Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero

[Nikademus]

Why was that? I would have thought that it would be the main British fighter against the Japanese or were the US fighters handling the situation so there was no need for the RAF?

Similar reason that the Spitfire arrived late to Malta and N.A. Priority. Fighter Command had first dibs on Spitfires.....then starting in 1942, the Med. received a few squadrons. PTO/CBI remained third priority. Another reason was that up through 1943, the Hurricane was considered good enough (on paper at least) to face the expected opposition in the CBI. That this turned out not to be the case is why Cmdr Ritchie was sent to the CBI to make an accessment. Eventually pilot demands for Spitfires was granted.

 

[Nikademus]

To tie this whole discussion back to your original point though, Joes findings about the very poor exchange has to goad the rest of us into working out why there was such a poor exchange rate in the theatre. At the rates Joe is asserting, it was significantly worse than at the beginning of the war, when zeroes were flying against poorer quality pilots, the allies did not have a numerical advantage, had radar, and the best pilots in the RAAF. Apart from exposing Caldwell as a liar, it means that all the tactical concepts we have accepted as transferring the advantage to the allies were not applicable to the Spitfire equipped units.

This is why I was interrogating Joe. He doers not want to say what his material means, but the obvious conclusion to draw is that for the Spitfires in the pacific, and the men that flew them something was wrong, very wrong.


So, as an adjunct to the original question, one conclusion to draw is that whatever tactics were being employed by the allies, they were not working....

Using Shores', I found that the earlier war exchange rate between the K-43 and Hurricane was worse than later in the war over Burma.

SRA/early Burma - (1942) 6.3:1 vs. 5.2:1 in favor of Ki-43

As to the why.....I think training and environment had alot to do with it. Early efforts (Malaya/Sumatra) were hampered by poor organization and lack of early warning. (This impacted the other airforces in the area similarily) Over Burma the wide geographical area allowed many opportunities for ambush on Hurricane patrols and ground attack missions. The tactics that were used are highly suspect, as Col Ritchie's report attests too. RAF pilot drafts tended to be very much on the green side. A similar problem existed in the Med. Arrival of Spitifres coupled with repeated requests for more experienced pilots and squadron leaders co-incided.

 

[renrich]

Using info from Shores, it was stated many times by the British that the Hurricane was not up to defeating the Japanese fighters which would mainly be the Ki43. From what I have read in the BOB, the Hurricane was more suitable than the Spitfire for a turning fight in the horizontal. My guess is that the Spitfire pilots first in combat with Japanese fighters thought they were going against a second rate opponent with second rate AC and that the superb flying qualities of the Spitfire would make it a "piece of cake" They were rapidly disabused of that notion. I believe that the US pilots went through that same cycle, except that they did not have the handicap of being arrogant because they had "vanquished" the vaunted LW in the BOB.

 

[buffnut453]

The reason the Hurricanes fared so badly in Burma is because in virtually all their tactical engagements with Ki-43s, the Japanese fighters had a great numerical advantage and usually had an altitude advantage as well. Inexperienced pilots and fighting a defensive campaign were more relevant than any supposed arrogance.

 

[Nikademus]

The reason the Hurricanes fared so badly in Burma is because in virtually all their tactical engagements with Ki-43s, the Japanese fighters had a great numerical advantage and usually had an altitude advantage as well. Inexperienced pilots and fighting a defensive campaign were more relevant than any supposed arrogance.

I'd have to disagree in regards to the Japanese almost always having a numerical advantage in Burma. In regards to altitude advantage, it varied but if the Oscar drivers spotted the British patrol first, they'd endevor to gain alt advantage before engaging. As time went by in the Theater it was the Japanese who found themselves more and more at a numerical disadvantage. It's a common notion that the Japanese were one trick pony drivers, always seeking low speed dogfights. In reality they would attempt bounces/energy attacks if possible. The Ki-43 (like the Zero) had an advantage here in it's quick ability to change it's energy state.

