SMS Ostfriesland and Billy Mitchell

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Its more to do with culture that exists within the military structure to which you belong. For all its failings at the political level, the german system favoured intitiative and innovation.


There were problems with the german system however. The germans were never quite able to develop unified command systems, or truly international levels of co-operation in either war. There was never any equivalent to the JCS, or theatre commands like SWPAC. Even in WWI, the strategic flexibility of the german command system was limited. There was never any supreme commander in the manner of Foch's role as supreme allied commander, or even Eisenhower. The ability of the americans to work in coaltion with their partners often offset their own shortcomings
 
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Earlier in the thread, a mention was made to the effect of American thought Firepower>maneuver. Desert Storm brought up earlier too... as a good example of this "unimaginative groupthink" Schwarzkopf is now credited and famous for the old "left hook" maneuver to take out the Iraqi forces. The truth is, his original plan submitted to JCS involved a set piece frontal attack to win by attrition. (Indeed, we had sent over a hundred thousand body bags in anticipation of a bloody conflict). This plan was derided by some calling it the old "hey diddle diddle, right up the middle" strategy. The plan that ended up unfolding was something of a collaborative effort led by USAF Col. John Boyd and was ironically not liked by Schwarzkopf though obviously used.

That said and more on topic, I thought it strange at the time that the brain trust (I was spending my time between PSAB and Al Kharge during this period), quite often, would send F-16's on short radius CAS when A-10's were available and send A-10's on longer range tactical bombing missions when F-16's were available. Seemed backwards to me.
 
Only one bomb dropped by that flight of Kates hit and blew up the USS Arizona.

Another large stationary target, and not really defending itself. Bombing from less than 10,000 feet too. Still, a 40% hit rate is very good.

Cheers

Steve
 

Have you checked to see what the F-16's range was when loaded with a lot of ground attack ordnance? When I was at the Pentagon I talked to the officer who was the program manager for the F-16 ground attack ordnance tests; he described it as a "Perimeter Defense Weapon." The F-16 was designed for air superiority missions and with that weapons load it had a lot of range. I went to see the F-16 production line in 1977 when I was at the GD plant on an F-111 problem. When I remarked on the F-16's range to one of the GD engineers he responded, "It's a gdammed airborne Kawasaki! It's so small it does not take much to keep it going." And sure enough, when I saw the cockpit of an F-16 being assembled, I felt like I was looking at a motorcycle sidecar.

Funny thing was there was a push in the USAF in the late 80's to replace the A-10 in Europe with the F-16 under the theory that in a war with the Warsaw Pact the A-10 would get hit on its first mission, probably make it back to its home base, but be unavailable for the duration of the war, which would not last long. During Desert Shield Schwarzkoph told the USAF to send him every A-10 they could find. When the war was over we had lost four A-10's. And four F-16's. So much for vulnerability.
 
Mlflyer,

I may be wrong about this, but at the time I believe I was told the F-16 outfitted with the ground attack ordnance had greater range than the F-15. And the A-10 could carry much more than the F-16 for CAS and loiter as well. Again, I am just the peanut gallery, it just seemed by casual observation that the F-16 was better suited for that longer range interdiction than the A-10; something you anecdotally confirm.

As far as losses are concerned, that really must be looked at with context. Sheer numbers (4 and 4) do not tell the story.

Sorry for the thread drift, let's get back to the Ostfriesland
 
Remember, you have to remember that Billy Mitchell wasn't entirely operating on facts -- but on persuasive arguments, omitted facts, and appeals to emotions: In the field of politics and law, the argument matters more than the facts.

And you have to remember, the Navy was doing precisely the same thing. So fighting fire with fire? Mitchell was but one man aligned against two of the most powerful organizations within the US Govt. Give the man his due... credit him with having the foresight to form a cogent theory and the courage (or megalomania- that's fair to say) to see it through.
 
Something was going on.

The ability of bombers didn't change a great deal from the early 20s to the late 20s.
Engine power was lucky it went up 50%,
The planes were still fixed landing gear biplanes with fixed pitch propellers.

The Battleships had roughly doubled the number of heavy AA guns and had added anti strafing guns (hand fulls of machine guns).
Mitchell (and others?) had demonstrated using fighter planes (Mitchell used S.E. 5As) to strafe and drop light bombs to disrupt the shipboard AA guns.
The Heavy AA guns had acquired gun directors (primitive?) and fuse setters.
The new treaty cruisers designed and laid down in the late 20s generally had four heavy AA guns ( as much as an early 20s battleship) , some may have had space for more but did not mount them in peacetime due to weight considerations. Many of these late 20s and early 30s ships were very tight on weight as they learned how to meet the treaty limits.
 
