Should The Allies Have Bypassed Italy?

[davebender]

Mark Clark is held with the same esteem as Grant and the post war carpetbaggers here in Texas.

36th Infantry Division officers requested and got a Congressional investigation into Gen. Clark's competence.

Unfortunately we had few really good generals during WWII and there were worse people then Gen. Clark. How would you like to invade Italy with Gen. MacArthur in command?

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Actually I think that in that case, MacArthur, in the words of Capt. Jack Aubrey, might have been the lesser of the two weevils. When he had been granted all the resources his gigantic ego demanded, he seemed to have gotten the job done, but that perception may be based on Mac's own PR machine. With him, I don't know what's real and what is myth. From reading Atkinson's Day of Battle, I feel I have a better handle on Clark's shortcomings and judge many would have been better suited to the command. Lucian Truscott for one. I suspect there were other less well known and most important, less well connected.

Our military has a history of being not so much a meritocracy as it is a nepotocracy and too often, an ineptocracy in its leadership and selection thereof.

MacArthur's leadership and that of his subordinates is epitomized by one instance that occurred during January, 1942. With roughly one full squadron of P-40 fighters (18 aircraft) surviving of his original four by January 3, he decided to send half to Del Monte Field on Mindanao, a flight of 530+ miles without drop tanks. Miraculously, 6 of the 9 aircraft arrived safely. One aborted and two crashed killing one and injuring the other of the pilots. The survivors operated there under very unfavorable conditions and even poorer leadership than they had enjoyed on Bataan if that's possible. Around January 20, the Bataan leadership decided it had made a mistake and recalled 4 of the remaining 5 P-40 aircraft at Del Monte A/F! Fortunately, it had been discovered that intermediate air fields were still in allied hands and available for refueling stops. One of the returning aircraft crashed at sea due to mechanical failure a common occurrence on such long transits. Thus, 5 of the 9 aircraft were lost to the Bataan forces without making a single contribution to the defense of the peninsula.

 

[davebender]

It appears to me our army didn't become a fully professional force until the 1980s. That's why I hesitate to judge WWII American officers such as Gen Clark too harshly. If Gen. Clark had been a German or Japanese officer he would have benefitted from better training throughout his military career and therefore been better prepared to lead an army into battle.

Gen. MacArthur is the exception to the rule. IMO someone with no military training at all but a bit of common sense could have done a better job at OMAGC and USAFFE. Political skills were his only skills.

 

[parsifal]

It appears to me our army didn't become a fully professional force until the 1980s. That's why I hesitate to judge WWII American officers such as Gen Clark too harshly. If Gen. Clark had been a German or Japanese officer he would have benefitted from better training throughout his military career and therefore been better prepared to lead an army into battle.

If clark had been a german or japanese commander, he would have been far more battlefield focussed and far less campaign focussed. His problem in fact was that he suffered that other peculiarly German trait....not knowing how to fight as a member of a coalitiion. his deliberate disobeying of Alexanders orders in not bypassing Rome committed the Allies to another 6 months of fighting on the Trasimene line. Smacks remarkably like Rommel disobeying the italian High Command who wanted a halt after the capture of Tobruk, to allow for the capture of Malta. It always amazes me.....Clark disobeyed his boss, and is branded incompetent....Rommel disobeys his boss, routinely went political , still lost, and in the end lost more material than Clark ever even commanded, and yet, Rommel is a military genius....apparently.

And then we have the german treatment of their allies. If the relationship between the british and the Americans was at times, under stress, the relationship between the germans and their allies was nothing short of diabolical.

Its a good thing that Allied officers learnt how to fight to achieve higher strategic objectives, using all the resources at their diisposal. A much broader and deeper usage of resources than the german leadership ever managed to achieve....and Mac was at the forefront of that combined arms concept. The allied leadership was uninspired on the battlefield. that remained a German dominated field of expertise. The German method failed because it was far too narrow and blind to all the wider strategic issues and possibilities. case in point....Rommel was mostly defeasted because of his poor understanding of logistics....his head of supply was a lowly Major......

