Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero

[Glider]

Excellent.

 

[Njaco]

Wildcat, thats awesome!!!

 

[renrich]

Very interesting and it shows why the advice, " Never fight the Zero at below 250 mph is much easier said than done!"

 

[parsifal]

Yes, I agree that Wildcats post is very revealing and interesting. Just remember that the author of this report is none other than Clive Caldwell.....

On the face of it, the advice being given in this memo was either not followed by the Spitfire Wing , or it did not help, since the exchange rates for the Spitfire Wing at this midpoint in the war were considerably worse than the exchange rates at the beginbning of the war, when allied pilots were flying types such as the P-36 and the Buffalo. The most plausible explanations that i can think of are

1) The records on which the verified losses are based have some errors or omissions in them. Joe has emphatically denied this, but still has also confirmed by the very nature of his replies that cross checking of the stated figures cannot (or will not) be undertaken. We are apparently stuck with accepting the losses stated in the japanese records as gospel truth......

2) The Pilots of the Spitfire wing were not following the advice being given in this report

3) There were other reasons at issue that was causing the high loss rate for the Spits. I suspect lack of endurance (and subsequent ditching) might be the main culprit.

 

[billswagger]

3) There were other reasons at issue that was causing the high loss rate for the Spits. I suspect lack of endurance (and subsequent ditching) might be the main culprit.

I think it had more to do with the traditional tactics used by the Spitfire pilots.
What Caldwell says was also noticed and utilized by Chanault, but for some reason it took some time for those tactics to make it to the battle field. This is also largely due to training. A pilot trains to dogfight and then is thrown into battle utilizing only what he knows. Its not a surprise that many pilots failed against Zeros, not only Spitfires. I doubt range was such a big issue, or at least would not account for the number of losses seen.
It could be that the Spitfire also loses considerable turning performance at higher altitudes where often it was expected to perform against high flying bombers and Zeros.

 

[buffnut453]

Further to Parsifal's Point #3, what were the tactical conditions during the engagements? If the Spitfires were at a height disadvantage then it's perhaps not surprising they were bested by the Zeros. As with the thread on the Mohawk performance over Burma, it seems we're examining a relatively small number of actual combats and seeking to extrapolate them into some overall assessment of performance when, in reality, tactical conditions are a vital component. Numbers on both sides and their relative altitudes must be considered. I know nothing about the Spitfire engagements over Darwin but I've seen nothing in the posts thus far which describe where the Spitfires were when they engaged the Zeros. I think that information might prove most illuminating.

Cheers
Mark

 

[JoeB]

1) The records on which the verified losses are based have some errors or omissions in them. Joe has emphatically denied this, but still has also confirmed by the very nature of his replies that cross checking of the stated figures cannot (or will not) be undertaken. We are apparently stuck with accepting the losses stated in the japanese records as gospel truth......

2) The Pilots of the Spitfire wing were not following the advice being given in this report

3) There were other reasons at issue that was causing the high loss rate for the Spits. I suspect lack of endurance (and subsequent ditching) might be the main culprit.

1. I don't seek to keep picking at this, but you seem to insist, basically mischaracterizing my position as somehow unique to the Japanese. I've already asked you several times, and you never answered: how is this any different than the specific Spitfire losses in these specific operations we accept from their detailed combat reports of the units involved? I still haven't seen the 'cross check evidence', that's any different than Japanese case, the absolulte proof that other Spit units weren't present, or the accounting reconciliation between the losses reported in these specific combats by the Spits, and all Spitfire V production and inventory. Turning around your statement, we're 'stuck accepting the losses in Spit unit records as gospel truth'. No, we're going on the best info available, and in this case quite good info on both sides, original combat reports of the units involved, combined with solid higher level sources on each side saying they were the only units involved (as do the Japanese units reports also state).

