Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Hawaii would have been 2,600 miles from any support, period, that would have caused serious concern state side without exception.
In order to stop the U.S., they would have to actually invade and hold stratetigic U.S. proper. Taking several dusty little Atolls and the Hawaiian island chain would not come close to forcing the U.S. to the negotiating table. It would actually backfire on the Japanese because now their assets have been stretched thinner than they Historically were prior to the Midway campaign.
I was thinking more along the lines of a completely revised battle plan for the Japanese rather than ditering at the edge of the existing one. That of course has to assume a completely revised American response as well. what might have happened if the plan of battle for the IJN had been altered completely from the historical.....
I was the squadron's line division officer and spent lots of time on the flight deck during flight ops. It was a very dangerous place for many reasons beyond the ordnance being loaded and fuel being dispensed. The types of danger were only a little bit different in 1942 but still one of the most dangerous places on Earth. I have a pretty fair idea of what exploding ordnance can do to a flight deck or carrier. even an armored one.
That's a tough one… throws the door wide open.
My class officer, a RIO in a VF squadron was a survivor of the 14 January 1969 Enterprise fire that killed 27 and injured 314. Ours was his first assignment after his recovery from severe burns. He was fortunate to have survived and also to have been wearing his helmet visor in the down position as he sat in his cockpit awaiting launch. How did we know his visor was down? it was clearly evident from the pattern of his scarring. He was a great guy and only lived because when he climbed out of his cockpit a quick-thinking CPO saw SV2 he was wearing and immediately realized it was the only chance either of them had for survival. His tackle carried them both off the ship's stern and down 80 feet to the water where the chief inflated the RIO's SV2. They were picked up by the plane guard.
Indeed. But the Midway planes were another matter - Having armed and fueled planes on the hangar deck - and a full 1/2 strike prepared (I think this is referred to a full deck strike - the Japanese would launch in two waves even if a total launch, which was the amount of planes that could be launched from 1 "deck load"). In addition to having this many planes and open avgas lines, they also had ordinance for all the Vals, and 2x the ordinance for the Kates. It is questionable how good the "housekeeping" was in the magazines for this ordinance, which would have made the situation even more volatile.
Compare this to merely having open AVGAS lines and no ordinance if the only air operations were to land and launch CAP. That is a huge difference.
Avgas Lines are a problem, but it's a limited amount of storage, as are the planes themselves when fueled.
Now, rupturing the AVGAS tanks is a different matter, but this were usually ruptured by concussion damage lower in the vessel, such as torpedo strikes.
Absolutely , but not impossible. The problems with the historical plan, from a japanese perspective were many. I think too much was being asked of CarDivs 1 and 2, and the fleet was too far forward to take advantage of what strengths the Japanese plan did possess. Having such complex plan as they did, might have been turned to their advantage, by confusing the USN in the approach, but there was far too much separation between the various TFs.
Your photos of deck accidents did bring back some memories as well for me. Aboard our carrier, late 70's. A flight deck is no place to be if you dont know what you are doing....
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WdnpHcQn3Y
This another video of deck operations on the melbourne. These are deck quals by pilots of VF805. Not my video. It was originally by Peter greenwood, and I rememeber when he took it. Thats me in the superstructure...actually Im not visible...
Video has sound track from actual A4G engine sounds (mostly) made by Peter Greenfield ex-RAN A4G Skyhawk pilot. The first half of the video shows how the nosewheel steering problem affects A4G operations on deck on the catapult. Usually the very effective nosewheel steering makes taxiing on deck easy enough. The second half of this video shows A4G deck landings from a low angle at a point where the aircraft is most likely to stop if the target wire is caught. Sometimes the A4G gets 'hung up' after arrest and once again we see the value of the hard working deck crew coming to remedy the problem swiftly. These aircraft/pilots are doing deck qualifications.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQT5yp8-bMs
No worries..Interesting, did not know!
My only point was refueling CAP is going to put the carrier in a lot less danger than having strike aircraft all being readied for a strike. And with CAP, they will be off the carrier again shortly after refueling, so you have a bit of a revolving door, which means you don't have 40 armed strike aircraft on the hangar deck with ordinance. Makes a huge difference in survivability. And at Coral Sea, the Shokaku may have been conducting at least CAP flight operations, I am not sure.
yes, the Midway class just missed the war with Midway CV-41 commissioned in September 10, 1945And none of these carriers had armored flight decks, So I'd rather have by planes on a flight deck than on the enclosed hangar decks. Of course, an armored flight deck would be nice, but Japan has to wait til the Taiho, the US never had an operational carrier with an armored flight deck in WW2.
Go read the U.S. Navy history of bases in the Pacific before you repeat other such statements that go against the actual situation whether or not Midway fell.Hawaii was indeed 2,600 miles away from any support without the Japanese taking Midway.
Midway provided no "support", if anything it was something that had to be supported.
Midway in 1942 was not really any kind of a base, so it lent no real support to Hawaii.