Strategies for defense 1944-45

[syscom3]

The other strategy the LW failed to commit to was night intruder missions over East Anglia - truly the most target rich environment in the world. Destroying B-17s and B-24s and P-47s and Mustangs on the ground surely would have been worth the cost in Me 410, Ju 88, etc lost to RAF defenses.

Exactly.

And dont keep putting down the P38. As an escort fighter, all it had to do was keep the -109's and -190's away from the bombers, and it was successful at that. Plus a P38 in the air meant no -110, -410 and Ju88 was safe.

 

[HellToupee]

HT, you seem to have entirely missed the point that moving industry underground is useless if the logistical infrastructure to move product and raw material is destroyed. You can't ignore 24 hour bombing, positive efforts need to be made to prevent it.

My 0.02 on improving defences is this: build the 262 as a fighter! Hitler's insistence that the type was developed as a bomber was possibly one of the stupidest mistakes ever made. On a similar note, prioritise development of the Ar234 nightfighter over the strike variant. The Germans had little use for bombers by 1945, better IMHO to use the airframes to shoot down Allied bombers.

Stragetic bombers never really put the logistical infrastructure out of action, tracks bombed would just be relayed only tactical use of fighter bombers really shut transportation infrastructure down, as it was even defending against such actions was a futile effort, a war of attrition could not be won by the LW.

Jet nightfighters were also not much use, their only real use was to shoot down mosquitos, the other NFs had no problems keeping up with the heavies, where a high closer rate would not be ideal.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

logistical infrastructure Stragetic bombers never really put the logistical infrastructure out of action, tracks bombed would just be relayed only tactical use of fighter bombers really shut transportation infrastructure down, as it was even defending against such actions was a futile effort, a war of attrition could not be won by the LW.

Heavy Strategic Bombing disrupted the "logistical infrastructure" to the point where if could not keep up with the war demand.

Jet nightfighters were also not much use, their only real use was to shoot down mosquitos, the other NFs had no problems keeping up with the heavies, where a high closer rate would not be ideal.

Do you realize that only one squadron, Nachtjagdgeschwader 11 operated the 2 seat Me 262 version and that only consisted of 7 aircraft? They also accounted for all Mossies shot down over Berlin the last months of the war. Of course they were not of much use, it was too little too late, but had they been around in numbers a year earlier, Bomber Command would of had their hands full.

 

[parsifal]

Nazi strategy after they lost the initiative was not a total road to losing. Negotiated settlement was possible, but only if the cost of the advance was made intolerable. This necessarily meant a far more effective defence on the eastern front than was actually achieved, and the trick here was mobility. The germans had to somehow conduct an offensive-defensive to destroy the Soviet manpower reserves, an in particular to destroy the growing pool of lower and middle ranking officers that were steadily improving the capability of the Red Army, this meant the germans had to achieve massively successful encirclements of Soviet offensives. It also meant that the Infantry formations had to be mobile enough to pull back from the front lines in sufficiently good order and with sufficient advance warning so as to dodge the heavy artillery attacks that the Russians were so adept at applying. It meant that the air assets on the east front had to stop being used as fire brigades to assist the struggling Infantry and in the end achieve nothing of decisve importance. the air fleets had to be kept back, rested, mobile, and ready to deploy in a concentrated counterstrike at the point(s) of strategic importance.

Hardware wise, the Germans should never have wasted their resources building the orivate armiers like the SS. In the end these were expensive show ponies that achieved nothing of strategic importance, and were formed at the expense off the truly experienced wehrmacht panzer formations, which were more or less left to wither and die. It meant that truck production had to be maintained at levels that ensured the Infantry could actually move at the right times. It needed tank production to be rationalized....ditch all the Tigers and other fluff and bubble, and concentrate on perhaps two types, MkIv and MkV, with a much greater emphasis on ATGs (not bigger than 75mm).

If a breathing space could be achieved on the eastern front, something meaningful can be achieved on the western front. If realistic terms are put out by a revitalized and reformed Nazi leadership, something meaningful might have been achieved

What chances do i give to all this happening, very low, because firstly it was not in the Nazi creed to reach meaningful negotiation, especially with the Russians, and the german leadership even the professiopnal soldiers, were just not up to this level of thetre management. they were opportunists, basically, and could not grasp the importance of strategic co-ordination to anywhere near the levels achieved by the allies. they were good at winning battles, but not campaigns....