In fact we're really tilting slightly in the Spits' favor just from the nature of a lot of their losses. We're talking the Spit combat reports at face value for non-air combat loss causes on missions in contact with the enemy, like prop problems and fuel (see 3, those are *not* counted in the numbes I gave). The pilots generally survived, and could quite plausibly have consciously or subconsicously mischaraterized the cause of their a/c's loss. In the Japanese case there are almost no such ambiguities, we're taking all 4 of the a/c lost by 202nd as combat cause. And, if more Zeroes were really shot down outright as claimed, those pilots would have had to have died. What were their names, and what training classes did they graduate from? (from the well known lists) That's a big logical obstacle that doesn't exist if somebody with the inverse of your attitude were to pointedly ask you to prove that some reported Spit fuel and prop pitch mechanism losses weren't really to Zeroes.

2. This is the big issue with 'boom and zoom' tactics instructions generally. When you make diving slashing passes at good fighter pilots, they will see you coming and turn, especially in an a/c with excellent visibliity like the Zero. Then you have to knock them down at high deflection angle, or you have to turn also. Very few pilots not intensively trained in deflection shooting could do the former reliably. The second leading P-38 ace Tommy McGuire was killed turning at low speed, as was leading P-47 ace of PTO, easier said than done, do as I say not as I do. Also, the Zero wasn't that much tremendously slower than the Spitfire in this practical case to present using hit and run tactics itself, the standard tactic of JNAF fighters as learned in China when the Zero was faster than all opponents, most common Zero tactic reported by F4F's in late 1942.

Also, the same Zero unit had flown the same missions v Darwin in 1942. In one of those combats a well executed energy attack by P-40's knocked down 5 Zeroes (really). The pilots of the 202nd (some of whom were present in both campaigns) may have thought about this and made adjustments. If we accept the historical fact which unit was involved in this operation both years and think of them as real pilots, it's quite plausible they'd have thought of a better idea how to execute the same mission a year later.

And finally on hit and run tactics, it would seem intuitively that this would be a way to escalate overclaims, staying in direct contact with the target a shorter period of time.

3. Again the losses quoted for the Spits (26 in the combats v the Zeroes) do not include known fuel exhaustion losses, and counting Spit disappearances as non-combat has a big objectivity problem when we're not counting Japanese disappearances as non-combat. A/c which disappear in contact with enemy a/c, for which there are enemy claims, are reasonably counted as air combat losses as a general rule of objective air combat analysis IMO. As to the stated Spit fuel losses we are *not* counting as combat, again this is really a bit in favor of the Spits because we don't absolutely know that those a/c didn't suffer fuel leaks from hits the pilots weren't aware of or didn't mention, IOW we don't absolutely know they weren't like the 'fuel' loss of Zero May 10 (hit in fuel tank, ran out of gas on the way back). I'm not suggesting we add the stated fuel losses of Spits to the air combat category, but I think we're barking up the wrong tree to try to massage down the Spit combat loss number*, if we're to retain any semblence of objectivity.

*except from simply better and more detailed info than Price's account which I'm quoting, that of course would be completely fair, but I doubt he's very far off.

Joe

 

[RCAFson]

To quote one of my earlier posts:

So you are claiming that the average altitude of the IJAF bombers was the same in during the P40 and Spit defence of Darwin? For example the P40s greatest success was on April 25, 1942 when 50 P40s intercepted 24 bombers escorted by 9 Zeros, with the bombers flying at 14-16000ft. Aces of the pacific, Hess, p13. Yet a year later, 34 Spitfires intercepted a raid where the "numbers were 18 bombers and 27 fighters" with the bombers at 27000ft and the fighters at 31000 ft. http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/03.pdf It's pretty obvious that these are completely different tactical situations! BTW the first encounter for P40s against Zeros over Darwin went 10-1 in the Zeros favour...of the course the tactical situation heavily favoured the Zeros, but lets not get into messy details...

The Spitfires usually, were at a rough parity in terms of numbers versus the fighter escorts, while the earlier P40 defence often had an overwhelming advantage in numbers.

