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3) There were other reasons at issue that was causing the high loss rate for the Spits. I suspect lack of endurance (and subsequent ditching) might be the main culprit.
1. I don't seek to keep picking at this, but you seem to insist, basically mischaracterizing my position as somehow unique to the Japanese. I've already asked you several times, and you never answered: how is this any different than the specific Spitfire losses in these specific operations we accept from their detailed combat reports of the units involved? I still haven't seen the 'cross check evidence', that's any different than Japanese case, the absolulte proof that other Spit units weren't present, or the accounting reconciliation between the losses reported in these specific combats by the Spits, and all Spitfire V production and inventory. Turning around your statement, we're 'stuck accepting the losses in Spit unit records as gospel truth'. No, we're going on the best info available, and in this case quite good info on both sides, original combat reports of the units involved, combined with solid higher level sources on each side saying they were the only units involved (as do the Japanese units reports also state).1) The records on which the verified losses are based have some errors or omissions in them. Joe has emphatically denied this, but still has also confirmed by the very nature of his replies that cross checking of the stated figures cannot (or will not) be undertaken. We are apparently stuck with accepting the losses stated in the japanese records as gospel truth......
2) The Pilots of the Spitfire wing were not following the advice being given in this report
3) There were other reasons at issue that was causing the high loss rate for the Spits. I suspect lack of endurance (and subsequent ditching) might be the main culprit.
So you are claiming that the average altitude of the IJAF bombers was the same in during the P40 and Spit defence of Darwin? For example the P40s greatest success was on April 25, 1942 when 50 P40s intercepted 24 bombers escorted by 9 Zeros, with the bombers flying at 14-16000ft. Aces of the pacific, Hess, p13. Yet a year later, 34 Spitfires intercepted a raid where the "numbers were 18 bombers and 27 fighters" with the bombers at 27000ft and the fighters at 31000 ft. http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/03.pdf It's pretty obvious that these are completely different tactical situations! BTW the first encounter for P40s against Zeros over Darwin went 10-1 in the Zeros favour...of the course the tactical situation heavily favoured the Zeros, but lets not get into messy details...
http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/04.pdfThe three squadrons rendezvoused over Sattler at 6,000 feet and, wit h
Caldwell in command in the centre, were directed by the ground controller
to make for Batchelor . The enemy was then approaching the coast wel l
south of Darwin near Anson Bay at a height of 20,000 feet . The slowness
of the raiders ' approach indicated that the enemy aircraft were climbing,
therefore the Spitfires continued to climb . When they were at 32,000
feet the Spitfire pilots saw the enemy coming towards the coast over
Peron Island at a height of 29,000 feet . There were 26 enemy bombers
flying in three broad V' s. The larger V's were divided into three smaller
V's of three machines each. Some 21 fighters could be seen escorting
them. The Spitfires were between the Japanese and their target, which
seemed almost certain to be Fenton where the enemy had attacked
Liberators on the ground only a week before .
Caldwell's plan was that No . 452 Squadron should engage the fighter
escort and No . 54 Squadron make the first attack against the bombers
from head-on while No . 457 remained in reserve, flying on a parallel
course to the enemy and 7,000 feet above, where it could see what was
happening and take advantage of the battle situation as it developed .
At 11 .35 a.m. shortly after the enemy force crossed the mainland coast
Caldwell ordered No. 452 to open the attack. The enemy fighters were
now turning left and forming a defensive circle about 2,000 feet above
the bombers when "white" section of No . 452, led by Flight Lieutenant
Hall,3 engaged them . These Spitfires succeeded in shooting down two
enemy fighters while another seven were so diverted that they could no
longer interfere with other Spitfires which were about to attack the raiding
bombers. However three Spitfires were lost . Flight Lieutenant Makin4
made a forced landing when his engine failed and Sergeant Richardson
parachuted when his also failed . Flying Officer Lloyd, s hit by enemy fire ,
was also forced to parachute .
