Spitfire Combat Radius (range) evolution, limitations?

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

They made a lot of changes to the design of the Spitfire over the years. Spit I and Spit XIV or XXII look pretty different. Could they have done something to the wing or fuselage etc. to substantially reduce the drag? Without making a totally new aircraft I mean?

 

[pbehn]

They made a lot of changes to the design of the Spitfire over the years. Spit I and Spit XIV or XXII look pretty different. Could they have done something to the wing or fuselage etc. to substantially reduce the drag? Without making a totally new aircraft I mean?

They could and many things were proposed but why would they. The first Griffon (single stage) Spitfires appeared in 1942, the Mk XIV was in squadron service from December 1943. The strategic bomber offensive was one niche in the allies needs. Defence of the UK was another. Attacks across the North Sea from Norway stopped after a few missions but they could start again. Attacks at high altitude and recon missions stopped when one Ju 86 was damaged over UK, but there was no guarantee that the Germans wouldnt come back with something better. Night time attacks didnt stop at the Blitz in 1940-41, the British had to have a night defence force to cope with the "baby blitz" of 1944 where Goring threw away much of his last remaining bomber force and intruder attacks like operation Gisela March 1945. There was always a need for a top class, balls out interceptor. Spitfire pilots may have been envious of Mustangs being able to fly to Berlin, Mustang pilots were happy that they werent facing 1000 Spitfire Mk IX and Mk XIVs when they got there.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Well adding fuel might affect performance, or it might not. FW 190 was heavier than a Spit V but it pretty much pwned them. I am not sure improved aerodynamics / reduced drag would negatively affect Spitfire performance any. An extra 30 miles per hour of range + 10 -20 mph of speed seems like it would be an overall improvement. I suppose it could affect lift and therefore turning radius, but i gather wing loading increased a bit with later mark Spitfires regardless. Why would less drag make for a worse interceptor? Do you think it would affect climb rate?

 

[GregP]

They DID produce the Spiteful (land-based) and the Seafang (carrier-based). These were basically late Spitfire fuselages mated to a new, laminar-flow wing. They were somewhat of a wonder for pistons, but jets were flitting by at 100+ mph faster speeds, so they weren't put into production. Had the jets not showed up, they likely would have been among the best of the pistons.

You could say the Spiteful/Seafang/Tempest/Sea Fury, P-51H, Ta 152 and the like were the last superprops. The jets couldn't maneuver with them or usually outclimb them, for the most part, but they were generally 100+ mph faster. So ... out with the pistons and in with the jets. It didn't hurt that the jet engines required many fewer hours of maintenance, either.

The early jets were basically jet-powered versions of the last superprops.

The Attacker was a single-jet version of the Spiteful/Seafang, It evolved into the Scimitar. The Sea Hawk was basically a single-jet version of the Fury/Sea Fury with bifurcated exhaust, which became the P.1052 and P.1081 and, finally, the Hunter.

 

[pbehn]

Well adding fuel might affect performance, or it might not. FW 190 was heavier than a Spit V but it pretty much pwned them. I am not sure improved aerodynamics / reduced drag would negatively affect Spitfire performance any. An extra 30 miles per hour of range + 10 -20 mph of speed seems like it would be an overall improvement. I suppose it could affect lift and therefore turning radius, but i gather wing loading increased a bit with later mark Spitfires regardless. Why would less drag make for a worse interceptor? Do you think it would affect climb rate?

Not only was the Fw 190 a later design, it had a bigger more powerful engine. The drag of the Spitfire increased with age because the cooling drag increased, from start to finish it doubled in weight. Why does the Spitfire have to match the Mustang when the British were using both? They also had the Typhoon and Tempest which filled other needs. The Mustang as a plane was superior in 3 major areas, cooling drag, aerodynamic drag from wing profile and fit and finish drag. Changing the cooling drag needs a new design, changing the wings is also a new plane, the "fit and finish" of the Spitfire was improved but much of the difference was in the design and method of manufacture which not only needs a new plane but a new factory and production process. Look at the radiators on the XIV, they are huge, and not very efficient in the Meredith effect.

 

[pbehn]

They DID produce the Spiteful (land-based) and the Seafang (carrier-based). These were basically late Spitfire fuselages mated to a new, laminar-flow wing. They were somewhat of a wonder for pistons, but jets were flitting by at 100+ mph faster speeds, so they weren't put into production. Had the jets not showed up, they likely would have been among the best of the pistons.

You could say the Spiteful/Seafang/Tempest/Sea Fury, P-51H, Ta 152 and the like were the last superprops. The jets couldn't maneuver with them or usually outclimb them, for the most part, but they were generally 100+ mph faster. So ... out with the pistons and in with the jets. It didn't hurt that the jet engines required many fewer hours of maintenance, either.

The early jets were basically jet-powered versions of the last superprops.

The Attacker was a single-jet version of the Spiteful/Seafang, It evolved into the Scimitar. The Sea Hawk was basically a single-jet version of the Fury/Sea Fury with bifurcated exhaust, which became the P-1052 and P.1081 and, finally, the Hunter.

When the Gloster E28.39 "Whittle" matched a Spitfire in level speed almost from its first flight in 1941 and later went up to 42,000ft the writing on the wall for piston engines was huge.

 

[tomo pauk]

They made a lot of changes to the design of the Spitfire over the years. Spit I and Spit XIV or XXII look pretty different. Could they have done something to the wing or fuselage etc. to substantially reduce the drag? Without making a totally new aircraft I mean?

