Strategic bombing campaign in Europe: No long range escorts (1 Viewer)

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Between losses and bad weather, the 8th Air Force scheduled relatively few deep penetration missions from Dec. 1943 through early March 1944. This is the time period in which the first P-51B units were first introduced to combat, but they were far outnumbered by P-47 units, and roughly matched by P-38 units. (The P-38 could fly deep penetration missions but was hampered at this time by cold cockpits and mechanical bug-a-boos relating to fuel incompatibility.) The P-47D-23 had additional internal fuel, and with better drop tanks had a combat radius of around 750 miles. It's tough making the theoretical arguments about plane availability, because even if a plane could have been available, that doesn't meant that it would have been available and combat-ready in practice. Also, the drop tanks would have had to have been available in quantity to match the planes. Still, it appears that the P-47 could have flown deep penetration missions by April 1944, not long after the Mustangs were available in quantity.

I'm definitely in the camp of people who think the P-51's role in achieving air superiority in Europe was overstated and the P-47's role has been understated. I don't think it would have been fatal to the American bombing campaign to focus on shorter (or night) missions until adequate escorts were available for long-range strikes.

The P-38 (-J) was plagued by much more things than 'British fuel', eg. pilots' piloting technique and engine intake system contributing much to the engine blow-ups.
The 'US Hundred thousands' book gives 600 miles of combat radius for the P-47 carrying 370 + 300 USG (internal + external).
 
'British fuel' Tomo? USA fuel more like....

Britain got its oil and petroleum products from the US.

In 1939, the US produced 58.9% of the crude and refined oil products produced (US: 151.8 million tons, global total: 257.5 million tons). But in 1939 Britain has getting most of its oil from the Caribbean, Mexico and Venezuela.


The war quickly changed that.

With the Mediterranean essentially closed to Allied shipping and the shipping routes around Cape Horn long and dangerous, Britain quickly switched to US oil. British controlled sources of oil in the Middle East continued to produce and refine oil but it was used in the Mediterranean theater rather than exported to the UK. Oil production in the Middle East declined because of reduced demand and civil unrest.

The overall numbers tell only part of the picture. By 1942, Britain imported 78.2% of its high octane aviation fuel and 80.0% of its other aviation fuel from the US. 100 and higher octane avgas gave British and American planes, especially fighters, a significant performance edge, higher power outputs and cooler running temperatures and increased reliability.
 
I just noticed that you are posting again John,welcome back.

I think that you are right.
It is the argument put forward convincingly by Williamson Murray in the book mentioned earlier. His argument is not particularly radical and is by no means unique. Given the historical strategy of the German government (meaning the RLM) and the Luftwaffe it is difficult to see a more positive outcome for the Luftwaffe.
Cheers
Steve

Thanks Steve.
I agree, the LW had the upper hand with the USAAF daylight bombing raids. Unbelievable losses of 500+ men a day.
The fighters changed the odds and we should acknowledge the P47 and P51's contribution as well as the pilots of course...
The 332nd Fighter Group and its 100th, 301st, and 302nd Fighter Squadrons were equipped for initial combat missions with Bell P-39 Airacobras (March 1944), later with Republic P-47 Thunderbolts (June–July 1944), and finally with the aircraft with which they became most commonly associated, the North American P-51 Mustang (July 1944). When the pilots of the 332nd Fighter Group painted the tails of their P-47s and later, P-51s, red, the nickname "Red Tails" was coined. Bomber crews applied a more effusive "Red-Tail Angels" sobriquet.
Sterling stuff.
Cheers
John
 
'British fuel' Tomo? USA fuel more like....

Britain got its oil and petroleum products from the US.

In 1939, the US produced 58.9% of the crude and refined oil products produced (US: 151.8 million tons, global total: 257.5 million tons). But in 1939 Britain has getting most of its oil from the Caribbean, Mexico and Venezuela.


The war quickly changed that.

With the Mediterranean essentially closed to Allied shipping and the shipping routes around Cape Horn long and dangerous, Britain quickly switched to US oil. British controlled sources of oil in the Middle East continued to produce and refine oil but it was used in the Mediterranean theater rather than exported to the UK. Oil production in the Middle East declined because of reduced demand and civil unrest.

The overall numbers tell only part of the picture. By 1942, Britain imported 78.2% of its high octane aviation fuel and 80.0% of its other aviation fuel from the US. 100 and higher octane avgas gave British and American planes, especially fighters, a significant performance edge, higher power outputs and cooler running temperatures and increased reliability.