Plus no account ismade of the quid pro quo that might arise if the Germans start this sort of caper. there is no telling how the Russians might react if the pressure is taken off them, as the germans swing from an offensive, to a more pensive stance....

 

[HellToupee]

Heavy Strategic Bombing disrupted the "logistical infrastructure" to the point where if could not keep up with the war demand.

War demand when fighting 3 superpowers at exceeds that of an un-bombed infrastructure. As it was heavies could only bomb hubs of activity aka cities, fighter bombers had a much greater effect in targeting logistics movements.

Heavy Strategic Bombing disrupted the "logistical infrastructure" to the point where if could not keep up with the war demand.
Do you realize that only one squadron, Nachtjagdgeschwader 11 operated the 2 seat Me 262 version and that only consisted of 7 aircraft? They also accounted for all Mossies shot down over Berlin the last months of the war. Of course they were not of much use, it was too little too late, but had they been around in numbers a year earlier, Bomber Command would of had their hands full.

Did you not read? the only real use for the jet NFs was shooting down mosquitoes, the high speed of a jet was counterproductive when hunting the slow heavies.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Did you not read? the only real use for the jet NFs was shooting down mosquitoes, the high speed of a jet was counterproductive when hunting the slow heavies.

Absolutly false and do you really know what you're talking about??? - the only thing lacking during that period was tactics and the way the NF 262s were deployed - had the NF 262s been around earlier they would of decimated the night bombers just as day 262s would of done against the day bombers - do you honestly think 262s constantly flew at full speed to attack bombers???

 

[Amsel]

The jet age was at hand.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The jet age was at hand.

That sums it up...

BTW 5 years later in Korea, an F3Ds killed PO-2, at least a 200 mph difference between the two aircraft during the encounter.

 

[HellToupee]

Absolutly false and do you really know what you're talking about??? - the only thing lacking during that period was tactics and the way the NF 262s were deployed - had the NF 262s been around earlier they would of decimated the night bombers just as day 262s would of done against the day bombers - do you honestly think 262s constantly flew at full speed to attack bombers???

Absolutely false!

Had greater numbers of already proven night fighters been built instead of unreliable jets which had very short engine lifes been built instead they would have been far more effective. The prop night fighters had greater endurance could more easily control their speed relative to the target, jets required slow throttle inputs and could not slow down quickly.

As it was the only practical benefit a jet NF had was that it could intercept mosquitos, most me262 night kills were using wilde sau tactics.

BTW 5 years later in Korea, an F3Ds killed PO-2, at least a 200 mph difference between the two aircraft during the encounter.

Yet we also have cases of f16s unable to intercept drug runners flying cessnas.

 

[syscom3]

When it came to bombing the transportation system of Germany, the greatest effect was not the damage to the marshaling yards and engine sheds, but to the rolling stock and engines caught out in the open.

Once the rolling stock was destroyed, or engines incapacitated, then it didnt matter how quickly the rail yards were repaired.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Absolutely false!

Had greater numbers of already proven night fighters been built instead of unreliable jets which had very short engine lifes been built instead they would have been far more effective. The prop night fighters had greater endurance could more easily control their speed relative to the target, jets required slow throttle inputs and could not slow down quickly.

Unreliable jets? As stated earlier the jet age was at hand. While the technology was a new the 262 had the potential to absolutely decimate the entire bomber effort day and night and while I could somewhat agree about reliability and endurance, the bottom line is the jet "would of" been more efficient and dangerous had the war continued another year or two.

As far as speed control - if tracking totally on radar, there is little to do if you get a fix, lock and a firing solution. You could be going 300 or 3000 mph, the end result will be the same.

As it was the only practical benefit a jet NF had was that it could intercept mosquitos, most me262 night kills were using wilde sau tactics.

And that was more situational than anything else.

Yet we also have cases of f16s unable to intercept drug runners flying cessnas.

So controlling speed relative to the target isn't that important after all...

 

[Amsel]

Yet we also have cases of f16s unable to intercept drug runners flying cessnas.

F-16's unable to shoot down Cessnas? Or pullover?

 

[delcyros]

Thanks for all Your inputs. Particularely thanks to Drdongdog, his suggestions are right on target.

