Strategic bombing campaign in Europe: No long range escorts

[bobbysocks]

th us tried several "shuttle" missions from the uk to russia....staying there for a few days and running some OPS then headed back to the uk. think there was 5 missions in all. the idea was finally nixed when the us supplied rebels in poland or somewhere...that angered stalin and that was the end of that.

 

[parsifal]

Gaining air supremacy over france was critical to the cross channel attack. Gaining air superiority over the remainder of Europe was critical to most land operations, including those in the East. The ability of the allied air forces to project airpower just about anywhere in Europe mean there was nowherer safe for the LW to rebuild and recover.

LR fighters were integral to the allies winning air superiority and from there the war. there were, of course other elements to that vioctory, but the role of fighters in gaining that victory ought not be under-estimated

 

[Hop]

With no long range escorts, the 8th AF gets most of the invasion support work, BC goes back to bombing the Ruhr. The tactical air forces and 8th spend all their time attacking targets in preparation for the invasion along with V-1 sites. The Luftwaffe fights to defend French air space and loses, the invasion goes ahead exactly as it did historically.

The Luftwaffe were not going to be allowed to sit out months of the air war whilst the allied air forces took apart the German defences in France. Goering wouldn't allow it, Hitler certainly wouldn't.

 

[Tante Ju]

th us tried several "shuttle" missions from the uk to russia....staying there for a few days and running some OPS then headed back to the uk. think there was 5 missions in all. the idea was finally nixed when the us supplied rebels in poland or somewhere...that angered stalin and that was the end of that.

It also greatly exposed USAAF bombers against Luftwaffe raids. See Poltava raid.

The Poltava Debacle

 

[drgondog]

th us tried several "shuttle" missions from the uk to russia....staying there for a few days and running some OPS then headed back to the uk. think there was 5 missions in all. the idea was finally nixed when the us supplied rebels in poland or somewhere...that angered stalin and that was the end of that.

There were seven Frantic missions. The last one was Frantic VII, September 18-22 to drop supplies into a small area in Warsaw. The Soviets waited outside Warsaw so that the SS could wipe out the rebellion.

The fighter escort for the three 3rd BD B-17 Groups, was the 355th FG led by my father. The mission to drop supply canisters of weapons, food and medicine was largely unsuccessful as only 10% of the supplies reached the shrinking perimeter of the resistance held portion of the Ghetto.

 

[bobbysocks]

It also greatly exposed USAAF bombers against Luftwaffe raids. See Poltava raid.

The Poltava Debacle

the one B17 that had all the photos of the airbase...which the soviets didnt want done at all...just happened to be one of the planes shot down. so the germans ended up with boxes of photos and was able to piece together the location. but as the LW did attack the soviets would not let the us fighters take off not did they scramble their fighters iirc. its been a long time since i researched this...i may have to go back and look it all over again. that raid also showed that the soviets were not able to defend the base as they claimed. although i doubt without radar the us would have fared any better...BUT the us had expressed the desire to man the base with maintenance and defense personnel. perhaps the us would have place radar at the bases they used.
the book " The Poltava affair: a Russian warning: an American tragedy" by Glen Infield is pretty good and gives a lot of insight by the key players who negotiated with stalin. what was written in there was supported by the other things i read...so i am going to say it is fairly accurate historically ( from the us point of view of course )

drgondog...yes i do remember the 355th escorting at least once and well as the 357th. but the last one happened just about the time my father got to europe. on the way back Bill Overstreet shot down a 109 with vodka....

http://www.cebudanderson.com/billoverstreet.htm

 

[davebender]

Germany had aviation gasoline until RAF Bomber Command destroyed hydrogenation plants during 1944. Germany had motor fuel until Red Army seized Ploesti.

Remove U.S. 8th Air Force and Red Army will hardly notice the difference.

 

[Erich]

that is utter nonsense Dave Bender

who needs the amount of LW defending fighters to counter US heavies both 8th and the 15th when you can go in and smash any Soviet air raid. as said earlier BC may have had to use other tactics for evening raids as they may have easily felt more night time concentrations of enemy fighters than in 42/43. obviously the war would of entered a newness none of us even knows about plus lenghtening out the war.

 

[bobbysocks]

With no long range escorts, the 8th AF gets most of the invasion support work, BC goes back to bombing the Ruhr. The tactical air forces and 8th spend all their time attacking targets in preparation for the invasion along with V-1 sites. The Luftwaffe fights to defend French air space and loses, the invasion goes ahead exactly as it did historically.