 

[buffnut453]

I'd have to disagree in regards to the Japanese almost always having a numerical advantage in Burma. In regards to altitude advantage, it varied but if the Oscar drivers spotted the British patrol first, they'd endevor to gain alt advantage before engaging. As time went by in the Theater it was the Japanese who found themselves more and more at a numerical disadvantage. It's a common notion that the Japanese were one trick pony drivers, always seeking low speed dogfights. In reality they would attempt bounces/energy attacks if possible. The Ki-43 (like the Zero) had an advantage here in it's quick ability to change it's energy state.

My statement was drawn from an analysis of every Hurricane -vs- Ki-43 engagement in Burma for the period May 1942-December 1943. The Hurricanes were outnumbered because the Japanese could select the time and location of their attacks and hence concentrate force as required. Therefore, although the RAF outnumbered the IJAAF taken across the Burma theatre, the Japanese were able to concentrate their fighter force which the RAF, due to lack of early warning, could not meet on equal terms. I posted my findings on a discussion of the relative combat effectiveness of Mohawks and Hurricanes in Burma. http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/underappreciated-aircraft-wwii-24094-11.html#post658779

 

[JoeB]

Using Shores', I found that the earlier war exchange rate between the K-43 and Hurricane was worse than later in the war over Burma.

SRA/early Burma - (1942) 6.3:1 vs. 5.2:1 in favor of Ki-43

I think the most significant point is that the exchange ratio didn't change a lot from 42 to 43, whether higher in one year or other (I found it slightly worse in '43 for Hurricane-only than in '42 but anyway similar in both years). This tends to undermine at least some of the explanations of '42 lack of succes like insecure (from even threat of being over run on the ground) airfields, lack of early warning, numbers* , shock, new opponent etc. But the Darwin Spit results fit in more or less, a bit more puzzling because a superior a/c to the Hurricane but as we all know a/c are only a limited part of the equation, and there's statistical variation; these samples are too small to say 5 v 6 to 1 is significant, though it's extremely statistically significantly different than 1:1 at such a sample size.

I think one general point is that the narrative of declining Japanese and increasing Allied fighter effectiveness tends to gets oversimplified, and accelerated, as in Japanese fighter turn to pumpkins somewhere around mid 42, way overstated. Units like 64th Sentai in Burma were no less effective in 43 than 42, likewise apparently the 202nd Air Group, at least till it (or a significant levy of its pilots) reached the cauldron of Rabaul at the end of '43. And AVG and USAAF P-40 record in Burma v the Type 1 in 42 and 43 were also similar. In fact if counting USAAF P-38's and P-51A's relatively small but relatively unsuccesful ops escorting raids to Rangoon in late '43, USAAF in '43 in Burma was less successful v the Type1 than AVG had been by my count (though it's still north of 2:1 in USAAF's favor, again just what the sources show, and not trying to intensify the national element of it, just making the point that it didn't change much from 42 through end of 43).

*I also don't agree about numbers favoring the Japanese in '43 in Burma either, many or most combats were at least close in numbers, and inferiority in numbers in a particular engagement is still a puzzling explanation for a very bad exchange ratio by a faster a/c; Bf109F's were consistently heavily outnumbered in Western Desert racking up high kill ratio in their favor often in deliberately small formations; some USAAF P-38 groups likewise sent out 4 plane missions on purpose into hornet's nest of superior numbers of Japanese a/c in 1944 in SWPA. It was selected experienced pilots, for example the P-38 4's might include Bong *and* McGuire, and it was a ballsy tactic, but by no means suicidal. If things got too hot, they'd run. The Spits outnumbered the Zeroes on average in the Darwin ops, though not by a great deal. I doubt numbers is a huge part of the answer here.

Joe

 

[JoeB]

Apart from exposing Caldwell as a liar, it means that all the tactical concepts we have accepted as transferring the advantage to the allies were not applicable to the Spitfire equipped units.

I'm not familiar with everything Caldwell ever said, but high overclaims don't necessarily mean lying. The feeling that one must either reject loss evidence in complete detailed, then secret enemy records, or else be calling some pilot a liar for his claims, leads to a lot of illogical arguments about claim v loss research, IME, not speaking particularly of this case or even just WWII. This was the whole longrunning theme of the internet debate between AVG fans and at least one AVG veteran v Dan Ford's book* , or Soviet claims v US losses in Korea; another often bitter debate. The people on one side seem to feel they must either call 'their guys', liars or else insist the old enemy is still trying to torture their beloved homeland with these 'phoney' lowball accounts of his losses. Shooting the messenger can be a compromise position.

