Stuka vulnerability

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

RE: SBD Dauntless

How did the A-24 Banshees fare?
It seems that the Army found it too vulnerable?
For that matter, if the Army found dive bombers valuable, perhaps the A-36 Apache would have remained in production.

Army had a few problems. Good as the A-24 may have been for the Navy, it was rather short legged for the Army in the South Pacific. And as people began to figure out, Dive bombers work real good against 2nd or 3rd class AA defenses, but not so good against 1st class ones. Climbing to 10-12,000ft before beginning the dive gives a little too much warning.
 
I agree except that none of those aircraft,nor the Spitfires,Hurricanes and P-51s,nor the German equivalent Fw 190 etc were dedicated fighter bombers. They were fighters pressed into a role for which they were not designed and which they carried out with varying degrees of success.

The dedicated dive bomber,including the Ju 87 could not operate safely in air space controlled by a well organised enemy. At the very least complete surprise (rare in the BoB) or temporary superiority over their area of operation had to be achieved. In 1940 the Luftwaffe tried to achieve both,particularly in the early "kanal kampf" and generally failed which is why,in the words of a previous poster, the Stukas got "toasted"

Cheers

Steve

And that shows it was more vulnerable than any other Dive Bomber how?
 
Has any other dive bomber ever been equipped with a siren ...?

Back in '39 and '40 when Blitzkrieg was on a roll ... the Stuka was a terror weapon (shawk and aaaahhh) by virtue of that siren and the use of the aircrast to strafe retreating columns that included refugees.

When the RAF started defending home turf against Stukas they quickly realized how vulnerable they were .... the Stukas didn't succeed in their most specific mission, the radars along the coast at Dover. The "random" tip and run raids by bomb-carrying Me's and Fw's were possibly more effective than the Stukas - against the British Isles. Russia, the Balkans and the Med ... a different story, perhaps. Did Lord Louis Mountbatten not lose HMS Kelly to a Stuka bomb down the stack while off Crete ...?

MM
 
... the Stukas didn't succeed in their most specific mission, the radars along the coast at Dover.

That was more a Goering's fault than the Stuka. Hitting the radar was not a priority. When Beppo Schmidt submitted his report "Case Blue", he advised that the LW would need to destroy England's ocean supply lines and her harbours but it neglected to take into account the British radar units. The priorities established for the forced submission of England were (1) defeat of the Royal Air Force, (2) incapacitation of the British air armament industry, and (3) elimination of the British Navy. Radar was low on the to-do list.

But several stations were taken out effectively but....British resolve soon had them up and running again, most within 24 hours. Still not the fault of the Stuka.
 
And that shows it was more vulnerable than any other Dive Bomber how?

It doesn't. The post to which I was responding,and essentially agreeing with,suggested that all dive bombers were effectively rendered obsolete and replaced by fighter bombers (or more accurately fighters adapted to that role) which could defend themselves in contested air space.
Dive bombers could no more defend themselves against fighters than their larger brethren.They were all vulnerable.
Cheers
Steve
 
the Stuka was a terror weapon (shawk and aaaahhh) by virtue of that siren and the use of the aircrast to strafe retreating columns that included refugees.
When the RAF started defending home turf against Stukas they quickly realized how vulnerable they were .... the Stukas didn't succeed in their most specific mission, the radars along the coast at Dover.
MM

The Ju 87 was operated as a sort of long range artillery under at least local air superiority during the "Blitzkrieg" of 1940. Potential targets were sometimes marked by artillery smoke.
It was not designed for cross channel operations and,particularly when unescorted (which happened for various reasons) was shown to be as vulnerable to fighters as any other bomber of the era. By 1940 it was dawning on the commanders of both the RAF and Luftwaffe that unescorted daylight raids by bombers were going to be very expensive. Initially the Luftwaffe tried "close escort" and then,like the RAF,resorted to the cover of darkness.
When all is said and done the Stuka is just another bomber.
Steve
 
It was a claim taken from Barrett Tillman's 1976 book about the Dauntless.

I find that incredibly hard to believe. I don't think ANY ww2 bomber got a positive kill loss ratio (b29 being a possible exception). Does the book give any primary source for that? Possibly the added up the offensive and defensive claims of the SBD and compared them to the confirmed losse to enemy fighters. that number if not cross checked is bound to be off by far.

no offense against the dauntless.
 
