Stalingrad

Let's say von Bock was never sacked, operational command remained between Oberkommando and the General Staff, and Army Group South remained a single entity with Gruppe Kleist, Gruppe Hoth and Gruppe Ruoff as attachments, plus reserves. Let's say the objective was to destroy Stalingrad as a transportation and industrial centre and not occupy it. Let's say Maikop and Grozny were left to the Luftwaffe to bomb to oblivion back in July-August with forward bases secured by Gruppe Ruoff no farther afield than Stavropol (for the Grozny attack).

Then it still would've been a very difficult campaign with no assured victory.

I think this winter clothing issue is semantics and boredom. The whole 1942 Summer Campaign was faulty.
Stalingrad wasn't a David and Goliath battle with a predictable outcome, it was a toddler with a foam rubber bat going up against a pride of lions. It could've been won only if every single prerequisite for victory had not first been taken away before the Don bend was even reached.
Even von Kleist's Chief of Staff noted clearly in his diary the General Staff were of the opinion by July that Oberkommando had fully abandoned all precepts for the conduct of logical wafare for a personality cult with less than no chance of success.

That's from a member of the General Staff. Without them the entire Prussian system of wafare is defunct, the Wehrmacht useless. Hitler ignored them from day one like it was some sort of class struggle, he was a Corporal with an inferiority complex and career military ambitions by political means. The outcome of that, was indeed predictable I think.

Vanir
That is about the funniest thing I read in this whole thread. And yet, it is also the most accurate. Well done son. Could not agree more strongly with what you have said

vanir said:

Let's say von Bock was never sacked, operational command remained between Oberkommando and the General Staff, and Army Group South remained a single entity with Gruppe Kleist, Gruppe Hoth and Gruppe Ruoff as attachments, plus reserves. Let's say the objective was to destroy Stalingrad as a transportation and industrial centre and not occupy it. Let's say Maikop and Grozny were left to the Luftwaffe to bomb to oblivion back in July-August with forward bases secured by Gruppe Ruoff no farther afield than Stavropol (for the Grozny attack).

Then it still would've been a very difficult campaign with no assured victory.

The whole 1942 Summer Campaign was faulty.
Stalingrad wasn't a David and Goliath battle with a predictable outcome, it was a toddler with a foam rubber bat going up against a pride of lions. It could've been won only if every single prerequisite for victory had not first been taken away before the Don bend was even reached.
Even von Kleist's Chief of Staff noted clearly in his diary the General Staff were of the opinion by July that Oberkommando had fully abandoned all precepts for the conduct of logical wafare for a personality cult with less than no chance of success.

That's from a member of the General Staff. Without them the entire Prussian system of wafare is defunct, the Wehrmacht useless. Hitler ignored them from day one...

Click to expand...

I didn't realise von Kleist's senior staff said that
but totally agree with the point, Stalingrad was a mortal mistake. A Stalingrad that the Wehrmacht had simply gone round and isolated as a pocket of resistance from other pockets of resistance in keeping with blitzkrieg doctrine would have caved in eventually without any more pressure from the Germans than a simple blockade.

The entire Sixth Army would have remained intact and the no-longer-needed expensive rescue attempt by von Manstein would have increased German options for forthcoming field battles, for which they were FAR better suited.

There's a potential positive knock-on effect for the Germans, with the Japanese making albeit slow progress from the east and a still-bouyant Germany in the west, Kursk may well never have happened, or more likely, happened the way it did; with the Wehrmacht deciding quite sensibly to go round Stalingrad instead of through, the time-line has accelerated out of favour for the Soviets, they need a blocking action quickly and Kursk didn't happen quickly, it was months of preparation.

Colin1 said:

...A Stalingrad that the Wehrmacht had simply gone round and isolated as a pocket of resistance from other pockets of resistance in keeping with blitzkrieg doctrine would have caved in eventually without any more pressure from the Germans than a simple blockade.

Click to expand...

Simple blockade wold have been enough? Not so sure. Look at Leningrad for example, under blockade for 900 days and yet it didn't "caved in".

imalko said:

...Leningrad for example, under blockade for 900 days and yet it didn't "cave in".

Click to expand...