All the armies of the world had strengths asnd weakness, and the US was no different. It was no less proficient, just different

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Gen. MacArthur is the exception to the rule. IMO someone with no military training at all but a bit of common sense could have done a better job at OMAGC and USAFFE. Political skills were his only skills.

OMAGC?

 

[stug3]

The allied leadership was uninspired on the battlefield. that remained a German dominated field of expertise.

wow, talk about over-generalization. I dont think I need to list all the names that disprove that statement. ridiculous.

Im no fan of MacArthur, but you have to give him credit for Inchon in 1950.

 

[parsifal]

It is an overgeneralization, i agree, but for every allied genius on the battlefield, there were probably 10 german genius's. it is also an overgeneralization to say that the germans always failed to "get it" in the non-battlefield issues.

But as general observations , the point I am making does hold true. Allied leadership on the battlefield was not inspired, german leadership was. Off the battlefield, German leadership was at best adequate but usually fell far short of allied capability.


An example of mediocre battelfield leadership was Eisenhower. He never quite got the need to concentrate resources to achieve decisive brekthroughs. Eisenhower very much took the safe road, attacking at a measured pace, across a broad front. this minimised risks, but ensured that the germans were pushed back, rather than encircled and destroyed. As a battle strategist Eisenhower was at best mediocre. As a campaign general, he was near perfect. he handled difficult people, managed difficult logistics issues, averted the worst political interventions, never lost sight of the greater military objectives, never allowed the expeditionary forces to be placed into too much hurt. You could seldom ask for a better general from the pov of the campaign.

Moreover this battlefield advantage for the germans remained an advatage for them at nearly all level odf command. The Germans produced some very good small and medium level leaders, but their military establishedment was inherently narrow in focus and conservative, and this, in the end was their undoing. germany would have been defeated militarily regardless of Hitlers interference. he just sped up the process

The poinmt i was trying to make is that on the battlefield, the Germans remained very dangerous and very capable. Neither the Germans of the Americans (or anyone else) were totally devoid of abilities outside their national focus. There were good german supply officers. there were good British Tank commanders. It was a question of what each nationality tended to be good at rather than laying down a blanket rule.

Nothing wrong with mac....i think he was a good leader

 

[stug3]

I can accept your criticism of Eisenhower even though I disagree with it. There were numerous political logistical variable factors he had to deal with to maintain Allied progress. Some of your other opinions are downright asinine to the point of being insultingl.

but for every allied genius on the battlefield, there were probably 10 german genius's RIDICULOUS

Moreover this battlefield advantage for the germans remained an advatage for them at nearly all level odf command.- RIDICULOUS, and how would you know anyway?

 

[parsifal]

[

I can accept your criticism of Eisenhower even though I disagree with it. There were numerous political logistical variable factors he had to deal with to maintain Allied progress. Some of your other opinions are downright asinine to the point of being insultingl.

Apologies if you find the opinions expressed in my post asinine and insulting. I cant please all the people all the time I guess.

but for every allied genius on the battlefield, there were probably 10 german genius's RIDICULOUS

Moreover this battlefield advantage for the germans remained an advatage for them at nearly all level odf command.- RIDICULOUS, and how would you know anyway?

It doesnt help your case to just blurt out that you think the statement ridiculous. You really need to post some counter position, and then back it up with some solid supporting material. unless all you are looking for is to get into a pissing contest, which doesnt help promote your opinion my friend.

As for "how would I know anyway?". Well, Im not old enough to have been there (but are you), neither do I have any friends ofr family that were there. But my strategic Studies lecturere at the academy was a captain in the 11 armoured. You could say i am failrly familiar with the material. As a starting reference, have you read "Brute Force" by Ellis? I dont agree with everything he says, but he does give a pretty good critique of allied command and leadership issues. Shelby Stantons US Army in WWII is a really good one volume reference on the US Army. Not sure if you are all that interested in the British Army or the CW. For the German Army there are numerous books on the subject, but just a few could be include Samuel Mitchams "The German Army Of WWII, or Major Gens Alfred Toppes small book on "Desert Warfare - The German experience and Methodologies"

As an officer in the military, we studied the various training and command methodologies used in WWII. For battlefield command and control, German Kriegspiel and command systems were by far the most thorough and effective. There are others in this place far more familiar than I, but I do have enough knowledge to acknowldege a good system when I see it. and from a good system comes good people.