Going back to the original question I think it was a matter of perception. In 1939 and early 1940 the Stuka was a symbol of Nazi "superiority" and featured in newsreel footage and other propaganda. It was also the first divebomber to see widespread use. American dive bombers used in the "banana wars" and Japanese dive bombers used in China may have interested the air staffs but were pretty much unknown to the general public. Air staffs scrambled for dive bombers after Poland or perhaps I should say they had their pre-war conceptions reinforced by the Stuka's success in Poland. The French campaign just added to the Stuka's reputation. It suffered a server check in the Battle of the channel and the BoB. NOBODY had a dive bomber in 1939-40 that would do any better but then in 1939/early 40 most people that 1-3 squadrons of bombers with RCMG could make deep daylight raids too.
The Stuka's reputation took a rather severe dent. As the war went on it became apparent that NOBODY's dive bombers could operate without fighter escort and the dive bomber "craze" had been over blown. I think that is the problem with the Stuka, it's abilities or effectiveness had been so overblown, both in German eyes and the eyes of it's opponents, that when it settled into a more normal place in the order of battle it was seen as a big come down.

And like many planes, a 1939/40 Stuka was a rather different plane than a 1941/42 Stuka.
 
I'm currently reading the title on the Stuka published by Ian Allan under their Classics series. Written by Eddie J. Creek and titled "Junkers Ju 87: From Dive Bomber to Tank Buster 1935-1945"

With that being said, I thought I'd drop my two cents in...

The author sets out to tell the story of the Stuka in a manner that is more objective (I.e. different than the usual "it was great until the BoB then it went away.")

It's been a fascinating read thus far. Every angle of its development and use is covered. All variants are covered including weapon changes and battles used in. I've been quite astonished at just how heavily used it was after the BoB. It proved to be an effective weapon and in particular its effect against Allied shipping was considerable. It remained effective in the CAS role and although acknowledged as vulnerable to fighters, it's rugged design was appreciated by its crews. According to the text, many weren't that thrilled about the transition to the Fw-190 as it was considered much less well protected. Does that mean the replacement of the Stuka by the faster Focke Wulf was a bad choice? No, but it does speak volumes about the level of respect the Stuka had from its crews. I don't think it was any more vulnerable than any other dive bomber and that is largely the point the author tries to make.

Anyways ill look to comment more later but typing on a phone is painful. Lol

Thanks for reading!
 
".... I think that is the problem with the Stuka, it's abilities or effectiveness had been so overblown, both in German eyes and the eyes of it's opponents, that when it settled into a more normal place in the order of battle it was seen as a big come down.



Still and all, if I was flying on the Eastern Front, I think it would be a tough, reliable mount ..... the canon D version especially .... wonder how it stacked up against the RAF canon-armed Hurricanes in the western desert?
 
The Germans themselves considered the Ju 87 out dated in a ground attack role by 1943.

The General der Schlachtflieger,Generalmajor Hubertus Hitschhold wrote in his treatise for allied intelligence during October 1945.

"Technical planning was not far sighted enough.Despite the continous increase in the effectiveness of enemy (Russian) air defences up to 1943,the equipping of dive bomber units with the outmoded Ju 87 continued. Only after putting a Waffengeneral in charge of all ground attack forces could the equipping of them with aircraft like the Fw 190,which suited the combat conditions,be effected."

Once again I suggest that the opinion of those who were there,and in this case commanded the very units equipped with these aircraft,might carry some weight.

Maybe the Ju 87 was no more vulnerable than other dive bomber but it was just as outmoded and soon to be superceded as all of them.

Cheers

Steve
 
Like most things, it seldom black or white but varying shades of gray. No airplane or weapon went from first rate to useless overnight. Some faded faster than others and many could still do useful work depending on changing tactics and tactical situations ( change from daylight bombing to night bombing or provision of large number of escorts).
Some soldiered on in an ever decreasing sphere of influence simply because there was nothing to take their place.

The Allies made good use of dive bombers in Burma until quite late in the war but the Japanese Army never had a first rate AA defense and the JAAF was getting very hard pressed to defend it's airspace at that point.

The Stuka had established a reputation early in the war that it didn't deserve. Not the fault of the aircraft or the designers but the situation and the needs of the German propaganda machine (and/or allied propaganda needed an excuse). The Poles, Dutch, Belgians, French and BEF did NOT have the AA defense that later armies would have, you not only need the right models of guns but you need them in large quantities. With the Stukas operating, for the most part, in only shallow penetrations into defended airspace the defending air forces for a variety of reasons, were unable to counter the Stuka formations with any regularity. This Changed against England. Once again in the attack on Russia the Germans enjoyed not only air superiority but air supremacy and the pendulum swung back for a while.
Few other dive bombers (if any) were employed as long or under such widely changing conditions except perhaps the VAL. What trained pilots could do in the absence of a decent air defense was amazing. Lower standards of training combined with attacking much improved air defenses turned them into little more than targets. Japanese Naval AA did not improve to the same extent that Allied Naval AA did. That alone changes changes the vulnerability of the attacking aircraft.
 
