Thank you for ruining this thread with your insulting banter.
If you don't like the thread move on, and go someplace else.
Now, as the other mods have stated, quit the BS!
Should The Allies Have Bypassed Italy?
- Thread starter stug3
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Thank you for ruining this thread with your insulting banter.
If you don't like the thread move on, and go someplace else.
Now, as the other mods have stated, quit the BS!
parsifal
Colonel
I think we killed the thread, Parsifal ....
yes perhaps. Just the same, I rather see both pieces that we submitted as illustrating very effectively why, despite their superior leadership and training, the Germans could never defeat us.....no sense of humour I think....
Just act like an adult and dont insult people. Simple as that.
parsifal
Colonel
so what was the advantage of the italian campaign. Before I start, I should preface by saying the Sicilian campaign is part of the Italian campaign in my book....
ill try and be brief in my summary
1) Retain Initiaitive on the southern front
2) Eliminate italy from the war, massive loss of garrison forces across the whole MTO
3) Diversion of forces from Russia at a critical time
4) Provide a limited front within allied capabilities of the time...allows real fire exposure for inexperienced units and commanders.
5) Tie down German manpower.
6) Force the Germans into roughly handling their most important ally....sours relations with all other allies and even the neutrals.
7) Frees up a loty of shipping for the allies by re-opening the mewd and suez routes
ill try and be brief in my summary
1) Retain Initiaitive on the southern front
2) Eliminate italy from the war, massive loss of garrison forces across the whole MTO
3) Diversion of forces from Russia at a critical time
4) Provide a limited front within allied capabilities of the time...allows real fire exposure for inexperienced units and commanders.
5) Tie down German manpower.
6) Force the Germans into roughly handling their most important ally....sours relations with all other allies and even the neutrals.
7) Frees up a loty of shipping for the allies by re-opening the mewd and suez routes
michaelmaltby
Colonel
"... no sense of humour, I think"
Parsifal, we might definitely wish that were true, and, I admit, different cultures have different "senses of humour" but Germany - specifically Berlin in 1931 - was very funny, and dark:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8P80A8vy9I
Now - back on topic - the rescue of Mussolini by Otto Scarface Skorzeny - to keep Italy in the Axis.
MM
Parsifal, we might definitely wish that were true, and, I admit, different cultures have different "senses of humour" but Germany - specifically Berlin in 1931 - was very funny, and dark:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8P80A8vy9I
Now - back on topic - the rescue of Mussolini by Otto Scarface Skorzeny - to keep Italy in the Axis
.MM
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Parsifal, you made my point and much better than I did. Italy (MTO/Southern Front) was VERY important to the total Allied war effort for exactly the reasons you gave.
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
"... no sense of humour, I think"
Parsifal, we might definitely wish that were true, and, I admit, different cultures have different "senses of humour" but Germany - specifically Berlin in 1931 - was very funny, and dark:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8P80A8vy9I
Now - back on topic - the rescue of Mussolini by Otto Scarface Skorzeny - to keep Italy in the Axis
MM
Ever read the Gunner Asch series of books by Hans Helmut Kirst? I thought they were very funny as a teen. Of course I didn't realize then that the guy was an officer in the wehrmacht, a WWII vet and a member of the Nazi party. read 'em all. Maybe will again some day.
Last edited:
parsifal
Colonel
I rather think somebody got their bat and ball and went home........
Trying to breath life back into this discussion (because it is a good one), what other options were available to the Allies in 1943 in the ETO other than invading Italy. Does anyone think the Allies had the strength and capability to undertake a cross channel invasion. One possibility might have been simply to invade Corsica, Sicily and Sardinia, as well as perhaps mount a more serious effort in the Aegean....taking back Crete and Rhodes (and from there, threatening Ploesti from the air) . All of these strategies are probably do-able, and do have certain advantages, but are they as optimal as hitting the italian peninsula directly???
Trying to breath life back into this discussion (because it is a good one), what other options were available to the Allies in 1943 in the ETO other than invading Italy. Does anyone think the Allies had the strength and capability to undertake a cross channel invasion. One possibility might have been simply to invade Corsica, Sicily and Sardinia, as well as perhaps mount a more serious effort in the Aegean....taking back Crete and Rhodes (and from there, threatening Ploesti from the air) . All of these strategies are probably do-able, and do have certain advantages, but are they as optimal as hitting the italian peninsula directly???