I wasn't born yesterday and of course realize that some overclaims were lies. Lying is part of human nature, especially when it doesn't seem likely you'll be caught in the lie, and a detailed accounting using enemy records must have seemed very remote, if ever considered, by pilots who might be killed on the next mission. But since it's usually impossible to prove the reasons for overclaims, and tends to be a toxic subject, I favor leaving the veracity issue alone, as a rule.

*"Flying Tigers" , or IOW v. Senshi Sosho Vol 34 basically, also Shores et al's main source for Japanese losses in Bloody Shambles 1 and 2, official history of JAAF in the early campaigns, not as ironclad a source as JNAF original unit records, not as many of the Army's survived. Although OTOH research among veterans by people like Shambles co-author Izawa makes it clear there weren't all kinds of 'unknown' additional pilot KIA's besides those mentioned in that book. I see no reason to doubt the basic info in that book, where given in detail; and in any case, what's sauce for the goose... any Allied units or air arms one might compare would all presumably suffer equally from incompletely reported losses in the book, if so in cases where the losses seem to be stated specifically and completely. In some cases losses aren't stated in SS v 34, but Allied losses in those combats obviously shouldn't be counted either in any evaluation of kill/loss. A potential flaw in English language narrative type books is that they often don't just come out and say that: 'no opposing account in this case'. You sometimes have to infer that from the wording, which is usually pretty clear, but not necessarily always.

Joe

 

[proton45]

This is interesting...

 

[parsifal]

I'm not familiar with everything Caldwell ever said, but high overclaims don't necessarily mean lying. The feeling that one must either reject loss evidence in complete detailed, then secret enemy records, or else be calling some pilot a liar for his claims, leads to a lot of illogical arguments about claim v loss research, IME, not speaking particularly of this case or even just WWII. This was the whole longrunning theme of the internet debate between AVG fans and at least one AVG veteran v Dan Ford's book* , or Soviet claims v US losses in Korea; another often bitter debate. The people on one side seem to feel they must either call 'their guys', liars or else insist the old enemy is still trying to torture their beloved homeland with these 'phoney' lowball accounts of his losses. Shooting the messenger can be a compromise position.

I wasn't born yesterday and of course realize that some overclaims were lies. Lying is part of human nature, especially when it doesn't seem likely you'll be caught in the lie, and a detailed accounting using enemy records must have seemed very remote, if ever considered, by pilots who might be killed on the next mission. But since it's usually impossible to prove the reasons for overclaims, and tends to be a toxic subject, I favor leaving the veracity issue alone, as a rule.

*"Flying Tigers" , or IOW v. Senshi Sosho Vol 34 basically, also Shores et al's main source for Japanese losses in Bloody Shambles 1 and 2, official history of JAAF in the early campaigns, not as ironclad a source as JNAF original unit records, not as many of the Army's survived. Although OTOH research among veterans by people like Shambles co-author Izawa makes it clear there weren't all kinds of 'unknown' additional pilot KIA's besides those mentioned in that book. I see no reason to doubt the basic info in that book, where given in detail; and in any case, what's sauce for the goose... any Allied units or air arms one might compare would all presumably suffer equally from incompletely reported losses in the book, if so in cases where the losses seem to be stated specifically and completely. In some cases losses aren't stated in SS v 34, but Allied losses in those combats obviously shouldn't be counted either in any evaluation of kill/loss. A potential flaw in English language narrative type books is that they often don't just come out and say that: 'no opposing account in this case'. You sometimes have to infer that from the wording, which is usually pretty clear, but not necessarily always.