Some things were improved, other left to be desired. A non-exhaustive list of improvements: internal bullet-prrof glass ( on Mk.VII, VIII, IX etc vs. the external, as used on Mk.II, V and VI), less draggy exhausts, less draggy rearwiev mirror, retractable U/C (Mk.VII, VIII, XIV, later marks), fully covered wheel wells (Mk.22 IIRC).
Cooling system was draggy, however, and was getting draggier with more powerful engines, especially with 2-stage Griffons. One possibility IMO was the relocation of cooling system in the leading edges (like the Mosquito had, as well as Tempest I, Fury and Hornet), but that was never done.

Well adding fuel might affect performance, or it might not. FW 190 was heavier than a Spit V but it pretty much pwned them. I am not sure improved aerodynamics / reduced drag would negatively affect Spitfire performance any. An extra 30 miles per hour of range + 10 -20 mph of speed seems like it would be an overall improvement. I suppose it could affect lift and therefore turning radius, but i gather wing loading increased a bit with later mark Spitfires regardless. Why would less drag make for a worse interceptor? Do you think it would affect climb rate?

"Drag is cruel", per Bill Marshall. Weight is a factor, but drag is a problem when striving to the high speeds.
Less drag = better interceptor, if the weight remains the same.

Fw 190 came right in the time when Spitfire was very ... imperfect. Combination of bad workmanship, draggy items and features, and bad carburetors meant that most of the Spitfire Vs (with 'normal' engines, non-tropicalized) were barely making 370 mph. A Spitfire V with good fit & finish, some nip and tuck was doing 388 mph per RAE - very close to the early Fw 190s.

 

[ColFord]

I was looking for my book on the 23rd Fighter Group, which I failed to locate, but i did find the 2012 Osprey "Air Vanguard' book "Allison Engined P-51 Mustang" by Martyn Chorlton. There are a few interesting tidbits of operational history in there, which I'll repeat here in no particular order

*During the Dieppe raid RAF Mustangs (I believe it says RCAF 400 Sqn) claimed a Fw 190 destroyed. They also comprised 11 of the 119 RAF aircraft lost that day, from 26, 239, 400 and 414 sqds. I didn't see any other claims.
*On Oct 22 1942 RAF Mustang Mk1 and 1As escorted Wellington bombers on a raid into Germany - against Dortmund and Essen. The raid was considered a partial success though the targets were obscured by clouds. All the aircraft returned to base. [It's unclear to me why they didn't do more of these escorted raids.]
*An RAF mission on June 29, 1943, a pair of Mustangs (one I and one IA) flown by Archibald MacLachlan and Geoffrey Page (the former flying with a prosthetic arm) flew a daylight raid all the way to Paris. They destroyed six enemy aircraft (four HS 126s and two Ju 88s).
*Twenty three (23) RAF Squadrons were equipped with Allison Mustangs (Mks I and IA)
*On June 6 1944 three RAF Mustangs were active over the D-Day beach, two flying cover for a Tac-R fighter, when they were attacked by four plus then another two FW 190s. One Mustang was destroyed and the other two managed to disengage. Three Mustangs were lost that day in total out of 86 Tac-R and spotting sorties.

And therein lies the problem.

The information in the source you quote, at least for the RAF component of the story, is somewhat flawed.

Dieppe 19 August 1942 - 10 Mustang Mk.I aircraft lost to all causes, including enemy fighters, enemy flak and 'friendly fire'. No.414 (RCAF) Squadron, at time claim of one FW-190 destroyed, post war analysis of Luftwaffe records would support a 'damaged'; No.239 Sqdn RAF one claim 'half-share' of a FW-190 matches to post war analysis of Luftwaffe records for a confirmed loss. Squadrons involved, No.26 and No.239 RAF had both been flying operational sorties using the Mustang Mk.I and so had some experience on the type. For both No.400 (RCAF) Squadron and No.414 (RCAF) Squadron, the Dieppe operation was the first time that their pilots had flown the Mustang Mk.I in operations - in most instances the Dieppe operation was the first time their pilots had flown operationally - so a bunch of very 'green' pilots. A review of the Mustang losses incurred during the Dieppe operation indicates that the cause of losses was potentially 1/3 to enemy fighters, 1/3 to enemy flak, 1/3 to 'friendly fire' - both naval AA and other RAF fighters attacking the Mustangs thinking they were Me-109s. A key thing to note about the Dieppe operation and the RAF/RCAF Mustang squadrons involved was the operational directives the pilots had been given before the operation was to try and avoid combat with enemy fighters and to only engage in combat in self defence. The directives, which were subject to critical review after Dieppe, also placed the Mustangs at a disadvantage in terms of the altitudes they were directed to fly, the airspeed over the operational area and their entry and exit areas from the coast which placed them near known concentratons of enemy flak and where they were likely to get tangled up in combat between the two fighter forces - they didn't really understand the concept of operational deconfliction at the time.

22 October 1942 sortie as written up there never happened. Also, as the Mustang Mk.IA didn't get introduced to RAF Squadron service until beginning of June 1943..........

Actually what happened was:

On 21 October 1942, four Mustang Mk.I aircraft of No.268 Squadron RAF, led by Wing Commander AF Anderson DSO DFC became the first single engine fighters based in the UK to penetrate the German border. They flew over Holland to the area of the Dortmund-Ems Canal in western Germany and shot up a number of objectives along the way, including a steam locomotive, canal barges, lock gates, hutten enemy camp, gasometer, factory and a number of small ships or tugs. They were supported by another group of four Mustang Mk.I from the same Squadron who conducted an offensive sweep through parts of Holland, also shooting up a number of target of opportunity. None of the aircraft involved lost or damaged. Over the next few months the Mustang Mk.I aircraft of No.268 Squadron made a number of further similar operations through Holland and into west Germany to shoot up targets of opportunity.