 

[stug3]

It doesnt help your case to just blurt out that you think the statement ridiculous. You really need to post some counter position, and then back it up with some solid supporting material.

Counter position to what? blanket generalizations that are obviously false? 10 German warrior geniuses for every dumb Allied brute who (unfortunately for you) was lucky enough to have better air support more "stuff" in general?

Sorry to tell ya, but every time I think of dead nazis, it gives me a warm, fuzzy feeling inside. Thanks for ruining an interesting thread with bs.

 

[davebender]

Office of the Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines

Commonwealth of the Philippines - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Philippines was a Commonwealth during 1935 to 1946. This was an interim step before complete independence.

The OMAGC commander (i.e. MacArthur) was head of the Philippine Army with the rank of Field Marshal. The 10 Philippine Army divisions which fought Japan during 1941 and early 1942 were his creation. Ike was his assistant during 1935 to 1939.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Office of the Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines

Commonwealth of the Philippines - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Philippines was a Commonwealth during 1935 to 1946. This was an interim step before complete independence.

The OMAGC commander (i.e. MacArthur) was head of the Philippine Army with the rank of Field Marshal. The 10 Philippine Army divisions which fought Japan during 1941 and early 1942 were his creation. Ike was his assistant during 1935 to 1939.

Thanks Dave. Also, thanks Pars. While perhaps your generalizations are a bit overstated (hyperbole?), I think in general, you have characterized the situation pretty well. To be fair, While not overly familiar with axis leadership, I suspect there weren't many instances when the higher echelon of axis leadership relieved effective field commanders because they were fearful of a public backlash or for questionable acts committed in the heat of battle which nevertheless got the job done. As examples: Patton, Terry Allen, Fletcher, Gil Hoover. I suspect there are more, perhaps even on both sides but I just don't know axis leadership history that well. Would Doenitz or Raeder have dismissed combat veteran and proven winner Norman Scott in favor of untried Dan Callahan on the basis of a few weeks seniority? Is it possible the much hated axis was as much or more of a meritocracy than allied forces? I don't know, but it seems to me that politics played more of a negative role in allied leadership decisions than is typically appreciated at least in the popular mind. We seem to quickly forget the mistakes and celebrate the victories and ascribe them to the loudest advocates of a mythical point of view. For example: the sacrifice of the TBD's at Midway to allow the SBD's to attack unopposed and so win the battle. The ultimate naval aviation myth.
Generalizing: victory is a poor teacher, defeat a superb one.

 

[parsifal]

Counter position to what? blanket generalizations that are obviously false?

Why are they false. what evidence do you have to support your claim

10 German warrior geniuses for every dumb Allied brute who (unfortunately for you) was lucky enough to have better air support more "stuff" in general?

The point i was making was that the Germans were ,in general, better battlefield commanders. that was their strength. Admittedly a generalization, but a valid one, backed up by some pretty solid material. I never said the allies were dumb brutes. In fact I was at pains to point out their stregths...which in essence were the ability to look at broader strategic capabilities and constraints. the allies were very good at that. I fail to see how that is inferring the allies were "dumb brutes"

As for (unfortunately for you) was lucky enough to have better air support more "stuff" in general where on earth do you get the notion that I am some kind of Nazi sympathiser or german apologist. Stick around awhile, and you might get a better picture of what I stand for. Askl a few other members what I do and what i believe. you could not be further from the truth.

Sorry to tell ya, but every time I think of dead nazis, it gives me a warm, fuzzy feeling inside.

I have no sympathy for them either. We werent talking about Nazis, we were talking about German military leadership. not all of them were Nazis. Some were just dedicated soldiers that happened to be controlled by the Nazis

Thanks for ruining an interesting thread with bs.

Why BS. The original comment was made about the limits on American leaders, and how poor they were. I didnt say that. i responded and refuted it to be honest. You decided you didnt like giving the germans any credit for their abilitie whatsoever. If you want to argue that, be my guest, but dont attack me as the person who derided US battlefield experiece in this thread. Check back on the posts, and you will see I was the one defending it.