My personal approach would be quite comparable but likely less effective. I would have deployed 2-3 enforced JG compromising very experienced pilots, supplied with C3 fuels and GM-1 augmented Bf-109G (initially, later more modern mounts) in the triangle between Berlin, Prague and Frankfurt. In that region I would also like to lay out hidden (light) Flak traps for special disengage tactics.
These fighter units operating in Gruppe or better Geschwader strength would NOT go after the bombers but exclusively against the escort fighters. Wit pre advance warning they climb to an altitude above the stream and go after the escorts if they can make an attack under favourable conditions. They don´t waste any efforts on the bombers.
If a pilot get´s hunted he trades all altitude and goes to a nearby Flak trap. Any pilot shot down will bail out over friendly terretory, while any USAAF pilot shot down has to bail out over hostile terretory and likely is lost for the war effort.
I would leave the bombers for the target AAA, initially.
Any new aircraft aviable, such as Me-262 and Me-163 would be operationally tested in this theatre while beeing deployed in proximity to the synthetic fuel production centres (better infrastructure and logistic chain).
Fw-190 Gruppen beeing dispersed to different airfields and trained for close approach tactics in dense formations (Sturmjäger/Rammjäger)-I even would have gone suicide by mid 44 latest if other tactics are not up to expectations.
When the attrition does show effect on the escorts, or the esort tactics will be changed to deal with the new situation, the Fw-190 Gruppen will go after the bombers in very concentrated attacks, not under Geschwader strength (100 to 120 planes per wave) better in strength of 300 to 400 planes. Even if I loose out 200 Fw-190 in one day (100 pilots KIA/WIA), I might well end up in the region of ~100 heavy bombers destroyed (1000 crew KIA/MIA). The special Bf-109 Gruppen will continue to deal exclusively with the escorts, making their work even more difficult.

 

[Valo300]

This thread is specififcally intended NOT to include advanced weapons (SAM, R4M) or fighters (jet and rocket interceptors) or "what if" designs (Fw-187).
Assume that You are given responsibility to develop a defense strategy against the US 8th AAF offensive daylight bombing campaign, circling around the Bf-109G, Fw-190A, Me-410 and other planes historically aviable. With the technological and quantitative ressources aviable in the timeframe 1943 to 1945 You should inflict very heavy losses up to the point when daylight bombing must be reconsidered in the light of raising losses.
Note that by 1944, the USAAF does field long range escort fighters and increasing sizes of bombing formations.

How do You do?
My personal opinion is that properly defended, the USAAF cannot win the war of attrition. But I might very well be wrong.

I totally disagree with this assessment.

The P51D, once it arrived, totally devastated the Luftwaffe in a matter of a few months. You can use any strategy you want, that's just not going to change IMO. Seriously, there was no winning strategy possible by 1944 for the Nazis. The war was already essentially completely lost by that stage.

Prolonging the war only makes things worse for the Nazi's anyway. Catastrophically worse.

Unreliable jets? As stated earlier the jet age was at hand. While the technology was a new the 262 had the potential to absolutely decimate the entire bomber effort day and night and while I could somewhat agree about reliability and endurance, the bottom line is the jet "would of" been more efficient and dangerous had the war continued another year or two.

The Nazis couldnt make enough engines for the 262s they did manage to build. And those they built were notoriously unreliable due to high quality metal shortages, etc. What's more, by 1945 Allied jet engine technology had already surpassed that of the Germans anyway- and unlike the Germans the Allies were gearing up to pump out Jets by the thousands by the end of the war.

There is no magic bullet for the Nazis to use. WWII was already long since lost by the time frame this discussion is concerned with. That includes the air war. Germany lost WWII the moment they invaded the SU before finishing off the Brits(assuming that was even possible to begin with, which is in itself extremely unlikely).

And again, even if they do manage to slow the offensives in the air and ground, the longer they prolong the war the worse their ultimate fate becomes. If they somehow managed to stretch the war into Aug 1945 then Hiroshima would've been Berlin.

 

[Valo300]

Delete please. double post.

 

[parsifal]

Yes, I have to agree, by 1944, ther was nothing the Germans could do to even significantly slow down the process. The critical years were 1942-3 in my opinion, and the critical front had far less apparent importance air wise than the area over the Reich itself. I am referring to the Eastern Front, where the war, in its entirety (virtually, was fought and lost for the Germans. Without a better result in the east, all this other talk about alternative strategies are just froth and bubble IMO

 

[delcyros]

The P51D, once it arrived, totally devastated the Luftwaffe in a matter of a few months. You can use any strategy you want, that's just not going to change IMO. Seriously, there was no winning strategy possible by 1944 for the Nazis. The war was already essentially completely lost by that stage.

