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Usually two or three debriefings at same time - squadron CO/lead ship flight commanders covered the mission highlights including times, routes, flak locations, target visibility, weather/visibility along the route, first contact with enemy fighters and details of the attacks - includng time and place of losses.In earlier episodes they showed some debriefing/interrogation scenes.
Mainly what was said in these was which bombers they saw go down, and the number of parachutes they saw.
Were the actual debriefings like that, or more detailed about strength and position of the flak defences, strength of the fighter opposition, what tactics they used, weather, etc.?
There seemed to be ground to air missiles fired at the 17 that had the nose blown off... To my knowledge no ground based German antiaircraft missiles reached operations. What did I see?
Of the five surface to air missile systems Germany had under development, none were ever used operationally.There seemed to be ground to air missiles fired at the 17 that had the nose blown off... To my knowledge no ground based German antiaircraft missiles reached operations. What did I see?
Because they were clueless. Visually they are all 500 pound GP. The maximum load out for Berlin range would be 10x500GP.
Of the five surface to air missile systems Germany had under development, none were ever used operationally.
I don't have internet (just limited internet via my phone) so I can't follow the series.
Is it possible that it was an R4M fired from an Me262?
They received their first P-51 Cs & Bs in the middle of June '44. They did transition training and their first mission was 4 July, '44. They first received D models in October '44. The producers know that they were flying B/C models on 12 August but they only had an actual flying D model, so they chose to stick with D models so they could use footage of the flying D. In this video, they talk about that choice, and also why they chose to use rockets, even though they knew it was strafing only (they were using Lt. Col. Alex Jefferson's book as a reference) : https://youtu.be/hl2EYqcFXsE?t=957Episode 8 has just aired.
... Then they show a raid on the south of France in August 1944. The 332nd were shown flying P-51Ds fitted with rocket projectiles.
drgondog tells me that the 332nd did not get P-51Ds that early, and that the P-51D did not get rocket stubs until April 1945.
They were definitely flying B / C models. They used Lt. Col. Jefferson's book for a lot of reference - especially many of his drawings. They acknowledge the wrong model - it was done for a reason as i linked in my other response in the thread. I had the pleasure of meeting Lt. Col Jefferson several times when I was younger. He was a good friend of my father. It is pretty surreal to have a story you heard as a kid visualised like it was.
That has the 12 August mission as "strafing", which I would take to mean gun attacks.
Unfortunately they don't say what aircraft they were flying.
It would have been nicer to see a good segment on VIII Fighter Command.But It would have been nice to see a good segment on the 56th FG Wolfpack.
Yes. The book wasn't bad, and covered the shift in operational aggressiveness under Doolittle well:It would have been nicer to see a good segment on VIII Fighter Command.
As for the 332nd, meh.
It also had the German reaction, with quotes like the famous one from Galland:Jimmy Doolittle's first decision as commander of the Eighth would reverse the course of the air war. Under Eaker, the mission of the fighter escorts was to stay within close range of the bombers until enemy fighters attacked. "This policy concerned me," Doolittle explained later, "because fighter aircraft are designed to go after enemy fighters. Fighter pilots are usually pugnacious individuals by nature and are trained to be aggressive in the air. Their machines are specially designed for offensive action." Doolittle wanted his escorts to intercept the enemy's fighters before they reached the bombers, and to strafe enemy fighter fields and transportation targets on their return home, as well as on separate operations. "If it moved, could fly or supported the German war effort, I told my pilots to kill it in place." Spaatz agreed completely, seeing the destruction of the Luftwaffe in the air, on its airfields, and at its fighter factories as the Eighth's paramount responsibility. Eaker's policy of forcing the Luftwaffe up to fight by hitting vital economic targets made no sense, Doolittle argued, if the fighters remained tethered to the bombers.
It also cited Williamson (though with insufficient emphasis in my opinion) and the decisive air campaign of '44: Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945Later, Adolf Galland would say that the day the Eighth Air Force's fighters went on the offense was the day Germany lost the air war. At this time, Hermann Göring was ordering his fighters to avoid the American fighter escorts altogether and concentrate on the bombers. This, Galland said later, was Germany's "greatest tactical error" of the air war. It caused his pilots to lose their élan and develop a deep fear of the American fighters, avoiding them whenever possible.
Because they were clueless. Visually they are all 500 pound GP. The maximum load out for Berlin range would be 10x500GP.