Just because your thread is not following the course you wanted, doesnt make it not relevant or un-interesting (uninteresting to you perhaps but not for the majority). Why are we talking about US military experience, and how does that relate to the topic? Because the US Army in 1943 lacked for nothing except one precious commodity....experience. and it got some of that experience in the italian campaign.

 

[Njaco]

Stug, stop with the sarcasm and the name-calling.

It seems that Parsifal gave an opinion (which another member accepted and understood) and he asked that if you disagree, you make your point. Calling someone asinine and ridiculus is not a way to do that.

OT, I've always thought that Kesselring was one of the best generals that Germany had - especially in Italy.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

OT, I've always thought that Kesselring was one of the best generals that Germany had - especially in Italy.

Unfortunately for allied forces...

 

[parsifal]

Also, thanks Pars. While perhaps your generalizations are a bit overstated (hyperbole?), I think in general, you have characterized the situation pretty well.

Thanks, and of course there is generalization in my comments, but Im not going to write detailed critique on US army leadership in a place like this

To be fair, While not overly familiar with axis leadership, I suspect there weren't many instances when the higher echelon of axis leadership relieved effective field commanders because they were fearful of a public backlash or for questionable acts committed in the heat of battle which nevertheless got the job done. As examples: Patton, Terry Allen, Fletcher, Gil Hoover.

I would say that if anythig Nazi leadership suffered more from political intervention than the allies. Perhaps the military shuffles were more for military reasons, but the interference was definately political in nature. hitler was not a professional soldier, though he was the head of the military (you could say the same things about Roosevelt as commander in chief and Churchill as the first Lord and then MOD). The meddling and intervention from Hitler is legendary....dismissal of Raeder, dismissal of Guderian, Von Bock, Rommel, to name just a few.....

 

[oldcrowcv63]

After I wrote my post I realized the IJN also had problems of that sort and the Reich almost certainly must have had such as you point out. At one point in the Guadacanal campaign, Yamamoto evidently felt he had cause to fire Tanaka and did boot probably the finest destroyer admiral in the war.

 

[parsifal]

OT, I've always thought that Kesselring was one of the best generals that Germany had - especially in Italy.

Dont agree that its OT....

German Commanders in Italy

The following brief biographies of the chief German commanders in Italy have been compiled mainly from personal files held by the German Military Documents Section of the United States War Department, Washington: also 1 Source: General Siegfried Westphal: The German Army in the West, pp. v and 211, and finally the NZ official history.


"Lieutenant-General Ernst Baade was an old enemy of 2 NZ Division from North Africa, where he commanded a regiment in 1942. He was one of the outstanding German divisional commanders in Italy – a dashing, independent soldier, one of the 'bad boys' of the German Army, who had ideas of his own and often acted with little regard for orders and regulations. He commanded a corps in 1945, and was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross for the defensive victory at Cassino on 18 February 1944.

Lieutenant-General Richard Heidrich was a machine-gun company commander in the First World War. He fought against the New Zealand Division on Crete as commander of 3 Parachute Regiment. Awarded the Oak Leaves with Swords for the defence of Cassino. He commanded 1 Parachute Corps in late 1944. A very keen, ambitious, strict soldier, and a most aggressive commander in action.

General Traugott Herr was an outstanding commander of formations of all sizes, from a company to an army; he always earned the highest praise for his steadiness, ability and energy, despite being permanently handicapped by the effects of a head wound. Described as 'a fine man and an exemplary soldier, full of character'.

Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring had a continuous record of service since 1904. He served mainly in artillery field commands and General Staff positions until 1936, when he transferred to the Luftwaffe. Commanded an air fleet in Poland, in the Low Countries, in the Battle of Britain, and in Russia in 1941, and was in charge of all German Army formations in Italy in 1943. An orthodox, sound strategist, but not brilliant – General Alexander thought him much better than the more impetuous Rommel. A master of battlefield tactics and very tenacious. One of the last high-ranking officers to keep on fighting in May 1945. He was sentenced to death (later commuted to life imprisonment) for being a party to the shooting of over 300 Italian civilian hostages in the Ardeatine catacombs near Rome. He was released from prison in October 1952 after an operation, 'as an act of clemency'.

