Super Hornet Replacement

[Waynos]

Having a human being actually IN the attacking plane didn't prevent friendly fire incidents during GW1 and II so I am happy to concede that point. Would you be able to elaborate on the line " its just quite amusing to people who know what's going on" as that sounds intriguing? Is this stuff what you do for a living?

 

[tomo pauk]

Now that we talk about UCAVs, is any air force contemplating fighter/interceptor ones?

 

[Torch]

There's thisBoeing Unveils Unmanned Phantom Ray Demonstrator | Air Force News at DefenseTalk

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks for the link; among the tasks they've listed there is no talk, however, about plain fighter tasks (interception etc.)

 

[red admiral]

Would you be able to elaborate on the line " its just quite amusing to people who know what's going on" as that sounds intriguing? Is this stuff what you do for a living?

Amongst other things.

There aren't any serious UCAV designs for air-to-air combat floating around yet. BVR is fine, but WVR gets into a hellishly complicated decision making process for the FCS.

 

[Matt308]

Amen Admiral. Not yet. But jamming and strike platforms? Absolutely.

 

[tomo pauk]

Hmmm... (while acknowledging that manned interceptor is better, airframe-per-airframe)
All modern air forces have in their inventories many non-fighter aircraft: AWACS, flying command posts, stand-off jammers, maritime patrol planes, plethora of helicopters etc. Many of those are force-multipliers, and are being guarded by CAPs as such. Therefore the would-be attackers would suffer great deal if they tried to destroy a juicy target. Yet, some stealth-ish UCAVs would've able to sneak near by (some of those destroyed in process, but who cares) and launch their ordnance.
All of those aircraft listed tend to have large IR RF footprints, so UCAVs sensor pack of current technology level would have no problems to single them out.

The conventional fighters would have their share of trouble too, since for each conventional fighter people could afford two UCAVs, while not fearing loosing any pilots. UCAVs would not require elaborate airports, making them more resilient to preemptive enemy strikes.

 

[vanir]

On the UCAV's my impression is that situational awareness is greater from a manned cockpit. Replacing this with an adequate remote sensor system would require several crewmembers per craft monitoring various aspects of a full spectrum sensor suite on various facings and ranges. A team of experts operating each craft and then there is a coordination issue.
It could be a cost/complexity factor considering the relative simplicity of getting much the same effect using conventional manned fighter development.
A definite pro however is the physical limitations of a pilot in high stress manoeuvres, aside from his safety from the combat environment (on this however what is likely is that UCAV's will be controlled from AWACS-like buses near the battlefield at the very least due to the potential of jamming technologies and thus vulnerable to interception by dedicated, penetration counter-air interceptors like the Flanker/Su-30 datalink package).

My guess is that high risk, short range combat environments like the close support and interceptor roles may become the purview of UCAV's but deep penetrations and air superiority will still require the mission adaptability of a manned cockpit, thereby having the command/control centre of the vehicle right there on the battlefield, in fact in the vehicle. This simply makes more sense to me personally.



On the SuperHornet replacement...I'm more than a little skeptical. This isn't the Cold War anymore where cultivated paranoia funded open ended FX/LFX projects and Blackbird and whatever. These thousands of billions of US dollars simply can't be justified against phantom enemies which really never existed in the first place. Ultimately the F-15 for all its expense hasn't been responsible for anything bar a series of technological marques, more materiel weight has been lended by the F-16 and F/A-18, whilst the old Phantom could've easily taken up the slack as an interim for those two types and the US air defence machine would've held wonderful parity, if not superiority with any or all other air forces in the world from then to now.

The FX as it was, wholly unrealistic (hence ridiculously expensive and rather loosely defined) design requirements, was a knee jerk response to paranoia where simple diplomacy could've won the day.
The F-22 and even to some extent the F-35 are effectively the last whimpers of the Cold War era, which in any case never truly ceased just because Roger Waters had a concert in Berlin. Activity in the Middle East and central Asia (most particularly) and US interests in the Black Sea region are a testament to this, international journalists in the Ukraine and transCaucasus region publish a firm local sentiment that the Cold War continues at the very least in the minds of district commanders and the Kremlin (it's mostly over the oil and conventional, not nuclear industries now).
The thing is we're supposed to be older and wiser, nobody can afford another arms race.