John, I was not pointing finger on the 'British fuel', just the oposite - the fact that all of the Allied ETO air warfare run smoothly on the fuel that was available at the UK serves as a proof that fuel was okay.
The talk about the fuel was a smoke screen that was hiding the questionable out-of-procedure operation of V-1701s in P-38 in ETO, late 1943, and the fact, acknowledged by Allison, that their product needed the change of engine intake (developed through mid 1943, the new intake was known as 'Madam Queen' center venturi intake pipe, that was managing to re-atomize fuel droplets).
 
The 332nd Fighter Group and its 100th, 301st, and 302nd Fighter Squadrons were equipped for initial combat missions with Bell P-39 Airacobras (March 1944), later with Republic P-47 Thunderbolts (June–July 1944), and finally with the aircraft with which they became most commonly associated, the North American P-51 Mustang (July 1944). When the pilots of the 332nd Fighter Group painted the tails of their P-47s and later, P-51s, red, the nickname "Red Tails" was coined. Bomber crews applied a more effusive "Red-Tail Angels" sobriquet.
Sterling stuff.
Cheers
John

Would you know: Did the Redtails fly bomber escort before they got the P-51s?
 
John, I was not pointing finger on the 'British fuel', just the oposite - the fact that all of the Allied ETO air warfare run smoothly on the fuel that was available at the UK serves as a proof that fuel was okay.
The talk about the fuel was a smoke screen that was hiding the questionable out-of-procedure operation of V-1701s in P-38 in ETO, late 1943, and the fact, acknowledged by Allison, that their product needed the change of engine intake (developed through mid 1943, the new intake was known as 'Madam Queen' center venturi intake pipe, that was managing to re-atomize fuel droplets).

I know Tomo...I was laughing at the idea of 'British fuel' when we were completely reliant on our American friends.
Cheers
John
 
I'm with you on the P-47. It should and could have had suitable drop tanks much sooner.

Coulda, Shoulda, Might have - but didn't. Further, the wing wan't designed for feeding fuel through wing pylons until the mid series D IIRC. Until the P-47D-25 the range was limited to Brunswick and Kassel. It was only when both wing tanks and the -25 internal fuel increase of 65 gallons permitted the D-25 to get as far as Leipzig in late July and August and still short of Berlin, Magdeburg, Munich, Brux, Stettin, Posnan.

Were substantial numbers of US bomber crews trained for night time bombing missions? When the RAF first attempted it the result was effectively a big fat zero. They couldn't find there way to any target by night. Why would the USAAF be any different?

Cheers

Steve

Steve - the 8th was beginning training for night ops in November 1943. IMO it would have taken many months of operations to become near as effective as the RAF and god knows how operations would have been effective with twice as many heavy bombers competing for airspace...

Further, absent the Mustang, at least five or six P-38 Groups would have to be diverted from MTO and PTO to build up sufficient escort capability to start Big Week in February. Also IMO, the P-38 would have been less effective at closing with LW to achieve air to air destruction for a variety of reasons including size, recognizability, inability to continue pursuit in a dive and, until the J-25 delivered around D-Day, not near as nimble as the 109 and 190 in comparison with the Mustang.
 
Between losses and bad weather, the 8th Air Force scheduled relatively few deep penetration missions from Dec. 1943 through early March 1944.

Following October 14 raid to Schweinfurt the 8th basically shut down long range ops because a.) the range on P-47D was too short, and b.) the P-38 was just starting ops with one FG - and having serious problems with intercoolers and dive compressibility. When the 8th had two Mustang Groups (354th and 357th) and two P38 Groups (20th and 55th), they launched Big Week on February 20-25.

This is the time period in which the first P-51B units were first introduced to combat, but they were far outnumbered by P-47 units, and roughly matched by P-38 units. (The P-38 could fly deep penetration missions but was hampered at this time by cold cockpits and mechanical bug-a-boos relating to fuel incompatibility.) The P-47D-23 had additional internal fuel, and with better drop tanks had a combat radius of around 750 miles.

I believe it was the -25 that was the first operational P-47 in the 8th AF which had the 65 gallon internal fuel tank. They began arriving in the ETO in late May, equipped some of the squadrons in June, but were not fully deployed until late August to the 56, 78, 353, 356 FG's. It wasn't until July that the -25 was used as anything except Penetration Support as far as Leipzig... AFAIK it never went to Schweinfurt, Berlin or Brux as examples of target escort.

