Strategies for defense 1944-45 (1 Viewer)

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1) This is simply not true. The garrison requirements for the SU alone would've gobbled up hundreds of thousands of germans and all the associated war materiel they would need to stay there. This would be a MASSIVE drain on Nazi resources....even if there was no insurgency after the war in the East ended(Which is highly unlikely).

2) Depends when in the war you're talking. In 1945 on GI veteran was probably worth 10 German conscripts. In 1942, one hardened SS man is probably worth 10 green US GI's.


3) How did we even get to a 5 million casualty figure? Even if you triple the LW's kill rate they get nowhere near that figure.

From my vantage point the allies did whatever it took to win, and never shie'd away from casualties when there was no other choice
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4) Take away LL and there are no massive Soviet counter-offensives. I would say the US won WWII more than any other nation. Without the 300,000 trucks the US sent, and all the thousands of rail cars, and the steel, explosives, yada, yada the soviets, even if they still blunt the German offensive, simply cannot exploit the reversals because they'd lack the transportation, the explosives, the steel, the whole nine yards.

No LL= a standoff in the East, at best.




5) No Russians = nuclear Armageddon in 1945-46 for the German populace.



6) This being said i do not mean to minimize the contribution of the Soviets, their bleeding made our job vastly easier than it would have been without them.

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1) In fact the Wehrmacht estimated that the garrison requirements for the eastern territories would have been about 60 divs. Moreover the partisans in Russia operated on a fundamentally different level to those say in france or other western european countries. they were all tightly controlled and supplied from the central government and were most effective where they could be re-supplied, that is, close to the front....if the central government of the Soviets is defunct, or "on the run", they are not going to be able to mount any effective partisamn effort for some time....they wont even be able to raise the manpower, since the manpower is not motivated by nationalist concerns so much as feart of the regime....if the regime has lost control, it cannot raise the formations.

And in any event partisan warfare would extract only a fraction of the losses that open warfare did. The average monthly losses in 1941-2 for the wehrmacht was about 40000 per month (net). With a partisan effort only to contend with, the partisans might be lucky to inflict 40000 per year. moreover, given the anti-soviet sentiments in the Ukraine and byelorussia, and the baltic states, the garrisoning requirements could eventually be met by indigenous resources

2) The SS was never the "best" soldiers fielded by the germans, in terms of "soldier efficiency". Its again one of those post war myths that have grown up in the post war era. The SS were tough soldiers, no doubt about it, but they were also some of the most abysmally led formations of any army of the time. The most efficient formations were in fact the regular army panzer divs, who benefitted from a hard core of highly experienced officers leading them. The SS gained its reputation, not from the economy it managed to achieved in lives in taking or defending an objective, rather it achieved its reputation by taking or defending an objective regardless of the cost (which inevitably was much heavier than for an equivalent regular army unit)

The studies i refer to in fact rate "fpf" advantage for the germans over the allies in 1942 as 2.31, that is, on average, the German soldier is equivalent in his effectiveness to 2.31 allied soldiers. By late 1944, this advantage had reduced to 1.31, but given the considerable advantages enjoyed by the allies in such areas as artillery, mobility, and air support, this suggests a german soldier still far superior individually to anything the allies could field

3) The 5 million figure comes from the actual casualties suffered by the germans....given that they could absorb 5 million casualtiers, and they are worth x1.6 times the allies in terms of the combat effectiveness, the allies are going to need to absorb at least 8 million casualties in order to win the battle

This issue of excessive casulaties never arose in WWII for the allies, because their loss rates were never anywhere near that loss rate. But in WWI it did arise....for example the french came close to mutiny in 1917 after only a million casualties. The british also were showing some signs of shakiness, which fortunately did not manifest itself until after the war. but british strategy during the war was aimed firmly at avoiding paying the "butchers bill" that had been demanded of them during WWI. If the british had taken serious losses in 1944, they would have been forced to the peace table, simply because by 1944 there were no more men to replace losses.