 

[buffnut453]

Sorry for missing that post RCAFSon. Do you happen to know the relative altitudes of the Zeros and Spits in their engagements? This may (or may not) be an interesting avenue of discussion and may shed light on why the Spit didn't do so well against the Zero.

 

[RCAFson]

The general details of the attacks and RAAF/RAF defence can be found here:
http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/03.pdf
http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/04.pdf

I only know what I can pull from these sources.

For example on July 06 1943:

The three squadrons rendezvoused over Sattler at 6,000 feet and, wit h
Caldwell in command in the centre, were directed by the ground controller
to make for Batchelor . The enemy was then approaching the coast wel l
south of Darwin near Anson Bay at a height of 20,000 feet . The slowness
of the raiders ' approach indicated that the enemy aircraft were climbing,
therefore the Spitfires continued to climb . When they were at 32,000
feet the Spitfire pilots saw the enemy coming towards the coast over
Peron Island at a height of 29,000 feet . There were 26 enemy bombers
flying in three broad V' s. The larger V's were divided into three smaller
V's of three machines each. Some 21 fighters could be seen escorting
them. The Spitfires were between the Japanese and their target, which
seemed almost certain to be Fenton where the enemy had attacked
Liberators on the ground only a week before .
Caldwell's plan was that No . 452 Squadron should engage the fighter
escort and No . 54 Squadron make the first attack against the bombers
from head-on while No . 457 remained in reserve, flying on a parallel
course to the enemy and 7,000 feet above, where it could see what was
happening and take advantage of the battle situation as it developed .
At 11 .35 a.m. shortly after the enemy force crossed the mainland coast
Caldwell ordered No. 452 to open the attack. The enemy fighters were
now turning left and forming a defensive circle about 2,000 feet above
the bombers when "white" section of No . 452, led by Flight Lieutenant
Hall,3 engaged them . These Spitfires succeeded in shooting down two
enemy fighters while another seven were so diverted that they could no
longer interfere with other Spitfires which were about to attack the raiding
bombers. However three Spitfires were lost . Flight Lieutenant Makin4
made a forced landing when his engine failed and Sergeant Richardson
parachuted when his also failed . Flying Officer Lloyd, s hit by enemy fire ,
was also forced to parachute .
Meanwhile, Squadron Leader Gibbs, leading No . 54, had begun his
attack on the bombers, although three of his Spitfires were unable to
keep up with the others, because of the poor state of their engines, and
did not engage in the first attack. After six months ' tropical service
coupled with rapid climbs the engines were fast approaching a critical
period in their flying life and were passing the limit of efficiency . Gibbs
reported later that this position had "assumed a serious aspect quit e
suddenly because of the greatly increased activity of the enemy in this
sector during the past few weeks ". As a result, only 7 Spitfires of No . 54
engaged the bomber force of 27 enemy machines . They shot down 4 and
damaged 2, while 2 of the Spitfires were lost .
No. 457 meanwhile had held its attack and followed the enemy bomber s
towards Fenton . About twenty miles from Fenton, Caldwell ordered two
sections (eight aircraft) of this squadron to attack . Both sections were
engaged by enemy fighters but the Spitfires succeeded in shooting down
two bombers . However, three Spitfire pilots (Flying Officers Hamilton and
Robinson? and Pilot Officer McDowell) were shot down and killed .
By midday twenty machines of the enemy bomber force were over
Fenton and dropped 140 bombs on the Liberator dispersal area in spite
of anti-aircraft guns which fired eighty-eight rounds at them withou t
effect. The enemy bombs destroyed one Liberator, damaged three others ,
and damaged anti-aircraft guns and the airfield . The Spitfires continued
to attack through the anti-aircraft fire and another bomber was shot
down almost over the gunners' heads . At this stage Caldwell gave per -
mission to Squadron Leader James to attack, but James was thwarted by
four enemy fighters and forced to dive down to 15,000 feet . He climbed
again to make another attack, but was again diverted by two enemy
fighters . The bomber force was now making for the coast and Caldwell
made a lone head-on attack on a bomber just as it was crossing the coast .
When pulling up again Caldwell was engaged by one of the escorts .
Another two fighters turned in towards him and because his oxygen supply
had been exhausted he took evasive action and returned to base . Another
pilot (Pilot Officer R . W. Watson) followed the enemy twenty miles out
to sea and succeeded in damaging a bomber .
After these losses Bladin again signalled to Air Force headquarters
that it was "imperative that all Spitfires allotted this area from southern
sources be delivered immediately ". However, the raid of 6th July was the
last to be made in strength over the Darwin area, and within a few days
more Spitfires began to arrive from the south .
Meanwhile Mitchells, Hudsons, and Liberators