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
Thinking out loud, the thing about the italian peninsula that makes me flinch at invasion is its defensibilty. If Malta was a knife held at the throat of the axis North African oil supply, then Italy was a knife at the throat of allied Mediterranean ambitions and operations and a guard at the door to its alternate Romanian oil supplies, No? The Aegean litoral geogaphy also seems to me to be even more fraught with potential difficulties than that of Italy. Seems like a bad place to become bogged down and even if successful, how does it help the greater war effort aside from Bombing Romanian oil fields which is admittedly important. I mean with Italy you take down one leg of the tripartite alliance (albeit the least stable) as well as draw army units some distance from the Russian front.
Last edited:
Shortround6
Major General
How much of Italy do you have to take to open the Mediterranean Sea to Allied shipping?
At least Sicily, and then either part of Southern Italy or Sardinia or both?
Taking Sardinia uses up the remaining anvib operation in the summer of 1943 (mostly). Denies Axis airbases and gains allied ones but doesn't really take Italy out of the war. Forces on Sardinia can'r really go anywhere without another operation.
For those who don't know already Options are explained further here : HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Salerno to Cassino [Chapter 1]
At least Sicily, and then either part of Southern Italy or Sardinia or both?
Taking Sardinia uses up the remaining anvib operation in the summer of 1943 (mostly). Denies Axis airbases and gains allied ones but doesn't really take Italy out of the war. Forces on Sardinia can'r really go anywhere without another operation.
For those who don't know already Options are explained further here : HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Salerno to Cassino [Chapter 1]
That is what happens when you were not taught manners...
Thanks for trying to get it back on track. It was a good and interesting discussion.
And to answer your question above, no I do not see any other options. My personal belief is that it was a necessary step to take. Most importantly it did open another front, and that front did tie up German forces and equipment. Basically I agree that if anything at all it helps weaken the Axis.
Last edited:
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
What if the Allies "split the difference" and invaded Sicily for Operation Torch instead of NA?
Shortround6
Major General
Way too risky. Trying to invade Sicily with the Axis having air bases on both sides of the Mediterranean exposes the the transports way too much. Some air support was being flown from NA for the Sicily landings ( bombers and P-38s) which you would also have to do without.
parsifal
Colonel
There were also not enough trained ground troops. The US was able to field less than a Corps Strength of trained formations to begin with, whilst the Brits were beginning to suffer shortages of manpower. The landings were undertaken well outside effective strike range of the LW, and for good reason. Just three months before, during the pedestal convoys, the RN had fought with great difficulty just 6 of the 14 merchant ships of the convoy. In doing that the RN had lost a carrier outright, had another moderately damaged with only 2 remaning. Two cruisers and a destroyer had been lost, and a further two cruisers damaged. The convoy had been attacked by 600 aircraft. They had been defended by just 70 fighters.
The Joint Chiefs were greatly concerned about committment of raw untested troops against the Wehrmacht. It was believed they were not really up to the task, and subsequent events tend to support that. it was felt at the time of the landings that the Vichy French might not provide as stiff a resitance and may even defect to join the allies, if the invasion was seen as being a mostly American undertaking. This also proved correct, and in fact the Vichy response entraged Hitler to the point of him basically collapsing the Vichy regime and occupying its territory
The Joint Chiefs were greatly concerned about committment of raw untested troops against the Wehrmacht. It was believed they were not really up to the task, and subsequent events tend to support that. it was felt at the time of the landings that the Vichy French might not provide as stiff a resitance and may even defect to join the allies, if the invasion was seen as being a mostly American undertaking. This also proved correct, and in fact the Vichy response entraged Hitler to the point of him basically collapsing the Vichy regime and occupying its territory
Not bothering to read the most of the long thread I would say that Sicily and Southern Italy up to N of Naples and of course the securing of Foggia area air bases would have been enough plus occupation of Sardinia after Germans withdrawn from there.
Juha
Juha
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
But what importance did the Allies have for invading these areas? Could they have let Italy alone and concentrated on a second front in Western Europe?