Joe

I think in this case it would have to be state that Caldwell was deliberately hiding the truth. He claimed 6.5 kills whilst based in Darwin, of which I think two were claimed as zeroes. He was the wing commander at the time, so would have had to endorse and sign off on the after action reports, on which the claims were made. It gets worse. I remeber more than 20 years ago trolling through various after action reports at the Australian war memorial and distinctly recall seeing some of the reports from the Spitfire Wing. In those reports there are references to wreckage of downed Japanese aircraft beiung found, confirmed kills, and other similar reports. I forget the numbers of zeroes claimed, but it was a lot. It is reasonable to join the dots and assume that some of the references Japanese wreckage would include references to crashed Zero wreckage. But if your figures are correct, this must all be a fabrication.

There are some subtle indicators that Caldwell was not being truthful in his reports to his superiors. At the time there was considerable disquiet about the losses being sustained by Caldwells command, which just happened to be one of the premier fighter wings in the RAAF. It would be natural under those circumstances for Caldwell, by then a celebrated war hero to gild the lily to protect his reputation.

After his tour was completed, Caldwell was sent south to take over a training command. He then returned to active duty on Moratai, where he was a leading participant in the "Moratai Mutiny". Because of his wartime reputation his part in this affair was glossed over and he got away with his insubordination. However soo after that he was caught at the center of a whiskey bootlegging operation, supplying sly grog to nearby American units. This time he was court martialled. He was busted down to the rank of Flight Lt which is how he finished the war. His end of the war behaviour displays some telling signs of a disillusioned pilot. There could be any number of reasons for this, but it is at least plausible that his behaviour in Darwin was a factor.

This was why I was severely qustioning you research and wanted (and still do) to approach the issue from a different perspective to make sure of your assertions. It casts serious dispersions on the top scoring ace of the RAAF in WWII

 

[JoeB]

I remeber more than 20 years ago trolling through various after action reports at the Australian war memorial and distinctly recall seeing some of the reports from the Spitfire Wing. In those reports there are references to wreckage of downed Japanese aircraft beiung found, confirmed kills, and other similar reports. I forget the numbers of zeroes claimed, but it was a lot. It is reasonable to join the dots and assume that some of the references Japanese wreckage would include references to crashed Zero wreckage. But if your figures are correct, this must all be a fabrication.

I'll be lazy here and not give the details, but relative number of claimed v actually downed (per Japanese records) a/c was less out of line when it came to the bombers, especially if counting crashlanded bombers (though OTOH the Spitfires were not claiming they caused bombers to crashland 500 miles later in Timor but claiming they'd downed them outright), and pretty accurate as far as claims of lone recon a/c, a typical pattern actually. Overall IIRC it was an overclaim of between 3 and 4:1 which is really nothing special. For fighters alone it is pretty out of line, though again not unmatched even so.

As far as wrecks, the list I gave of all damage with number of hits I haven't seen that in print, but the outright loss data has been in (English language) print for quite awhile. I think we would have heard by now if specific wreck evidence showed outright losses the Japanese didn't record, and we'd be debating whether those specific conflicts in info indicated false wreck evidence or false Japanese records. But I've never heard of it. The only specific wreck evidence claims I know of, for the 1943 campaign correspond to real Japanese losses; K. Sakai's Zero on May 10 '43, and a few bomber wrecks; for example Baeza has a photo of a wreck of Army Type 97 Heavy Bomber (Sally) loaded on a truck, a/c recorded lost in the June 20 raid. Then there's the ground to air photo of Yamanaka's a/c leaking fuel, indicating its likely loss, but again it was recorded as a loss. A lot of the combat was over water, and the two other outright Zero losses the 202nd recorded didn't show up as wrecks, AFAIK.

Coincidentally, both the other examples I gave of bitter claim/loss debates have featured the claiming side's proponents attacking the other side's records by way of supposed wreck evidence. But in AVG's case the claim of verification of 'all' their claims by Allied (Chinese) observors is not backed up by much at all; a lot or even most AVG claims weren't even over China! And w/ Soviets in Korea, not to threadjack into the more complicated answer there, the bottomline is Soviet wreck reports don't establish any losses the US didn't record, not that I've ever found looking at the question quite closely. In fact I know of no case in air war history (though happy to expand my knowledge and learn of one) where solid, specific wreck evidence on one side showed losses the opposing side had failed to record in then-secret records; or even showed that widely accepted orders of battle of one side were actually incomplete.

