Strategies for defense 1944-45

[timshatz]

Read the thread and think Dragondog had it best. Trick was to strip away the escorts early in the raid. Try to get the heavies out there without fighter support. This was an option the Luftwaffe tried in late 43. Not sure how well it worked.

Will avoid talking about 262s and advanced 190s, it was not in the original question.

In a way, the Luftwaffe in 43-44 and the RAF in 40 had the same problem. But totally different strategic situations. The RAF had to survive to Fall Weather. The Luftwaffe had to develop a successful defense that was sustainable. In that, the Luftwaffe leadership would have to recognize an air war is a war of attrition and technical advance. No doubt plenty of people did in the Luftwaffe, but the chiefs would have to recognize it and shift priorities to fighter production (defensive) and away from Bomber productions (offensive).

However, on a tactical level, the interception of the allied fighter groups over the Dutch and French coast by high performance LW fighters would force them to drop tanks and deal with this threat. The goal of the LW fighters was to engage them, getting one or two here and there. But engagement is crucial. It is the goal to strip away the fighter escort.

I would also attack the 8th AF heavies AFTER crossing the German Border. Make it something of a line of departure. Maybe send the odd pure fighter group to attack them from the coast to the border. But it would have to be units that could protect themselves from Allied Escort fighters when the coastal intercepts failed.

At the German border, the bomber killers would come out. Twin engined and up gunned FW190/Me109 fighters. Heavy cannon on underwing gondolas and air to air rockets would be used. Air to air bombing was dud and would not be used. They would focus on one group at a time and be fed in sequentially (not in one large group of 150, but in groups of 12-24 at a time) and given 5 minutes of contact time before the next group of LW fighter attacks. The intent is to wipe out totally one American bomber group per raid. I can think of no better morale killing effect than knowing when you were latched onto by the LW, you were gone. That they would just keep coming. I had read that this was one of the things 8th Bomber feared.

There would also have to be a master fighter controller alongside the bomber stream. He would be sending fighters to attack certain units. Something close to AWACs but with a visual cue. He would get his own fighter escort.

Fighters would not enter their own flak but would be waiting on the other side after the bombers hit their bomb runs. They would attack from the German border, to the target, and back to the border. One sortie per fighter would be definite, two if possible. At the border, they would pull off.

On the bombers crossing the border, the only fighters pursuing would be standard LW single engine fighters (tasked specifically to destroy stragglers) and High Performance fighters still seeking Escort Groups.

The number break down on how many aircraft this would require is a different and more involved question but I think the above plan would do great damage to the allied daylight bomber effort.

Note- the focus is on allied heavy bombers. Allied medium and light bombers would be ignored wherever possible. For the most part, they did not pose a strategic threat and did not cross the German border.

 

[drgondog]

If the Luftwaffe focuses on the escorts(which were quite capable of defending themselves on equal or better terms against the Nazi fighters) then the bomber streams attack their targets totally unmolested.
And even assuming a 3:1 kill ratio vs the allied escorts, the Nazi's would've still done little more than prolong their agony, considering that in theater they were outnumbered over 10:1 in operational fighter aircraft(I'm guessing probably a lot more than 10:1, though i do not have the figures).

The Allies probably had 5:1 total fighter superiority if the LW put Luftflotte Reich in range of RAF, 9th AF, 8th AF FC and engaged over Holland through France in spring 1944.

That does not strike me as a winning strategy either.

But the Luftflotte Reich had numerical superiority over the fighters reaching Central to Eastern and Souther Germany ~ very high in December 1943, reaching parity when the 8th FC had converted 6 P-47 Groups to Mustangs and had 4 Lightning Groups at same time - Late May 1944... then downhill from there.

The LW could always achieve Local superiority with skilled controllers capitalizing on Bomber/Escort coverage gaps due to mistake or weather right up to March, 1945.

My strategy prolongs and extends bomber losses in 1943 and early 1944 - but while the LW forces early returns of P-47s and then 38s and 51s, as well as inflicting higher fighter losses - they would also lose experinced pilots in the outer ring which would be far more difficult to replace when the Mustangs arrived in force...