The Luftwaffe were not going to be allowed to sit out months of the air war whilst the allied air forces took apart the German defences in France. Goering wouldn't allow it, Hitler certainly wouldn't.

i think everyone would agree with you that the LW was going to get a vacation and be allowed to do nothing. but as was stated before over 1000 aircraft were destroyed during deep incursions prior to that. those 1000+ planes would have been redeployed to east and west as needed. the number of ac built would augment the ranks of the LW. i can say if it would happen or who would win D-day but i feel where the LW didnt have much a presence during the actual landing... they would have in this scenario..it would have been more bloody and costly than it was.

 

[Hop]

In general deep penetration raids make things harder for the attacker and easier for the defender. The bombers (and their escorts) are in the air longer, increasing wear and tear on the aircraft and crew. A damaged aircraft has less chance to make it home the further from base it is.

With the USAAF focused on France they can fly more bombing sorties, more escort sorties, and the RAF can join in the escort as well. There's no doubt the Luftwaffe would have a harder time over France than they did over Germany.

So either the German high command allows the Luftwaffe their holiday, or the Luftwaffe have to face more allied fighters and bombers over France than they did over Germany.

The problem for the Luftwaffe is numbers, not geography. If the Germans had not been active on several fronts the Luftwaffe might have been able to sit back and refuse combat. But in 1943/44 the eastern front and Italy were active war zones and France and the Low Countries about to become active. They could not refuse combat in any of those theatres. That still leaves a relatively small Luftwaffe facing 3 air forces that were considerably larger than it.

Even without long range air fighters the Luftwaffe has to fight in the first half of 1944 and they will lose. That leaves the allies in control of the air space above France for the invasion, just as happened historically.

 

[gjs238]

Not just France, but a good part of Germany as well.
Somewhere on one of these threads someone posted a chart showing ranges of the various escort fighters in different Marks depicted as radius on a map of Europe.

 

[tomo pauk]

You mean these maps?
BTW, the 475 mi radius for the P-51 without tank is too optimistic, the US 100000 book gives a hundred miles less, with 269 gals. The P-47 can do the depicted radius, but on 1943 engine setting (no WER, military rating only 5 minutes instead of 15).

 

[VinceReeves]

I always got the impression that strategic bombing was dogma-driven rather than results-driven. Results were unmeasurable until post-war anyway.

If you're using your bombers tactically you can assess their effectiveness far more accurately. (If you're advancing, at least.)

 

[gjs238]

Yes, those maps!
It seems there were lots of targets available for strategic bombing within pre-P51 escort range.

Just thinking that if, pre-P51, unescorted bombing missions incur unacceptable and/or unsustainable losses, then perhaps consider "saturating" the areas you CAN escort (?)

 

[tomo pauk]

I always got the impression that strategic bombing was dogma-driven rather than results-driven.

The 'dogma' needed to be there, in order the CBO protagonists can asses results of the CBO itself. Even if 1% bombs hit home, the Germans were forced to slug it against three major air forces, an unsustainable thing at the long run. The CBO made the whole of Axis-held Europe a front line.

Results were unmeasurable until post-war anyway.

If you're using your bombers tactically you can assess their effectiveness far more accurately. (If you're advancing, at least.)

The fighter-bomber over claim was just under the heavy bomber gunner over claim?

 

[VinceReeves]

The 'dogma' needed to be there, in order the CBO protagonists can asses results of the CBO itself. Even if 1% bombs hit home, the Germans were forced to slug it against three major air forces, an unsustainable thing at the long run. The CBO made the whole of Axis-held Europe a front line.

If escorted heavy bombers were being used tactically on or behind the frontlines in Italy, or against tactical targets in France, the Luftwaffe still have to slug it out with them. On the occasions when Allied armies are moving forwards, statistical assessments can be made of the damage caused.

The fighter-bomber over claim was just under the heavy bomber gunner over claim?

No but e.g. after D-Day it was possible to make an objective statistical assessment of fighter-bomber claims i.e. the ineffectiveness of rockets against armour was gauged quite quickly to correspond with trials IIRC.

 

[tomo pauk]

If escorted heavy bombers were being used tactically on or behind the frontlines in Italy, or against tactical targets in France, the Luftwaffe still have to slug it out with them. On the occasions when Allied armies are moving forwards, statistical assessments can be made of the damage caused.

