese as to the purpose of them when operating off carriers. The Sea Mosquito carrier spinning discs designed to cut through the side of Japanese ships.
- Thread starter
- #56
Admiral Beez
Major
Exactly, and is what actually occurred, thanks to my fellow Canadian, "The Saviour of Ceylon". So, just get more Catalinas and we should be able to spot the Kidō Butai in time to ready the RAF and FAA strike.
Through the FECB and WEC the British know Nagumo is coming into the Indian Ocean in late March 1942, with Ceylon the obvious target. The British just need to know when he's arrived.
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- Thread starter
- #57
Admiral Beez
Major
Imagine the site of the aircraft....
Wellingtons striking from medium altitude.
Fulmars, Albacores (and Chesapeakes, Skuas and Rocs?) dive bombing.
Hampdens, Beauforts, Albacores and Swordfish launching torpedoes
Escorted by Spitfires and Hurricanes...
Envisioning such a force taking off makes me think of both Rule Britannia and unfortunately, Tennyson's Charge of the Light Brigade....
"Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do & die,
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred."
Wellingtons striking from medium altitude.
Fulmars, Albacores (and Chesapeakes, Skuas and Rocs?) dive bombing.
Hampdens, Beauforts, Albacores and Swordfish launching torpedoes
Escorted by Spitfires and Hurricanes...
Envisioning such a force taking off makes me think of both Rule Britannia and unfortunately, Tennyson's Charge of the Light Brigade....
"Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do & die,
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred."
Kevin J
Banned
I'd forget the Wellingtons and Beauforts, I'd want Catalinas and Hampdens from land bases. From carriers, Fulmar dive bombers, Albacore for recce, Swordfish for night torpedo attack, Martlets for CAP and Albacore escort, Hurricane for DLI and Fulmar escort. I can't see the point of Wellingtons dropping bombs from any altitude other than very low. I'd stick with the Hampden for torpedoes, mines and bombs.
Freebird
Master Sergeant
The British Fleet tracked the Japanese strike force on radar over the two cruisers, so they certainly knew that a large Japanese force had struck.
They were apparently about 45 miles away, close enough to show up on air search radar.
- Thread starter
- #60
Admiral Beez
Major
Beaufort is the RAF's primary torpedo strike platform. They would not be left behind.
I'm not sure either that HA Wellingtons can do much, but if we can modify them for two torpedoes or simply bomb from low level we might find a use for them. At LA the Wellington is faster than the Albacore and carries more than twice the bomb load.
IMO, the Wellie looks pretty agile for a big aircraft.
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