The best chance to prolong the war is to inflict such high casualties that the USAAF abandons the daylight effort and transitions to night - which didn't happen - nor was it likely to happen given the defensive capabilities actually in place for LW.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

by 1945 Allied jet engine technology had already surpassed that of the Germans anyway.

Absolutely False...

Allied jet technology was probably a year at best behind the Germans. The J-33 was just marginally more reliable than the Jumo 004 and was probably due more to its configuration than anything else. There were more advanced versions of the Jumo that would have put it on par with allied engines that were coming off the assembly lines by 1947. By 46/ 47 those allied engines developed during the war years were reaching maturity and the next generation was on the drawing board.

 

[Amsel]

The USAAF bomber command was getting near to breaking before the introduction of long range escorts. I am not sure how much more heavy losses could be taken. Attacking the escorts as well as the bombers would have helped Germany. By switching priorities in 1943 to reichs defense might have stopped the daylight bombing altogether.

Before the daylight bombing campaign began a very carefully prepared study was submitted to the USAAF. Basically it outlined and pinpointed every strategic target in Germany and took into account losses to flak, and fighters as well as weather situations and target hit probabilities. The study surmised that almost 7,000 missions would have to be flown over Germany to destroy its production capability.
Th major problem at the time was not so much losses to fighters as was losses to flak. A few cases could be the exception such as the RAF Nuremburg raid. Due to weather and flak only 22% of all bombs dropped during the raids over Germany came within 5 miles of the intended targets. This is what led to the area bombing of German cities. The dismal accuracy was noted and target area saturation seemed better then precise targeting.
So I think if more attention was paid to picking up the escorts after they crossed the channel and engaging them instead of the bombers some sort of small victory could be obtained, short term. It just depends on who was able to win the dogfights. If the escorts could be engaged and kept busy then other fighters could swoop in and hunt the edges of the bombers with more impunity. This would lead to more attrition on both sides, but the object is to make daylight raids too dangerous because the war was already decided in Russia and the Med.

 

[timshatz]

It just depends on who was able to win the dogfights

Amsel, agree with you the 8th BC was having morale problems in the fall of '43.

However, strictly from a tactical perspective, the LW didn't need to win the dogfights/engagements on the coast to be effective. They only needed to have the allied escort fighters take them seriously enough to drop their tanks to be effective. Once the allied fighters had done that, they were no longer escorts but simply a fighter sweep.

Technically, the LW would need to develop a very effective high altitude, fast climbing fighters. Maybe a 109 with specially geared engine (others on this board know far more about the DB605 than I) so it could have a consistent altitude advantage on the escort fighters. Would create a very difficult tactical problem for the allies to solve. Something similar to the Mig15/F86 problem of the Korean War with the Migs flying south of the DMZ at altitude and the F86s shadowing them at a lower altitude.

 

[Valo300]

The achilles heal for the US, like the British was the shortage of manpower. If the the Germans managed to shut down the eastern front, 80% of their casualties disappear overnight, and the massive drain on materiel falls off dramatically as well.

This is simply not true. The garrison requirements for the SU alone would've gobbled up hundreds of thousands of germans and all the associated war materiel they would need to stay there. This would be a MASSIVE drain on Nazi resources....even if there was no insurgency after the war in the East ended(Which is highly unlikely).

Studies by Dunigan and others suggest that on average, each German soldier and airman is worth about 1.5 allied soldiers.

Depends when in the war you're talking. In 1945 on GI veteran was probably worth 10 German conscripts. In 1942, one hardened SS man is probably worth 10 green US GI's.

Given the sensitivity of the Allies to losses, I can hardly see them paying something in the order of 8-10 million lives for victory (given an assumed German casualty figure of 5 million).

How did we even get to a 5 million casualty figure? Even if you triple the LW's kill rate they get nowhere near that figure.

From my vantage point the allies did whatever it took to win, and never shie'd away from casualties when there was no other choice.

The Russians won the war against the germans, make no mistake, with admittedly a lot of help.

Take away LL and there are no massive Soviet counter-offensives. I would say the US won WWII more than any other nation. Without the 300,000 trucks the US sent, and all the thousands of rail cars, and the steel, explosives, yada, yada the soviets, even if they still blunt the German offensive, simply cannot exploit the reversals because they'd lack the transportation, the explosives, the steel, the whole nine yards.