Meanwhile, Squadron Leader Gibbs, leading No . 54, had begun his
attack on the bombers, although three of his Spitfires were unable to
keep up with the others, because of the poor state of their engines, and
did not engage in the first attack. After six months ' tropical service
coupled with rapid climbs the engines were fast approaching a critical
period in their flying life and were passing the limit of efficiency . Gibbs
reported later that this position had "assumed a serious aspect quit e
suddenly because of the greatly increased activity of the enemy in this
sector during the past few weeks ". As a result, only 7 Spitfires of No . 54
engaged the bomber force of 27 enemy machines . They shot down 4 and
damaged 2, while 2 of the Spitfires were lost .
No. 457 meanwhile had held its attack and followed the enemy bomber s
towards Fenton . About twenty miles from Fenton, Caldwell ordered two
sections (eight aircraft) of this squadron to attack . Both sections were
engaged by enemy fighters but the Spitfires succeeded in shooting down
two bombers . However, three Spitfire pilots (Flying Officers Hamilton and
Robinson? and Pilot Officer McDowell) were shot down and killed .
By midday twenty machines of the enemy bomber force were over
Fenton and dropped 140 bombs on the Liberator dispersal area in spite
of anti-aircraft guns which fired eighty-eight rounds at them withou t
effect. The enemy bombs destroyed one Liberator, damaged three others ,
and damaged anti-aircraft guns and the airfield . The Spitfires continued
to attack through the anti-aircraft fire and another bomber was shot
down almost over the gunners' heads . At this stage Caldwell gave per -
mission to Squadron Leader James to attack, but James was thwarted by
four enemy fighters and forced to dive down to 15,000 feet . He climbed
again to make another attack, but was again diverted by two enemy
fighters . The bomber force was now making for the coast and Caldwell
made a lone head-on attack on a bomber just as it was crossing the coast .
When pulling up again Caldwell was engaged by one of the escorts .
Another two fighters turned in towards him and because his oxygen supply
had been exhausted he took evasive action and returned to base . Another
pilot (Pilot Officer R . W. Watson) followed the enemy twenty miles out
to sea and succeeded in damaging a bomber .
After these losses Bladin again signalled to Air Force headquarters
that it was "imperative that all Spitfires allotted this area from southern
sources be delivered immediately ". However, the raid of 6th July was the
last to be made in strength over the Darwin area, and within a few days
more Spitfires began to arrive from the south .
Meanwhile Mitchells, Hudsons, and Liberators
Since you've now spread the same misinformation to two threads it has to be corrected even if it's basically off topic on this one. The raid of April 25 1942 saw 11 of 50 P-40's actually make contact with the Japanese formation which included 14 escorting Zeroes, 9 was the US side's misestimation. The bombers were flying at 8km (26k ft), which was typical, and one reason for low numbers of P-40's making contact on several of the raids, see below. See Baeza, pp. 101-103 for the correct details of this raid.To quote one of my earlier posts:
The Spitfires usually, were at a rough parity in terms of numbers versus the fighter escorts, while the earlier P40 defence often had an overwhelming advantage in numbers.
Since you've now spread the same misinformation to two threads it has to be corrected even if it's basically off topic on this one. The raid of April 25 1942 saw 11 of 50 P-40's actually make contact with the Japanese formation which included 14 escorting Zeroes, 9 was the US side's misestimation. The bombers were flying at 8km (26k ft), which was typical, and one reason for low numbers of P-40's making contact on several of the raids, see below. See Baeza, pp. 101-103 for the correct details of this raid.
