Should The Allies Have Bypassed Italy?

Should The Allies Have Bypassed Italy?

  • yes

    Votes: 8 25.8%
  • no

    Votes: 23 74.2%

  • Total voters
    31

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Italian government wanted an assurance of an Allied landing before they would surrender
Italy may change their mind eventually if Allied armies occupy Sicily and Southern France. But it doesn't matter either way. Italy can be bypassed for the remainder of the war.
 
Italy turned out not to be "the soft underbelly of the axis" that Churchill promised.
 
Anyone who has spent a couple months in the army knows that mountains are ideal defensive terrain. Not to mention experience fighting uphill at Gallipoli and in the mountains of 1940 Norway.

PM Churchill undoubtedly had reasons for wanting to land in 1943 Italy but I don't think he expected an easy victory. That was just political posturing.
 
"... PM Churchill undoubtedly had reasons for wanting to land in 1943 Italy but I don't think he expected an easy victory ..."

Italy provided among other features, close access to Yugoslavia and the partisan army there. It was Churchill, let's remember, who threw his support and resources behind Tito. Churchill knew it was vital (for the west) to weigh in on the fate of the Balkans -- and try and slightly counter-balance Russia's influence.

No one is lauding Gallipoli .....

MM
 
Just to make things clear....
Yugoslavia had two large guerrilla forces plus a bunch of smaller independent forces.
.....Chetniks. Legitimate organization led by former officers of the Yugoslav army.
.....Partisans. Military arm of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
Britain supported Chetniks at first as they were the legitimate organization. Support shifted to communists during September 1943 as part of diplomatic effort to please Stalin.

By summer 1943 guerrilla forces had largely been driven out of northern and eastern Yugoslavia. Night supply flights can reach SW Yugoslavia from airfields in Sicily. It's easier still from southern Italy but you don't commit a half million troops just to make partisan supply operations easier.
 
Support shifted to communists during September 1943 as part of diplomatic effort to please Stalin.
There you go again dave. The support was shifted to Tito and his partisans because the Chetniks had shifted to collaborating with the Germans and Italins, and was more concerned with ethnic cleansing, and fighting the partisans, than fighting invaders.
 
The invasion of italy was a factor in the surrender of italy. mussolini had been arrested in July, following Husky. The new italian regime under Bagdoglio continued to mouth support for Germany whilst undertaking secret peace talks with the allies. The Italians would not surrender until given assurances of Allied help, which meant an invasion. They wanted times and places, bviously the allies refused, but they were given an assurance of an invasion sometime. The failure of the allies to undertake an airdrop into Rome meant the germans had the opportunity to arrest and depose the key members of the new government and force those that did escape into a hurried exile. This detracted from the legitimacy of the bagdoglio govt, and contributed to the fissure that occurred in the country.

Italy was never fully supported by the americans and was always starved of resources by them. It eventually became a major sink hole for the german occupying more than 40 divisions at one point. Thats almost as much as the whole of the westwall. There is absolutely no doubt that the forces the americans did commit provided valubale combat experience for their elite divisions. The italian front became a swinging door for the allies, as green personnel were constantly fed into and then back out of the battle. some entire formations were shipped in and then out, but even those formations that remained were constantly having personnel exchanged. The British lacked the manpower to be effective, and nobody except the free french had any real idea on mountain warfare.

Still it was worth it. italy was the first front to surrender in 1945. Invasion of italy opened the mediterranean as a major sea route for the allies, and materially contributed to the build up of shipping that in turn allowed the overlord strategy to be more successful. Not invading Italy would not have allowed any significant diversion of forces from the southern front, or committment in france, as it would have exposed north Africa and the ME TO generally to re-invasion by the Germans. knocking italy out of the war removed 60-70 divisions of the Italian Army from Axis inventory. The germans had to find major forces to replace the italians in garrison in Greece, the Aegean, France, Italy, Corsica and Sardinia. The invasion of Sicily and the imminent threat to italy had a major effect on the course of the Kursk battle and the subsequent soviet counteroffensives. And the murderous treatment meted out by the germans on their erstwhile allies made every one of their remaining allies a net liability to them. After italy was raped by the Germans, nobody trusted the germans any more.

The allied committment in Italy was never going to win the war in Italy. But it was still a valuable stepping stone in the road to victory, and ultimately represented good value for the investment made.....
 
".... Support shifted to communists during September 1943 as part of diplomatic effort to please Stalin. "

Churchill did NOT send James Fitzroy MacLean to Yugoslavia to appease or placate Stalin. He sent him to determine which partisan force was worth supporting .... i.e. in the business of killing Germans at whatever cost (in reprisals).

Eastern Approaches - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The final and longest section of the book covers Maclean's time in and around Yugoslavia, from the late summer of 1943 to the formation of the united government in March 1945. The Yugoslav front, also known as the Yugoslav People's Liberation War, had become important to the Allies by 1943, although the Partisans had been fighting for two years without any help. He lived closely with Tito and his troops and had the ear of Churchill, and as such his recommendations shaped the Allies' policy towards Yugoslavia."

Beside that, there was an interesting small-ship naval war going on in the Adriatic across from the east coast of Italy ....

MM
 
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Not invading Italy would not have allowed any significant diversion of forces from the southern front, or committment in france, as it would have exposed north Africa and the ME TO generally to re-invasion by the Germans.

There's no way in hell the Germans had any resources to "re-invade" North Africa or anywhere else of consequence when it was becoming increasingly clear what was happening in the USSR and what was going to be happening in the west.
 
Italy turned out not to be "the soft underbelly of the axis" that Churchill promised.

On the contrary, it did indeed prove to be very soft - politically soft.