It's tough making the theoretical arguments about plane availability, because even if a plane could have been available, that doesn't meant that it would have been available and combat-ready in practice. Also, the drop tanks would have had to have been available in quantity to match the planes. Still, it appears that the P-47 could have flown deep penetration missions by April 1944, not long after the Mustangs were available in quantity.

No. See above. Jugs were turning back at Stuttgart, Kassel, Brunswick March through July, 1944.

I'm definitely in the camp of people who think the P-51's role in achieving air superiority in Europe was overstated and the P-47's role has been understated. I don't think it would have been fatal to the American bombing campaign to focus on shorter (or night) missions until adequate escorts were available for long-range strikes.

Depends on your definition of 'overstated'. The two rookie Mustang Groups (354 and 357FG) destroyed 64.5 in the air during Big Week. The 11 9th and 8th AF Jug groups combined destroyed 78 and the two P38 groups destroyed 10. The four operational Mustang Groups in March destroyed 254 to 176 for the 10 P-47 Groups and 25 for the three P-38 FG's.

By D-Day, the P-51B destroyed more than all the P-47s in the ETO (dating back to march 1943) in the air and three times as many on the ground, 9th and 8th AF combined, with fewer than 25% of the combat sorties.

Combat losses to 8th AF bomber crews dropped below 5% per month and decreased steadily after Big Week. You might ask them if they thought the contribution of the Mustang was overstated..
 
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Bill, the P-47s were ferried (back in August 1943) from USA to UK, via Island, while using 2 x 165 USG tanks under wing. The Ford in Brisbane, Australia, was producing combat-worthy 200 gal belly tanks for P-47s of the 5th air force in the same time, because Gen. Kenney was furious about the lack of legs of his P-47s. The P-47, when using WER (so, 1944), was able to do 425 miles of combat radius with 305 + 300 USG; without WER (=1943) the combat radius is further increased.

The wing was capable to carry fuel, unfortunately Gen. Kenney was half a globe away to matter for ETO.
 
Depends on your definition of 'overstated'. The two rookie Mustang Groups (354 and 357FG) destroyed 64.5 in the air during Big Week. The 11 9th and 8th AF Jug groups combined destroyed 78 and the two P38 groups destroyed 10.



Perhaps the P-51 mystique is illustrated by what may be its first long range escort mission on January 11, 1944. The deep penetration operation was partially recalled and generally disorganized. The P-47s and p-38 ran out range 50miles short of the target with the single available group of P-51Bs providing escort over the target near Berlin.

As it happened the P-51s also got caught up in the discord. One showed up. Ignoring standing orders not to engage without a wingman, the P-51 successfully protected a bomber flight for a half hour, downing between 2 –fighter pilot claim- and 6 -bomber crew report-of the interceptors.

Statistically, the bombers in total still suffered terrible losses. But Maj. Howard was heartening to the bomber crews and, in view of the award of a CMoH, apparently escaped disciplined for ignoring a standing order.

The point being that this episode and statistics might be about different things.
 
Jim Howard, 354FG TDY to 8th AF, was the only fighter pilot awarded the MoH in the ETO.. pretty strange considering how many times one or two fighters engaged a large force of German fighters against small chances of survival.

When you compare the DSC awards for 8th and 9th AF versus USN, USMC and USAAF MoH in the PTO - there are no discernable variations in the courage or achievements..except that none of the other services had 8th BC HQ reviewing all awards..
 
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Jim Howard, 354FG TDY to 8th AF, was the only fighter pilot awarded the MoH in the ETO.. pretty strange considering how many times one or two fighters engaged a large force of German fighters against small chances of survival.

When you compare the DSC awards for 8th and 9th AF versus USN, USMC and USAAF MoH in the PTO - there are no discernable variations in the courage or achievements..except that none of the other services had 8th BC HQ reviewing all awards..

Might have had something to do with the 8th having been battered and needing some hope. Same with the P-51. It was new on the escort scene and offered a new paradigm. Long-range p-38s and P-47s could have done –and later did do- the job. But the P-51 was first on the long range scene. Sometimes you need a symbol and a dab of hype.

I don't think that many modern MoHs were awarded unearned; but many were earned that weren't awarded.
 

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