How long is a piece of string?
A blockade for as long as it takes. You're the German commander, do you send your army in for a gruelling, costly, dirty fight or do you blockade them and wait for them to starve or maybe try a breakout of their own out of desperation?
You need to wonder where the relief is going to come from, the Siberian troops are more than likely tied up by the Japanese, the Sixth Army are very much alive and kicking, von Manstein has retained the armour he would have lost in the ill-fated breakout attempt of the Sixth Army and is looking for trouble. Kursk, or whatever replaces Kursk has been accelerated and the Soviets have had no time to prepare their defences in depth or even any indication of where to prepare them.

Hello Vanir
Partly agree, probably all of us agreed that the key was how the summer offensive was conducted and here Hitler had made some fatal mistakes by dispersing his troops and not keeping them focused to one main objective in time. The cloth discussion is also overblown, in essence Soren and I were arguing on the thickness of the German winter parka, ie how important it was as insulation against cold compared to other clothing German troops had.

But Germany's aim was the oil fields of Maikop, Grozny and most of all of Baku, so the idea was to capture them in as good condition as possible. Maikop was captured but Soviet demolitions had been effective and Germans could not get much oil from them before Soviets retook them. Germany's problem was that late Autumn 42 its troops on the southern part of Eastern front were badly overextended. Rational decision would have been that "we f*uck it" and retread behind Don plus keeping the Kuban peninsula but that would have meant to give up most of the conquests of summer 42 campaign and would have been bad to morale and bad to egos.

6th and 4th PzAs were not toddlers, they and the AG A were the best equipped forces Germany had at least if we look the AFV equipment, many PzDs in AG Centre and North were in pitiful condition in 42 when compared those in the south.

Colin
Germans could not isolate Stalingrad because they had no plans to go over Volga, so it could be supplied and reinforced over Volga as it was during the battle. Crossing Volga and encircling Stalingrad would have been so big oper that it would have meant forgetting the oil fields. IMHO simply screening it wasn't enough but of course it would have been possible to try to take only the northern industrial suburbs so that Germans hold on the western bank of Volga would have been more secure and only screen the southern part of the city.In Nov 42 Germans knew what was coming, they had one PzC ready behind Romanians and armoured group of 14 PzD ready for counter attack nearer the city amd 29 PzGrD, which in fact was the most powerful div in the area and only mech div with reasonable fuel reserves in the area, was ready behind southern part of the city to handle possible promlems there. But they underestimated Soviets, Soviet attack was more powerful and better led than they had predicted. Not that the Soviet attack went entirely as was planned, plan was to smash the 6th and 4th Pz Armies and then went towards Rostov and unhinge whole southern part of Germany's eastern front. But Germans front N of Stalingrad held and so the cauldron was born.

Juha

Juha said:

Colin
Germans could not isolate Stalingrad because they had no plans to go over Volga, so it could be supplied and reinforced over Volga as it was during the battle

Click to expand...

Surely a waterway supply line is more difficult for the Soviets to maintain than it is for the Germans to disrupt? With the Sixth Army no longer preocuppied with merely surviving, losses incurred interrupting supply attempts across the Volga would be far outweighed by the supply losses incurred by the Soviets.

Colin
Soviets had been capable to run the supply line even when most of the western bank was occupied by Germans and so observed by Germans and Germans put much effort to distrupt it because they understood its importance to the outcome of the battle. IIRC the northern pincer of Soviet counterattack burst out fromone of the bridgehead Soviets had south of Don, Germans had been incapable to prevent Soviet reinforments and movement of tanks into that bridgehead. Problem with these crossing was when rivers began to froze over, the time between when the ice began hinder boat and ferry trafic and the time when the ice was strong enough to carry trafic was period of vulnerability but the period was also predictable so one could prepare to it.

Juha

Juha said:

...Germans had been incapable to prevent Soviet reinforments and movement of tanks into that bridgehead

Click to expand...

Had been
they're not wading head-down into Stalingrad any longer, with the Sixth Army more intelligently deployed around the city they would almost certainly have been better placed to influence Soviet movements.

Hello Colin
That would have been totally different ball play. At least part of 6th A would have been then more south if that would have been logistically possible. AG A's supply situation, especially on its SE sector was stretched. Anyway at least the mot. divs would have been there. Would the remaining had a better fuel reserves or worse? Soviets plans would probably have been different in different situation etc.

Juha

Juha said:

Soren
if they didn't wear them, they didn't have camo, did they?