http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/04.pdf

The IJNAF usually flew above the bombers, so the Spitfires could only rarely achieve a useful altitude advantage over the escorts.

The extreme height of these attacks made interception difficult, and hampered the ability of the Spitifires to achieve local numerical superiority, as many aircraft dropped out due to engine problems (by mid 1943 many of the Spitfire engines were reaching the end of their service life) before intercepting and poor GCI hampered tactical coordination.


Frpm other reading I discovered that the Spitfire V trop was, new, the lowest performing Spitfire of all, and in Darwin suffered from a number of problems when trying to make very high altitude intercepts, as the cannon often froze up, the engines were worn out and the CSU on the props were not engineered for high altitude work and often ran away when the oil froze.

Tthe IJNAF losses recorded above are based upon kill claims, but the RAAF/RAF losses are accurately recorded.

 

[JoeB]

To quote one of my earlier posts:
The Spitfires usually, were at a rough parity in terms of numbers versus the fighter escorts, while the earlier P40 defence often had an overwhelming advantage in numbers.

Since you've now spread the same misinformation to two threads it has to be corrected even if it's basically off topic on this one. The raid of April 25 1942 saw 11 of 50 P-40's actually make contact with the Japanese formation which included 14 escorting Zeroes, 9 was the US side's misestimation. The bombers were flying at 8km (26k ft), which was typical, and one reason for low numbers of P-40's making contact on several of the raids, see below. See Baeza, pp. 101-103 for the correct details of this raid.

The 49th FG's combats over Australia in 1942, with numbers of fighters present and fighter losses, Darwin area v 3rd AG except as noted. Numbers of Allied a/c in contact includes contact with any enemy a/c in the attacking formation.
Source: Baeza
March 14, 1942 (Horn Island): 12 P-40's v 12 Zeroes (4th AG); 1 P-40 and 2 Zeroes lost
March 30: 8 P-40's v 12 Zeroes; 1 P-40 lost, 1 P-40 belly landed
April 4: 9 P-40's v 6 Zeroes; 2 P-40's damaged by Zeroes, downed by own AA on approach (right after Zeroes strafed the field)
April 25: 11 (making contact, of 50) P-40's v 14 Zeroes; 1 P-40 belly landed on a beach, repaired, 1 Zero lost
April 27: 23 (making contact, of 50) P-40's v 21 Zeroes, 4 P-40's
June 13: 10 (making contact, of 36) P-40's v 33 Zeroes; 3 P-40's
June 14: 12 (making contact, of 28 ) P-40's v 25 Zeroes; 1 P-40
June 15: 28 P-40's v 20 Zeroes; 2 P-40's
June 16: 16 P-40's v 24 Zeroes; 3 P-40's
July 30: 27 (making contact, of 46) P-40's v 27 Zeroes; 1 P-40, 1 Zero
August 23: 18 (making contact, of 36) P-40's v 27 Zeroes; 1 P-40, 4 Zeroes*
Total: 174 P-40 sorties in contact w/ 221 Zero sorties; 19 P-40's downed (including belly landings, not including own AA) v 8 Zeroes downed