I agree,but the original question was about vulnerability.
The Ju 87 and all other dive bombers showed themselves to be vulnerable to any coordinated defence,be it aerial or anti aircraft. That's why they gradually disappeared and that's why Hitschhold wrote that they should have been replaced sooner with aircraft more suited to "combat conditions".Those conditions had changed since the early successes of "Barbarossa".
Cheers
Steve
 
Clive Caldwell flew a Tomahawk with No.250 Squadron RAAF:
Our Hurricanes and Tomahawks patrolled the battle area, and intercepted many formations of Ju. 87s, escorted by German and Italian fighters often forcing them to jettison their bombs. In the course of two days, the 4th and the 5th, 22 Ju 87s and 12 fighters were destroyed, 15 aircraft probably destroyed and 20 damaged; our losses were 11 fighters, with at least three pilots safe.

Hurricanes made several low-flying attacks in the Jedabya area, destroying four and damaging at least six aircraft. On the Jedabya-El Agheila road two staff cars, three road tankers and three large vehicles were also destroyed, and 26 vehicles were damaged. Beaufighters and Blenheim fighters inflicted heavy damage on transport in the Marawa and Derna areas.

I received radio warning that a large enemy formation was approaching from the North-West. No. 250 Squadron went into line astern behind me and as No. 112 Squadron engaged the escorting enemy fighters we attacked the JUs from the rear quarter.

At 300 yards I opened fire with all my guns at the leader of one of the rear sections of three, allowing too little deflection, and hit No. 2 and No. 3, one of which burst into flames immediately, the other going down smoking and went into flames after losing about 1000 feet. I then attacked the leader of the rear section…from below and behind, opening fire with all guns at very close range. The enemy aircraft turned over and dived steeply…opened fire [at another Ju 87] again at close range, the enemy caught fire…and crashed in flames. I was able to pull up under the belly of one of the rear, holding the burst until very close range. The enemy…caught fire and dived into the ground.


Caldwell had shot down five Stuka dive bombers. He was well on the way to becoming one of the leading aces of the war and the top scoring Australian pilot. He was noted for his aggression, invariably landing without ammunition because he sought out land based targets and enemy transport to shoot up when he came to the end of his patrols.

A later official portrait of Clive Caldwell in Australia, as a Wing Commander flying Spitfires in the defence of northern Australia.
Clive-Caldwell-595x429.jpg
 
Caldwell's account supports others I've read in reporting the Ju 87's tendency to catch fire when hit.

The Ju 87 was still operating as a dive bomber into 1944 and,when used correctly,could be an effective and devastating weapon.It wasn't until mid 1944 that mostunits cashed in their Stukas for Fw 190s. Some were still flying theirs at the end of the war.

The Ju 87 was a successful aircraft by any standards.

Cheers

Steve
 
Last edited:
The Stuka had established a reputation early in the war that it didn't deserve.

I'm not so sure about this.
As far as I can see - and always with the proviso of tactical surprise a relatively free hand uncontested by enemy fighters - the Stuka had a fully justified reputation.
Pin-point accuracy (in contrast to just about every other tactical level bomber anyone else was fielding) operational tactics which multiplied their effectiveness (I'm thinking especially about the genuinely useful close cooperation coordination with German army units here).
In relatively free airspace I can easily imagine the Stuka of 1939 - 40 (until the BoB.....when I think most would agree it was operating outside of it's designed competence) was about as effective a ground attacking plane as there was.

.....and I don't know about anyone else but as a 'terror weapon' those damned 'Jericho trumpets' still send a chill down my spine at the thought of being on the angry end of them!

As other have said and as history shows, in contested airspace and without sufficient fighter cover or caught alone, it was probably as big a death-trap as any other bomber of that weight power defensive armament (although the video interview above is interesting, perhaps not quite the complete 'game over' some of us might have imagined).

I did read once that the LW never had more than 500 Ju87's available (all fronts) at any one time which to me indicates again a rep which must have been earned, not a PR conjuring.

For the eastern front I would imagine the D G models (had they had enough of them) given decent fighter support would have furthered that rep considerably.
Germany's own IL2-style flying tank, perhaps?

It was certainly not the 'wonder weapon' of the early war propaganda but I think nevertheless it was a very effective unit to have.
 
Last edited:

Users who are viewing this thread

Back