No LL= a standoff in the East, at best.

Remove the Russians from the equation, and the allies are unable to win IMO, because only the Russians were prepred to pay whatever the cost for victory

No Russians = nuclear Armageddon in 1945-46 for the German populace.

Germany could not win the war once the US joined the fight, not under any realistic scenario. Russians or no Russians.

This being said i do not mean to minimize the contribution of the Soviets, their bleeding made our job vastly easier than it would have been without them.

 

[drgondog]

The USAAF bomber command was getting near to breaking before the introduction of long range escorts. I am not sure how much more heavy losses could be taken. Attacking the escorts as well as the bombers would have helped Germany. By switching priorities in 1943 to reichs defense might have stopped the daylight bombing altogether.

The October 14 1943 losses had already effectively slowed the 8th AF to point that few deep penetrations were attempted until the introduction of the Mustang. When Big Week occured in 21 Feb timeframe, the 8th and 9th had 3 Mustang and 2 Lightning groups operational. Two weeks later for first Berlin mission there were 4 Mustang plus three Lightning Groups operational for Berlin. Two days later there were 5 Mustang groups fully operational for second maximum effort Berlin mission on March 8 - from this point forward the maximum effort deep penetration attacks multiplied and probably as much to draw out and destroy the LW as any other reason.

Before the daylight bombing campaign began a very carefully prepared study was submitted to the USAAF. Basically it outlined and pinpointed every strategic target in Germany and took into account losses to flak, and fighters as well as weather situations and target hit probabilities. The study surmised that almost 7,000 missions would have to be flown over Germany to destroy its production capability.
Th major problem at the time was not so much losses to fighters as was losses to flak.

This was true in 1945 but not true in 1943 and 1944 - GAF Fighters took a far higher toll and continued in a couple of isolated days (i.e.April 29, May 12, July 7, Sept 27) to hit one particular Bomb Wing with devating results

A few cases could be the exception such as the RAF Nuremburg raid. Due to weather and flak only 22% of all bombs dropped during the raids over Germany came within 5 miles of the intended targets. This is what led to the area bombing of German cities. The dismal accuracy was noted and target area saturation seemed better then precise targeting.
So I think if more attention was paid to picking up the escorts after they crossed the channel and engaging them instead of the bombers some sort of small victory could be obtained, short term. It just depends on who was able to win the dogfights. If the escorts could be engaged and kept busy then other fighters could swoop in and hunt the edges of the bombers with more impunity.

The RAF and USAAF performed very well against the LW from the September 1943 timeframe forward as the 8th and 9th built up to 12 Fighter Groups - numerically superior to JG2 and 26 - and gained valuable experience and better tactical awareness of strengths and weaknesses of the P-47 vs 109 and 190. IMO, this is the only time that my 'ring theory' had a chance to set the USAAF back on its heels - and as pointed out, should only be temporary in a battle of attrition.

This would lead to more attrition on both sides, but the object is to make daylight raids too dangerous because the war was already decided in Russia and the Med.

How was the war 'decided' in MTO? Nobody was exactly racing up Italy's mountain spine - although Ploesti was probably the single most important Axis target of WWII and it was hammered in 1944. What did you have in mind?

 

[Amsel]

The war was decided in the MTO as well as the Eastern front before it there was any invasion in Normandy. After Stalingrad and the Afrika Korps getting booted from Africa and then the humiliating defeat at Sicily theb third reich had lost all initiative and had to go on the defensive. Those defeats lost a large swath of experienced and capable troops as well. The vital resources that the third reich was depending on using to sustain the reich were also gone with the wind.

 

[Valo300]

Absolutely False...

Nope, it is not false if the information i have seen is accurate(and i have no reason to believe it's not). By 1945 Allied Jet engines produced more thrust and had much more reliability than contemporary Nazi engines. This is a simple fact. I am sure i can find a chart if you really need proof.

There were more advanced versions of the Jumo that would have put it on par with allied engines that were coming off the assembly lines by 1947.