Click to expand...

Ofcourse they did. Did you miss out on the smocks provided?

The padded parka was worn exclusively in the winter or late autumn, NOT during the summer. In the summer camoflaged smocks were worn.

As for walking through snow in +4 Celcius, well one simply had to take off some of the inner layers then. The padded parka was kept on. Same thing was done by the Soviets.

Now there really is nothing more to be discussed on this matter.

A few comments about the 1942 campaign in general. It was only possible by Germany adopting to the most ruthless comb outs and equipment transfers on other sectors of the front. Most Infantry formations went from nine battalions organized into 3 Regiments, supported by 3 battalions of artillery, with an establishment of 5000 horses and 800 motor vehicles, to an establishment of 2 battalians (with reduced sized companies at that) per regiment and 2 battalions of artillery, often one of those battalions being equipped with nothing better than heavy mortars. Draft animals were reduced to the bare minimum, about 2000, and motor vehicles to about 150 or so. Nearly all semblance of mobility for these formations was now gone, and this was to have disastrous consequences in the coming years....the Germans could no longer effectively move, even if they wanted to, except in stages.....if called on to make a mass pull back in their lines, they were bound to lose large quantities of men and/or materiel,

The Panzer units at least maintained their mobility, but their chief means at firepower was severely diluted. Panzer Divisions were generally stripped out, and reduced to a single Battalioin of armour per div.

The combat strength of AGN and AGC was reduced to about 40% of their 1941 levels, and was made vastly less mobile than it had been. All this stripping out of men and equipment was to build up AGS back up to full strength....the campaign in the South had to be resoundingly successful, and it had to be extraordinarily cheap in terms of manpower and equipment losses. It was, in other words, an unrealistic plan....

What was happening to the Soviets in this time. The winter offensive had been hard on them as well. The German casualties had run at 490-650000 (depending on which source you take), whilst Soviet losses ran at about 790000 men. The Soviets since the beginning of the war had lost close to 7 million men, and could not afford to take losses at the same rate that they had in 1941. Conversely, their armaments industry was now getting into full swing, easily ovetaking that of the germans (who of course had other fronts to worry about as well), moreover they were not as drained of men quite as badly as the Germans. They appear to have had a ready reserve of about 100 divs, all training behind Moscow. Many of these formations were stilll short of equipment , and needed training before committment to battle.

The Soviets had built up a precious reserve of tanks, which was squandered early (because Stalins interference, and insistence to capture Kharkov). The loss of these formations at Izyum, forced the Soviets to face facts...they were not ready to to withstand the Germans,, could not afford to take losses on the same scale as the previous year, and needed time to train their reserves properly. These were the parameters that led to the Stalingrad battle. The Soviets fell back avoiding massive casualties, and the big pockets. A vicious battle developed for the city itself, where Soviet casualties, whilst heavy, were far more manageable than in open terrain warfare. The slow and deliberate build up of forces on the flanks, and the eventual hammer blows that crushed the Germans and their allies....a masteful and near perfect execution of a strategy designed to extract the very most out of the Soviet war machine. If 6th Army had deployed north and south of the city, the Soviets would have devised a different strategy. Stalingrad would initially have been turned into a fortess, and then a jumping off point. The areas south of Stalingrad, all the way to the Caspian Sea, was only lightly defended. With perhaps another 1.5 million men available (because of no battle in the city itself), the Soviets could have burst out of the area south of the city, and destroyed the 2 armies trying to overrun the Caucasus. Instead of losing one army in this scenario, the germans would have lost two, and would have been in a far worse position than they were historically

The 1942 Fall Blau plans were faulty from the start because they did not match resources to objectives properly, and failed to take into account increasing Soviet experience. This was just as much the fault of the General Staff as it was Hitlers. Hitler was being fed faulty assessments and situation reports, and his original decision to attack in the first place was supported by the senior commanders of the Wehrmacht, including the field commanders. After the defeats at Stalingrad, all three of the German Army Groups were exhausted, and in no condition to undertake vigorous operations. It only the genius of Manstein, coupled with the wholesale transfer and further comb outs of half trained men (rendering the German army more and more like the Soviets in terms of experience) that enabled the energetic Manstein to eventually stabilize the situation But that is anothe story

Parsifal,

Good post, as always you make good sense, even if we not always agree. I'll address some of the parts I have issues with later.