The Spit Wing combats in 1943:
Source: Price, Baeza, kodochosho
March 2 1943: 26 Spits v 21 Zeroes (not all in contact either side, but no losses)
March 15: 19 (making contact, of 26?) Spits v 26 Zeroes; 4 Spits, 1 Zero
May 2: 28 (making contact, of 47) Spits v 26 Zeroes; 14 Spits of which at least 5 were probably directly to air combat
May 10: (Stewart Field strafing) 5 Spits v 9 Zeroes; 1Spit crashlanded, 2 Zeroes
May 28: (Stewart Field) 6 Spits v 7 Zeroes; 2 Spits
June 20: (raid by JAAF)
June 28: 39 (making contact, of 42) Spits v 27 Zeroes; 2 Spits
June 30: 38 Spits v 27 Zeroes ; 5 Spits combat+2 engine failure
July 6: 33 (making contact of 36?) Spits v 27 Zeroes ; 6 Spits combat+ 2 engine failure
Sept 7: 48 Spits v 36 Zeroes; 3 Spits, 1 Zero
Total 242 Spit sorties in contact w/ 201 Zero sorties, 28 Spits air combat loss/crashlanding only** v 4 Zeroes downed

The Spit didn't prove itself superior to the P-40 in fighter combat in this case, which was my original point on topic in the other thread, as one explanation why the Soviet opinion of the superiority of the P-39 to the Spit V, in another set of specific circumstances, was not totally beyond Allied experience. Note, if you need a lesson in basic logic, that statement doesn't directly equate to 'the P-40 proved itself superior in this case'.

* earlier, I said 5 Zeroes lost Aug 23 based on old notes on the Kagero series book "3rd/202nd AG". Baeza says 4. I checked the kodochosho (C08051626300 pp.31-32). The disagreement might be about a 5th a/c which returned shot up, hit 12 times, …hmm but now that we're looking at a *US* air unit's claims maybe we're not looking for 'understatements' of losses in the Japanese records anymore. Let's call it 4!
**ISTR on an earlier thread *legitimate* debate with real sources by Wlidcat IIRC, not instant google/spamming, which quibbled with this total within a couple of a/c.

Joe

 

[buffnut453]

Joe,

Thanks for that really useful info - it's a very positive contribution to the discussion. Per my earlier post, do we have any data on the relative altitudes of the Zeros vs the P-40s and Spits in these engagements? I suspect the answer will either be a negative or, at best, limited to a percentage of the total engagements. However, I'd still be interested in learning what part altitude may have played in the engagements.

Kind regards,
Mark

 

[RCAFson]

Since you've now spread the same misinformation to two threads it has to be corrected even if it's basically off topic on this one. The raid of April 25 1942 saw 11 of 50 P-40's actually make contact with the Japanese formation which included 14 escorting Zeroes, 9 was the US side's misestimation. The bombers were flying at 8km (26k ft), which was typical, and one reason for low numbers of P-40's making contact on several of the raids, see below. See Baeza, pp. 101-103 for the correct details of this raid.

You are neglecting the 8 or 9 P40s lost, against 1 Zero loss on Feb 19.

The next three weeks passed quietly before the Japanese attempted strike another blow at Darwin, and its defending airfields. By this time, three squadrons of the 49th PG would be ready and waiting for the the attack came on Anzac Day, 25 April, celebrated as a holiday Australia to commemorate the part its forces played in the Gallup campaign in 1915. Under the able leadership of Lt Col Paul Wurtsmith the 49th put up 50 P-40s in the early afternoon to intercept enemy bombers detected by radar approaching from the former Allied base Koepang, on Timor Island. One of the P-40 pilots was Java veteran Jim Morehead, leading the Yellow Flight of the 8th PS. He wrote this account of the action that ensued;