The key word is 'escorted'. USAF was rigid in it's doctrine (=dogma) that they don't need escort for their bombers. Once they saw the mistake, they scrambled to produce field the long range fighters. If the bomb raid can be escorted, it would be more prudent to use the advantage to bomb an oil refinery from 25000 ft (with added bonus of dodging most of the Flak), rather that to try do the Army support from 10000 ft (making them fair game for the 88mm, maybe even the 37mm. Also, if the Allied bombers need to wait until D day to unleash their power, what would they do prior to that?
Further, if the Allied are leaving the fuel, coal, transportation systems to contribute to the German war effort, that would mean the fuel shortage never occurs. The Germans have more better new pilots, since they have more fuel to use for training, plus they don't have to worry that some prowling fighter group does not intent to make their training exercise ends abruplty.

No but e.g. after D-Day it was possible to make an objective statistical assessment of fighter-bomber claims i.e. the ineffectiveness of rockets against armour was gauged quite quickly to correspond with trials IIRC.

We again need to wait until after D day for that doctrine to kick in.

 

[VinceReeves]

The key word is 'escorted'. USAF was rigid in it's doctrine (=dogma) that they don't need escort for their bombers. Once they saw the mistake, they scrambled to produce field the long range fighters. If the bomb raid can be escorted, it would be more prudent to use the advantage to bomb an oil refinery from 25000 ft (with added bonus of dodging most of the Flak), rather that to try do the Army support from 10000 ft (making them fair game for the 88mm, maybe even the 37mm. Also, if the Allied bombers need to wait until D day to unleash their power, what would they do prior to that?

Well, the premise of the thread is that no long range escorts are available, so bombing range is necessarily reduced if you want to preserve your bomber force. By tactical bombing, I mean bombing of railheads, bridges, marshalling yards, supply dumps etc. that are necessary to feed the front lines. I don't mean CAS. Therefore, normal bombing heights are acceptable.

Further, if the Allied are leaving the fuel, coal, transportation systems to contribute to the German war effort, that would mean the fuel shortage never occurs. The Germans have more better new pilots, since they have more fuel to use for training, plus they don't have to worry that some prowling fighter group does not intent to make their training exercise ends abruplty.

My understanding is that tactical bombing is very much aimed at transportations systems - just those that directly feed the front, going back as far as you can maintain fighter support. Therefore, the shortages will still occur, and may be more pronounced, as though the production is less affected, fewer of the products are reaching the front. This is theoretical of course, as I don't know if an analysis of tactical vs. strategic bombing has been done.

We again need to wait until after D day for that doctrine to kick in.

I just used D-Day as an example. The idea is that analysis can be done in any situation where your army is advancing. Where your army is not advancing, you are relying on estimates gathered through reconnaissance/espionage etc. just as in strategic boming.

 

[tomo pauk]

Well, the premise of the thread is that no long range escorts are available, so bombing range is necessarily reduced if you want to preserve your bomber force. By tactical bombing, I mean bombing of railheads, bridges, marshalling yards, supply dumps etc. that are necessary to feed the front lines. I don't mean CAS. Therefore, normal bombing heights are acceptable.

Oh, boy, when one says 'tactical bombing', it's not too hard to conclude he means 'CAS'. The mentioning of 'Allied forces moving forward, allowing for an accurate damage assessment' kinda fooled me, too
The target types you listed would be more of operational level, rather than of tactical level?
The Allied airforces extracted a heavy toll at the target types you're mentioned (mostly without 4 engined bombers ), and the 'transportation plan' was set in motion some time in 1944 IIRC. We still don't know what combat range of the escort might be called long, short, or even medium - adds to the confusion.

My understanding is that tactical bombing is very much aimed at transportations systems - just those that directly feed the front, going back as far as you can maintain fighter support. Therefore, the shortages will still occur, and may be more pronounced, as though the production is less affected, fewer of the products are reaching the front. This is theoretical of course, as I don't know if an analysis of tactical vs. strategic bombing has been done.

The modern nomenclature is 'BAI', battlefield air interdiction, and it would be indeed a part of tactical air operations. It was been unleashed upon German forces in France and Low Countries, again without heavies.

I just used D-Day as an example. The idea is that analysis can be done in any situation where your army is advancing. Where your army is not advancing, you are relying on estimates gathered through reconnaissance/espionage etc. just as in strategic boming.

Okay, now I know what you mean.

 

[VinceReeves]

Oh, boy, when one says 'tactical bombing', it's not too hard to conclude he means 'CAS'. The mentioning of 'Allied forces moving forward, allowing for an accurate damage assessment' kinda fooled me, too
The target types you listed would be more of operational level, rather than of tactical level?

Yeah, operational might be a better word than tactical.

Basically, I mean the kind of missions that Harris and Doolittle had to do when their arms were being twisted, but didn't want to do if left to their own devices.