P40 Warhawk Aces of the Pacific, p29-30.The next three weeks passed quietly before the Japanese attempted strike another blow at Darwin, and its defending airfields. By this time, three squadrons of the 49th PG would be ready and waiting for the the attack came on Anzac Day, 25 April, celebrated as a holiday Australia to commemorate the part its forces played in the Gallup campaign in 1915. Under the able leadership of Lt Col Paul Wurtsmith the 49th put up 50 P-40s in the early afternoon to intercept enemy bombers detected by radar approaching from the former Allied base Koepang, on Timor Island. One of the P-40 pilots was Java veteran Jim Morehead, leading the Yellow Flight of the 8th PS. He wrote this account of the action that ensued;
'Climbing offshore, my flight was to the east, with Capt (Mitche Sims' flight to the west. We were all moving past Melville Island, north the mainland. We were approaching the service ceiling of the P-40, and I was offshore about 25, miles when I saw a large Procession or enemy bombers below us at about 16,000 ft. I had rarely seen their bomber below us before this. I called Cap Sims and asked if he wanted to make, the attack, or should I. I was nearer the enemy formation than Capt Sims was, and it was logical that I make the attack. To my great relief he said to go ahead. Recently, we had received a report of Japanese pilots doing aerobatics over PorT Moresby, New Guinea, for the benefit of our airmen there. I decided to do the same for the benefit of the Japanese airmen assembled below, and to build confidence in my green troops who, as yet, had seen no combat. As I built up speed in a slight dive, I did a slow roll, and continued rolling into the attack on a quartering angle off the port bow. The Zeros were speeding to cut us off, but they were too late.
I was approaching good range now. I led the lead bomber by about five ship-lengths, and with a little elevation I opened fire. My lead was exactly right as my tracers fed into the nose of the lead bomber. I held the trigger down all the way in on the pass until I had to pull off. The lead bomber appeared to be smoking from both engines. I then did a high-speed steep turn to the left, back into the formation. This was the one opportunity I had to charge into the Jap bombers at a decent altitude where the P40 Performed well. I blacked out in the turn but couldn't have timed it better. I came out on the tail of the bomber, to within 50 yards of him..."
HyperWar: The Army Air Forces in WWII: Vol. IV--The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan [Chapter 1]First priority naturally went to the defense of Allied bases, a burden which fell upon the fighter units at Moresby and Darwin. Over both points the enemy bombers usually came in at 22,000 feet and above, too high for satisfactory interception by P-40's, P-39's, or P-400's, the only fighters available to the AAF in the Southwest Pacific, and their limitations seriously affected Allied operations.64 During July the P-39 had made contact with enemy bombers only four times in a series of nine raids despite a thirty-minute warning; in sixteen actual contacts it never once enjoyed an altitude advantage and the Zero invariably could outclimb and outmaneuver this fighter, which suffered the additional disadvantage of increased vulnerability because of the location of its motor behind the pilot. The P-40 was somewhat better, but it, too, was outperformed by the more nimble enemy fighters, particularly at high altitudes. Inferior performance of their planes lowered the morale of the pilots.65 It was true that the Allied planes were more rugged and less inflammable, they could outdive the Zero, and if given warning to permit them to reach sufficient altitude they could achieve creditable scores, as they did on 30 July over Darwin when twenty-seven P-40's shot down six Zeros and two bombers at the cost of one P-40.66 But pilots continued to be frustrated, as on 17 August, when for the seventy-eighth time enemy bombers struck Moresby in an attempt to disable their favorite target, Seven-Mile Airdrome. Although defending fighters had received adequate warning, they were unable to intercept.
Total: 174 P-40 sorties in contact w/ 221 Zero sorties; 19 P-40's downed (including belly landings, not including own AA) v 8 Zeroes downed
Total 242 Spit sorties in contact w/ 201 Zero sorties, 28 Spits air combat loss/crashlanding only** v 4 Zeroes downed
AFAIK CMIIW, in BoB, the loss ratio in fighters favored the 109 (vs the Hurricane and Spitfire), but the loss ratio in total aircraft (fighters and bombers) favored the RAF. Mission type has a lot to do with it."What about the bombers? Wasn't shooting down the bombers the whole point of these intercepts?"
Interesting stuff Bill. You're points are exactly in-line with my question about the relative altitudes of the opposing forces during the engagements. The Spit's speed and ability to disengage would be markedly reduced if they were climbing to reach the Zeros. It's all about energy and the ability to convert potential energy (altitude) to speed (kinetic energy) as rapidly as possible. It seems from your post that the P-40 was better able to do this than the MkV Spit with the speed-sapping Vokes filter.
Regards,
Mark