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Would the war have been shortened and less overall casualties suffered?
Would substantial German forces have still been required to control northern Italy and prevent Rome from falling under the influence of antifascist factions?
But Churchill wanted Rome and pursuaded FDR that invading Italy would tie down enough German forces to relieve pressure on Russia and reduce their numbers in France.
Though it would have allowed the Allies to accumulate men material in England for the cross channel invasion sooner, it would also have left considerable German assets free to reinforce France or attempt to stem the turning tide in the East.
Gen. Marshall the US JCS realised by mid 1943 that The Germans had bitten off more than they could chew in the USSR and thus being pushed westward, the western Allies should just get on with it in France and really put the squeeze on them.
Even without invading Italy, afaik the Allies werent even thinking about a cross channel invasion before Spring 1944.
Even without invading Italy, afaik the Allies werent even thinking about a cross channel invasion before Spring 1944.
Its well documented and common knowledge that Churchill wanted Rome to show the world that the star of European Fascism was a descendant star.
I dont think Italy could have given significant aid to Germany after 1943 anyway. .
I'm not sure the lessons learned during the Italian campaign was worth the assets we tied down (vs Germans), nor do I think the Italians would have been effective beyond the Med, nor do I think that Kesselering would have been a threat across the Med back to the Suez.
The better question is what could the Allies do, earlier? Sicily and Africa was a warm up for the US and they tested the LW to the point that combined with RAF Desert Force, they controlled the air (and the Med).
I believe that a cross channel invasion before control of the air was very risky.. but had the Allies Not invaded Italy and stopped at Sicily, kesserling is still compelled to keep a sizable force at hand in the Rome area.
So, possibly the extra fresh assets would have been of enormous leverage by invading southern France in April/combined with Normandy two months earlier when the West wall was less re-inforced.
Logistically, the Germans are not in a good position to re-inforce either Russia OR France from Italy. Their natural inclination would have been to re-inforce East which ultimately would have been good for the West.
although the signing of the armistice came the same day of the landing in Calabria, the firm was only the final stage and the surrender was indipendent from invasion (even if a invasion was supposed shortly)If the Allies don't invade mainland Italy, then they don't sign the armistice.
They certainly would, Italian occupation forces in Greece the Balkans frees up 10 - 20 German divisions for activity elsewhere.
although the signing of the armistice came the same day of the landing in Calabria, the firm was only the final stage and the surrender was indipendent from invasion (even if a invasion was supposed shortly)
But without the presence of German forces, are the antifascist factions strong enough that the Fascists need those troops in Italy to maintain control?
The problem was that the Italian government wanted an assurance of an Allied landing before they would surrender, as they feared German retaliation occupation.
My understanding of the negotiations is that without a landing promised there would be no armistice, but if Italian sources say otherwise I would be interested to find oot