TBD Devastators at the Battle of Midway

[MIflyer]

Source: Profile Publication No. 171

VT-3 USS Yorktown

0285 Lost

0286 Lost

0303 Lost

0310 Lost

0340 Lost

0341 Lost

0343 Lost

0354 Lost

0361 Lost

0375 Returned to USS Yorktown

0381 Lost

1511 Lost

1517 Not launched


VT-6 USS Enterprise

0279 Lost

0289 Lost

0294 Lost

0327 Lost

0338 Returned to USS Enterprise

0342 Lost

0350 Returned to USS Enterprise

0365 Lost

0367 Lost

0368 Returned to USS Enterprise

0378 Lost

1505 Lost

1512 Lost


VT-8 USS Hornet

0276 Lost

0284 Lost

0293 Lost

0295 Lost

0297 Lost

0308 Lost

0311 Lost

0321 Lost

0324 Lost

0329 Lost

0362 Lost

0372 Lost

1506 Lost

1509 Lost

1518 Lost

 

[Capt. Vick]

Knew it was bad, but...

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Six returned, thirty-five shot down. IIRC, USN had less than 100 TBD on chare even before the battle started, and Midway scuppered half the USN's complement of the type.

 

[Ovod]

It was not an auspicious start to the TBD's combat career. It reminds me of one of the B-26 Marauder's early combat missions in Europe bombing a power station in the Netherlands. 11 B-26s were sent out - none of them came back.

 

[Capt. Vick]

Wow! Really?

 

[MIflyer]

The book "Flying the B-26", written by a B-26 Navigator, describes how they got such a low loss rate there. The RAF told them it took something like 5 min for the Germans to set up a AAA barrage, so the answer was to never fly on one course for more than 4 min. They zig-zagged all over Europe. Admittedly, that seems to have led to some navigational difficulties.
I recall a Spitfire pilot escorting B-26's that said that they got lost on every mission.

And as for the TBD's at Midway, I think that some that "returned to the carrier" did so in the water next to the carrier.
Here is what it says in "No Higher Honor":

Three torpedo squadrons, 41 TBD, 82 men were sent. None returned to its own ship. Five, one from Hornet, two from the Enterprise, and two from the Yorktown, would land in the ocean. Of course Gay's TBD "landed" in the water in the middle of the IJN fleet. The TBD of Corl and Childers made it back to the Yorktown but were unable to land due to a hole in the deck and splashed down next to a destroyer. The gunner, Childers, died from his wounds; he was firing at the Zeros with his .45 after his machine gun jammed.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Knew it was bad, but...

This has to be one of the worst naval aircraft torpedo strike fails, with the massacre of the Swordfish at the Channel Dash close behind. Mind you, the IJN with their supposed superlative Kates didn't do much better.

 

[GrauGeist]

It was not an auspicious start to the TBD's combat career.

The TBD and SB2U were mid-30's designs and on their way out of service when the Pacific war started.
The crews for the most part, did not have combat experience and the fact that their aircraft were reaching obsolescence meant they were in trouble.
None of that diminishes their heroic efforts, though.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

It was not an auspicious start to the TBD's combat career. It reminds me of one of the B-26 Marauder's early combat missions in Europe bombing a power station in the Netherlands. 11 B-26s were sent out - none of them came back.

Actually the TBD was first flown in combat at Coral Sea and had some limited success. Without a doubt it was hopelessly obsolete at Midway but there were many other factors that contributed to it's slaughter.

 

[MIflyer]

The TBD and SB2U were mid-30's designs and on their way out of service when the Pacific war started.
The crews for the most part, did not have combat experience and the fact that their aircraft were reaching obsolescence meant they were in trouble.
None of that diminishes their heroic efforts, though.

Indeed, when VT-8 attacked the IJN fleet there were seven Zeros on CAP. VT-8 shot down at least one of them.

When the SBD's from Yorktown and Enterprise arrived over the IJN fleet there were an estimated FIFTY Zeros defending the fleet. Remember that the IJN carriers were preparing to launch a strike and the Zeros did not have to be reconfigured for air defense. And the SBD's high overhead had NO fighter escorts, the Enterprise F4F's had mistakenly followed VT-8 and then headed for Midway when they hit bingo fuel, without engaging in combat; the few Yorktown F4F's were down desperately covering their TBD's and the Hornet F4F's had ditched when they could not find their carrier.