PS: The Soviets had in all lost about 3.3 million men KIA MIA by December 1942, along with a further 3 million plus taken as POW's. The worst losses were still to come however, but at that point the Soviets would have no problem replacing them. But German losses were on the rise as-well, and contrary to the Soviets, they couldn't replace theirs.

Soren said:

Parsifal,

Good post, as always you make good sense, even if we not always agree. I'll address some of the parts I have issues with later.

PS: The Soviets had in all lost about 3.3 million men KIA MIA by December 1942, along with a further 3 million plus taken as POW's. The worst losses were still to come however, but at that point the Soviets would have no problem replacing them. But German losses were on the rise as-well, and contrary to the Soviets, they couldn't replace theirs.

Click to expand...

Hi soren.

What are your sources for these Soviet Casualties. I have never seen any sources that quote Soviet losses for 1942 as 6 million. At that rate they would have no men of military age after 1942, if you factor in the losses of 1941, plus the proportional losses for men of military age in the civilan deaths. I just cannot see those numbers as adding up.

The numbers I have seen are closer to 2 million in total. Total military deaths were 13-18 million, although I acknowledge you strongly argue they are closer to 25 million.

No one should say they are "sure" about Soviet Casualties, because the actual losses are not completely known. So I am not discounting your claims, just saying I have not seen them that high before.

I want to point something out. Most soldiers did not wear camo. Most wore the standard Wehrmacht uniforms. If you look at most pictures from the East Front, you are not going to see Camo smocks or Camo Parkas. The SS wore that stuff more often than the regular Wehrmacht.

I know for sure that my Grandfather was not issued an Camo while he was on the East Front including his service in Stalingrad. I also know from pictures that my wifes Grandfather was not issued Camo during his time on the East Front as well as during his service in Stalingrad.

parsifal said:

Hi soren.

What are your sources for these Soviet Casualties. I have never seen any sources that quote Soviet losses for 1942 as 6 million. At that rate they would have no men of military age after 1942, if you factor in the losses of 1941, plus the proportional losses for men of military age in the civilan deaths. I just cannot see those numbers as adding up.

The numbers I have seen are closer to 2 million in total. Total military deaths were 13-18 million, although I acknowledge you strongly argue they are closer to 25 million.

Click to expand...

25 million ?? I've seriously never claimed that.

Soviet military deaths were around 16.8 million according to my sources.

I admit I was going off of memory before as I remember around 3 million Soviet POW's taken in 41 to 42 and around 3 million Soviets KIA MIA. With another 12½ million KIA MIA from 42 to 45. That's purely out of memory Parsifal, and I am ready to be corrected on this.

No one should say they are "sure" about Soviet Casualties, because the actual losses are not completely known. So I am not discounting your claims, just saying I have not seen them that high before.

Click to expand...

Oh I agree.

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:

I want to point something out. Most soldiers did not wear camo. Most wore the standard Wehrmacht uniforms. If you look at most pictures from the East Front, you are not going to see Camo smocks or Camo Parkas. The SS wore that stuff more often than the regular Wehrmacht.

I know for sure that my Grandfather was not issued an Camo while he was on the East Front including his service in Stalingrad. I also know from pictures that my wifes Grandfather was not issued Camo during his time on the East Front as well as during his service in Stalingrad.

Click to expand...

Knowing how bad the survival rate was for the men captured at Stalingrad, Did both of them come back after their captivity ?
If they were captured at Stalingrad and this is not too personal of a question for me to be asking you.
Accept my apologies in advance if it is.


Wheels

wheelsup_cavu said:

Knowing how bad the survival rate was for the men captured at Stalingrad, Did both of them come back after their captivity ?
If they were captured at Stalingrad and this is not too personal of a question for me to be asking you.
Accept my apologies in advance if it is.


Wheels

Click to expand...

My grandfather was captured at Stalingrad and he came home in 1947. One reason why we believe he survived was the fact that he was a doctor and not a fighting soldier.

My wife's grandfather as far as I know was not captured at Stalingrad, but was captured later in the war on the eastern front. He too came home a few years after the war. I am not sure what year though, I will have to ask her. I did see some interesting photos of him on the eastern front in fighting positions. The one that I found the most interesting was was the one of him climbing over a knocked out T-34 tank. Most of the photos I have of my grandfather are from the western front (in fact all of them are from the western front). The most interesting would be of him standing in front of the Eifell Tower in his Wehrmacht uniform.

