Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero

[JoeB]

You are neglecting the 8 or 9 P40s lost, against 1 Zero loss on Feb 19.

So the above is a first hand account of the April 25 intercept and the pilot makes it very clear that the bombers were not at 26000 ft.

What about the bombers? Wasn't shooting down the bombers the whole point of these intercepts?

The bombers on April 25 came in at 8km per their own records. In fact only 11 P-40's could make contact. Also in some of the 1943 raids the bomberswere lower by the time they bombed, or the time they left. The basic point you made by insisting on posting that same misleading info on two threads was, that the P-40's enjoyed numerical superiority the Spits didn't, which is simply not true. If you don't acknowledge you had bad info on that point, why should anyone follow you along to some other 'but what about this' type of point, where you also just throw up so more old sources linked from web, then it's up to somebody else to correct those or show how they aren't representative?

The P-40's in Feb 19 had no radar warning, and opposed large carrier groups. *That's* actually different than the 1942 and 1943 escorted raids (radar installation March 1942). But again, go back to the actual point and stop flailing around throwing everything on the wall to see what sticks. I said the Spit didn't prove itself superior in Darwin defense of '43 compared to '42. So you would either argue that it *did* prove itself superior and explain how, or acknowledge the point.

If we just want to dredge up every over P-40 v Zero engagement, we'd also have to count engagements in New Guinea and Solomons in late 42-early 43 where the kill ratio was about 1:1 or even a bit better for the P-40's etc. The 49th FG when it moved to New Guinea in fall of 42 for example had about parity ratio with Zeroes, that's still before the Spits (in terms of path of decline of the JNAF fighter force), and no more dissimilar situation to the escorted twin bomber Darwin raids than the Feb 19 carrier raid was. But I didn't count that, because I'm trying to make a serious objective analysis with the best sources I can find, comparing the *closest* (nothing is ever exactly the same) case that exists. You OTOH obviously are 'son' of a particular air arm or family or air arms and trying to be cheerleader for those with whatever links you can find and whateever arguments you can shoehorn in.

Joe

 

[RCAFson]

The bombers on April 25 came in at 8km per their own records.

We have a very clear account from a USAAF pilot who states that the bombers were at 16000ft. The most likely explanation is a translation error and that the "8" in 8km should read "5" as in 5km, which is about 16000ft. I wonder how many other mistakes have been made?

Also, what about the bomber kills?

 

[JoeB]

My source (Lynch, Parnell, Odgers as well as otes taken from Department of defence aircraft status cards from the aircraft historical section of the war meorial) reveals a total of 30 aircraft lost March through to the end of May for the following sqns, 2, 18, 31, 54, 452 and 457. That time period is not the same as Wildcats, which is over a longer period. In that period for operations in the theatre, including offensive operations over enemy territory. I dont think the figures include non-combat losses, but then a ditching due to running out of fuel is classified as a combat loss.

OK, so you don't know what were combat and non-combat losses, and don't even know what the total representes, from this 'cross check'. How does that really verify the specifics of loss causes on particular days in the units records? (see below if that first sentence comes on too strong, I am *not* criticizing the presentation of new info). We are in fact relying on those Spit unit records to count losses exactly by incident and classify their cause.

I've been through this debate in other cases, like for example Korean War where I've done a lot more primary record research than about Pacific War. In fact getting more into reading Japanese books and records was really a spin off for me of learning to read Chinese writing, which I did to better understand captured NK documents from the KW (many men still wrote in mixed Chinese/Korean alphabetic style at that time, not pure Korean alphabets tyle as common now), and Chinese accounts. The Korean debate is very similar, people looking at it with sense of 'ownership' from either Russian or international 'skeptical of the US as part of personal identity' type worldview. How do you *prove* the US units records of particular combats don't just omit losses. There is to some degree a back up 'cross check' of invidual a/c records, but fact is they aren't a perfect duplicate path of proof of each loss and its cause. And why would you believe USAF individual a/c record cards if you really believe then secret unit combat diaries are fudged? There is also the sheer cumulation of the same data appearing in various types of USAF records and reports (mountains of it), but if, rather than just reading Baeza and JACAR online kodochosho, we went in person to the National Institute of Defense Studies in Tokyo, we could almost surely access other record types with same basic story as the kodochosho (this has been shown to my satisfaction by other researchers in other campaigns, like individual record that clarified the cause of loss of a Zero at Midway where it's ambiguous in kodochosho; JACAR is ongoing effort, far from all J records available there).