Funny thing was there was a push in the USAF in the late 80's to replace the A-10 in Europe with the F-16
In the 80s, Air Guard units in MA, CT, and NY all had warthogs and operated on the Ft Drum ranges. Just prior to Desert Storm the hogs went away and were replaced with retired early model F16 interceptors repurposed for CAS, much to the chagrin of the personnel. ("How would you feel if they took away your M1 Abrams and sent you up against T72s in a Humvee?")
The F16s couldn't use the short Army strip at Drum the way the hogs did, so had to cart their live ordnance from civilian fields at Windsor Locks, Westfield, and Syracuse to the ranges in the MOA. All went well until a bomb came adrift on a taxiway at Syracuse, and the public found out what was going on. Can you spell "firestorm"? I can remember occasions of waiting in sequence for takeoff with F16s toting low drags.
Cheers,
Wes
 
The only USAF F-15 that carried ground attack ordnance is the F-15E, which generally had conformal tanks as well. No way did the F-16 with bombs have longer range than that bird. Remember that the alternative to the F-15E was the F-16XL. And I can only relate what the officer who ran the program told me about the F-16's range when fitted for ground attack; if he did not know then no one does.

The A-10's spent a lot of time during Desert Storm hunting Scuds, not exactly their intended mission.

 
soulezoo said:
And you have to remember, the Navy was doing precisely the same thing.
Of course, you counter one narrative with another... when it comes to stuff like this, you kind of act in a weird state where part of you is aware of the facts to avoid being bamboozled, yet another part of you operates with a complete disregard to facts and is honestly almost totally unconcerned with even being right.

At least that's what I've learned with observations of online debates, politicians, lawyers, and sociopaths
 
Read something that the destruction of the Yamato was the final vindication of air power over battleship.
However task force 54 was ordered to intercept Ten-Go and we could have seen the final slugging out of battleship v battleship action against the biggest monster of them all v Pearl Harbour refloats.
It could have been a battleship dream match up.
 
Actually, the battleships dispatched to intercept the Yamato's group included the New Jersey, Wisconsin and Missouri. The other battleships committed were the South Dakota, Massachusetts and Indiana.
None of which were at Pearl Harbor during the Japanese attack.

And the initial airstrike launched by Mitscher wasn't authorized by Spruance, but once he was informed of the strike, agreed to let it go - this move by Mitscher altered the course of history to an extent, as had the air attacks not commenced, then the most modern (of the day) battleships would have confronted the most powerful Battleship built.
 
From what I is seeing task force 54 did include battleships but the older stuff. Tennessee with Admiral Deyo.

From an armchair naval fanatic then sounds like a monster movie but loss of life on the American side could have been horrendous. So another problem with battleships is when they do go bang they take a lot of hands with them.
 
USAAF bombing hit rate at the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was 75%.

I don't know where that number came from, but it is far from realistic.

The Allies dropped 514 bombs on the Japanese, they didn't even claim a 75% hit rate (385 hits!) they CLAIMED 78 hits (15%).

Again, the level bombing attacks were conducted from low altitudes and were largely ineffective. Remember that Arnold had ballyhooed the Army's participation at Midway, claiming his airman dropped 322 bombs for 22 hits and 46 near misses. Japanese records show that these level bombing attacks scored no hits and caused no damage. The carriers Soryu and Hiryu reported that the closest bombs that they reckoned were aimed at them fell 50m away.

Cheers

Steve
 

Was that a general statement, or directed at soulzoo?
 
When you have bombers flying in formation, all trying to hit the same target, counting the number of bombs dropped versus the number that hit the target is a reasonable approach relative to hit success rate.

At the Bismarck Sea there were individual aircraft making attacks with both bombs and guns. The 75% hit rate presumably reflects the number of aircraft that successfully hit their targets. That is a more reasonable approach than counting bombs dropped. Given that they sank all of the cargo ships as well as the convoy commander's destroyer, the success rate cannot be denied.

Of course that number may not reflect the fact that B-17's also attacked the convoy during darkness.
 
When you have bombers flying in formation, all trying to hit the same target, counting the number of bombs dropped versus the number that hit the target is a reasonable approach relative to hit success rate.

It's the method used by the USN and USAAC/USAAF.

By that method they claimed a 15% hit rate. I would expect that to be optimistic given examples were claims vs reality have been tested. I don't know how many were claimed by aircraft flying at medium or higher altitudes, but I would also bet that number was in fact closer to zero.

At the end of several days and dozens of attacks, including the RAAF skip bombing and bombing at 'masthead height' and US bombers attacking from as low as 700 feet, the allied air forces had managed to damage or ultimately sink (with a little help from USN vessels) most of the Japanese ships (15?)

Cheers

Steve
 
Be that as it may, Spruance intentionally dispatched six of the newest battleships the USN had plus the South Dakota and Iowa class boats had the latest radar fire control for their main batteries, which would have meant that fifty four 16" guns would have had accurate fire over the Yamato's optically directed nine 18" batteries.

Another point that was brought to light during the air attacks on Yamato, was the failing of her underwater armor at the seams by the torpedoes and the poor damage control after they were breached.

So the speed and accuracy of the Iowa class boats would have been more than enough to put the hurt on Yamato, add the three South Dakotas and it would have been like a pack of dogs on a three-legged cat.
 

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