Like the Eagle the F-22 is a ridiculously expensive, highly complicated warplane which simply has no direct contemporary planned for service entry (only a limited number of SuperFlankers have been built for India).
It has no adversary to justify the expense, a final F-15 variant proposal (purely for reasons of introducing new airframe lives to the fleet), can handle things just fine with parity in any conceivable engagements of the foreseeable future. Just saved yourself a few thousand million dollars right there with a bigger force projection to boot.

The F-35 has better arguments on two fronts, it represents a downsizing of production and infrastructure required for the given force projection, provides a necessary update of the short field and high turnaround units most particularly with the Marines, effectively filling the gap between attack helicopters and modern warplanes, as well as gives new airframe lives to the existing workhorse fleets assigned forward defences and carrier battlegroups.
It's like the modern Phantom, a great all rounder in basic design.
The second front is spending recuperation, a tremendous amount (literally thousands of millions of dollars) was spent developing the high survivability airframe technologies begun with the HaveBlue project, ultimately the F-35 represents its step into general service use.

The SuperHornet is perfectly adequate for the forseeable future, representing a Tomcat replacement for the fleet with contemporary updating. Performance and technology is wonderfully modern and contemporary, it is the US Flanker at this time with very similar all round performance. In terms of facing potential enemies, there is simply no reason to even contemplate replacing it.
It has some high survivability features, the Flankers when used properly have datalinked cross-field signal interpretation and command/control. They even out. Performance armed is about the same as the latest SM-Flanker update. US airframe finishing and avionics tech is nicer, Russian stuff more robust. In a war the SuperHornet will probably have the edge most of the time. What more could you want?

 

[N4521U]

You guys are giving me another headache. All we need to know is where the wings are gonna fold! bill

 

[red admiral]

I don't agree on the situational awareness front, though it depends what level of autonomy you bring into the vehicle. Against surface targets you're likely to have a better situational awareness, with the capability to fit a larger SAR / GMTI / EO sensor on the UCAV. You also don't need a pilot to analyse that data, you can take the output straight off and form a target picture. For airborne targets (or even just avoiding running into passenger aircraft) a modern DAS like on JSF gives you a far better situational awareness than you can achieve with a pilot. In this case you have the same sensors, you just avoid the need for a pilot to look at the output screen. The only real situation where you have problems is with heavy WVR manoeuvering as you're unlikely to get the same visual response as with a pilot. The EO sensors can be better than eyes but you need an intelligent and fast reacting system in order to analyse the pictures - that is a real problem.

I have no idea why a long range mission would be more demanding on sensors than short range. Type of mission is more important.

Why bother with air superiority when you have such levels of stealth as to make interception by another aircraft extremely unlikely? Easier to bomb the enemy air assets whilst they're on the ground to ensure air superiority.

 

[Matt308]

Why bother with air superiority when you have such levels of stealth as to make interception by another aircraft extremely unlikely? Easier to bomb the enemy air assets whilst they're on the ground to ensure air superiority.

Why?? Because war is just another level of politics wherein politicians influence the rules of engagement (c.f., Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War, etc). History has shown that oftentimes the enemy's air assets cannot be bombed for purely political reasoning and nothing more. Thus WVR becomes the norm. Not the exception. That's why.

 

[Glider]

I don't agree on the situational awareness front, though it depends what level of autonomy you bring into the vehicle. Against surface targets you're likely to have a better situational awareness, with the capability to fit a larger SAR / GMTI / EO sensor on the UCAV. You also don't need a pilot to analyse that data, you can take the output straight off and form a target picture. For airborne targets (or even just avoiding running into passenger aircraft) a modern DAS like on JSF gives you a far better situational awareness than you can achieve with a pilot. In this case you have the same sensors, you just avoid the need for a pilot to look at the output screen. The only real situation where you have problems is with heavy WVR manoeuvering as you're unlikely to get the same visual response as with a pilot. The EO sensors can be better than eyes but you need an intelligent and fast reacting system in order to analyse the pictures - that is a real problem.

If I read this correctly you are working on the basis that the UCAV will be totally automated which is something that people would not be happy with. The alternative would be some sort of human intervention which would be a weakness as it would be up for jamming.

Why bother with air superiority when you have such levels of stealth as to make interception by another aircraft extremely unlikely? Easier to bomb the enemy air assets whilst they're on the ground to ensure air superiority.