Then, on the night of 21-22 October 1942, in a very separate series of operations by Wellington bombers of the RAF also attacked targets in the region of the Dortmund-Ems Canal in western Germany - some 8 hours after the Mustangs were back home and the pilots happily tucked in bed after some post operation celebrations in the Mess.

How do the two get combined into one? Best I can find is the series of Air Ministry Offical Communiques issued on 22-23 October 1942. The communique lists the operations separately. The communique then gets edited to reduce the word count for onwards transmission to overseas news agencies by their representative in the UK, and in this case one of the US news agencies contracts the wording in the communique so that the separation between the operations is a bit vague. When that communique arrives in the USA, it is then further edited and sent out to all the affiliated newspapers of that agency - at this point the two separate operations have become one and a bit of journalistic licence has been applied in describing the operations. Years later, in trying to find information on early RAF Mustang operations, a US author finds a copy of the article in a period newspaper in a local library/archive, and quotes it in his book. It then gets requoted repeatedly in other books on the Mustang, with none of the authors in between thinking to check the original source.

Re long range bomber escort, the Mustang Mk.I aircraft of the RAF ACC Squadron had been conducting escort operations for the light-medium bombers of No.2 Group RAF since September 1942 and continued to do so until around February 1943. The post action reports from the 2 Group bomber units were generally complimentary about the escort they received from the Mustang Squadrons as they usually actually made the rendezvous with the bombers on time and at the correct place, they stayed with the bombers at the same low level approach and attack altitudes and similar airspeeds, rejoined with the bombers after the bomb run and then stayed with them on the flight back. The same reports contained criticism of the escort being given in a number of instances by the fighter squadrons of FC flying Spitfires, Hurricanes or Typhoons who had either not made the RV, arrived late to the RV, or left the escort role early due to fuel concerns. Criticism from the bomber units also included failure of the FC Squadrons to arrive at the post bombing RV leaving the target area and leaving the bombers early on the return flight due to fuel shortages. The criticism of course did not go down well with HQ FC and as a result, the ACC Mustang Squadrons were no longer invited to partake of that role - separation between Command structures where ACC operations were flown under operational control of FC, convoluted RAF wartime politics and command structures.

MacLachlan and Page flew to Luftwaffe airfields to the south-west and south of Paris - 44kms to south-west and 26kms to south respectively. The description given by Chorlton is similar to the wartime press release about the operation.

21 RAF/RCAF/PAF Squadrons equipped with the Mustang Mk.I, Mk.IA and Mk.II in the ETO, plus the small numbers of Mustangs placed with various Flights and Units for trials, training and support in non-operational roles. Of the 21 RAF/RCAF/PAF Squadrons with the Mustang Mk.I, Mk.IA or Mk.II, four did not fly their Mustangs on operations whilst equipped with them in the UK - some were only equipped with the Allison engine Mustang for a short period before either being re-equipped with another type, or transferred overseas. Three RAF Squadrons and one RAF Flight operated P-51 and A-36 aircraft borrowed from the USAAF in the MTO in limited numbers for a limited time to conduct operational flying in the MTO - usually because the RAF did not have suitable aircraft available to meet the operational needs of those Squadrons in the MTO at the time.

6 June 1944, D-Day, sorties flown between 04.55hrs and 21:15hrs. Three Mustangs lost that day - one to enemy fighters, one to 'friendly fire' from Naval flak (very likely USN vessels) and one that was returning to base with engine problems and went 'missing' in the Channel - potential here is engine quit and pilot ditched and was not seen, also possibility that he was also shot down in error by naval gunners as due to his engine problems he may have approached an Allied ship with intention of ditching near it and he was shot down in error. More than 86 Tac/R and Naval Gunfire Direction 'sorties' conducted by Mustang Mk.I, Mk.IA and Mk.II on D-Day - I suspect Chorlton has taken "tasking" an operational task that can be conducted by a number of aircraft and loosely translated that to 'sortie'. In official RAF terms a 'sortie' is conducted by an individual aircraft/pilot. There were around 86 'taskings' for Allison engine Mustang Squadrons on D-Day, with the 'tasking' requiring groupings of aircraft anywhere between the usual pair, to two pairs of Mustangs. The wartime analysis of D-Day operations conducted by HQ 2TAF gives a figure for individual Mustang sorties for D-Day closer to 200 individual aircraft flights on the day. The loss figures in their analysis, of three Mustangs for the day to all causes, was well below their predicted loss rate for the type given the operating environment and level of opposition associated with the landing. The loss rate for the Tac/R Mustangs went up dramatically - but still well below pre invasion HQ 2TAF predictions - after D-Day in the period up until the beginning of September 1944. This was primarily losses to enemy flak and an increase in losses to enemy fighters. In mid to late June 1944 a directive was issued to all Luftwaffe fighter units in France to particularly target low flying Tac/R aircraft and enemy flak units also specifically targetted the low flying Tac/R aircraft. In turn this lead to Montgomery (seeing the loss numbers increase with consequent loss of intelligence information) issuing a directive to HQ 2TAF requesting that the low level Tac/R units be requested not to engage in strafing of targets of opportunity, that they be reminded that he was depending on the reconnaissance coverage they were obtaining to help him in his decision making of the Army ground campaign, and also requested 2TAF where possible to provide either close or loose escort for the low level Tac/R aircraft to prevent Luftwaffe intereference with their work. That is why in the period from late June to late August 1944, on occasions, pairs of low level Tac/R Mustangs - sometimes with an escort of other RAF fighters - were intercepted by formations of Luftwaffe fighters of anywhere up to 20 enemy aircraft.