Same issue here, both with your RAAF 'cross check' and refusal to accept original then-secret IJN unit combat diaries, or anyway tendency to hold them at arm's length like a dead rat (well Joe says, well I guess we 'might' be 'stuck' with this, etc ) The basic issue to 'other side loss skeptics' in any air war is to show cases where *then secret unit records* are proven to be knowing falsehoods by some other source, when it comes to their own losses, especially outright losses on missions 500 miles from base. I still know of *no* case in any country where that's been shown. And that's basically what we are relying on in either case, RAAF or IJN, USAF or Soviet AF. If real cases of phoney original combat diaries placed in records were common it wouldn't be all that convincing that you (or I or anyone) could find a back up record, by the same people!, showing a somewhat similar number of losses where we weren't sure what it included. That's not to criticize the presentation of additional facts, but I don't see the implied contrast with the Japanese situation. What you presented, what exists AFAIK, in RAAF records is no more immune to absolute skepticism than what's in Japanese records, though unreasonable skepticism in either case IMO, as far as whether those records tell the bulk of the story.

Joe

 

[JoeB]

We have a very clear account from a USAAF pilot who states that the bombers were at 16000ft. The most likely explanation is a translation error and that the "8" in 8km should read "5" as in 5km, which is about 16000ft. I wonder how many other mistakes have been made?

Also, what about the bomber kills?

No translation error, as I said the bombers could reduce altitude as they came in for runs, but the fact is only 11 P-40's intercepted. Your point was that P-40's enjoyed 'overwhelmingly numerical superiority' in thos raids and that's a seriously wrong statement. Whatever arguments about who made contact in particular cases (though crystal clear in April 25) case, the 1942 and 1943 interecpting forces enjoyed broadly comparable numerical odds, and it's bending things in the Spit direction to even say that.

We might discuss bomber kills if you show yourself a serious person by admitting you were mistaken about the fighter numbers point you made *twice*. If OTOH you don't believe the info I gave on relative numbers, what's the point of giving other info you ask for?

Joe

 

[RCAFson]

No translation error, as I said the bombers could reduce altitude as they came in for runs, but the fact is only 11 P-40's intercepted. Your point was that P-40's enjoyed 'overwhelmingly numerical superiority' in thos raids and that's a seriously wrong statement. Whatever arguments about who made contact in particular cases (though crystal clear in April 25) case, the 1942 and 1943 interecpting forces enjoyed broadly comparable numerical odds, and it's bending things in the Spit direction to even say that.

We might discuss bomber kills if you show yourself a serious person by admitting you were mistaken about the fighter numbers point you made *twice*. If OTOH you don't believe the info I gave on relative numbers, what's the point of giving other info you ask for?

Joe

I'm sorry but it is obvious that you made a mistake, and refuse to admit that your source is incorrect. My statement regrading 50 P40s intercepting was based upon information from reputable sources. Now you try to fudge things and state that the bombers reduced altitude, but the simple fact is that the interception was made at 16000ft. Why should we believe the rest of your source when it is wrong about such a fundamental part of the engagement?

In any event, it was the bombers that the fighters were after, so it seems silly to withhold the bomber kills. although hopefully they are accurately recorded.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I'm sorry but it is obvious that you made a mistake, and refuse to admit that your source is incorrect. My statement regrading 50 P40s intercepting was based upon information from reputable sources. Now you try to fudge things and state that the bombers reduced altitude, but the simple fact is that the interception was made at 16000ft. Why should we believe the rest of your source when it is wrong about such a fundamental part of the engagement?

Please state...

 

[RCAFson]

Please state...

49th Fighter Group: Aces of the Pacific
By William N. Hess.
P13: "on 25 April - Anzac day - 50 P40s from all three squadrons intercepted 24 bombers, escorted by 9 Zeros, in the largest Japanese raid on Darwin in months...Morehead reported: I took off and climbed to 19000ft and sighted about 24 twin engined bombers escorted by a number of Zeros. The bombers were headed out to sea, and my flight happened to have the altitude on the accompanying flight, so I dived (bombers being at 14000ft) and intercepted the enemy at the tip of Melville Island..."