'Climbing offshore, my flight was to the east, with Capt (Mitche Sims' flight to the west. We were all moving past Melville Island, north the mainland. We were approaching the service ceiling of the P-40, and I was offshore about 25, miles when I saw a large Procession or enemy bombers below us at about 16,000 ft. I had rarely seen their bomber below us before this. I called Cap Sims and asked if he wanted to make, the attack, or should I. I was nearer the enemy formation than Capt Sims was, and it was logical that I make the attack. To my great relief he said to go ahead. Recently, we had received a report of Japanese pilots doing aerobatics over PorT Moresby, New Guinea, for the benefit of our airmen there. I decided to do the same for the benefit of the Japanese airmen assembled below, and to build confidence in my green troops who, as yet, had seen no combat. As I built up speed in a slight dive, I did a slow roll, and continued rolling into the attack on a quartering angle off the port bow. The Zeros were speeding to cut us off, but they were too late.

I was approaching good range now. I led the lead bomber by about five ship-lengths, and with a little elevation I opened fire. My lead was exactly right as my tracers fed into the nose of the lead bomber. I held the trigger down all the way in on the pass until I had to pull off. The lead bomber appeared to be smoking from both engines. I then did a high-speed steep turn to the left, back into the formation. This was the one opportunity I had to charge into the Jap bombers at a decent altitude where the P40 Performed well. I blacked out in the turn but couldn't have timed it better. I came out on the tail of the bomber, to within 50 yards of him..."

P40 Warhawk Aces of the Pacific, p29-30.

So the above is a first hand account of the April 25 intercept and the pilot makes it very clear that the bombers were not at 26000 ft.

First priority naturally went to the defense of Allied bases, a burden which fell upon the fighter units at Moresby and Darwin. Over both points the enemy bombers usually came in at 22,000 feet and above, too high for satisfactory interception by P-40's, P-39's, or P-400's, the only fighters available to the AAF in the Southwest Pacific, and their limitations seriously affected Allied operations.64 During July the P-39 had made contact with enemy bombers only four times in a series of nine raids despite a thirty-minute warning; in sixteen actual contacts it never once enjoyed an altitude advantage and the Zero invariably could outclimb and outmaneuver this fighter, which suffered the additional disadvantage of increased vulnerability because of the location of its motor behind the pilot. The P-40 was somewhat better, but it, too, was outperformed by the more nimble enemy fighters, particularly at high altitudes. Inferior performance of their planes lowered the morale of the pilots.65 It was true that the Allied planes were more rugged and less inflammable, they could outdive the Zero, and if given warning to permit them to reach sufficient altitude they could achieve creditable scores, as they did on 30 July over Darwin when twenty-seven P-40's shot down six Zeros and two bombers at the cost of one P-40.66 But pilots continued to be frustrated, as on 17 August, when for the seventy-eighth time enemy bombers struck Moresby in an attempt to disable their favorite target, Seven-Mile Airdrome. Although defending fighters had received adequate warning, they were unable to intercept.

HyperWar: The Army Air Forces in WWII: Vol. IV--The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan [Chapter 1]

This site has some info as well, but is a bit short on specifics.
Darwin's Few

Total: 174 P-40 sorties in contact w/ 221 Zero sorties; 19 P-40's downed (including belly landings, not including own AA) v 8 Zeroes downed
Total 242 Spit sorties in contact w/ 201 Zero sorties, 28 Spits air combat loss/crashlanding only** v 4 Zeroes downed

What about the bombers? Wasn't shooting down the bombers the whole point of these intercepts?

 

[claidemore]

Good question RCAFson,

"What about the bombers? Wasn't shooting down the bombers the whole point of these intercepts?"

AFAIK CMIIW, in BoB, the loss ratio in fighters favored the 109 (vs the Hurricane and Spitfire), but the loss ratio in total aircraft (fighters and bombers) favored the RAF. Mission type has a lot to do with it.

 

[Wildcat]

Joe, a minor correction to your figures. The June 28 raid was opposed by only 457 sqn with a total of 16 aircraft, the other squadron's failed to make contact.

To add to the Spitfire losses, here is a list I have compiled from the various ORB's. Take from it what you will.