Not the least of the errors in fact in Mr Chorlton's book.

 

[Shortround6]

Sometimes they were trying to build the most "good" fighters in a given period of time rather than a fewer number of "best" fighters.

The huge radiators under the wings of the MK XIV helped balance the Griffon engine up front.
Move hundreds of pounds of radiators and coolant even a few feet from behind the CG to infront of it and you may need to do more flight testing. You need to change more wing panels. You need to move stuff, if not the wing itself to get the CG back to where you want it. You also want to make sure you don't put too many propellers into the ground when landing/taxing.

Given enough time and change enough parts and a much more streamline Spitfire could have been made.
Now do you want the super Spitfire one year from now or do you want the MK XIV six months from now?

The Hurricane II was an attempt to keep the Hurricane competitive with the 109E. It might have worked, except the Germans came out with the 109F. There is an example of gaining around 30 mph by cleaning up the airframe while using the same engine. But you had to change a lot of stuff to do it.
The Spitfire had become the only game in town after the Hurricane reached the end of the line and the Typhoon threw up in the bushes on both sides of the road on the way home from the pub. It took just over 3 years for Hawker to go from starting work on the Tempest to getting 2-3 squadrons into operation with it. But hey, it was "just" a Typhoon with a new wing right?

 

[pbehn]

Given enough time and change enough parts and a much more streamline Spitfire could have been made.
Now do you want the super Spitfire one year from now or do you want the MK XIV six months from now?

As I understand it the fuselage sections were made in advance of production, so to produce a super duper Spitfire "now" means scrapping those fuselages, so you get better Spitfires but not many of them. Same story for the Typhoon, a better Typhoon could have been made but it would have meant less of them.

 

[ColFord]

If I post pictures of all the guys who died flying Fairy Battles, Boulton Paul Defiants, or Brewster Buffalos does that mean those aircraft were great fighters all the sudden?

Big difference, I can name everyone of those pilots in my post, know what operations they flew during the War on Mustangs and other types, know what their fate was during the war or after, and in the case of over half of those pictured, was fortunate and priviledged enough to be considered by them as a friend and in a couple of instances to help them when they were documenting and producing their wartime memoirs. Nothing like being able to get the story first hand, in their own words, access to their original pilot's log books, photographs and diaries, and in some instances provide a little illumination between what they were told during the War and what actually happened, for example reasons for particular operations, who shot them down, who rescued them after they ditched in the Channel, or the true fate of fellow Squadron pilots listed to this day as "Missing" in the official records. And those photographed were just a small selection of those I could have posted photographs of, who I similarly interacted with and knew or knew directly of. Unfortunately, off all those, to best of my knowledge and that I can ascertain, there remains alive today just one pilot who flew Allison engine Mustangs in the Tac/R role with the RAF and Commonwealth and Allied Air Forces during WW2 - and he is aged 99 years and looking forward to celebrating his centenary if he can.

You also missed the point of my post, these pilots referred to themselves as Fighter-Reconnaissance pilots, the RAF officially referred to them as Fighter-Reconnaissance pilots in official correspondence and reports, some of the RAF Squadrons included in their title in all their official documentation and had incorporated into their RAF Squadron Crests when they were approved and given Royal Assent the letters "FR" denoting Fighter-Reconnaissance, as distinct to those who were Reconnaissance, Photographic-Reconnaissance, Maritime-Reconnaissance or General-Reconnaissance. When the pilots did their training during the war, they were selected from their pilot training as being suitable for single engine types, usually being intended to be fighter pilots. At a particular point, based on a number of factors, often above average scores in navigation, above average sight and above average performance in specialised memory tests, they were subjected to, they were then streamed into the Fighter-Reconnaissance role and specialised training for that role. A smaller percentage of those on occasions were streamed off for the Photographic Reconnaissance role and specialised training for that role (plus the high altitude chamber tests for those destined for high altitude PR work).

The RAF adopted the definition of a Fighter-Reconnaissance aircraft was that it was primarily a Fighter, suitable for conducting Reconnaissance operations in a contested and hostile environment. In the RAF wartime studies into aircraft for the role, its first and primary consideration was its suitability as a fighter within the operational parameters required to conduct the low level Tactical and other reconnaissance requirements (speed and handling at lower altitudes - primarily below 15,000ft but optimised below 8,000ft - range on internal fuel only, armament) and then its ability to carry any specialised equipment such as reconnaissance cameras, radio equipment, required for the reconnaissance activity. Overlaid with that was consideration of supportability and serviceability of the aircraft from Advanced Landing Grounds or 'austere' airfields with minimal ground support for servicing and rearming, plus ability to operate from 'rough' airfields including take off and landing distances at loaded operational weights, cross wind and tail wind landing and take off limitations when operating from forward airfields with 'fixed' runway directions - one area where the Mustang was definitely preferred over the Spitfire in the assessments.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

And therein lies the problem.

The information in the source you quote, at least for the RAF component of the story, is somewhat flawed.