The other source was:

P40 Warhawk Aces of the Pacific, by Carl Molesworth, p29-30. In post 73 I quoted an extract from this book as well.

 

[parsifal]

Joe

I wasnt cross checking anything from your posts. I am askingthe question as to why RAAF spitfire losses were so high. I think the posts by Billswagger and Buffnut go some way to looking at why they were not that successful,, as well as your comment about how it is reasonable to expect the zero jockeys with experience to adapt to the boom and zoom tactics.

I think you are over-reacting to my comments about cross checking, and appear convinced that I dont trust Japanese records, and somehow do trust allied records. Its just that your figures dont seem to synchronise with other (secondary) published figures. I was interested in your response, but it obviously hit a nerve I can see.

As far as not knowing the difference between a combat and a non-combat loss, what are you getting at? Sometimes losses can be referred to a operational and non-operational, perhaps its better to describe ditching as a n operational loss?

 

[JoeB]

My statement regrading 50 P40s intercepting was based upon information from reputable sources.

Well you're not *quite* claiming that wrong info is right anymore, that's something I guess, but still two major problems:

-whether or not 'reputable', old purely one sided works by authors like Hess are wrong about a lot of points. I have 'Pacific Sweep' and Hess says basically the same thing in that book. I read the book many years ago, and I accepted the spare statements in it, Hess covers most missions in a few sentences, as provisional facts in the absence of a more complete and detailed treatment. But I surely wouldn't use such a book now as 'reputable source' to challenge the results in a newer study which is describing the missions over several *pages* each from both sides*. I would have to call myself an ignoramus if I did that, that's all I'll say.

-moreover *you* not Hess, cherry picked one mistaken example into a general statement that the P-40's 'often had overwhelming numerical superiority'. Now you seem to want to imply you were only relying on the 'reputable' Hess (to make a generalization he never made), or just tap dance furiously away to any other aspect of the topic you possibly can.

*one reason Hess' implication that all 50 P-40's intercepted April 25 '42 is obviously wrong is that the Japanese records also don't say they were engaged by lots of P-40's that day.

Joe

 

[JoeB]

Joe
1. Its just that your figures dont seem to synchronise with other (secondary) published figures. I was interested in your response, but it obviously hit a nerve I can see.

2. As far as not knowing the difference between a combat and a non-combat loss, what are you getting at? Sometimes losses can be referred to a operational and non-operational, perhaps its better to describe ditching as a n operational loss?

1. You've said this or something like it several times, but still never explained what other figures exist for the Japanese combat losses over Darwin besides the Allied claims and losses the Japanese reported (as I've given). The figures which have appeared in one-sided English language books are in all cases AFAIK simply what the Allies claimed. Japanese secondary sources have quoted what the Japanese claimed for Allied losses (79 enemy a/c plus 22 probable for 202nd AG in 1943 campaign), same same.

Again if you have in mind, and can show, some set of Japanese loss figures which is independent of what Allied pilots claimed, and different from the Japanese reported losses, my curiosity would be intense, maybe that seems like touching a nerve. But I honestly can't imagine what that would be, and as covered before, I just don't see any contradiction between known Japanese cumulative losses over the whole war, and losing just a few Zeroes over Darwin in '43: they obviously suffered much more heavily in other campaigns, to other causes (as when their a/f's were in range of Allied strikes, especially) other types of a/c, in many other cases over the whole war. I'm just trying to understand what these 'other figures' are which, it's suggested, call into question what the units records say in some solidly logical way.

2. My only point was that if you don't know what the figures you quoted include (which you seemed to say), then those data might be interesting pieces of the puzzle but hardly prove anything independently of the unit records

And again, the counts of Spit losses I've given have always excluded known fuel losses as non-air combat, The rub with fuel losses in combat is the issue with the May 10 '43 Zero loss, they could be caused by holes punched in fuel tanks, and pilots might not be aware of it, or this is the sort of case where records actually *might* be fudged a bit (though it clearly says in 202nd kodochosho that that Zero took a hit causing a leak, just like the Allied photo shows), but again I don't know that that happened to any of the 'fuel' loss Spits, so I'm not assuming it.