That the germans lacked the raw materials to make.

By late war they were facing all kinds of raw material shortages. Historically they could not even build enough engines for Me262s, and those they did build were terribly unreliable. What's more, by 1945 the LW didn't really have any fuel left for any sort of mass operations anyway, and certainly not massive prolonged operations.

Had the war stretched to 1946 the US alone would've massively outpaced the Germans in jet aircraft production. Not to mention that the Germans lacked the ability to man all the planes that they'd need by that stage in the war anyway.

Even if the Germans had thousands of jets, the simple fact is that 16yo boys in 'wunder-weapons" are absolutely no match for seasoned vets in top-end legacy designs.

Germany had already irreversibly lost WWII long, long before the entry into service of Jet powered aircraft.

The war was decided in the MTO as well as the Eastern front before it there was any invasion in Normandy.

The war was lost long before that stage as well. Several times over, really.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Nope, it is not false if the information i have seen is accurate(and i have no reason to believe it's not). By 1945 Allied Jet engines produced more thrust and had much more reliability than contemporary Nazi engines. This is a simple fact. I am sure i can find a chart if you really need proof.

By the end of 45, sure but what about the beginning of 45, the last months of the war?

In Jan 45 the best the allies were getting out of the J-33/ Welland was about 3800 pounds and that was in the test cell.

Yes, I'd like to see this chart and where it came from....

That the germans lacked the raw materials to make.

By late war they were facing all kinds of raw material shortages. Historically they could not even build enough engines for Me262s, and those they did build were terribly unreliable.

The only thing they lacked was raw material...and time - and they knew that. But during that period 9and it was short) they were producing more advanced turbine engines and considering the conditions, they did an excellent job.

the Jumo 004 had a shelf life up to 10 hours. The Germans were attempting to substitute nickel steels so their engines could be made more reliable. The early J-33s and RR Wellands were just a little better but because of their construction were lasting another 10 hours more. Test pilot Tony Levier had a turbine disk come off an early P-80 south of Muroc in 1945 - it only had 5 hourd on it.

the 004C was being developed with an afterburner; the 004E was more fuel efficient, put out more thrust (1650 lbs) and was more reliable. When the war ended Junkers was working on the 004H which was capable of over 2,600 pounds thrust.

Then you had the Heinkel HeS 011 putting out close to 3000 pounds thrust - and this engine was in the test stand in early 1945.

From the HeS 0011 and 004C and on you were looking at power plants that were probably just as advanced as the first J-35s. Yes, early German turbine engines were unreliable, but they were no way behind "technically" allied engines of the same period, quite the opposite.

 

[drgondog]

The war was decided in the MTO as well as the Eastern front before it there was any invasion in Normandy. After Stalingrad and the Afrika Korps getting booted from Africa and then the humiliating defeat at Sicily theb third reich had lost all initiative and had to go on the defensive. Those defeats lost a large swath of experienced and capable troops as well. The vital resources that the third reich was depending on using to sustain the reich were also gone with the wind.

Until Dragoon - the Allies were floundering around Rome after a long campaign with extremely high casualties - and low resource requirements by Wermacht in the mountains.

Respectfully, taking Rome and D-Day were basically in same weeek.. While you are correct about Germany being on defensive in MTO, the same could be said about Germany being on the defensive in the East from Stalingrad forward and could say Germany started on the defensive for Channel Ops after the BoB wound down. The only offense conducted by Germany after Dec 1942 was Battle of Atlantic IIRC.

Taken further, the war was decided when Hitler attacked Russia and then declared war on US

 

[Amsel]

Sounds good, my only point being that Germany had no chance for a win, stalemate, or terms without Russia being liberated. The shortage of ammunition and fuel was too severe as well as the lack of fresh soldiers. That being this conversation about strategies to counter the strategic bombing can only realistically be put in the context of stoppong the daylight bombing and sueing for peace with the Western allies. Highly unlikely as long as Hitler and Goerring were at the helm.

