General statement -- politics in general
SMS Ostfriesland and Billy Mitchell
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That is actually what I thought. Simple miss-understanding here...
It basically requires you to always look at the numbers
47.8%
They were swerving every which way, I think I saw a picture of that... they were missing left and right.
Exactly, not at all like the Ostfriesland, more like the Utah in those bombing trials.
Also enemy vesels had a really bad habit of shooting at attacking aircraft. This might seem ineffective in terms of aircraft shot down, but a ship didn't necessarily have to shoot an attacker down to ruin his aim, force him higher, etc.
Cheers
Steve
I never knew about trials involving the USS Utah. When was this?
Ironically the whole premise of level bombing from altitude was that it would avoid the defensive fire from the ships.
fubar57
General
Dec. 1940ish says GOOGLE
parsifal
Colonel
This doesn't seem correct. In the first place the battle was a joint operation with units of the RAAF
The battle more or less followed the following narrative
At dawn on 2 March, a force of six RAAF Bostons attacked Lae to reduce its ability to provide support. At about 10:00, another Liberator found the convoy. Eight USAAC B-17s took off to attack the ships, followed an hour later by another 20. These aircraft were each carrying approximatyely 6x 1000lb bombs They found the convoy and attacked bombs from 5,000 ft (1,500 m). They claimed to have sunk up to three merchant ships but in fact Kyokusei Maru had sunk carrying 1,200 army troops, and two other transports, Teiyo Maru and Nojima, were damaged each hit, or near missed by a single bomb.[ That's a hit rate of just under 3%.
The convoy was attacked again that evening by 11 USAAC B-17s, with the same basic load out, but this time no hits. Overall, for the first day of the action 39 bombers had dropped about 150 bombs for one hit and two near misses.
Next day 100 sqn RAAF launched Beaufort strikes from milne Bay, but most of the aircraft failed to find the target. Two did, and were carrying 2000 lb bombloads. Assuming they were 1000lb bombs, the bombs again missed
Near cape Huon, the weather cleared and the allies launched a strike with more than 90 aircraft involved. An additional 22 A-20s hit the airfield at Lae. , reducing the convoy's air cover. Attacks on the base continued throughout the day.
Im not certain of the bomb load outs for this strike. But given that the range was now reduced, it is reasonable to extrapolate and assume the same or greater bombloads as the previous days attacks. At 10:00, 13 B-17s reached the convoy and bombed from medium altitude of 7,000 feet, causing the ships to maneuver, which dispersed the convoy formation and reduced their concentrated anti-aircraft firepower. There were no hits in this attack. That raises the tally to 3 hits for 220 bombs dropped. One B-17 blew up in the air after being hit by a Zero., but the p-38s participating were very effective at this time. Five Zekes were shot down by the P-38s in exchange for 3 p-38s lost. Disregarding US claims in the air, the Japanese records show the loss of a total of 7 fighters that day. It is thought the B-17s brought down 2 (they claimed 15). Three additional Zekes were damaged.
B-25s arrived shortly afterward with 3000lb bomb loads. They were carrying 500lb bombs. They released their 500-pound bombs between 3,000 and 6,000 feet, reportedly causing two Japanese vessels to collide. The result of the B-17 and B-25 sorties scored few hits but left the convoy ships separated making them vulnerable to strafers and masthead bombers, I believe the B-25s were about 20 in number. The running total is now 3-4 hits for 340 bombs dropped or about 1% hit rate
What these early attacks did achieve was a scattering of the convoy, excessive expenditure of AA ammo and a focussing of the directors on the medium altitudes. Thus facilitating attacks at masthead height that were to follow. But the preliminary attacks ddo need to be included in the analysis and this destroys the notion of super accuracy at Bismarck sea. The results achieved this far were still above average,, but nowhere near the 755 often claimed.