Joe

 

[RCAFson]

Well you're not *quite* claiming that wrong info is right anymore, that's something I guess, but still two major problems:

-whether or not 'reputable', old purely one sided works by authors like Hess are wrong about a lot of points. I have 'Pacific Sweep' and Hess says basically the same thing in that book. I read the book many years ago, and I accepted the spare statements in it, Hess covers most missions in a few sentences, as provisional facts in the absence of a more complete and detailed treatment. But I surely wouldn't use such a book now as 'reputable source' to challenge the results in a newer study which is describing the missions over several *pages* each from both sides*. I would have to call myself an ignoramus if I did that, that's all I'll say.

-moreover *you* not Hess, cherry picked one mistaken example into a general statement that the P-40's 'often had overwhelming numerical superiority'. Now you seem to want to imply you were only relying on the 'reputable' Hess (to make a generalization he never made), or just tap dance furiously away to any other aspect of the topic you possibly can.

*one reason Hess' implication that all 50 P-40's intercepted April 25 '42 is obviously wrong is that the Japanese records also don't say they were engaged by lots of P-40's that day.

Joe

Morehead stated that he intercepted at 14-16000 ft. I can understand that a pilot can be a bit fuzzy about precise details, but his statements seem to corroborate a medium altitude intercept. Again, both sources can't be right.

I didn't "cherry pick" anything. I picked a date where the P40s claimed to be very successful and where the altitude and numbers were clearly stated. Other altitudes mentioned:

Molesworth:
April 04

10 p40s ( 4 airborne and 6 scrambled) intercept 6 bombers and similar number of fighters. it goes on to state that 2 G4M were shot down at "11000 ft." p28

This and the April 25 combat, are the only one that mention altitude and specific numbers.



Hess:
on page 17 there is also mention of another raid at 23000 ft, but no numbers given.

on page 19 records a combat on June 16th, where 36 P40 intercepted 27 bombers and 15 zeros. A pilot
recounts that he led his flight to 29000ft to get above the bombers which were at 23000ft.

on page 22, July 30, bombers at 3000ft and zeros at 5000ft

page 24, Aug 23, states the bombers were at 25000ft, which is the highest altitude mentioned.

 

[parsifal]

Hi Joe


Your last post to me is a misrepresentation of my point. As I recall it began with me saying I had my doubts about your figures. this is not an isolated position that you have taken. Every time a discussion comes up about Japanese losses, you jump in, boots and all, to say just how wrong the allied claims are, and that Japanese losses are grossly overstated. I am asking the obvious question, after joining the dots from this thread, and others like it where you consistently say just how low Japanese losses really are . if Japanese losses are so low in every sample you care to talk about, is it not reasonable to assume that your research suggests that for the whole war, Japanese losses are being overstated. you have not been willing to go there, I suspect because it exposes your research to the obvious question "well, if losses are so low across the board, where did all the production and new pilots end up????' your reply to that is evasive, and dismissive, "oh it happened somewhere else" Okay, but if not in those sample engagements that you are willing to talk about, then where??? You refuse to go there, for reasons known to yourself.

I then had the temerity to suggest that perhaps your "ground up" reseach methods might be faulty.....a variation of "its easy to miss the foresst because your too busy looking at the leaves". you basically exploded at that point, essentially saying there is no "big picture" to look at. Thats not what other researchers believe, but the discussion seems at that point to reduce to farcical proportions, because you insist that its your way or the highway.....can i suggest that people dont take kindly to that sort of treatment, and further suggest it might be why you encounter so much resistance to your claims despite the obvious depth of knowledge that you possess

Finally after provisionally accepting the figures you suggest, "holding it arms length like a dead rat" as you put it, you seem to lose all self control because I suggest that the japanese records may not be completely accurate. I give parrallel examples of more well known deceptions, not just secret records, and point out that the japanese have a fundamentally different attitude to losses and defeat, equating these outcomes with dishonour. I suggested that it might be possible for such deceptions to occur even at a tactical level, to which your response was basically to say how dare i suggest the japanese records might not be completely accurate and why would they lie in the secret documents. I never said i had alternative records....if you check back on the relevant posts, I asked you if this might be a possibility, and if it was a possibility how that might be addressed. I tend to believe you about the records being unlikely to be wrong, but it remains a possibility, because it has not been refuted, and ther is this irritating thing in the back of my mind concerning the overll loss rates compared to those that you believe in. I never did get anything like an adequate answer to that, but concluded from your response that you could not, and were unprepred in any case to undertake such a further analysis.