 

[Valo300]

The only thing they lacked was raw material...and time - and they knew that.

the Jumo 004 had a shelf life up to 10 hours. The Germans were attempting to substitute nickel steels so their engines could be made more reliable. The early J-33s and RR Wellands were just a little better but because of their construction were lasting another 10 hours more. Test pilot Tony Levier had a turbine disk come off an early P-80 south of Muroc in 1944 - it only had 5 hourd on it.

the 004C was being developed with an afterburner; the 004E was more fuel efficient, put out more thrust (1650 lbs) and was more reliable. When the war ended Junkers was working on the 004H which was capable of over 2,600 pounds thrust.

From the 004C and on you were looking at power plants that were probably just as advanced as the first J-35s. Yes, early German turbine engines were unreliable, but they were no way behind allied engines of the same period.

Though i do not disagree with your observations regarding their advanced jet engines, again, by 1945 the Allied designs were producing more power with longer service life on average. I should find that chart, it's pretty telling. (i'm still trying to find it)

And again, even if they had plans for a PW F-100, they simply lacked the ability to produce them in sufficient numbers, as well as lacking the fuel to fly the birds even if they did build them in the numbers they needed.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Though i do not disagree with your observations regarding their advanced jet engines, again, by 1945 the Allied designs were producing more power with longer service life on average. I should find that chart, it's pretty telling. (i'm still trying to find it)

By the end of 45, I'll agree, but your original quote

by 1945 Allied jet engine technology had already surpassed that of the Germans anyway

And again, even if they had plans for a PW F-100, they simply lacked the ability to produce them in sufficient numbers, as well as lacking the fuel to fly the birds even if they did build them in the numbers they needed.

Agree...

 

[red admiral]

When the war ended the best ther allies were getting out of the J-33/ Welland was about 2000 pounds and that was in the test cell.

By 1945 the time of the Welland was over, the first Meteor F3s introduced in 1944 had Derwent engines which were producing up to 2600lbf by the end of the war (Mk IV) and had a life of around 200hours. The Nene, Goblin and Ghost were already running and producing vastly more power. Reliability isn't about engine lifetime. The problem facing the Jumo 004 was compressor stall leading to flameout with rapid throttle changes and vibration in the turbine (which was pretty much solved eventually). The build quality on the 004 can only be described as poor (based on my experience). The centrifugal compressor is much less prone to surging.

The Germans were attempting to substitute nickel steels so their engines could be made more reliable. The early J-33s and RR Wellands were just a little better but because of their construction were lasting another 10 hours more.

The Germans, even with better raw materials and time available stuck with nickel stainless steels (for the 004A). The allies had nickel superalloys (not steels) with much better creep performance. Simply having nickel available doesn't mean superalloys magically appear - they were in development for ten years previously. By mid 45 the manufacturing issues with air cooled turbine blades had been more or less resolved (probably, but not much information to go on) in the German engines meaning that turbine temperatures could be raised (more thrust) and turbine life improved with the steels used.

Part of the poor lifetime with German engines was down to the fact that turbine temperatures were already higher than the allied engines. In conjunction with low pressure ratio you get a lot of thrust in exchange for lower lifetime and poorer fuel consumption.

The lifetimes of allied engines was over 150hours and up to about 300 or so. It is easy to get things wrong and so there could be a wide variation in lifetimes, especially with fatigue and vibration problems in the initial engines. But really you're looking at a lifetime an order of magnitude greater.

the 004C was being developed with an afterburner; the 004E was more fuel efficient, put out more thrust (1650 lbs) and was more reliable.

Its difficult to find information on the later models, mostly because they were built in very small numbers if at all. So far as I can tell the 004E was actually built and had an afterburner. With increased turbine entry temperature (to give more dry thrust) and few other apparent changes, I extremely doubt that the fuel efficiency was better. It should be worse. Lifetime should be better with air cooled blades, but reliability will probably be worse with the afterburner as the engine should be more prone to surging. But its difficult to say with the lack of information available. The US had a great deal of problems with their first generation of afterburning turbojets.

Yes, early German turbine engines were unreliable, but they were no way behind "technically" allied engines of the same period, quite the opposite.