15 Mar 43
Sgt Cooper - AR620 – 54 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/Sgt Varney –AR619 – 54 sqn – crashed after enemy action – DOW
S/L Thorold-Smith – BS231 – 452 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/O Lloyd – BS293 – 452 sqn – shot down – bailed out – pilot OK

2 May 43
F/O Farries – BR239 - 54 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
F/O Wall - BR572 - 54 sqn – ran out of fuel – bailed out – pilot OK
F/O Taylor – BS220 - 54 sqn – ran out of fuel – crashed short of airstrip – pilot OK
Sgt Spencer – BR536 - 54 sqn – ran out of fuel – force landed on beach – pilot OK
Sgt Cavangh – BR480 - 54 sqn – engine problems (before combat) – force landed on beach – pilot Ok
Sgt Fox – BS221 - 54 sqn – engine problems (before combat) – bailed out – pilot OK
F/O Goldsmith – BR526 – 452 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
P/O Fox – BS225 – 452 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
Sgt Nichterlein – BS226 – 452 sqn – force landed – pilot OK
F/O McNab – BS162 – 452 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/L Makin – BS191 – 452 sqn – force landed – pilot Ok
Sgt Stagg – BR547 – 452 sqn – engine failure – bailed out – pilot Ok
F/Sgt Hardwick – 457 sqn – engine over revved – bailed out – pilot Ok
F/O Gifford – 457 sqn – shot down – KIA

10 May 43
P/O Little – 457 sqn – hit ground whilst dog fighting – pilot Ok

28 May 43
F/O Blake – 457 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/OBeale – 457 sqn – shot down - KIA

20 Jun 43 – JAAF raid
F/O Hughes – JG795 - 54 sqn – force landed on beach – pilot OK
F/Sgt Rowe – BS174 – 452 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/O Mawer – BR548 – 452 sqn – crash landed due to enemy action – pilot OK
Sgt Nichterlein – EE607 – 452 sqn – shot down - KIA


28 Jun 43
F/O Cowell – EE608 – 452 sqn – force landed on beach due to glycol leak – pilot OK
F/O Halse - 457 sqn – engine over revved – crash landed – pilot Ok
F/O Clark – 457 sqn – crash landed after enemy action – pilot OK

30 Jun 43
P/O Wellsman – BR528 - 54 sqn – shot down – KIA
Sgt Laundy – BR490 - 54 sqn – crashed after combat – pilot OK
Sgt Holmes – BR530 – 54 sqn – crashed after combat – pilot OK
F/Sgt Harker – EE670 – 54 sqn – crashed after combat – pilot OK
F/O Lamerton – BR241 – 452 sqn – crash landed due to glycol leak – KIA
F/Sgt Cross – BR456 – 452 sqn – force landed due to enemy action – pilot Ok
F/Sgt Duncan – AR523 – 452 sqn – glycol leak – bailed out – pilot Ok

6 Jul 43
F/O Hinds – BR495 - 54 sqn – force landed due to glycol leak (before combat) – pilot OK
F/Sgt Wickman –JG731 – 54 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
F/L Makin – BS193 – 452 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
F/O Lloyd – BR549 – 452 sqn – shot down – bailed out – pilot OK
Sgt Richardson – BR237 – 452 sqn – engine failure – bailed out – pilot Ok
F/O Hamilton – 457 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/O Robinson – 457 sqn – shot down – KIA
P/O McDowell – 457 sqn – shot down - KIA

7 Sep 43
F/O Hinds - EF558 – 54 sqn – shot down – KIA
S/L McDonald – LZ884 – 452 sqn – shot down – bailed out – pilot Ok
P/O Tully – 452 sqn – shot down – bailed out – pilot OK

 

[Njaco]

I was thinking the same thing Claide - split between types instead of totals and BoB looks alittle different.