I thought "fair enough Ill leave it at that", and was moving away from further discourse with you, as it was obvious that your discussions with me were not causing you any joy. So I moved away, deliberately avoiding direct conversation with you. That doesnt mean I have to accept your position, or that I need to discuss the issue further with you. You decided however that you wanted to continue this discussion, and start to lecture me about how wrong i am. You may be right, but you dont seem to care that perhaps we have reached the limit of intelligent debate on this issue, and are beginning to move into rough water from this point.

 

[Njaco]

we have reached the limit of intelligent debate on this issue, and are beginning to move into rough water from this point.

Very well put and lets move on.

 

[Freebird]

Joe

I am askingthe question as to why RAAF spitfire losses were so high.?

Yes I'm curious too.

Joe, what's the crux of your opinion on the Pacific airwar comparing Commonwealth vs US results?

Were the P-40 Wildcat just better aircraft to fight the Japanese vs Spitfire Hurricane?

Or were the CW not as good as US? Inexperienced pilots? Poor training? Poor tactics?
Poor planning on choice of missions?
What was the reason for the disparity?

 

[RCAFson]

Morehead stated that he intercepted at 14-16000 ft. I can understand that a pilot can be a bit fuzzy about precise details, but his statements seem to corroborate a medium altitude intercept. Again, both sources can't be right.

I didn't "cherry pick" anything. I picked a date where the P40s claimed to be very successful and where the altitude and numbers were clearly stated. Other altitudes mentioned:

Molesworth:
April 04

10 p40s ( 4 airborne and 6 scrambled) intercept 6 bombers and similar number of fighters. it goes on to state that 2 G4M were shot down at "11000 ft." p28

This and the April 25 combat, are the only one that mention altitude and specific numbers.



Hess:
on page 17 there is also mention of another raid at 23000 ft, but no numbers given.

on page 19 records a combat on June 16th, where 36 P40 intercepted 27 bombers and 15 zeros. A pilot
recounts that he led his flight to 29000ft to get above the bombers which were at 23000ft.

on page 22, July 30, bombers at 3000ft and zeros at 5000ft

page 24, Aug 23, states the bombers were at 25000ft, which is the highest altitude mentioned.

16
11
23
23
3
25
----
101/6 = 17000 ft average altitude for the 49th FG intercepts, according to the sample given by Hess and Molesworth.

Altitude of Spitfire intercepts:
2 may 20k
28may 20k
20june 27k + 2
30 june 20k
4th july 29 k
------------------
118/6= 20000 average

The Spitfire squadrons had lost 44 aircraft in their six months of operations
although only 17 of these losses had been directly due to enemy
action . By comparison enemy losses at the hands of the Spitfires had bee n
63 destroyed and another 13 probably destroyed . The Spitfire squadrons
had been below strength after a period of intense action in late June an d
early July, but replacements had come from the south during the month ,
and there were no further losses in action because the Japanese raid s
had ceased. Indeed, by the end of July, enemy activity in the air was
almost at a standstill

http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/07.pdf

 

[JoeB]

Hi Joe
1. Every time a discussion comes up about Japanese losses, you jump in, boots and all, to say just how wrong the allied claims are, and that Japanese losses are grossly overstated.

2. if Japanese losses are so low in every sample you care to talk about, is it not reasonable to assume that your research suggests that for the whole war, Japanese losses are being overstated. you have not been willing to go there, I suspect because it exposes your research to the obvious question "well, if losses are so low across the board, where did all the production and new pilots end up????' your reply to that is evasive, and dismissive, "oh it happened somewhere else" Okay, but if not in those sample engagements that you are willing to talk about, then where??? You refuse to go there, for reasons known to yourself.

3. Thats not what other researchers believe,

4. I give parrallel examples of more well known deceptions, not just secret records, and point out that the japanese have a fundamentally different attitude to losses and defeat, equating these outcomes with dishonour. .

1. I don't think it's jumping in boots and all to add information if available, when people even now 65 years on, quote *anybody's* aerial claims in WWII as if facts without reference to the other side's accounts. If you do a comprehensive search you'll find it's by no means limited to Japanese losses. Consistent pattern: everyone once confronted with that truism, claims aren't reliable, says 'oh yeah I know that', but many would still clearly prefer to believe 'their guys' claims were only moderately overstated, and have a degree of personal irritation when others insist it's not the case in a particular situation, from all evidence at least.