Anyone who has spent a couple months in the army knows that mountains are ideal defensive terrain. Not to mention experience fighting uphill at Gallipoli and in the mountains of 1940 Norway.

On the other hand, the long narrow penninsula of Italy allows the attacker to land amphibiously and outflank defensive lines, provided that the attacker has the will to do so.

PM Churchill undoubtedly had reasons for wanting to land in 1943 Italy.

The reason was to knock Italy out of the war and tie up the maximum number of Axis forces - in which it succeeded very well

The invasion of italy was a factor in the surrender of italy. mussolini had been arrested in July, following Husky. The new italian regime under Bagdoglio continued to mouth support for Germany whilst undertaking secret peace talks with the allies. The Italians would not surrender until given assurances of Allied help, which meant an invasion....

The allied committment in Italy was never going to win the war in Italy. But it was still a valuable stepping stone in the road to victory, and ultimately represented good value for the investment made.....

An excellent post Parsifal
 
There's no way in hell the Germans had any resources to "re-invade" North Africa or anywhere else of consequence when it was becoming increasingly clear what was happening in the USSR and what was going to be happening in the west.

Not mainataining the pressure, and removing the troops needed to protect the newly liberated territories would have absolutely given the germans back the initiative and with that, the ability to take whatever action they cared to adopt. not invading italy may well have tipped the balance at kursk, which in turn may well have forced the russians to the negotiating table. There are all manner of possibilities arising from a failure to force the surrender of italy. The balnce of power in 1943 was still quite close....less than 6 months before the Germans were still attacking and on the offensive
 
Check your dates.

Sicily was invaded during July 1943 and caused the Kursk offensive to be curtailed. This is well documented by David Glantz.

Italy was invaded during September 1943. The Italian invasions (Salerno and 8th Army) had no effect on Russian front operations.
 
Check your dates.

Sicily was invaded during July 1943 and caused the Kursk offensive to be curtailed. This is well documented by David Glantz.

Italy was invaded during September 1943. The Italian invasions (Salerno and 8th Army) had no effect on Russian front operations.

check your geography. last time i looked, sicily was part of Italy. Sicily was invaded 11July, and 1SS Corps was withdrawn 21 July (I think). After the arrest of Mussolini the Germans were also forced to commence withsrawing other less well known formations into the garrison area of the Balkans, Italy and southern France, to be ready to implement Alaric

The whole situation in italy (and that includes Sicily and Sardinia) had a significant effect on force structures for AGS

Moreover Kursk did not end in July. For the russians, their counteroffensive, still part of the Kursk operation, did not end until november, when they moved to their 'winter storm" operations.
 
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Disarming the Italian military tied down considerably more German units during the fall of 1943 then U.S. and British ground forces.

October 1943. Data from "The Day of Battle" by Rick Atkinson.
163 German divisions fighting the Soviet Union.
34 German divisions in France.
9 German divisions in Northern Italy (i.e. disarming Italian military).
8 German divisions in Southern Italy opposing U.S. and British invasions.
?? German divisions disarming Italian military in Balkans. I suspect this was quite a few. Plus airpower to defeat British invasion of Aegean Islands.
 
July 1943. We had enough amphibious assault ships in Europe to simultaneously land 7 combat divisions.

The U.S. Army lands at Normandy with 4 divisions plus 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. Followed by additional divisions as fast as they can be shuttled from England. Air cover provided by P-38s and the new P-47 operating from English air bases. Naval fire support provided by a dozen USN battleships.

The British 8th Army invades Sicily from Tunisia with 3 divisions plus an airborne division. Followed by additional divisions as fast as they can be shuttled from Tunisia or Malta. Air cover provided by Spitfires based on Malta. Naval fire support provided by a dozen RN battleships.

Optional.
Halt 1943 offensive operations in the Pacific. That will free up about two divisions worth of amphibious transports for employment in Europe. The Normandy invasion could be 5 divisions (i.e. same as 1944 historical). British 8th Army could land 4 divisions on Sicily.
 
July 1943-Optional.
Halt 1943 offensive operations in the Pacific. That will free up about two divisions worth of amphibious transports for employment in Europe. The Normandy invasion could be 5 divisions (i.e. same as 1944 historical). British 8th Army could land 4 divisions on Sicily.

If the American public had gotten wind of this "option", they would have exerted massive resistance by means of political pressure on congress FDR. Revenge against Japan occupied the national psyche and was its overwhelming goal and priority. Pretty sure Australia New Zealand would have been greatly disturbed also since Japan still had a considerable presence in the Solomons at that time. Not to mention how it would affect the CBI too.
 
Let's try an even better option.

December 1941.
The U.S. Army has 37 combat divisions with plans to expand to 59 divisions during 1942.

Point of Departure.
U.S. Army Chief of Staff realizes all these combat divisions are useless unless they can be landed on a hostile shore. He orders the Army to procure amphibious transport for 1 division each month for the next 15 months. By the summer of 1943 the U.S. Army will have amphibious transport adequate for 5 divisions in the Pacific and 10 divisions in Europe. That allows the USA to take the fight to the enemy NLT summer 1943 and shipping will not be a bottleneck.

WWII era amphibious transports were converted merchant ships so they weren't terribly expensive. A Liberty Ship costs about $ 2 million. You can purchase about 50 for the price of a single battleship and the USN was purchasing battleships like they were going out of style.
2 x North Carolina class.
4 x South Dakota class
6 x Iowa class (two were cancelled after partial completion.)
5 x Montana class were ordered but cancelled before construction started.
6 x Alaska class battle cruisers. 3 laid down. 2 completed.
 

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