Joe

 

[Njaco]

Great stuff guys!

Concerning using wreckage as claims - wouldn't that be rather difficult for this theatre as opposed to others based upon the terrain and water areas? Jungle and ocean can hide a lot and my point is I would think it would be VERY dfficult to verify in those conditions. Maybe some leeway is needed here?

 

[parsifal]

In the same way that I am cautious of the allied claims on shoot downs, I must confess that I have my doubts about the veracity of the japanese records, though far less so (since they are recording losses). During the war the Japanese had a very peculiar attitude to losses, they equated it to a loss of honour if they were in command of that formation. I cannot make any informed claims on the 202nd, and am looking for an explanation more than anything. But during the war I can think of some very famous occasions when the records were falsified by the japanese, and this didnt just happen at the top end of town, it occurred even at the tactical level. Some of the occasions that come to mind include withholding the losses at Midway, advising of the capture of Henderson which led directly to Santa Cruz, the faulty reports on gains, AND losses during Yammomotos final air offensive in 1943, and again the same behaviour on Guam by the local air commander during Philipinnes Sea. There are literally dozens of these episodes, so why is it assured that the japanese records are competely honest and correct here?

A small point Joe, if I could beg your indulgence. You stated earlier that the only unit involved in the fighting over Darwin was the 202 kokutai, yet we have a number of army types being lost over Darwin, the latest being that type 97 you mentioned. I dont get it, how can army bombers be getting lost if there were no army formations over darwin to be shot at?

 

[parsifal]

NJ

We will eventually get to discussing tactics I hope, but I agree, this discussion is very interesting

 

[Wildcat]

A small point Joe, if I could beg your indulgence. You stated earlier that the only unit involved in the fighting over Darwin was the 202 kokutai, yet we have a number of army types being lost over Darwin, the latest being that type 97 you mentioned. I dont get it, how can army bombers be getting lost if there were no army formations over darwin to be shot at?

The 20th June raid was flown by Army bombers and 59th Sentai Oscars.

 

[Timppa]

But during the war I can think of some very famous occasions when the records were falsified by the japanese, and this didnt just happen at the top end of town, it occurred even at the tactical level. Some of the occasions that come to mind include withholding the losses at Midway, advising of the capture of Henderson which led directly to Santa Cruz, the faulty reports on gains, AND losses during Yammomotos final air offensive in 1943, and again the same behaviour on Guam by the local air commander during Philipinnes Sea. There are literally dozens of these episodes, so why is it assured that the japanese records are competely honest and correct here?

If the Japanese falsified the loss reports sent to their superiors , then where the "correct" numbers come from ?

 

[parsifal]

I expect that eventually the truth comes to the surface, at least for the big foobars. But for the smaller stuff......I dont know. I am waiting for Joe to make comment.

 

[Nikademus]

Midway is a bit of a red Herring for an example of falsification. The sheer scale of the disaster and it's implications to the nation (not to mention the impact it would have had on civilian morale) were the motivators for the cover up. Aircraft losses in tactical and operational enagements do not nearly equate to such a thing and there would be no pressing need for such covert consipiracies. The Japanese airforce was not interested in kill ratios anymore than the British were during the BoB. They were only concerned with mission success. Shores actually commented on the accuracy quesiton in vol3. Overall, he felt the Japanese records and claiming were well documented however, citing as an example the 64th Sentai in Burma who's diligence in claiming and recording losses was laudible. As an example of the exception he cited the 50th Sentai which Shores said you could tell how well the "mission" went by the accuracy of it 's claims. If the mission went well, (aka the escort did it's job), it's claims were fairly on the money (as best as any claim can be). If the escort preformed poorly, their claims proportionally shot up. He called this phenomenum "50th Sentai syndrome" in a rare display of dry humor by the author. Note that this obscuration of "facts" revolved around claims....not recorded losses. The Japanese overall were pretty good with tracking their own equipment. As the war turned badly for them and more inexperienced pilots got into the cockpits it was the success claims that got ridiculous.