Dieppe 19 August 1942 - 10 Mustang Mk.I aircraft lost to all causes, including enemy fighters, enemy flak and 'friendly fire'. No.414 (RCAF) Squadron, at time claim of one FW-190 destroyed, post war analysis of Luftwaffe records would support a 'damaged'; No.239 Sqdn RAF one claim 'half-share' of a FW-190 matches to post war analysis of Luftwaffe records for a confirmed loss. Squadrons involved, No.26 and No.239 RAF had both been flying operational sorties using the Mustang Mk.I and so had some experience on the type. For both No.400 (RCAF) Squadron and No.414 (RCAF) Squadron, the Dieppe operation was the first time that their pilots had flown the Mustang Mk.I in operations - in most instances the Dieppe operation was the first time their pilots had flown operationally - so a bunch of very 'green' pilots. A review of the Mustang losses incurred during the Dieppe operation indicates that the cause of losses was potentially 1/3 to enemy fighters, 1/3 to enemy flak, 1/3 to 'friendly fire' - both naval AA and other RAF fighters attacking the Mustangs thinking they were Me-109s. A key thing to note about the Dieppe operation and the RAF/RCAF Mustang squadrons involved was the operational directives the pilots had been given before the operation was to try and avoid combat with enemy fighters and to only engage in combat in self defence. The directives, which were subject to critical review after Dieppe, also placed the Mustangs at a disadvantage in terms of the altitudes they were directed to fly, the airspeed over the operational area and their entry and exit areas from the coast which placed them near known concentratons of enemy flak and where they were likely to get tangled up in combat between the two fighter forces - they didn't really understand the concept of operational deconfliction at the time.

22 October 1942 sortie as written up there never happened. Also, as the Mustang Mk.IA didn't get introduced to RAF Squadron service until beginning of June 1943..........

Actually what happened was:

On 21 October 1942, four Mustang Mk.I aircraft of No.268 Squadron RAF, led by Wing Commander AF Anderson DSO DFC became the first single engine fighters based in the UK to penetrate the German border. They flew over Holland to the area of the Dortmund-Ems Canal in western Germany and shot up a number of objectives along the way, including a steam locomotive, canal barges, lock gates, hutten enemy camp, gasometer, factory and a number of small ships or tugs. They were supported by another group of four Mustang Mk.I from the same Squadron who conducted an offensive sweep through parts of Holland, also shooting up a number of target of opportunity. None of the aircraft involved lost or damaged. Over the next few months the Mustang Mk.I aircraft of No.268 Squadron made a number of further similar operations through Holland and into west Germany to shoot up targets of opportunity.

Then, on the night of 21-22 October 1942, in a very separate series of operations by Wellington bombers of the RAF also attacked targets in the region of the Dortmund-Ems Canal in western Germany - some 8 hours after the Mustangs were back home and the pilots happily tucked in bed after some post operation celebrations in the Mess.

How do the two get combined into one? Best I can find is the series of Air Ministry Offical Communiques issued on 22-23 October 1942. The communique lists the operations separately. The communique then gets edited to reduce the word count for onwards transmission to overseas news agencies by their representative in the UK, and in this case one of the US news agencies contracts the wording in the communique so that the separation between the operations is a bit vague. When that communique arrives in the USA, it is then further edited and sent out to all the affiliated newspapers of that agency - at this point the two separate operations have become one and a bit of journalistic licence has been applied in describing the operations. Years later, in trying to find information on early RAF Mustang operations, a US author finds a copy of the article in a period newspaper in a local library/archive, and quotes it in his book. It then gets requoted repeatedly in other books on the Mustang, with none of the authors in between thinking to check the original source.

Re long range bomber escort, the Mustang Mk.I aircraft of the RAF ACC Squadron had been conducting escort operations for the light-medium bombers of No.2 Group RAF since September 1942 and continued to do so until around February 1943. The post action reports from the 2 Group bomber units were generally complimentary about the escort they received from the Mustang Squadrons as they usually actually made the rendezvous with the bombers on time and at the correct place, they stayed with the bombers at the same low level approach and attack altitudes and similar airspeeds, rejoined with the bombers after the bomb run and then stayed with them on the flight back. The same reports contained criticism of the escort being given in a number of instances by the fighter squadrons of FC flying Spitfires, Hurricanes or Typhoons who had either not made the RV, arrived late to the RV, or left the escort role early due to fuel concerns. Criticism from the bomber units also included failure of the FC Squadrons to arrive at the post bombing RV leaving the target area and leaving the bombers early on the return flight due to fuel shortages. The criticism of course did not go down well with HQ FC and as a result, the ACC Mustang Squadrons were no longer invited to partake of that role - separation between Command structures where ACC operations were flown under operational control of FC, convoluted RAF wartime politics and command structures.

MacLachlan and Page flew to Luftwaffe airfields to the south-west and south of Paris - 44kms to south-west and 26kms to south respectively. The description given by Chorlton is similar to the wartime press release about the operation.

21 RAF/RCAF/PAF Squadrons equipped with the Mustang Mk.I, Mk.IA and Mk.II in the ETO, plus the small numbers of Mustangs placed with various Flights and Units for trials, training and support in non-operational roles. Of the 21 RAF/RCAF/PAF Squadrons with the Mustang Mk.I, Mk.IA or Mk.II, four did not fly their Mustangs on operations whilst equipped with them in the UK - some were only equipped with the Allison engine Mustang for a short period before either being re-equipped with another type, or transferred overseas. Three RAF Squadrons and one RAF Flight operated P-51 and A-36 aircraft borrowed from the USAAF in the MTO in limited numbers for a limited time to conduct operational flying in the MTO - usually because the RAF did not have suitable aircraft available to meet the operational needs of those Squadrons in the MTO at the time.