In the case of the Americans, the general board had originally envisioned an army of some 200 divs, but this was pared right back to a frontline strength of just 60 Divs (with about 30 Divs in reserve). For the US to take on the 400 or so german Divs they would need to implement the original mobilzation plan, and more, and be prepred to lose about the equivalent of that 200 Divs in casualties in order to defeat the Germans. This would have massive, and probably catastrophic knock on effects in other areas, including the manufacturing sector, the R&D sector, and in the prosecution of the air war. US manufacturing would suffer significant losses in efficiency, and i would even speculate that the A-Bomb program would be delayed or even curtailed by these losses


4) That is not a view shared by Russian historians, they are generally dismissive of the effect of LL.

My opinion is more moderate than that, I believe it assisted significantly the Russian efforts, particualrly the massive amounts of food that were delivered thereby releasing huge quantities of manpower for the front. However i do balk at the notion that Lend Lease was decisive for the eastern Front....useful yes, decisve, probably not

5) Err no, not if the nuclear program is curtailed, Britain forced to the peace table, and the US forced to divert a greater share of her diminshed resources into the regular forces.....
Germany could not win the war once the US joined the fight, not under any realistic scenario. Russians or no Russians.

6) Extremely patronising...you make it sound as if the russians were a "nice to have" addition to victory, in fact without them victory is probably not attainable. Nearly all the authoritative histories attest to the vital role played by the Russians. The Allies also oplayed a vital role, I am not saying that either component to victory was "expendable"
 
And if the LW cannot get control of the air over France, then the allied invasion will go as planned. And if contested, the LW will have to fight outnumbered far from its bases in which it will destroyed.

And then factor in the effect of the allies moving closer to Germany on the ground, means the allied fighters are going to be flying deeper and/or longer.
 
In france, in 1944, the allies fought about 40 Divs, and with difficulty managed to get ashore, and then fight their way into germany.

In this "what if" scenario, the Allies are going to be weakened materially, because so many more of the working men are going to be drafted into the army. A much greater effort would have been expended in getting control of the Atlantic, and overcoming the KM.

The Luftwaffe would be far better trained, and on parity in terms of fighter numbers. a delay of even a few months, means that the Germans have all manner of technology to call upon, including Me 262s and the like, but most importantly they are fighting with a much larger reserve of pilots, far better trained than they were. Given that they are defending over friendly territory, they inher4ently have a lower pilot wastage than the Allies. Almost certainly the allies in that scenario will not achieve the toatal air superiority that they did historically, in fact it is quite likley that the allies wind up fighting defensively themselves, defending the invasion barges frfom German air attacks over britain.

And after all this, instead of fighting against 38 Divs of indeifferent quality, the Allies will be attempting to battle something like 120 divs of the highest quality the wehrmacht can field, with fully adequate reserves, and formidable air defence protecting them.

In short, the allies are at minimum suffer a bloodbath as they battle ashore, and more likely total defeat as they are thrown back into the sea......
 
Bombers on the penetration phase would have spitfire and p47 escorts, getting them to drop their tanks still wouldn't strip away the p51 escort.

True, you are talking about a segmented escort covering various times and locations of the stream. Each one would have to be intercepted. That, admittedly, would be difficult.

The initital intercepts would be over the coast. Holland and France would be fighter battlegrounds. Hence the reason for keeping heavy fighters behind the German border and leaving the pure fighters to duke it out over France/Belgium/Holland. The fighters working this turf would be High Performance Bomber intercepts and true fighters (mostly ME109 for the HP fighters and FW-190s for the true fighters). As the focus of their attacks would be fighters, I would limit the firepower on the FWs to 2 MG and 2 Cannon and the 109s to standard 2MGs and one Cannon.

Essentially, there are two fights going on. One between the coast and the German border between fighters and one after the German border with heavy fighters and heavy bombers. Doubtless, the fights will overlap. But the majority of the pure HP Fighters would be working the coast to Germany territory and the Heavy Fighters would be working the Heavy Bombers over Germany.
 
The strategy to send LW fighters over France and low countries has one weak point: it would allow to W. Allies to deploy Spits, P-47 and Typhoon to the battle. So, instead of meeting P-51 and P-47, LW will meet much larger number of fighter opposition.