The main deconstruction of the convoy began, however with the low level attack. First in was strafing attack by Beaufighters of 30 sqn RAAF . The 13 Beaufighters approached the convoy at low level to give the impression they were Beauforts making a torpedo attack. The ships turned to face them, the standard procedure to present a smaller target to torpedo bombers, but this allowed the Beaufighters to maximise the damage they inflicted on the ships' anti-aircraft guns, bridges and crews from thir strafing. The Beaufighters20mm guns were devastating in this role. And the six wing-mounted .303 in added to the slaughter. On board one of the Beaufighters was cameraman Damian Parer, who shot dramatic footage of the battle. The techniques of flak suppression were techniques mostly worked out in the north sea and werer techniques still not fully understood by their US allies.
Immediately following the flak suppression, , 13 B-25s of the 38th Bombardment Group's 711 and 405 sqns USAAC w attacked at mast height. The beafighter attacks had killed many of the deck crews by this stage and many of the deck cargoes had caught fire. severe fires had
Shirayuki was the first ship to be hit, by a combination of strafing and bombing attacks. Almost all the men on the bridge became casualties, including Adm Kimura, who was wounded. Either the deck fires, or one of the bomb hits caused the magazine to explode, breaking off the ships stern . The ship sank because of this damage.
The destroyer Tokitsukaze was also hit and fatally damaged. Its crew was taken off by Yukikaze. The destroyer Arashio was hit, and collided with the transport Nojima, disabling her. Both the destroyer and the transport were abandoned, and Nojima was later sunk by a subsequent air attack.
Fourteen B-25s returned that afternoon,. By this time, a third of the transports were sunk or sinking. As the Beaufighters and B-25s had expended their munitions, some USAAF A-20 Havocs of the 3rd Attack Group joined in. Another five hits were claimed by B-17s of the 43rd Bombardment Group from higher altitudes. During the afternoon, further attacks from USAAF B-25s and Bostons of No. 22 Squadron RAAF followed
So at the end of these attacks and the preceding attacks, for about 500 bombs dropped, about 25 hits had been achieved. That's excellent shooting, but still very far from the claimed 75%,
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parsifal
Colonel
I have no doubt that a force of 4 or so USN battleships with escort could have overwhelmed the yamato in 1945. However its a suspect assumption to assume that radar in a daylight engagement (assuming the battleships engaged instead of the aircraft) would offer any advantage compared to the Yamatos massive optical range finders.
USN fire control did not work well in rough seas. It was standard procedure to fire at a certain point in the roll which could reduce rates of fire to less than half in certain sea conditions. According to Campbell, the maximum effective range of the fire control radars in US BBs was 37000 yds, but this would reduce significantly in any sea state. Realistically, the effective maximum range of the US surface gunnery was about 32000 yds. At 32000 yds, the MV of the Mk VIII 16 in shell was down to 1400 f/s. I doubt that would be enough to significantly threaten the yamato. To be effective, I estimate they would need to get the range down to under 15000 yds. Yamato could outrun the Sth Dakotas (in terms of effective sea speed) which means that until Yamato was slowed, most of the heavy lifting would need to be done by the iowas. . At full speed there was a 6 knot speed advantage for the Iowas, which means that the rate of closure would be 12000 yds per hour. Given that the Yamatos optical rangefinders used a targettig system known as sokutekiban 9a word for which there is no English equjivalent) was very advanced, fitted as far as I know only to the Yamato class, and inclorporating huge 15m rangefinders that gave the japanese to fire out to ranges of about 39000 yards
The maximum range of the Type 94 18 in gun was 45000 yards, and it was effective against the main belt of the iowas at virtually all ranges for which fire control could be provided. if we assume the Japanese could open fire at 35000 yds, they have 20000 yards of immunity in which to disable the Iowas before effective return fire could be made. That's a lot of shells to dodge.