Thanks Adler.
One of the reason I asked was my dad worked with a guy in the late 60's who had been captured by the Russian's during the war.
He was 15 when he was captured and didn't get released until 1955.
He said the prisoners were used to help rebuild Stalingrad and other cities.

All second hand stories for me but when my Dad told me about the things Werner experienced during his captivity...
All I can say is Holy cr@p.

The picture of your grandfather in front of the Eifell Tower does sound interesting.
It's not something you would normally see over here.
Also being able to talk to someone who knew the person in the picture helps make it more "real" for me.
It not just another picture in a book or photo album.

I am sure I had relatives fighting on both sides during the war so any stories from the Wehrmachts side of the war interests me too.
My Dad's side of the family fought on the German side in WW I and WW II.
My Mom's side of the family on the Allied/US side.
We can't trace her side of the family to the Mayflower yet but we can get as far back as the mid 1600"s in the "New Country."

Sorry for the OT guys.
We now return you to your normally scheduled thread.


Wheels

Hi Juha. Oberkommando des Heere's advice was isolating Stalingrad (read: destroying from a distance). The General Staff only cared about keeping the reserves in place (no split of Heeresgruppe Süd). OKW wanted the Donets properly secured and were prepared to have an advance to the Don, no further. OKL wanted to bomb the Causcasus oil fields to oblivion and call it a day (disallowing Soviet use of them, a strategic victory where capturing them was impossible).
Hitler wanted a Don Front. Then he wanted Stalingrad taken care of. Then he wanted the oil fields for Germany. Then he wanted Stalingrad occupied. His big mistake was splitting off all the reserves to form Heeresgruppe A, to which he also assigned Gruppe Ruoff which really needed to operate independently (as an attachment to Heeresgruppe Süd).
This is what OKW, OKH and the General Staff had severe problems with, they started resigning, and wrote things like "Hitler is the Devil."

When Heeresgruppe B moved on the Don bend and launched towards Stalingrad, it had no reserves. They were now Heeresgruppe A.
Now all things considered that doomed it.

I know why this happened, Hitler was an arrogant moron and when he received reports of little or no contact from Gruppe Ruoff in the Kuban he decided personally that the Red Army had itself finally run out of reserves. He couldn't have been more wrong, and he was told this by the General Staff, by OKW and by OKH. He refused to listen.
And when he made his final Directive changes, for the upteenth time and filled with his increasingly typical holy zeal of self infatuation both OKW and OKL had enough, even his field commanders started resigning. You've heard what von Kleist said to him on the telephone haven't you?
The honeymoon was definitely over with OKH and the General Staff, no question.


The 1942 was in my opinion an undercurrent of civil war between Hitler's Nazis and the Prussian leadership which traditionally ran the German military. Previously Hitler used scheming and manipulation to get them to play ball, but from December 41 all pretence dropped, and the brilliance of Prussian military doctrine was no more. The General Staff, who's job it was to look after the men in the field became useless. The leadership, who's job it was to maintain absolute tactical control towards strategic ends, were completely tied. Hitler ran them by decree, the same way he kept the Nazis in such disarray that he was both absolute dictator and a force of pure chaos.

Hoth suffered so much attrition running back and forth he had barely two dozen tanks, and the 14th and 24th Panzerkorps were relying on Pz38(t) for the bulk of fighting ability by September. All Panzergruppen were utterly dependent upon day to day replenishment by very stretched and continually attacked supply lines, it was a matter of lose a PzIII, two Pz38s and a StuG, get a PzIV and a Marder next week and requisition two or three older StuGs and a couple of armoured cars in the meantime. That's how Stalingrad was fought, with a division of Luftwaffe infantry taking up flanks from an armoured Korps. Meanwhile those idiot sonderkommando SS are murdering ten year old children and school teachers over near Krasny, Cherkassy or something, on the Don bend there. That gives an idea of the Nazi priorities here, von Weichs himself ordered the Einsatzgruppen out of the area for morale.
Heeresgruppe B never stood a chance, no way. Hitler sacked what's his face, General Lube I think for protecting his rear. I mean c'mon, how much interference can you get? Not toddlers? They were being treated like they were.