6 June 1944, D-Day, sorties flown between 04.55hrs and 21:15hrs. Three Mustangs lost that day - one to enemy fighters, one to 'friendly fire' from Naval flak (very likely USN vessels) and one that was returning to base with engine problems and went 'missing' in the Channel - potential here is engine quit and pilot ditched and was not seen, also possibility that he was also shot down in error by naval gunners as due to his engine problems he may have approached an Allied ship with intention of ditching near it and he was shot down in error. More than 86 Tac/R and Naval Gunfire Direction 'sorties' conducted by Mustang Mk.I, Mk.IA and Mk.II on D-Day - I suspect Chorlton has taken "tasking" an operational task that can be conducted by a number of aircraft and loosely translated that to 'sortie'. In official RAF terms a 'sortie' is conducted by an individual aircraft/pilot. There were around 86 'taskings' for Allison engine Mustang Squadrons on D-Day, with the 'tasking' requiring groupings of aircraft anywhere between the usual pair, to two pairs of Mustangs. The wartime analysis of D-Day operations conducted by HQ 2TAF gives a figure for individual Mustang sorties for D-Day closer to 200 individual aircraft flights on the day. The loss figures in their analysis, of three Mustangs for the day to all causes, was well below their predicted loss rate for the type given the operating environment and level of opposition associated with the landing. The loss rate for the Tac/R Mustangs went up dramatically - but still well below pre invasion HQ 2TAF predictions - after D-Day in the period up until the beginning of September 1944. This was primarily losses to enemy flak and an increase in losses to enemy fighters. In mid to late June 1944 a directive was issued to all Luftwaffe fighter units in France to particularly target low flying Tac/R aircraft and enemy flak units also specifically targetted the low flying Tac/R aircraft. In turn this lead to Montgomery (seeing the loss numbers increase with consequent loss of intelligence information) issuing a directive to HQ 2TAF requesting that the low level Tac/R units be requested not to engage in strafing of targets of opportunity, that they be reminded that he was depending on the reconnaissance coverage they were obtaining to help him in his decision making of the Army ground campaign, and also requested 2TAF where possible to provide either close or loose escort for the low level Tac/R aircraft to prevent Luftwaffe intereference with their work. That is why in the period from late June to late August 1944, on occasions, pairs of low level Tac/R Mustangs - sometimes with an escort of other RAF fighters - were intercepted by formations of Luftwaffe fighters of anywhere up to 20 enemy aircraft.

Not the least of the errors in fact in Mr Chorlton's book.

This is all real interesting, and I enjoy reading such operational details, but i don't see how any of that is relevant to the point. Does it show that Allison Engined Mustangs, of any mark, were able to dominate German fighters? That they were able to consistently fly combat escort or interception or any of the other fighter missions that the Merlin-engined variants routinely did?

All i see here is a much longer winded, though possibly a bit more accurate, rendition of the (admittedly hasty) summary I posted based on the Osprey book. What is your point ?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Big difference, I can name everyone of those pilots in my post, know what operations they flew during the War on Mustangs and other types, know what their fate was during the war or after, and in the case of over half of those pictured, was fortunate and priviledged enough to be considered by them as a friend and in a couple of instances to help them when they were documenting and producing their wartime memoirs. Nothing like being able to get the story first hand, in their own words, access to their original pilot's log books, photographs and diaries, and in some instances provide a little illumination between what they were told during the War and what actually happened, for example reasons for particular operations, who shot them down, who rescued them after they ditched in the Channel, or the true fate of fellow Squadron pilots listed to this day as "Missing" in the official records. And those photographed were just a small selection of those I could have posted photographs of, who I similarly interacted with and knew or knew directly of. Unfortunately, off all those, to best of my knowledge and that I can ascertain, there remains alive today just one pilot who flew Allison engine Mustangs in the Tac/R role with the RAF and Commonwealth and Allied Air Forces during WW2 - and he is aged 99 years and looking forward to celebrating his centenary if he can.

You also missed the point of my post, these pilots referred to themselves as Fighter-Reconnaissance pilots, the RAF officially referred to them as Fighter-Reconnaissance pilots in official correspondence and reports, some of the RAF Squadrons included in their title in all their official documentation and had incorporated into their RAF Squadron Crests when they were approved and given Royal Assent the letters "FR" denoting Fighter-Reconnaissance, as distinct to those who were Reconnaissance, Photographic-Reconnaissance, Maritime-Reconnaissance or General-Reconnaissance. When the pilots did their training during the war, they were selected from their pilot training as being suitable for single engine types, usually being intended to be fighter pilots. At a particular point, based on a number of factors, often above average scores in navigation, above average sight and above average performance in specialised memory tests, they were subjected to, they were then streamed into the Fighter-Reconnaissance role and specialised training for that role. A smaller percentage of those on occasions were streamed off for the Photographic Reconnaissance role and specialised training for that role (plus the high altitude chamber tests for those destined for high altitude PR work).

The RAF adopted the definition of a Fighter-Reconnaissance aircraft was that it was primarily a Fighter, suitable for conducting Reconnaissance operations in a contested and hostile environment. In the RAF wartime studies into aircraft for the role, its first and primary consideration was its suitability as a fighter within the operational parameters required to conduct the low level Tactical and other reconnaissance requirements (speed and handling at lower altitudes - primarily below 15,000ft but optimised below 8,000ft - range on internal fuel only, armament) and then its ability to carry any specialised equipment such as reconnaissance cameras, radio equipment, required for the reconnaissance activity. Overlaid with that was consideration of supportability and serviceability of the aircraft from Advanced Landing Grounds or 'austere' airfields with minimal ground support for servicing and rearming, plus ability to operate from 'rough' airfields including take off and landing distances at loaded operational weights, cross wind and tail wind landing and take off limitations when operating from forward airfields with 'fixed' runway directions - one area where the Mustang was definitely preferred over the Spitfire in the assessments.