The problem of course is that there will be bound tro be complications mistakes, extraneous factors. Im not saying the yamato can win. I don't believe that possible. but it would be very hard to bring a ship like the yamato to her knees in a surface fight. that was whast she was designed for.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
The other option for the US ships was to stay at long range (30,000 yds or better) and try for the "lob".
Plunging fire coming down through the deck/s.
The deck is larger target than the side of the ship. at 30,000 yds the angle of decent is about 28 degrees, at 35,000yds it is about 36 degrees.
chances of a hit are much reduced but then the American ships have a lot more ammo if all the different ships ammo is added up.
Plunging fire coming down through the deck/s.
The deck is larger target than the side of the ship. at 30,000 yds the angle of decent is about 28 degrees, at 35,000yds it is about 36 degrees.
chances of a hit are much reduced but then the American ships have a lot more ammo if all the different ships ammo is added up.
There were occasions during Leyte Gulf when American ships fired effectively on Japanese ships who were obscured by squals and smoke and couldn't see to shoot back with their optical range finders.
With all the assets it had available, USN could have certainly arranged for smoke even if Mother Nature didn't cooperate in the squal department.
But I'm sure it was deemed cheaper and easier to send in the airedales.
Cheers,
Wes
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The attack wave was initially unauthorized, and after they had been launched, Spruance was informed and he decided to let it go ahead but dispatched the six BBs and support at flank speed to intercept just in case the air attack failed.
Trials were carried out from 1932 to 1940, and hitting ships level bombing proved extremely difficult.
It led to the quest for better sights and the USN to favour dive bombing, which was consistently much more accurate, and torpedo bombing, because torpedoes sink ships.
Cheers
Steve
Particularly when the maneuvers were radical or unrestricted, accuracy was 1.9% at best and 0% at worst, around 2.4-5.6% when sharp turns alone were employed; against dive bombing accuracy ranged from 13-23.1%
It is also important to remember that USS Utah was not shooting back, nor were the attackers intercepted by any defending aircraft. These were bombing trials, the bombers had a completely free run at the target ship. The results can only have been worse operationally.
Cheers
Steve
Cheers
Steve
Almost certainly true, though some people actually are more accurate under pressure (this likely wouldn't apply for level bombing because of the limitations imposed) -- hell I suck standing in front of a basket shooting balls at the basket. I've scored better having somebody coming at me real fast.
fubar57
General
I shot trap for several years and half/most/all the time we were usually several beers into it so you were kinda keeping an eye on the guy on either side of you or when you were playing slider.
But in all other bombing we know for a fact that operational accuracy was significantly worse than that achieved on the ranges. There is no reason to expect this to be any different when bombing ships.
The facts are that anti aircraft fire disrupted formations, individual aircraft took evasive action preventing accurate aiming (or the bombsight even working properly). It also forced formations higher, and higher altitude meant less accuracy... always.
For example, cruising in on the range, or over USS Utah, the aircrew might devote considerable time and effort to ensuring an accurate course, speed and altitude, there was nothing to distract them. The bombardier could concentrate on putting accurate data into the bombsight and into doing it error free. At a relatively low 8,000 feet bombing altitude a one degree error in ground track will result in a 174 foot bombing error (you missed the ship). A 3 mph error in ground speed will result in a 100 foot bombing error (you probably missed the ship). If the time of fall of the bomb is input with a one second error there will be a 440 foot bombing error (that has most definitely missed the ship). These minute errors might often be avoided in training or on exercise, but were often far worse operationally.
Cheers
Steve
That's why the F4F was built with the high altitude supercharger? I thought that was already underway
MIflyer
Captain
The XF4F-3 with the two stage two speed supercharger was the subject of contract negotiations between the USN and Grumman beginning in October 1938. The prototype first flew on 12 Feb 1939. By that time the USAAC had already compared the XP-41 with basically that same engine with the Republic AP-4 which had fitted a turbo to a single stage supercharged R-1830. The Air Corps decided that the turbo was the way to go, resulting in the P-43 order.