I do not suggest a war winning / war prolonging scenario here. I rather suppose historical developments. Change in the aerial war over Germany will not impact the outcome of ww2. This is a rather isolated discussion specifically to avoid the ever tempting "we do use jets, simply!" attitude when the topic appears.

The escort fighters were never priority target and the Luftwaffe (Galland) only once attempted a mass attack in multiple Geschwader strength to hold a bomber stream but this was eventually abandoned by poor weather and the planes were dispersed for other ops. I believe that the same can be done sooner, without requiring new technologies.
orrespondingly, I feel justified that the Escorts cannot win the war of attrition against a strategy where they are the primary target over hostile airspace.

 

[Valo300]

In reality i think one can build an unassailable position that the Nazis lost WWII the day the Germans declared war on the US...regardless of what happened in the East.

But Hitler being Hitler, he'd already managed to lose the war even before that. Turning his back on the still warring Brits to invade the SU was monumentally stupid. Then again, so was attacking to begin with and having no actual workable plan to put the Brits out of the fight. As everyone on this board surely knows Sea Lion was an utter pipe dream of a "plan".

Germany was simply not ready to fight WWII in 1939, and it cost them everything in the end.

I do not suggest a war winning / war prolonging scenario here. I rather suppose historical developments. Change in the aerial war over Germany will not impact the outcome of ww2. This is a rather isolated discussion specifically to avoid the ever tempting "we do use jets, simply!" attitude when the topic appears.

The escort fighters were never priority target and the Luftwaffe (Galland) only once attempted a mass attack in multiple Geschwader strength to hold a bomber stream but this was eventually abandoned by poor weather and the planes were dispersed for other ops. I believe that the same can be done sooner, without requiring new technologies.
orrespondingly, I feel justified that the Escorts cannot win the war of attrition against a strategy where they are the primary target over hostile airspace.

If the Luftwaffe focuses on the escorts(which were quite capable of defending themselves on equal or better terms against the Nazi fighters) then the bomber streams attack their targets totally unmolested.
And even assuming a 3:1 kill ratio vs the allied escorts, the Nazi's would've still done little more than prolong their agony, considering that in theater they were outnumbered over 10:1 in operational fighter aircraft(I'm guessing probably a lot more than 10:1, though i do not have the figures).

That does not strike me as a winning strategy either.

 

[parsifal]

The achilles heal for the US, like the British was the shortage of manpower. If the the Germans managed to shut down the eastern front, 80% of their casualties disappear overnight, and the massive drain on materiel falls off dramatically as well.

Studies by Dunigan and others suggest that on average, each German soldier and airman is worth about 1.5 allied soldiers. Given the sensitivity of the Allies to losses, I can hardly see them paying something in the order of 8-10 million lives for victory (given an assumed German casualty figure of 5 million).

The Russians won the war against the germans, make no mistake, with admittedly a lot of help. Remove the Russians from the equation, and the allies are unable to win IMO, because only the Russians were prepred to pay whatever the cost for victory

 

[parsifal]

And even assuming a 3:1 kill ratio vs the allied escorts, the Nazi's would've still done little more than prolong their agony, considering that in theater they were outnumbered over 10:1 in operational fighter aircraft(I'm guessing probably a lot more than 10:1, though i do not have the figures).

That does not strike me as a winning strategy either.

err no....the US did not outnumber the Luftwaffe to anything like that number in frontline strength. The RAF aircraft could not really engage because of the limits to their range. In fact the Luftwaffe probably had near parity in fighters over the Reich in early 1944.

Its a common fallacy that the Luftwaffe was beaten by numbers.....what the US possessed which the LW did not, was a massive reserve capacity....more than 60% of the US air force remained stationed in the US to provide a ready reserve of aircarft and better trained pilots than the LW could hope to field. If a LW unit took losses, it could expect considerable delays before replacement pilots arrived. Aleeratively (and this is what they did do) untrained pilots would be combed out of the schools to replace the casualties. The untrained pilots were easy meat for the experienced US formations, and so the vicious spiral begins.

But with the vast steppes of russia at peace, all of a sudden the LW has a safe training ground, vastly improved fuel supplies (meaning the training program can be improved and expanded) and vast resrves of its own to call upon.