On the somewhat unrelated issue (but still very much on-topic):
I don't to see people saying that Germans should've built more AAA.
 
Bombers on the penetration phase would have spitfire and p47 escorts, getting them to drop their tanks still wouldn't strip away the p51 escort.

Attacking the inbound P-51s is the basic strategy - and it would cause at least part of a group to drop tanks and repel the bounce. Stalking the Mustangs under controller and spotter direction causes a large percentage of inbound Mustangs to turn back well short of target escort for deep targets.

The logical counter is to prioritize a percentage of long range escort capacity to Sweeps well out in front under type 16 control to go after the interceptors.

But in the early Mustang deployment, there weren't really enough Mustangs in combined RAF (III) and USAAF (9th and 8th) until April - leaving another three months of severe casualties to deep penetration attacks beyond what actually happened.

If your strategy is to punish bombers beyond the Ems/Rhine, then you don't care as much whether Spits and Jugs drop tanks as they aren't a factor in central Germany and beyond. Only the P-38s and Mustangs should be your intercept targets.
 
On the somewhat unrelated issue (but still very much on-topic):
I don't to see people saying that Germans should've built more AAA.
I believe the Germans had around 1,000,000 men, women and boys and girls involved in AA defense.
 
True, you are talking about a segmented escort covering various times and locations of the stream. Each one would have to be intercepted. That, admittedly, would be difficult.

If I were running the show I would put low level Fw 190s, Ju 88s and Me 110/410s on the deck (risking barrage ballons) and attack bases all over East Anglia from 3am through 5am as bomber bases were fueling and bombing up - the fighter bases would be as vulnerable because SOP was to refuel after every mission and each Fighter would be full of fuel - until the attacks made it too risky. It would be very difficult to maintain perfect blckout over the bases.

Then I would put the first line of fighter interceptors and plan to hit escorts as early as possible while climbing to altitude - basically over the Channel until the RAF/USAAF could develop a strategy to make that too expensive.


The initital intercepts would be over the coast. Holland and France would be fighter battlegrounds. Hence the reason for keeping heavy fighters behind the German border and leaving the pure fighters to duke it out over France/Belgium/Holland. The fighters working this turf would be High Performance Bomber intercepts and true fighters (mostly ME109 for the HP fighters and FW-190s for the true fighters). As the focus of their attacks would be fighters, I would limit the firepower on the FWs to 2 MG and 2 Cannon and the 109s to standard 2MGs and one Cannon.

Essentially, there are two fights going on. One between the coast and the German border between fighters and one after the German border with heavy fighters and heavy bombers. Doubtless, the fights will overlap. But the majority of the pure HP Fighters would be working the coast to Germany territory and the Heavy Fighters would be working the Heavy Bombers over Germany.

Those are the only differences we have Tim.
 
Attacking the inbound P-51s is the basic strategy - and it would cause at least part of a group to drop tanks and repel the bounce. Stalking the Mustangs under controller and spotter direction causes a large percentage of inbound Mustangs to turn back well short of target escort for deep targets.

It is unlikely to me that Germans could pick adversaries at will when a plethora of Allied planes confronts them. Plus the Allies would have the benefit of GCI, what they lacked over Germany proper.

The logical counter is to prioritize a percentage of long range escort capacity to Sweeps well out in front under type 16 control to go after the interceptors.

But in the early Mustang deployment, there weren't really enough Mustangs in combined RAF (III) and USAAF (9th and 8th) until April - leaving another three months of severe casualties to deep penetration attacks beyond what actually happened.

If your strategy is to punish bombers beyond the Ems/Rhine, then you don't care as much whether Spits and Jugs drop tanks as they aren't a factor in central Germany and beyond. Only the P-38s and Mustangs should be your intercept targets.

That's my idea, strategy-wise.

I'm not familiar with 'type 16 control' term, what is that?
 
On the somewhat unrelated issue (but still very much on-topic):
I don't to see people saying that Germans should've built more AAA.

