parsifal
Colonel
1) In fact the Wehrmacht estimated that the garrison requirements for the eastern territories would have been about 60 divs. Moreover the partisans in Russia operated on a fundamentally different level to those say in france or other western european countries. they were all tightly controlled and supplied from the central government and were most effective where they could be re-supplied, that is, close to the front....if the central government of the Soviets is defunct, or "on the run", they are not going to be able to mount any effective partisamn effort for some time....they wont even be able to raise the manpower, since the manpower is not motivated by nationalist concerns so much as feart of the regime....if the regime has lost control, it cannot raise the formations.1) This is simply not true. The garrison requirements for the SU alone would've gobbled up hundreds of thousands of germans and all the associated war materiel they would need to stay there. This would be a MASSIVE drain on Nazi resources....even if there was no insurgency after the war in the East ended(Which is highly unlikely).
2) Depends when in the war you're talking. In 1945 on GI veteran was probably worth 10 German conscripts. In 1942, one hardened SS man is probably worth 10 green US GI's.
3) How did we even get to a 5 million casualty figure? Even if you triple the LW's kill rate they get nowhere near that figure.
From my vantage point the allies did whatever it took to win, and never shie'd away from casualties when there was no other choice.
4) Take away LL and there are no massive Soviet counter-offensives. I would say the US won WWII more than any other nation. Without the 300,000 trucks the US sent, and all the thousands of rail cars, and the steel, explosives, yada, yada the soviets, even if they still blunt the German offensive, simply cannot exploit the reversals because they'd lack the transportation, the explosives, the steel, the whole nine yards.
No LL= a standoff in the East, at best.
5) No Russians = nuclear Armageddon in 1945-46 for the German populace.
6) This being said i do not mean to minimize the contribution of the Soviets, their bleeding made our job vastly easier than it would have been without them.
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And in any event partisan warfare would extract only a fraction of the losses that open warfare did. The average monthly losses in 1941-2 for the wehrmacht was about 40000 per month (net). With a partisan effort only to contend with, the partisans might be lucky to inflict 40000 per year. moreover, given the anti-soviet sentiments in the Ukraine and byelorussia, and the baltic states, the garrisoning requirements could eventually be met by indigenous resources
2) The SS was never the "best" soldiers fielded by the germans, in terms of "soldier efficiency". Its again one of those post war myths that have grown up in the post war era. The SS were tough soldiers, no doubt about it, but they were also some of the most abysmally led formations of any army of the time. The most efficient formations were in fact the regular army panzer divs, who benefitted from a hard core of highly experienced officers leading them. The SS gained its reputation, not from the economy it managed to achieved in lives in taking or defending an objective, rather it achieved its reputation by taking or defending an objective regardless of the cost (which inevitably was much heavier than for an equivalent regular army unit)
The studies i refer to in fact rate "fpf" advantage for the germans over the allies in 1942 as 2.31, that is, on average, the German soldier is equivalent in his effectiveness to 2.31 allied soldiers. By late 1944, this advantage had reduced to 1.31, but given the considerable advantages enjoyed by the allies in such areas as artillery, mobility, and air support, this suggests a german soldier still far superior individually to anything the allies could field
3) The 5 million figure comes from the actual casualties suffered by the germans....given that they could absorb 5 million casualtiers, and they are worth x1.6 times the allies in terms of the combat effectiveness, the allies are going to need to absorb at least 8 million casualties in order to win the battle
This issue of excessive casulaties never arose in WWII for the allies, because their loss rates were never anywhere near that loss rate. But in WWI it did arise....for example the french came close to mutiny in 1917 after only a million casualties. The british also were showing some signs of shakiness, which fortunately did not manifest itself until after the war. but british strategy during the war was aimed firmly at avoiding paying the "butchers bill" that had been demanded of them during WWI. If the british had taken serious losses in 1944, they would have been forced to the peace table, simply because by 1944 there were no more men to replace losses.
In the case of the Americans, the general board had originally envisioned an army of some 200 divs, but this was pared right back to a frontline strength of just 60 Divs (with about 30 Divs in reserve). For the US to take on the 400 or so german Divs they would need to implement the original mobilzation plan, and more, and be prepred to lose about the equivalent of that 200 Divs in casualties in order to defeat the Germans. This would have massive, and probably catastrophic knock on effects in other areas, including the manufacturing sector, the R&D sector, and in the prosecution of the air war. US manufacturing would suffer significant losses in efficiency, and i would even speculate that the A-Bomb program would be delayed or even curtailed by these losses
4) That is not a view shared by Russian historians, they are generally dismissive of the effect of LL.
My opinion is more moderate than that, I believe it assisted significantly the Russian efforts, particualrly the massive amounts of food that were delivered thereby releasing huge quantities of manpower for the front. However i do balk at the notion that Lend Lease was decisive for the eastern Front....useful yes, decisve, probably not
5) Err no, not if the nuclear program is curtailed, Britain forced to the peace table, and the US forced to divert a greater share of her diminshed resources into the regular forces.....
Germany could not win the war once the US joined the fight, not under any realistic scenario. Russians or no Russians.
6) Extremely patronising...you make it sound as if the russians were a "nice to have" addition to victory, in fact without them victory is probably not attainable. Nearly all the authoritative histories attest to the vital role played by the Russians. The Allies also oplayed a vital role, I am not saying that either component to victory was "expendable"