Again, I actually think you missed my point. I've met and talked to WW2 fighter pilots as well. How does knowing these people, as cool as that is, change the type of missions they flew or the combat record the pilots of these particular aircraft had compared to just as brave and interesting and skilled pilots who flew other types of aircraft? Like Mustang IIIs etc.?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

They DID produce the Spiteful (land-based) and the Seafang (carrier-based). These were basically late Spitfire fuselages mated to a new, laminar-flow wing. They were somewhat of a wonder for pistons, but jets were flitting by at 100+ mph faster speeds, so they weren't put into production. Had the jets not showed up, they likely would have been among the best of the pistons.

You could say the Spiteful/Seafang/Tempest/Sea Fury, P-51H, Ta 152 and the like were the last superprops. The jets couldn't maneuver with them or usually outclimb them, for the most part, but they were generally 100+ mph faster. So ... out with the pistons and in with the jets. It didn't hurt that the jet engines required many fewer hours of maintenance, either.

The early jets were basically jet-powered versions of the last superprops.

The Attacker was a single-jet version of the Spiteful/Seafang, It evolved into the Scimitar. The Sea Hawk was basically a single-jet version of the Fury/Sea Fury with bifurcated exhaust, which became the P-1052 and P.1081 and, finally, the Hunter.

Good point. This is kind of what I was getting at, perhaps something like the Spiteful- except with more emphasis on range than pure performance. Or perhaps something more intermediate and less radical of a redesign, but I think something in that general direction. And preferably before the jets took over.

One can indeed ask, "why give a Spitfire the range of a Mustang?" Well I don't think that is needed - assuming you have the Mustang. But there is a time gap here, and a considerable gap when it comes to range, and to a lesser extent, speed.

There is a lot of daylight between a 500 mile range fighter and a 2000 mile range fighter. Spitfires were indeed excellent interceptors but they were pressed into service where their range was a severe limitation - including in the role of interceptor (see Darwin). In North Africa Spitfires could have done a lot more with say 800-1000 mile range. Or even a bit less like the Mk VIII, but the Mk VIII came out rather slowly. Spitfires that could escort bombers

Seafires could have also greatly benefited from almost any improvement in range / loiter time.

The large number of Mk Vs which were produced were not all needed, many ended up sitting in England doing little. Probably some kind of hasty improved version, along the lines of what was done for the Spit IX but with the emphasis on range rather than speed and altitude performance, could have been really helpful, even if it did mean a bit fewer Mk Vs sitting on the grassy fields. If something like that had been available in 1942-43, I think it might have hastened the turning point of the war and saved a lot of lives.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

This is all real interesting, and I enjoy reading such operational details, but i don't see how any of that is relevant to the point. Does it show that Allison Engined Mustangs, of any mark, were able to dominate German fighters? That they were able to consistently fly combat escort or interception or any of the other fighter missions that the Merlin-engined variants routinely did?

All i see here is a much longer winded, though possibly a bit more accurate, rendition of the (admittedly hasty) summary I posted based on the Osprey book. What is your point ?

Big difference, I can name everyone of those pilots in my post, know what operations they flew during the War on Mustangs and other types, know what their fate was during the war or after, and in the case of over half of those pictured, was fortunate and priviledged enough to be considered by them as a friend and in a couple of instances to help them when they were documenting and producing their wartime memoirs. Nothing like being able to get the story first hand, in their own words, access to their original pilot's log books, photographs and diaries, and in some instances provide a little illumination between what they were told during the War and what actually happened, for example reasons for particular operations, who shot them down, who rescued them after they ditched in the Channel, or the true fate of fellow Squadron pilots listed to this day as "Missing" in the official records. And those photographed were just a small selection of those I could have posted photographs of, who I similarly interacted with and knew or knew directly of. Unfortunately, off all those, to best of my knowledge and that I can ascertain, there remains alive today just one pilot who flew Allison engine Mustangs in the Tac/R role with the RAF and Commonwealth and Allied Air Forces during WW2 - and he is aged 99 years and looking forward to celebrating his centenary if he can.

You also missed the point of my post, these pilots referred to themselves as Fighter-Reconnaissance pilots, the RAF officially referred to them as Fighter-Reconnaissance pilots in official correspondence and reports, some of the RAF Squadrons included in their title in all their official documentation and had incorporated into their RAF Squadron Crests when they were approved and given Royal Assent the letters "FR" denoting Fighter-Reconnaissance, as distinct to those who were Reconnaissance, Photographic-Reconnaissance, Maritime-Reconnaissance or General-Reconnaissance. When the pilots did their training during the war, they were selected from their pilot training as being suitable for single engine types, usually being intended to be fighter pilots. At a particular point, based on a number of factors, often above average scores in navigation, above average sight and above average performance in specialised memory tests, they were subjected to, they were then streamed into the Fighter-Reconnaissance role and specialised training for that role. A smaller percentage of those on occasions were streamed off for the Photographic Reconnaissance role and specialised training for that role (plus the high altitude chamber tests for those destined for high altitude PR work).

The RAF adopted the definition of a Fighter-Reconnaissance aircraft was that it was primarily a Fighter, suitable for conducting Reconnaissance operations in a contested and hostile environment. In the RAF wartime studies into aircraft for the role, its first and primary consideration was its suitability as a fighter within the operational parameters required to conduct the low level Tactical and other reconnaissance requirements (speed and handling at lower altitudes - primarily below 15,000ft but optimised below 8,000ft - range on internal fuel only, armament) and then its ability to carry any specialised equipment such as reconnaissance cameras, radio equipment, required for the reconnaissance activity. Overlaid with that was consideration of supportability and serviceability of the aircraft from Advanced Landing Grounds or 'austere' airfields with minimal ground support for servicing and rearming, plus ability to operate from 'rough' airfields including take off and landing distances at loaded operational weights, cross wind and tail wind landing and take off limitations when operating from forward airfields with 'fixed' runway directions - one area where the Mustang was definitely preferred over the Spitfire in the assessments.