If the Russians are out of the picture, the very best flak crews, the regs, can return to germany to protect German cities, at least an additional 35 battalions are added to the defence. more importantly the crews dont have to rely on barrage fire to attack the bombers. if the germans are smart, they will distribute the seasoned regular veterans, so that the overall flak units improve in quality.

If the crews are up to it, they can use aimed fire instead of the more easily delivered, but less effective barrage fire. The number of rounds per kill should start to drop from 16000 rounds per kill, back toward the 4000 that were needed in 1942, when these regular LW crews were first detached from the AD role. This means that with the greatly enhanced number, the flak is likley to shoot down 3 to 4 times the number they actually did.

in addition, the Germans can build additional 128 mm heavys, which have a kill ration roughly five times that of the standard 88s and 105s that are normal issue
 
Sure enough, with Russians defeated many things would change, with Jagdgeschvadern being 'the firstest with the mostest'. The additional Flak would be welcomed of course.

But perhaps the most positive issue would be the cease of loosing the lives of German soldiers have the Russians plummeted.
 
"If I were running the show I would put low level Fw 190s, Ju 88s and Me 110/410s on the deck (risking barrage ballons) and attack bases all over East Anglia from 3am through 5am as bomber bases were fueling and bombing up - the fighter bases would be as vulnerable because SOP was to refuel after every mission and each Fighter would be full of fuel - until the attacks made it too risky. It would be very difficult to maintain perfect blckout over the bases.

Then I would put the first line of fighter interceptors and plan to hit escorts as early as possible while climbing to altitude - basically over the Channel until the RAF/USAAF could develop a strategy to make that too expensive."


Dragondog, I see your point and it is a valid one. It is a difference in strategies. But, just to be a nitpicker, I think Delc's request was for a defensive strategy. While you could qualify your ideas as an "active defense" as there was no intent for a follow on invasion of the British Isles, I'm going with the perspective that it crosses the line and becomes an attack strategy. However, given your due, the arguement on this point is 6 to one, half a dozen to the other. An active defense can easily become an offensive or it can draw back. That is a the beauty of an air war! Very flexible.

But, getting back to the tactical ramifications, I would be inclined to keep my fighters over friendly turf and not venture out to meet the USAF over it's home bases. This is for several reasons:

1. Over home turf, loses are lower. A damaged aircraft can belly in or be salvaged. A bailed out pilot is not a prisoner.

2. Losses to operational reasons (fuel exhaustion, getting lost, ect) are lower.

3. You will be fighting in your back yard, not theirs. Your AAA, Your Radar, Your local conditions. All that stuff adds up.

4. Fewer defenses to deal with. Over England, you're up against 8th Fighter, 9th Fighter (if needed and in business at this time) and RAF Fighter Command. In their backyard with all the attendent advantages, experience and improvements since the BOB. Your odds start getting very long.

In short, any sustained effort over England would be playing into the Allies (especially the USAAF) hands. The Americans could afford to get into a long war of attrition with technically advanced machinery (an Air War), it was the war they wanted. It was not the war Germany wanted or could win.

All that said, I think the occasional raid taking advantage of local conditions (possible sneaking back tailing a bombing raid or using speed/low level conditions or high altitude hunting Allied escorts) would be effective in making the RAF and USAAF treat their home turf as a battleground, increasing wear and tear and using up aircraft tasked for other duties, could work. But it would be a limited thing.
 
If your strategy is to punish bombers beyond the Ems/Rhine, then you don't care as much whether Spits and Jugs drop tanks as they aren't a factor in central Germany and beyond. Only the P-38s and Mustangs should be your intercept targets.

Yes but they can hardly just go picking and choosing p51s when they try to intercept them within range of p47s and spitfires, they will just get overwhelmed by the far superior numbers. They would not have a way to locate the p51s among all the other airborne fighters either.
 