General Joachim Lemelsen began his career as an artillery officer before the First World War, transferred to the General Staff in 1918, and served later in artillery, infantry and panzer formations, gaining a wide knowledge of all arms. Commanded a panzer division in 1940, a corps until 1943, then an army. He gained high praise for his leadership of the Fourteenth Army in 1944.

General Smilo Freiherr von Luettwitz was a cavalryman who transferred to the panzer troops. He was one of the best divisional commanders in Italy until July 1944, then was promoted quickly through a corps to an army command, but failed as an army commander and was relegated to a corps again in 1945. He always had a reputation for leading from in front.

General der Panzertruppen F. von Senger und Etterlin was born in Baden in 1892 and was at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar shortly before the First World War, in which he fought as a junior artillery officer. After the war he became a regular officer, transferring to the cavalry, and in 1940 commanded a motorised brigade which took Le Havre and Cherbourg. After service on the Italo-French Armistice Commission in 1940–42, he commanded a panzer division in Russia, but returned west to command the German troops in Sicily during the Allied invasion and then in Corsica. He fought the battles of Cassino with 14 Panzer Corps and took part in the retreat through Italy. In April–May 1945 he led the German commission which negotiated the surrender of the German forces in Italy at Fifth Army Headquarters.

General Siegfried Westphal joined the German Army at the end of the First World War and spent much of his career as a staff officer. Before the Second World War he was in the Operations Section of the Army General Staff and in the early months of the war served as First General Officer of a division in the West. On the fall of France he was made a member of the Franco-German Armistice Commission, but in mid-1941 he went to Africa, where he became Chief of Staff to Field-Marshal Rommel. In 1943 and 1944 he was successively Chief of the Operations Section and Chief of Staff to Kesselring in Italy. His war service ended on the western front as Chief of Staff to the Commanders-in-Chief West (first Field-Marshal Rundstedt and later Kesselring).1 Kesselring thought highly of his abilities, writing (in his Memoirs, p. 260): 'I could not have wished for a better Chief of Staff…. He knew my idiosyncrasies as I knew his'.

Colonel-General Heinrich-Gottfried von Vietinghoff fought on the eastern and western fronts in the First World War and commanded a panzer division in Poland and a corps in France in 1940. He served in Russia in 1941–42, commanding Ninth Army 'well and confidently … in very critical defensive battles'. He won praise from Kesselring for his conduct of the defence in Italy while in command of Tenth Army. As Commander-in-Chief South-West he negotiated the surrender of the German forces in Italy in May 1945.

Lieutenant-General Gustav Heisterman von Ziehlberg held a General Staff position at GHQ for several years prior to 1943, when he was transferred to a field command. He commanded 65 Division from its formation. He was described as an 'upright, friendly, warm-hearted man with plenty of guts and optimism'. He lost an arm as a result of his wound at the Sangro, but five months later was back commanding a division in Russia. Suspected of implication in the anti-Hitler plot of July 1944, he was tried and shot in January 1945.

 

[parsifal]

Dupuy Institute have undertaken a number of empirical studies to try and quantify various combat relationships between the Germans and their opponents. One study I have seen gives their battlefield leadership advantage as 2.63 in 1942, falling to 1.35 in late 1944. This concept of attempting to quantify the advantage was further explored by Simulations Inc, a military simulation think tank working for the US.

The number is meant to be an indication of the general advatage (oops, theres that word again) enjoyed by the germans over their opponents, including the effects of their small unit leaders. 2.63 means that it takes 2.63 allied soldiers to equal 1 German soldier, and so on

These quantum models have been criticised, including me, but they are still a valid tool in trying to get a general understanding of this issue.

A pretty good discussion both for and against can be found at the end of this link

Professor Michael Licari: assessment of WW2 performance and criticism of QJM - The Dupuy Institute Forum

 

[parsifal]

From the same website, there have been a number of discussions about CEVs (Combat Effectiveness Values). I think the discussion between Niklas Zetterling (yes, THE Niklas Zetterling) and Chris Lawrence is very interesting, and makes reference to Zeterlings book which dealt with this subject though the focus was the Eastern Front....

German combat figures - The Dupuy Institute Forum