 

[JoeB]

1. But during the war I can think of some very famous occasions when the records were falsified by the japanese, and this didnt just happen at the top end of town, it occurred even at the tactical level. Some of the occasions that come to mind include withholding the losses at Midway, advising of the capture of Henderson which led directly to Santa Cruz, the faulty reports on gains, AND losses during Yammomotos final air offensive in 1943, and again the same behaviour on Guam by the local air commander during Philipinnes Sea. There are literally dozens of these episodes, so why is it assured that the japanese records are competely honest and correct here?

2. A small point Joe, if I could beg your indulgence. You stated earlier that the only unit involved in the fighting over Darwin was the 202 kokutai, yet we have a number of army types being lost over Darwin, the latest being that type 97 you mentioned. I dont get it, how can army bombers be getting lost if there were no army formations over darwin to be shot at?

1. In none of those cases is it shown that the Navy's own records didn't show what they perceived to have to happened, and perception of one's own losses is naturally accurate (perception of damage done to the enemy is OTOH much more subject to error). The Japanese Navy delayed telling other Japanese govt agencies, notably the Army, about their carrier losses at Midway. But their own combat reports demonstrably record those losses, have the losses of personnel in detail, also losses of a/c in air actions prior to the loss of of all of them when the ships sank. That's how we know that stuff in detail, how else? The USN at the time, in conjunction with USAAF (B-17's etc), claimed a lot more sinkings at Midway than occurred. We're just not used to debating ship sinking claims and losses because Japanese accounts of the actual ship losses were analyzed and basically officially accepted as the reality, by the Joint Army Navy Commission report in the US, in the late 40's. JANAC has some errors since corrected, or still debated in a few minor cases, but actual war time claims of sinkings were much higher.

This is similar to your Coral Sea point before: you are referring to actual results gotten basically *from Japanese Navy records*, stuff that wasn't and couldn't be known from any other source, but then using that to challenge Japanese records. There's a basic logical problem with that argument.

On the other cases mistaken belief in the capture of Henderson was a typical 'fog of war' episode in land combat nothing to do with the accuracy of air unit records. You'll have to give more info and sources on supposed falsified losses, *in IJN's own then-secret records*, which is what we're reviewing here for 202nd Air Group, not what the Navy said to the Japanese public or Army or Cabinet, re 1943 raids in Solomons.

Allied press release stats during WWII often neglected to mention losses, or fully so, but the losses were in their actual secret records.

2. I wrote repeatedly, the 202nd was the only fighter unit inolved in the *Navy's* raids on Darwin. The Army flew one escorted raid which was intercepted, June 20 1943, without the Navy, according to both, and that raid was also in the list in my detailed post. On one other occasion, Sept 7, 202nd Zeroes, only, flew cover for Army Type 100 Hq Recon planes and fought Spits. The 59th Sentai was the only component of the Army's 7th Air Division within range of Australia that was equipped with single engine fighters (saw considerable fighter-figher action in the early campaigns, then based on DEI from mid 1942). The 7th Div's other fighter unit was the 5th Sentai equipped with Type 2 two-seat fighters (Nick) also encountered by Allied bombers over DEI, but not over Australia. On the June 20 raid, the 61st Sentai lost 2 out of 18 Type 100 Heavy Bomber ('Helen', Baeza's caption says the pretty shredded wreck of one was *mistakenly* ID'd as a 'Sally'), the 59th lost 1 out of 22 Type 1 Fighter (Lt. Kawata Shigeto MIA). Another Type 100 Bomber was destroyed on crashlanding at base, and 2 of 9 Type 99 Twin Engine Light Bombers (Lily) of 75th Sentai were 'good for scrap' after wheels-up landings. The Spits intercepted what they reported as 18 Betty's and 19 Hamps, and later chased what were believed to be Dinah's at low altitude (photo from AA position shows the Type 99's at low altitude), claimed 9 twin engine and 5 fighters destroyed for the loss of 2 Spitfires. Source of raid details is Baeza, other sources (like Hata/Izawa's history of JAAF fighter units) agree on career of 59th Sentai and lack of other Army fighter units in that area at the time.

Joe

 

[Wildcat]

Chris here is a RAAF report dated May 1943 - May be of some interest to you?

source - National Archives of Australia