Following the other thread about bomber killing weapons I would like to discuss it from another perspective.
This thread is specififcally intended NOT to include advanced weapons (SAM, R4M) or fighters (jet and rocket interceptors) or "what if" designs (Fw-187).
Assume that You are given responsibility to develop a defense strategy against the US 8th AAF offensive daylight bombing campaign, circling around the Bf-109G, Fw-190A, Me-410 and other planes historically aviable. With the technological and quantitative ressources aviable in the timeframe 1943 to 1945 You should inflict very heavy losses up to the point when daylight bombing must be reconsidered in the light of raising losses.
Note that by 1944, the USAAF does field long range escort fighters and increasing sizes of bombing formations.

How do You do?
My personal opinion is that properly defended, the USAAF cannot win the war of attrition. But I might very well be wrong.
Rocket-propelled "suicide" aircraft with a bomb in the nose and a crude gunpowder ejection seat so the poor pilot can punch out and have a chance to survive the experience.

Call it the V-5 Höðr
 
The strategy to send LW fighters over France and low countries has one weak point: it would allow to W. Allies to deploy Spits, P-47 and Typhoon to the battle. So, instead of meeting P-51 and P-47, LW will meet much larger number of fighter opposition.

Tomo, you raise a good point. One counter the Allies could use to combat the intercepts would be to send fighter sweeps out in front of the escort fighters to catch the LW fighters climbing to altitude or just to engage them. It is impossible for the LW to tell the difference between an escort fighter and a fighter sweep. With the excess of short range fighters that adding the Fighter Command to the battle would give, the Allies have more options. There is also the option of sending light and medium bombers after LW bases, thereby reducing the serviceability rates.

There is no simple solution to this problem that I can see. Given the numerical superiority the Allies can bring to this battle, the LW is once again in a losing position. What happens is actually what did happen. The LW loses the ability to run the show over France and the Low Countries and is reduced to hit and run attacks on the Allied aircraft or local, temporary, air superiority.

The numbers consistently drift the Allies way.
 
Yes but they can hardly just go picking and choosing p51s when they try to intercept them within range of p47s and spitfires, they will just get overwhelmed by the far superior numbers. They would not have a way to locate the p51s among all the other airborne fighters either.

Actually they do HT. The Target escorts ALWAYS took off well after the Penetration Escorts who had to meet the bombers on the coast (i.e Borkhum Is) and proceed at same speed as bombers.

Target Escort Mustangs took off at least 1-2 hours after say, 91st BG at Bassingbourn, if the target was deep - would up form and fly straight (more or less) to R/V point somewhere in Western/Central GY.

If the target was Berlin and the Trolley route was used, the 51's might pick up the bombers past Denmark... Their cruise speed depended on fuel conservation requirements but they would burn the fuselage tanks, then start on drop tanks, hoping to use all of it by the target,
 
Tomo, you raise a good point. One counter the Allies could use to combat the intercepts would be to send fighter sweeps out in front of the escort fighters to catch the LW fighters climbing to altitude or just to engage them. It is impossible for the LW to tell the difference between an escort fighter and a fighter sweep.

Actually, they could distinguish between the escort and sweep fighters.

With the excess of short range fighters that adding the Fighter Command to the battle would give, the Allies have more options. There is also the option of sending light and medium bombers after LW bases, thereby reducing the serviceability rates.

This happened frequently anyway by 9th AF mediums and light bombers

There is no simple solution to this problem that I can see. Given the numerical superiority the Allies can bring to this battle, the LW is once again in a losing position. What happens is actually what did happen. The LW loses the ability to run the show over France and the Low Countries and is reduced to hit and run attacks on the Allied aircraft or local, temporary, air superiority.

The numbers consistently drift the Allies way.

Agree to end result, but intercepts of inbound target escorts increase effectiveness of fighter attacks by twin engine fighters deeper in Germany, reduce the attrition of German s/e fighters deeper in Germany - at the expense of s/e fighters and pilots on coastal defense.

I also agree that fighter sweeps are the counter to LW intercepts early as I mentioned earlier. But fighter sweeps are detectable simply because the task force is at least 70-100 mph faster as they are not required to 'ess' over the bombers.
 
I'm not familiar with 'type 16 control' term, what is that?