Hello Njaco
Sicily and Southern Italy meant fairly secure Med for convoys. Foggia was very important to strategic bombing campaign, targets in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Schlesia and Southern Poland were clearly easier to reach from there than from England and targets in Hungary and Romania became in reach. Also possibility to support partisans in Yugoslavia and in Northern Greece opened. There were important armament industry for ex. around Wien, and of course the oil targets around Ploesti and Wien and for ex at Blechhammer.
Juha
Sicily and Southern Italy meant fairly secure Med for convoys. Foggia was very important to strategic bombing campaign, targets in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Schlesia and Southern Poland were clearly easier to reach from there than from England and targets in Hungary and Romania became in reach. Also possibility to support partisans in Yugoslavia and in Northern Greece opened. There were important armament industry for ex. around Wien, and of course the oil targets around Ploesti and Wien and for ex at Blechhammer.
Juha
parsifal
Colonel
Hi Juha
What do you envisage happening after the capture of these rather peripheral areas. Do the allies just stop in Southern italy, allow the germans to consolidate in Northern italy and build a secure base from which to defend and possibly counterattack. Do the italian fascists be allowed the security of holding the capital, consolidating their position in Northern italy and building a power base from which to raise a new army to support the Germans and the overall defence of italy.
This strategy is actually more costly for the allies, not in casualties, but in garrison troops. The more the allies leave italy alone as a Theatre, the more secure it becomes for the axis, and the better and more effective a build up they can make. These additional forces can either be used to increas ethe pressure on the allies in italy (and hence force the allies to commit more troops there) or transfer those additional resources elsewhere to put additional pressure elsewhere. Garrison troops for either sidfe are a waste of time, but even more so for the allies with their limited numbers of frontline formations.
What do you envisage happening after the capture of these rather peripheral areas. Do the allies just stop in Southern italy, allow the germans to consolidate in Northern italy and build a secure base from which to defend and possibly counterattack. Do the italian fascists be allowed the security of holding the capital, consolidating their position in Northern italy and building a power base from which to raise a new army to support the Germans and the overall defence of italy.
This strategy is actually more costly for the allies, not in casualties, but in garrison troops. The more the allies leave italy alone as a Theatre, the more secure it becomes for the axis, and the better and more effective a build up they can make. These additional forces can either be used to increas ethe pressure on the allies in italy (and hence force the allies to commit more troops there) or transfer those additional resources elsewhere to put additional pressure elsewhere. Garrison troops for either sidfe are a waste of time, but even more so for the allies with their limited numbers of frontline formations.
Hello Parsifal
a couple points
IMHO facists were not very popular in Northern Italy, so it would have been fairly difficult to raise substatial italian forfes loyal to Mussolini and anyway Germans didn't trust much to "their" italians in 43-44. I recall only one substatial attack by Mussolini's army after summer 43,a brigade or division size fairly successful attack against Co-Belligent troops. I doubt that italians would have been very effective against British, US or French troops. Germans from Autumn 43 onwards suffered permanent lack of troops so I doubt that they would have eager to commit substantial troops and try to kick the Allied forces out especially because of Allied naval superiority much of german ground troops would have been tied to coastal defence along central Italy's long coastline as they were most of the time in real world. Of course substantial Allied forces would have tied in Southern Italy but less than historically because usually one needs less troops in defence than in attack especially when their flanks were secured by naval superiority and air superiority would have minimize the possibility of surprises. And air superiority would have made it difficult for Germans to amass enough material for an all-out attack.
Juha
a couple points
IMHO facists were not very popular in Northern Italy, so it would have been fairly difficult to raise substatial italian forfes loyal to Mussolini and anyway Germans didn't trust much to "their" italians in 43-44. I recall only one substatial attack by Mussolini's army after summer 43,a brigade or division size fairly successful attack against Co-Belligent troops. I doubt that italians would have been very effective against British, US or French troops. Germans from Autumn 43 onwards suffered permanent lack of troops so I doubt that they would have eager to commit substantial troops and try to kick the Allied forces out especially because of Allied naval superiority much of german ground troops would have been tied to coastal defence along central Italy's long coastline as they were most of the time in real world. Of course substantial Allied forces would have tied in Southern Italy but less than historically because usually one needs less troops in defence than in attack especially when their flanks were secured by naval superiority and air superiority would have minimize the possibility of surprises. And air superiority would have made it difficult for Germans to amass enough material for an all-out attack.
Juha