Thats a challenging point to support. In terms of the engines actually built, the Allied ones were better. Usually the point is made of the better thrust/unit area of the German axial types but the Metrovick F2 also exists. It offers more thrust, much lower fuel consumption, lower weight and greater lifetime. By 1945 you've got the F2/4 offering even more thrust with lower fuel consumption. You've also got in 1945 the F3 and F5 turbofan and UDF running successfully offering 40% lower fuel consumption and 100% more thrust (4600lbf and 4800lbf respectively with sfc 0.66). The 004, 003 and 011 don't come anywhere close to competing on these technical issues - but are easier to produce with the limited resources available.

In terms of more paper engines, design for the Avon and Sapphire is already underway in 1945. Griffith is advocating high bypass ratio turbofans... Bristol has the world's first rate turboprop with heat regenerator... Little information is available on German paper engines but the ideas on both sides are pretty similar.

The one German advantage, that they had been forced into studying air cooled turbine blades which eventually worked so lower amounts of specialised materials could be used. The German engines were suited to the type of war they were fighting and their restrictions. The Allied ones were better optimised for their war and peacetime postwar.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

By 1945 the time of the Welland was over, the first Meteor F3s introduced in 1944 had Derwent engines which were producing up to 2600lbf by the end of the war (Mk IV) and had a life of around 200hours. The Nene, Goblin and Ghost were already running and producing vastly more power.

Sure, by the end of the war, what were they doing when they were first put on an airframe?

Reliability isn't about engine lifetime.

Agree

The problem facing the Jumo 004 was compressor stall leading to flameout with rapid throttle changes and vibration in the turbine (which was pretty much solved eventually). The build quality on the 004 can only be described as poor (based on my experience). The centrifugal compressor is much less prone to surging.

Also agree

Part of the poor lifetime with German engines was down to the fact that turbine temperatures were already higher than the allied engines. In conjunction with low pressure ratio you get a lot of thrust in exchange for lower lifetime and poorer fuel consumption.

Also agree...

The lifetimes of allied engines was over 150hours and up to about 300 or so.

Again, in 1945 and more so toward the later part of the year.

The one German advantage, that they had been forced into studying air cooled turbine blades which eventually worked so lower amounts of specialised materials could be used. The German engines were suited to the type of war they were fighting and their restrictions. The Allied ones were better optimised for their war and peacetime postwar.

Agree 100%

 

[red admiral]

Sure, by the end of the war, what were they doing when they were first put on an airframe?

Losses would be minimal given the Meteor's short nacelles so the thrust should be the same. 2000lbf for the Derwent I, 2400lbf for the II and III, rising to 2600lbf for the IV fitted to F3s in 1945.

Again, in 1945 and more so toward the later part of the year.

No, those lifetimes are true for 1943. Reliability would be a bit worse as the combustion problems had only just been solved but materials remained the same so life shouldn't be appreciably different.

One I forgot before, the LR.1 turbofan under construction by Power Jets (and almost completed according to Whittle) just before it was nationalised and effectively disbanded. 6000lbf with a bypass ratio of 3.0

 

[FLYBOYJ]

No, those lifetimes are true for 1943. Reliability would be a bit worse as the combustion problems had only just been solved but materials remained the same so life shouldn't be appreciably different.

I believe the J-33 as installed on the P-80 had a 25 hour life.

One I forgot before, the LR.1 turbofan under construction by Power Jets (and almost completed according to Whittle) just before it was nationalised and effectively disbanded. 6000lbf with a bypass ratio of 3.0

I have heard about that and it would of been pretty amazing if the potiential was seen.

 

[delcyros]

Reliability issues of the Jumo-004 is for a very significant part construction related and not a question of generalisation.
The BMW-003 in late 1944/early 1945 had an avg. service lifetime of over 200 hours and didn´t suffered from rapid throttle changes the way the Jumo-004 did.

 

[HellToupee]

However, on a tactical level, the interception of the allied fighter groups over the Dutch and French coast by high performance LW fighters would force them to drop tanks and deal with this threat. The goal of the LW fighters was to engage them, getting one or two here and there. But engagement is crucial. It is the goal to strip away the fighter escort.

Bombers on the penetration phase would have spitfire and p47 escorts, getting them to drop their tanks still wouldn't strip away the p51 escort.