Type 16 Control went operational in December 1943. Two high definition radars which had a range of 120+ miles. The radar signatures were plotted at a central control plot room manned by RAF and used to direct up to two Allied Fighter Groups (usually escort fighters into the Dummer Lake (max) range intercepts.)

In July it was replaced by the MEWS system which had a range of 200 plus miles. In November the MEWS system was moved to the continent and two more joined the first installation in December.

Both of these systems were developed by the Brits and manned by USAAF and RAF teams. Used heavily during Normandy Campaign to detect LW and direct Allied Fighters to intercept.
 
I also agree that fighter sweeps are the counter to LW intercepts early as I mentioned earlier. But fighter sweeps are detectable simply because the task force is at least 70-100 mph faster as they are not required to 'ess' over the bombers.

DD, I was thinking a fighter sweep or inbound escort mission would be inpossible to discern due to speed. Both would probably cruise around 200mph. However, it is possible the inbound escort would be a tad bit slower as they would be on a more economical setting. That point is debateable.

As for the SSSing over the bomber stream, I would consider that to be a failure of the intercept from the LW to catch the fighters before they got there. My idea is to intercept them early enough to make them dump tanks. Not so much for destroying the allied fighters (although that would be a good thing as well) but to wreck the mission profile by taking the fuel they would need out of the equation and shortening their range.

As to the intercepts of the inbound allied escorts, the intent is to interrupt their mission profile and not allow them the freedom of action beyond the German border due to fuel constraints. The twin engine heavy fighters of the LW would not be effective against the escorts, too heavy, too loaded down with ordinance. That is the specific intent of the intercepts over the coast. To spare the twins.

Was aware of the light and medium attacks on Airfields. In truth, most of the ideas we've tossed around on this thread were tried by both sides during the '43 to '45 time period. In some cases earlier during the RAF's raids in 1941-42. Goes to show there is a logical way to handle these things and, after kicking it around, we generally end up in the same spot!
 
DD, I was thinking a fighter sweep or inbound escort mission would be inpossible to discern due to speed. Both would probably cruise around 200mph. However, it is possible the inbound escort would be a tad bit slower as they would be on a more economical setting. That point is debateable.


Tim - debatable but only has one answer for penetration support. As fast as the slowest bomber and moving with same vector/course. The settings would be close to optimal for fuel consumption but the fighters would be 'essing' across the bomber track at perhaps 220TAS while the B-17s are moving at 150 in a straight line... but the combined radar signature is a 'cloud' moving at 150 for the escorted bombers and 220-240 for the free cruising target escort en route to R/V.

As for the SSSing over the bomber stream, I would consider that to be a failure of the intercept from the LW to catch the fighters before they got there. My idea is to intercept them early enough to make them dump tanks. Not so much for destroying the allied fighters (although that would be a good thing as well) but to wreck the mission profile by taking the fuel they would need out of the equation and shortening their range.

We agree - that is what I proposed in my first post for 'outer ring' strategy - force the Penetration and/or Target Escort to engage and drop tanks - avoid air combat - hit and run with multiple single flight/section attacks to draw away equivalent forces or more from escort.

As to the intercepts of the inbound allied escorts, the intent is to interrupt their mission profile and not allow them the freedom of action beyond the German border due to fuel constraints. The twin engine heavy fighters of the LW would not be effective against the escorts, too heavy, too loaded down with ordinance. That is the specific intent of the intercepts over the coast. To spare the twins.

Agreed once again. The tactics would not be 100% effective but it was only in April 1944 that there were enough long range escort Groups (51/38) to permit 2 Groups per 8th AF Air Division for Target Escort. 90 effective fighters Max - before forced drop tanks at coast- to provide escort for `10-13 Bomb Groups (~20 miles of necessary coverage per fighter group) .

Was aware of the light and medium attacks on Airfields. In truth, most of the ideas we've tossed around on this thread were tried by both sides during the '43 to '45 time period. In some cases earlier during the RAF's raids in 1941-42. Goes to show there is a logical way to handle these things and, after kicking it around, we generally end up in the same spot!

As near as I can tell we haven't disagreed - except on different flight profile of target escort en route to R/V and those already in escort position
 

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