 

[billswagger]

I have yet to locate the actual report, ( National Archives of Australia) but there is a RAAF test out there that shows the differences in performance between the Tropical Spitfire and the P-40, and although the Spitfire was more maneuverable, the P-40 was said to be both faster in level speed and in acceleration up to 16,000ft and easily out dove the Spitfire from tests at 20,000ft.
At 20kft the Spitfire easily gained the advantage with in a minute of engagement, but in all cases the P-40 had the choice to break engagement by simply diving away.

In other words, the faster plane is going to control the fight, or at least have a better choice as when to engage and disengage. This seems to have been a true component of the Spit vs P-40 match up, and so i don't see how a Zero vs P-40 match up would be any different so long as the height of the fight was not too high.

The report concluded by recommending that as the large Volkes air filter on the Spitfire cost 20-30mph in top speed, it should be removed in operational service - or at least an alternative found.
There are several comparisons done by the RAAF comparing the Trop Spit and the Regular Spit that also validate this claim although the difference in speed is not as significant.
In reference to the P-40 reports its possible that the speed advantage particularly in dives was a lot less between the Spitfire and Zero, meaning that pilots had less control over when to disengage as they might using a P-40.

The problem was getting a plane that could fly high enough to be a useful fighter above 20,000ft and the spitfire was really the only fighter available at the time, but diving to escape was probably less of an option for a Spitfire, my guess.



Bill

 

[buffnut453]

Interesting stuff Bill. You're points are exactly in-line with my question about the relative altitudes of the opposing forces during the engagements. The Spit's speed and ability to disengage would be markedly reduced if they were climbing to reach the Zeros. It's all about energy and the ability to convert potential energy (altitude) to speed (kinetic energy) as rapidly as possible. It seems from your post that the P-40 was better able to do this than the MkV Spit with the speed-sapping Vokes filter.

Regards,
Mark

 

[parsifal]

From Wildcats figures I count 46 losses in that three month period. We still do not have any reasons as to why the loss rates were so heavy. That incidentally is more than twwo thirds of the original force structure. I count a total of 654 Spits being delivered, which includes RAAF spits operating in Europe.

At least in late 1942, RAF 54 sqn was also based in Darwin. There were three sqns from the RAAF that I know of.

My source (Lynch, Parnell, Odgers as well as otes taken from Department of defence aircraft status cards from the aircraft historical section of the war meorial) reveals a total of 30 aircraft lost March through to the end of May for the following sqns, 2, 18, 31, 54, 452 and 457. That time period is not the same as Wildcats, which is over a longer period. In that period for operations in the theatre, including offensive operations over enemy territory. I dont think the figures include non-combat losses, but then a ditching due to running out of fuel is classified as a combat loss. The 46 claimed enemy a/c is everything, bombers, fighters, army and navy. For the record, Oscars, Dinahs, Sallies Helens are all Japanese Army types, whilst Bettys, Nells, Petes and Zekes are all Navy aircraft

 

[billswagger]

Interesting stuff Bill. You're points are exactly in-line with my question about the relative altitudes of the opposing forces during the engagements. The Spit's speed and ability to disengage would be markedly reduced if they were climbing to reach the Zeros. It's all about energy and the ability to convert potential energy (altitude) to speed (kinetic energy) as rapidly as possible. It seems from your post that the P-40 was better able to do this than the MkV Spit with the speed-sapping Vokes filter.

Regards,
Mark

I think top speeds can be misleading figures anyway considering most aircraft require at least a minute or two to reach such speeds from a level cruise. In combat there isn't that much time to accelerate in an emergency situation.
Despite the disparities in speed, the spitfire (as oppose to a P-40) was still more dominant in the vertical which is probably what would make it more competitive as a fighter all around. I think in the case of the Zero vs Spitfire, the performance gap was too narrow so that ultimately the fight resided on positioning and speeds from the start of the engagements.
Loss records can be telling, but i don't think you could decipher one plane over the other because of the factors mentioned. Its different fighting a 1v1 engagement than having to fight a battle, however it was clear the Zero could out turn the Spit and so turn battles were no longer an option for spit pilots.

Bill