For every development in war a countermeasure has been developed. To bet the house on stealth to get you to the target and back is a risk.

 

[red admiral]

History has shown that oftentimes the enemy's air assets cannot be bombed for purely political reasoning and nothing more. Thus WVR becomes the norm. Not the exception. That's why.

I'm not sure I'd agree any more. Dropping an SDB is a good way of taking out an aircraft with low collateral damage. WVR only becomes an issue when enemy air assets are airborne. Stealth gives a much greater ability to strike undetected whilst they are on the ground. I don't think the requirement for WVR will disappear, it'll just become less important.

If I read this correctly you are working on the basis that the UCAV will be totally automated which is something that people would not be happy with. The alternative would be some sort of human intervention which would be a weakness as it would be up for jamming.

More recent UAVs are becoming more and more autonomous rather than remotely piloted (e.g. Mantis and Corax). Weapons release still comes down to man in the loop (more of a yes/no decision) for legal reasons more than anything else. Jamming of UAV datalinks is often brought up, but modern manned aircraft suffer from exactly the same problem.

For every development in war a countermeasure has been developed. To bet the house on stealth to get you to the target and back is a risk.

With an operational UCAV you've got similar performance to modern aircraft, similar EW possibilities but a far smaller signature. You're a lot more survivable than a contemporary manned aircraft. With contemporary unstealthy aircraft you're betting the house on the availability of EW aircraft. What is the alternative? Could go with an ultra manoeuverable UAV to avoid missiles but that's basically impossible. Could go with a hypersonic missile like X-51 but it can still be hit. What is the alternative to stealth?

 

[vanir]

There is always some confusion about the term "stealth technologies" which is why Lockheed engineers for example prefer the term "high survivability (airframe) technologies"

"Stealth" has nothing to do with search modes, but track and locking. Anywhere that uses links to EWR based in the combat environment (every interceptor since the 50's), or airborne datalink (to AWACS or the Russian long range interception system coupling MiG-31 or Su-30 command/controllers to flights of regular Flankers and Fulcrums), makes signal scattering central to stealth designs superfluous as the signal interpretation sent to interceptors is spread across several hundred kilometres on at least three facings of the penetration aircraft (in the case of the Russians, some 450km EWR and 350km airborne).

What the "stealth" design is superb at doing is breaking missile locks much easier than normally and foiling missile seeker heads particularly with active seekers (probably the reason development of the active R-27 was cancelled in favour of more refined semi-active with hardened ECM resistance and faster track/lock).

Certainly for a single e/a interception detection range is vastly reduced with smaller RCS but again if facing a standard PVO interception at least two Foxhounds or Su-30 will be datalinking at least four Fulcrums or Flankers using combined signal interpretation from all receivers spread in a 250km wide pincer on approach. The RCS reflecting actual size of the aircraft, not its signal scattering capabilities are going to be picked up and tracked and it gets worse if anywhere near EWR stations (they don't need to worry about a datalinked formation then).

Lockheed themselves always worked on the assumption that aircraft would be detected, but the effort was placed on foiling missile seeker heads. Best standing example is the F-117 in the Gulf, they were infamously tracked by a local civilian technician using the domestic mobile phone coverage network, by following gaps in the coverage during missions. The Iraqis however didn't have much in the way of intel, and only point radar systems, not a true, coordinated EWR system. But even so, it was also shown in Bosnia (?) that an experienced, smart AAA commander can bring down stealthed aircraft that show the slightest complacency, such as thinking they are invisible to the enemy.

It's not a question of being "stealthed" but is a question of being right there in front of the enemy, yet still damn hard to get a weapons lock on, easy to break a lock even if achieved, and making countermeasures have a much easier time of working for you.
Hence, more accurately, high survivability technology.


Red Admiral, with situational awareness wrt UCAV's what I was talking about with extended missions is the adaptability of a manned aircraft to make circumstantial changes on the fly which is more crucial to deep penetration and air superiority type missions than short range strike or close support missions, where the high risk factor is the overriding concern.
You really need your command/control inside the aircraft on an air superiority furbee, or a deep penetration of enemy territory where things like circumstantial instincts can win the day, these are more likely to occur on these longer, broad objective missions.
Take a Vietnam penetration strike that turns into an air superiority contest and finally an escort of wounded squadron mates. These are long missions, with aerial refuelling, which are necessarily highly adaptive based on judgement calls made by pilots superseding commands from home base. They get medals for things like this.
If those aircraft were remote piloted they wouldn't have had those successes.