2. We've been over this a few times, and I gave examples, that are obvious enough, of Japanese fighter losses a lot heavier than one single Air Group's 4 Zero losses flying a relatively few missions in 6 months over Darwin. The JNAF lost for example 188 Zeroes (to all causes, land and carrier based) in only a 3+ month period at Guadalcanal; 107 of those from landbased units whose average order of battle strength was nowhere near a 100, IOW well over 100% losses v the average strength in a pretty short time, very much in contrast to the typical early 1942 ops, and also in contrast to the 202nd's experience over Darwin. So we just keep going around on this where you say 'well if this was the typical Japanese figher loss rate...' but what it was, was somewhat typical of JNAF fighter ops in early 42, but very atypical ofJNAF fighter ops from late '42 on, and nearly unheard of for '44-45; and again the air war got bigger in '44-'45. That's not vague and evasive, that's the basic well known big picture of the Pacific air war. The Darwin 1943 episode fits in with the early cases, as perhaps the last operation where a JNAF fighter unit had consistent dominance over an Allied one, but it wasn't the first time, and some case had to be last.

As to where did all the JNAF pilots go, the list of 'key' pilot KIA by incident in appendix of Hata/Izawa "Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in WWII" is pretty complete where I've checked it v records, as I have for all of 1942 in New Guinea. The few pilots absent from that list are generally low ranking (hence not 'key'), but their names generally still appear in the lists in same book of each JNAF training class, with (K) parenthetically, later killed. Even in 42-43 period (where surviving JNAF records tend to be pretty complete) the 3 pilot KIA's of the 202nd over Darwin in 1943 are a very small % of the total in the incident by incident list.

3. This is the standing question you haven't answered: *which* researchers ever tabulated losses for the Japanese over Darwin other than either what the Allies claimed or what the Japanese reported (as I've related from published and primary sources)?

4. The whole point is that your supposed other examples do not show any cases where the records themselves tell a clear and specific story, of particular units involved and their losses, but some other source proves the losses were really higher than that. And that's the evidence we have here: detailed original records.

Arguing based on broad statements about countries' cultures is not logically valid IMO. We could as easily say the scrappy Aussies, proud of their military prowess in general, fudged their records of losses because it was unbearable to be on the losing end against the 'Jap' fighters so long after the Americans, whose military prowess the Aussies liked to think was generally inferior to theirs, had apparently been doing better. That would be a blood boilingly ridiculous argument if I were making it seriously, but it's pretty much equivalent to 'the Japanese view of defeat' and extrapolating that to fudged Japanese records you apparently have no evidence of.

You have to show errors in the records by finding independent sources (not Allied claims in 'published sources') of higher losses than what the Japanese units reported. Then you might reasonably go on to national characteristics as among explanations for such a finding. But using broad national characterizations to establish 'facts' is BS, frankly.

The plain logic remains, *somewhere* a JNAF unit (any air unit) had to write down what actually happened from their POV, surely in terms of their pilots who had been lost, so others in the organization, not other organizations or the public but that same organization, would know, to send them more pilots, to know that pilot couldn't be transferred to Rabaul..because he was dead already!, etc. There's no reasonable basis, that you've given IMO, to believe the kodochosho are anything other than the place where they did that.

Joe

 

[RCAFson]

What about the bomber losses?

 

[JoeB]

Yes I'm curious too.

Joe, what's the crux of your opinion on the Pacific airwar comparing Commonwealth vs US results?

Were the P-40 Wildcat just better aircraft to fight the Japanese vs Spitfire Hurricane?

Or were the CW not as good as US? Inexperienced pilots? Poor training? Poor tactics?
Poor planning on choice of missions?
What was the reason for the disparity?

As in my longer post recently and others before, high losses compared to what?