Another maybe better way to put it: I get that armed reconnaissance or 'Fighter recon' was a successful role for the Mustang I and IA, and I certainly believe you that these pilots considered themselves fighter pilots, and were such. But I don't see how that tells us that this particular aircraft type was successful in the many other roles that fighters were badly needed for in the various Theaters of war in WW2. I.e. interception, bomber escort, fighter-bomber escort, fighter sweeps, and so on.

 

[pbehn]

Another maybe better way to put it: I get that armed reconnaissance or 'Fighter recon' was a successful role for the Mustang I and IA, and I certainly believe you that these pilots considered themselves fighter pilots, and were such. But I don't see how that tells us that this particular aircraft type was successful in the many other roles that fighters were badly needed for in the various Theaters of war in WW2. I.e. interception, bomber escort, fighter-bomber escort, fighter sweeps, and so on.

It is the other way around, there were many aircraft that could fill the other niches but non were as good as the Allison engined Mustang at tactical recon.

 

[Shortround6]

But I don't see how that tells us that this particular aircraft type was successful in the many other roles that fighters were badly needed for in the various Theaters of war in WW2. I.e. interception, bomber escort, fighter-bomber escort, fighter sweeps, and so on.

That may be true but a lot of the other fighters (especially in 1939-43) weren't really all that good at a varity of roles. P-40s didn't do well at intercepting anything flying at 20,000ft or above for example, let alone trying to escort B-17s or B-24s unless they were flying low and close to home.
A Spitfire V was shorter in range than a P-40 but it took rougly 2/3s of the time to get to 20,000ft and when flying above 20,000ft it had around double the rate of climb.

Now for all the "early long range Spitfire" fans see.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/ab320climb.jpg

for times with and without a 90 gallon tank. Granted the tank has drag but we can pretty quickly figure out that the Spitfire V could loose around 200 fpm of climb even with a 45 gallon extra fuel load. and since at 26,000ft the climb rate was only about 1400fpm to begin with losing 10% or more due to to even 45 imp gallons extra fuel might not have been popular.

Now a MK IX Spit could climb (proving ground) at a bit under 2400fpm while carrying at 30 gallon tank at "Normal" (12lbs boost) rating.

Now in late 1942 which Spifire do you want to try escort for American B-17s in the mid 20,000ft area of the sky? Even if only over Holland
The Idea of an escort fighter is to actually provide an escort to the bombers, not provide alternative targets for the enemy to shoot down.
Simply flying along with or over the bombers isn't enough, the escort fighters need to be able to fight the enemy intercepters with at least some degree of success even if not shooting them down a 1:1 ratio.

 

[Zipper730]

There was a war on and taking a working Spitfire (or anything else) from the front line to fit a new fin and rudder or to recontour an elevator or stabilizer, etc. likely wasn't high on the priority list. Sure, they COULD have been modified, but they were flying and fighting at the time and changes were generally cut in at some point and not always retrofitted. Things like the dorsal fins fitted to P-51D and some B/C models as well as dorsal fins for P-47s WERE sometimes field-fitted, as were things like P-38 dive flaps.

Here's a good study of four P-51Ds. Only one, the 2nd one, has the dorsal fin extension

I've seen that picture before, but I thought that was more like a photo-shoot. That might sound stupid, admittedly.

So, the dorsal fun mod was either field-installed or the change was cut in somewhere between 44-1310 and 44-13926 (the two serial numbers of the nearest two).

Okay, so the redesigned cockpit and aft-fuselage cutback coincided with the redesigned tailfin? As for the late Mk. IX tail design, when did that take place?

I'm also curious when the Mk.VII/VIII ended compared to the Mk. IX?

The P-51-NA (4x20mm) comparison for AAF operational suitability tests vs P-39Q, P-40N, P-38G and P-47D was deemed the 'best fighter below 15000 feet - and it was at least 10mph slower than P-51A across the entire envelope.

Honestly, it's kind of amazing that we didn't use the 4 x 20mm arrangement.

They made a lot of changes to the design of the Spitfire over the years. Spit I and Spit XIV or XXII look pretty different. Could they have done something to the wing or fuselage etc. to substantially reduce the drag? Without making a totally new aircraft I mean?

From what I remember the draggiest part of the Spitfire was the canopy frame early on because it wasn't highly inclined and had a piece of bulletproof glass on the outside of the frame (the aircraft wasn't designed with bulletproof glass initially, nor was the Me 109): While the last item may/may not have been changed to a cleaner design, I don't know if they ever changed the canopy angle.

I do remember they had a rear-view mirror attached outside the canopy which wasn't terribly conducive to aerodynamic cleanliness, but it probably saved quite a lot of pilots from getting shot down.

 

[tomo pauk]

Now in late 1942 which Spifire do you want to try escort for American B-17s in the mid 20,000ft area of the sky? Even if only over Holland
The Idea of an escort fighter is to actually provide an escort to the bombers, not provide alternative targets for the enemy to shoot down.
Simply flying along with or over the bombers isn't enough, the escort fighters need to be able to fight the enemy intercepters with at least some degree of success even if not shooting them down a 1:1 ratio.

That's an easy question. I pick Spitfire IX to escort B-17s at any altitude they might be, range/radius of Spits permitting. We know that Mk.IX was at least equal to the Fw 190s performance-wise.

 

[pbehn]

That's an easy question. I pick Spitfire IX to escort B-17s at any altitude they might be, range/radius of Spits permitting. We know that Mk.IX was at least equal to the Fw 190s performance-wise.

Which is what happened, starting at Dieppe.