Should The Allies Have Bypassed Italy?

parsifal · Jun 13, 2012

Getting back onto what was achieved by invading italy, if nothing else, it bagged a reasonable casualty list from the Axis. Already we have seen that the invasion of Sicily (part of italy) and the mainland caused (or contributed to) the dissolution of all the italian Army, and that this had an effect on the numbers of german garrison troops needed to replace them.

But what of the actual losses incurred? The following gives a pretty good account of what was achieved from a US perspective

PO VALLEY 1945

Relevantly, in its conclusion it says

"For the Allied armies in Italy, the Po Valley offensive climaxed the long and bloody Italian campaign. When the spring offensive opened, it initially appeared that its course might continue the pattern of the previous months and battles in Italy, becoming another slow, arduous advance over rugged terrain, in poor weather, against a determined, well-entrenched, and skillful enemy. However, by April 1945 the superbly led and combat-hardened Allied 15th Army Group, a truly multinational force, enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority on the ground and in the air. On the other side, Axis forces had been worn down by years of combat on many fronts; they were plagued by poor political leadership at the top as well as shortages of nearly everything needed to wage a successful defensive war. By April 1945 factors such as terrain, weather, combat experience, and able military leadership, that had for months allowed the Axis to trade space for time in Italy could no longer compensate for the simple lack of manpower, air support, and materiel. By the end of the first two weeks of the campaign both sides realized that the end of the war in Italy was in sight, and that all the Allies needed to complete the destruction of Axis forces was the skillful application of overwhelming pressure, a feat largely accomplished within ten days, by 2 May 1945.

By the time of the cease-fire in Italy, the U.S. Fifth Army had been in continuous combat for 602 days, well over twenty months, far longer than any U. S. field army during World War II. During the entire Italian campaign, Allied losses had exceeded 312,000, of which 60 percent, or about 189,000, were sustained by Fifth Army units. Of the total losses, 31,886 were killed, including 19,475 Americans, the remainder of the dead being British and Commonwealth troops, Brazilians, Poles, Frenchmen, free Italians, and members of the Jewish brigade. German losses in Italy were estimated at over 434,600, including 48,000 killed in action and over 214,000 missing, the majority of the latter presumed dead.

What had started as a limited Allied assault on the "soft underbelly of Europe" in mid-1943, an invasion to tie down Axis forces and push Italy from the war, by 1944 had become a full operational theater of its own, involving upwards of five hundred thousand Allied troops at its peak. Although considered a sideshow from mid-1944 on, the soldiers involved in the Italian campaign succeeded in the vast majority of the goals which the Allied high command had set for them. From the invasion of Sicily in July 1943 until the final Axis surrender just south of the Alps in May 1945, the Allied armies in Italy had battled north over one thousand miles of mountainous terrain, through inclement weather, against a capable and determined enemy. Only the overwhelming Allied materiel and manpower resources and the countless heroic acts of hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers in small unit actions of a type unique to the war in Italy overcame the Axis forces. Primarily, the Allied soldiers' determination and aggressive spirit forced Germany to divert considerable men and materiel from other, more significant fronts in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to halt the Allied drive north".

DonL · Jun 13, 2012

You can also add:

Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 from Martin van Creveld.

Amazon.com: Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (9780313233333): Martin van Creveld: Books

It is a little more provocative but to my opinion is based on science and very methodic.
I don't agree with all but a very good book.

parsifal · Jun 13, 2012

It looks like a very good analysis. i am going to try and get a hold of a copy.

When you break this issue down, I think we are led inevitably to the superiority of german leadership. There is not a lot of difference in the quality of material, though that may be disputed for certain items like Tiger tanks and the like. Numerous studies have shown that in fact the qualitative advantages of these items of kit are only a partial answer to explaining German Battlefield superiority. Having a Tiger tank in your kitbag will only give you an advantage if you know how to use it.

If my position is accepted, namely, that the germans were not good or outstanding at issues which i have called "strategic" issues (eg supply) but excel at battlefield management, and one also accepts that the quality of german equipment can only provide a partial answer to their superiority, there are only a few other options we can consider to try and explain that advantage

I would suggest the folowing to consider:

1) At the beginning of the war better tactical organization and doctrine, particulalry with regard to the armour/Infantry/artillery/airpower mix

2) At the beginning of the war, manpower that was better trained and organized. German Infantry was man for man better than all opponents at the beginning of the war. However as the war progressed and casualty rates went up the quality of German manpower, and the level it was trained to did fall significantly

3) As mentioned above, on a selective basis German equipment at the beginning of the war was superior in many fields. In my opinion they held advantages in machine guns, mortars, field artillery, Corps level artillery, communications, some small arms, half tracks. For tanks they generally had advantages, except for armoured protetion . as the war progressed, they tended to lose most of these advantages except perhaps in Tank development.

4) The Germans spent more time training their officers than anyone, including their NCOs, and this proved to be the rock on which the German Army held itself together through its darkest ordeals. Moreover this advantage was retained for most of the war. This advantage goes at least back to the Weimar days, under Von Seekt, when a very large of the Versaille army was officers or NCOs.

The weaknesses of the german army were related to an inordinate preoccupation on direct support....a coconcentration on the immediate battle rather than looking at the overall campaigns. relatively few german officers worried about anything other than their immediate commands. this is in marked contrast to the better allied commanders. There were exceptions to this, of course, but it sometimes explains why the germans would act as they did.

Despite their rather magnificant late war defensive efforts, the germans actually were a bit lacking in defensive thinking. on orders from Hitler, defensive training....how to retreat, as opposed to headlong flight, was removed from the training manuals before the war. Hitler believed such preprations to be "defeatist". The result was that many german soldiers tended to fight until they could no longer fight, and then just run headlong from the enemy. This tended to create situations that led to inordinate losses once the formation was in the process of being overwhelmed. There were exceptions, such as Rommels masterly withdrawal from Alamein. But this was an exception, and it wasnt helped by hitlers often insane "stand fast" orders.

stug3 · Jun 14, 2012