First, forget RCAF's obfuscation. The original point I made to him was that the Spitfire did not prove itself superior to the P-40 in fighter combat defending Darwin. That's not a statement of the converse, than the P-40 *did* prove itself superior. And now having posted the results of each mission defending Darwin, you can see it was common for either P-40's or Spitfires to go after bombers escorted by Zeroes and suffer losses to the Zeroes without scoring any kills in return (though generally believing they had). Up to the summer of 1942 this sort of result was the rule for JNAF fighters v a variety of Allied fighter opposition. Other P-40 ops in period are not as directly comparable in situation but also not good results. For example 75sdn RAAF in first deployment in March-Apr '42 at Moresby downed 2 Zeroes in air combat for 16 P-40/Kittyhawk air combat losses to Zeroes (source: "Seek and Strike" by Wilson kodochosho*), though OTOH in the few combats in August 1942 75 and 76 Sdn downed 4 Zeroes for 5 Kittyhawks (same sources) and 49th FG in NG in Nov-Dec '42 downed 4 Zeroes for 3 P-40's (Hess kodochosho)

F4F's v Zero contests of course varied case to case to but overall trend was less variable around 1:1 with >100 kills on each side in 1942, in a variety of situations (G'canal defense high altitude, low altitude, carrier battles, F4F escorts v Zero CAP's over convoys in Solomins, etc without appearing to change wildly, numbers tended to be similar on each side).

So it's not so much why did Spitfires do worse as why did they achieve results typical of what most Allied units did ca spring-summer '42 rather than parity situation that began to appear in 2nd half '42 in many other cases. I think most of the specific possible explanations have been mentioned at one time or another, and few if any originally by me:
-Spit intolerant of primitive field conditions, not as rugged as the other types, exactly the Soviet complaint in finding the P-39 preferable for their purposes on their southern front in 1943
-Spit V just generally overrated, one mark of a fighter of which some versions were arguably the best fighter around in their time, at least for short range ops, Spit V not so much. In some circumstances it was perhaps more comparable in practical fighter combat capability to P-39/40 or F4F than the conventional wisdom would hold, with the first point in mind especially.
-F4F specifically turned better, certainly than the P-39/40. If you were going to instinctively turn, and be outturned by the Zero, the Zero would outturn the F4F by less.
-202nd AG experienced and previously generally successful unit, Spit wing not, as a unit anyway
-anti-Zero tactics on paper perhaps generally overrated as a factor in obtaining successful results v Zeroes; easier to say than do, not actually practiced yet by F4F units in 1942. In fact among F4F tactics were deliberate dog fighting (Joe Bauer to his men at G'canal ca. Oct 42 'if you see Zeroes, dogfight em', believing that the hit and run tactics of some of the Zero units then indicated deteriorating pilot quality so they should be closely engaged), and alternatively the 'pin cushion': just don't turn with Zero on tail but jink up and down and rely on the F4F to absorb hits from directly astern, a tough a/c, rapid roll at high speed was the main tactic later enshrined in manuals that was actually frequently used in 1942 in combat.
-not just 'training' in theory but whole personnel structure of 1942 Japanese v US v Brit/CW fighter forces differed. Brit/CW ca 42 tended to consist of some men experienced in real combat leading larger number of relatively poorly trained inexperienced men. The 1942 USAAF, desperately expanding, had a somewhat similar profile except even the experienced men had no combat experience. JNAF of '42 in contrast had an experience profile like a peactime force, with relatively more highly and mid experienced men, some (though fewer than is sometimes assumed) with combat experience in China, and their green pilots were more thoroughly trained than wartime type mass produced newbies of 1942 RAF or USAAF, not to mention their own later on. USN had a similar profile to JNAF except no combat experience. USN and USMC training systems were basically same but USMC had more low hour pilots in combat units in 1942 than USN did; greenest USN pilots on deployed carriers had more hours than greenest USMC at G'canal, and those carrier guys were often the spares and didn't always get to fly combat.

How this experience profile summary applies to 1943 is a little fuzzier. In general the Spit (and Hurricane) results in Far East in 1943 are more puzzling than the record in 1942.

I don't have a strong opinion on the weighting of those causes. My main problem in all frankness is with what I perceive as obviously situationally dependent arguments by people who have an obvious 'dog in the fight', either about what the results were in the first place, or often ridiculous theories that particular relatively minor variations in situation would cause not only huge changes in results but persistent ones. One side would decide to use a few 1k more feet altitude, and OK that's it...other side would go from achieving parity to getting whipped consistently for months, and so would any other unit. The JNAF could have ruled the Pacific all through '43 and beyond, with their super altitude capable Zero, if only they'd known! People should try to be serious, objective and grown up, that's the only thing I have a really strong opinion about here.

*Wilson gives Japanese losses for some incidents per US comms intercepts of Japanese radio reports to higher Hq's, he got at US National Archives...they agree well with written Japanese records but latter are aviable for all engagements in that period.