 

[Glider]

More recent UAVs are becoming more and more autonomous rather than remotely piloted (e.g. Mantis and Corax). Weapons release still comes down to man in the loop (more of a yes/no decision) for legal reasons more than anything else. Jamming of UAV datalinks is often brought up, but modern manned aircraft suffer from exactly the same problem.

I agree with some of this but not all. UAV's are becoming more autonomus but as you say the man is still in the loop. How would a UAV identify between an insrgent in Iraq and a friendly unit behind the lines?

Data links can potentially be jammed but the difference between a manned aircraft and a UAV is huge. To the UAV it would be the end of the mission and potentially the end of the UAV. To lose the data link between an aircraft is a hinderence but not the end of the world and the mission can continue.

Its worth remembering that at the moment the F35 cannot share data with the F22 but it wouldn't stop them going into combat together and it will not be able to share for a few years yet.

 

[vanir]

AFAIK the USAF datalinking system (which has just been updated and retrofitted to service models) isn't between aircraft but between individual aircraft and the AWACS controllers. It doesn't work like the Russian system, the Indian air force bought the system, under very tight security but refused to let USAF techs look at it in the last set of wargames they were invited to. The organisers therefore ruled India wasn't allowed to use their datalink, but had to install/use the American AWACS datalink instead, unless they changed their minds. They didn't and went without datalink, this was their main gripe about unfair USAF advantages in BVR during those games but made some wins in CWC (which they attributed to the SuperFlankers digital-ogival vectoring).

 

[Matt308]

I'm not sure I'd agree any more. Dropping an SDB is a good way of taking out an aircraft with low collateral damage. WVR only becomes an issue when enemy air assets are airborne. Stealth gives a much greater ability to strike undetected whilst they are on the ground. I don't think the requirement for WVR will disappear, it'll just become less important.

Read your history my friend. Look at the order of battle in Korea, Vietnam and even the Gulf War. Chinese/Russian airplanes were just north of the Yalu and untouchable. In Vietname, Hanoi and other areas were air asset staging bases that were off limits. Even in the Gulf War, planes that were flown into Iran were considered "out of the game". One cannot dismiss political influences to the rules of engagement.

You're a lot more survivable than a contemporary manned aircraft. With contemporary unstealthy aircraft you're betting the house on the availability of EW aircraft. What is the alternative? Could go with an ultra manoeuverable UAV to avoid missiles but that's basically impossible. Could go with a hypersonic missile like X-51 but it can still be hit. What is the alternative to stealth?

I'm confused as to the basis for these claims. Don't get me wrong, I'm not a detractor from UCAV/UAS. But a flat out claim that these platforms are more "survivable" has not been validated in any real world scenario where enemy assets have equal or remotely equal parity. That statement you made cannot be supported.

EW aircraft are not obsolete and remain a viable asset for non-stealthy aircraft entering protected airspace. X-51 is a non-classified platform that is not capable of operational delivery of payload. Thus, unless a classified version exists in operationally effective numbers, it is irrelavent.

So the alternative to stealth? Force multiplication. Manned platforms and UAS platforms operating together in a netcentric environment. But the shortcoming of this is too much information available to all levels of the decision making. With netcentric information exchange, minutieau is subject to overburdened battle management and may prevent warriors' ability to make command decisions on fire/not-fire at their levels. Thus UAS contributions can be a boon or bane depending upon leadership involvement.

 

[Glider]

AFAIK the USAF datalinking system (which has just been updated and retrofitted to service models) isn't between aircraft but between individual aircraft and the AWACS controllers.

This doesn't sound likely and certainly isn't how the RAF and Swedish datalink works, which links the aircraft to the AWACS but also links the aircraft to each other. I would expect all NATO Typhoon operators to have a similar system to the RAF.

After all what happens if the AWACS isn't around, do you not use the datalink? Something is very wrong here.

 

[Matt308]

AFAIK the USAF datalinking system (which has just been updated and retrofitted to service models) isn't between aircraft but between individual aircraft and the AWACS controllers.

I to disagree with that post as well. See my post above on Netcentric information exchange. An example that has seen a lot of use is LINK-16 and now a follow-on, JTRS.