Joe

 

[FLYBOYJ]

People should try to be serious, objective and grown up, that's the only thing I have a really strong opinion about here.

Folks, while this exchange has been informative and entertaining, JoeB has more than substantiated his position on several occasions and one must accept most if not all of his data is based on cold facts. Please provide tangible historical evidence to either agree or disagree with his information. While none of us are "all encompassing" aviation historians, his data and research should be looked upon as "agenda-less."

My 2 cents - stay away from the stock market and please continue to keep this civil.

 

[parsifal]

FB has asked that where disagreement arises, we should provide examples to back up our alternative positions. Joe has previously also requested this, so I think it needs to be observed.

In preparing this response I need to acknowledge the great knowledge that Joe has on this subject. My point in raising opposition is not that I refute his position, but simply that I have doubts and need explanation to reconcile what are nagging and persistent concerns about reconciling the true nature of the battle. Joes last post to Freebird did go a long way to explaining and rationalizing what was happening, and makes a lot of sense to me. But there was one issue or rather example that he raised that I thought I should respond to.

With regard to the accuracy of Japanese unit records, I should firstly state that in the main I believe Joes position to be correct, however, there are a couple of point on which I have some doubts. Joe at the end of his reply to me used a quasi example of how it was illogical to suppose that a unit might falsify its losses. If it did that it would run into trouble when that unit was due for transfer to say Rabaul. It would appear as unlikely and illogical to falsify the records, as it would not take long for the deception to be exposed. I think that in essence is what Joe was trying to say. But in fact that is exactly what happened, and often. As an amendment to my hypothesis it might not always be so much as a case of deliberate deceit, as a case of a unit simply being unaware of where assets were, or where they had been lost. I have two examples that suggest this.

Example 1. The source is Japanese Army Operations In the South Pacific: Translated by Steve Ballard, Australian War Memorial. This is a translation of the war history series Senshi Soshu, which I am sure Joe is familiar with. This volume covers from the invasion of Rabaul in January 1942 through to the destruction of the South Seas Force in January 1943.

After giving some details of the scheduled reinforcements for April 1942, at page 62 the narrative states "this would seem to indicate that the strategic position of units had been strengthened. However, after re-organization, the strength of the 25th flotilla was quite different from the listed complement"...further on it suggests that the scheduled reinforcements never arrived.

There are several ways this anomaly could be explained, but it does clearly indicate that sometimes scheduled reinforcements did not arrive as promised. This was not a phenomena peculiar to the Japanese, but it seem to happen to them more often than for other nationalities.

Example 2: This is from an admittedly secondary source…"The Pacific War" by John Costello. It is significant, however in that it was one of the first pieces that tended to rely on decrypted intercepts more than unit summaries in compiling the narrative. I think that this suggests that allied estimate and comments about Japanese losses are more accurate than Japanese estimate of allied losses, and it is certainly at least plausible that the Allies knew more about Japanese losses than the Japanese themselves, at times at least.

Putting all of that aside, however, the narrative include a chapter on the Marianas Turkey Shoot. Commenting on the operations of the 1st Air Fleet, at page 480 it describes how Kurita was advising Ozawa that he had retrieved over 500 aircraft from the dispersal area in the Carolines, and from those units that had been transferred south as a result of the crisis on Biak. In fact over 1/3 of the 500 aircraft he listed as still on the effective list had been lost. Most scholars believe this was a deliberate deceit by Kurita, I am not so sure, but the facts remain, he was no longer in command of the numbers he said he was controlling. I believe that many aircraft had in fact been lost in the long over water flights, many more were destroyed on landing, or shot down. Kurita maintained the delusion, however, sending off unsubstantiated, and what appear to be deliberately deceptive reports of winning the battle and eliminating much American strength. These were not propaganda communiqués they were military reports to superiors and colleagues.

I believe that a good proportion of this mis-information arose simply from confusion and the stresses of battle, though there may have been an element of the "dishonour with defeat" ethos as well. One thing to note whenever examining Japanese accounts is that far from being a model of super efficiency and self awareness, Japanese military operations, and hence (by extension) military records were examples of confusion and a lack of knowledge about what was really going on.

Joes accounts are referring to squadron level records, in which it is harder to argue the confusion and ignorance argument. Difficult, but not beyond the realm of possibility