If those fifty Zeros had been at altitude when the SBD's got there, it would have all been over with. But they were all down on the deck chasing TBD's. Sacrificing the TBD's as they mostly failed to launch their torpedoes, most of which probably would not have worked anyway, was not intended as a brilliant strategy, but thanks largely to John Waldron disobeying his orders and focusing on fighting the enemy, it proved to be.

 

[MIflyer]

Actually the TBD was first flown in combat at Coral Sea and had some limited success.

Yes. In fact they lost NO TBD's at Coral Sea, although the Yorktown had lost seven in another engagement.

 

[R Leonard]

And not to be overly picky, not a single TBD made it back aboard Yorktown at Midway. Two made the return trip, but both ditched short of the Task Force . . . your list needs a little revision. TBD's from VT-5 at Coral Sea did well, losses wise, against Shoho and, later, against Shokaku, because they were escorted by F4Fs from VF-42 who managed to keep the Japanese CAPs occupied. Too bad they used up their newest torpedo issue on Shoho and their older torps on Shokaku. VF escort for the VT-5 strike on Shoho was led by Jimmy Flatley; VF escort against Shokaku the next day was led by my father.

TBD 0375 (3-T-11) from the OP list was lost in the attack on the Kido Butai. Ens. Oswald A. Powers and Joseph Emile Mandeville, Sea2c, were listed as missing in action and were declared dead on 4 June 1943.

 

[SaparotRob]

I've read and heard that the Zeros being at low altitude because of dealing with the Devastators is a myth. The source easiest for me to remember is a Drachinifel video on Midway about two weeks ago. He discussed the battle with either Tully or Parshall of "Shattered Sword" fame. There was a twenty minute or so gap after the destruction of the TBD's when the SBD's arrived. Plenty of time for the A6M's to get up to altitude. I have to watch it again as I can't remember why they weren't up there. Perhaps rearm/refuel the CAP? If that were so then perhaps the TBD's did get the Zeros down though perhaps indirectly.

 

[MIflyer]

VT-8 got there first, and served as a spoling attack for IJN strike against the USN carriers, followed by the Enterprise and Yorktown TBD's. So they did not all get there at the same time. The Enterprise Air Group made the same mistake in the analysis as the Hornet, flew the wrong course and the took up the heading of a IJN destroyer to look for the enemy fleet. Yorktown deliberately launched later than Enterprise or Hornet and flew the correct course. So the three groups of TBDs were spread out in time and in the course they followed.

And that's not my list; it is from the Profile.

 

[R Leonard]

The TBDs in a succession of attacks actually did contrive to keep the Japanese CAP low. First the VT-8 attack, then the VT-6 attack, then as VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3 SBDs were gathering overhead, came the VT-3 attack. That attack, on Hiryu, was still under way when the SBDs started in. Dick Best has said, and told me personally, that as he pulled out of his attack and was trying to make space between himself and the Japanese, he not only observed that there was a fourth carrier but that it was under attack by torpedo planes . . . these would be from VT-3.

In the popular mythology of Midway, VT-8's gallant loss is/was credited with drawing off the CAP so the SBDs could work their mischief. If someone says that is not the way it happened, then they are correct. Almost an hour elapsed between the destruction of VT-8 and the arrival of the various SBD squadrons. VT-6 had kept them busy in the meantime. Remember also the Yorktown strike arrived as a strike group, TBDs, SBDs, and F4Fs after a planned rendezvous in the vicinity of the Japanese. VT-3 and the VF-3 escort went low while VB-3 went high. So, no, VT-8 did not draw off the CAP for the SBDs' attack, nor did VT-6, but they both influenced the subsequent event when VT-3 arrived and did draw down the CAP.

It is also useful to consider just what the Japanese considered the greatest threat to their ships. Their thinking was colored by their possession of an excellent aerial delivered torpedo and the understanding that letting water in is worse then letting air in. They were un-aware of the mechanical problems of US torpedoes but viewed them in light of their own as the greatest threat to their ships.

Profile Pubs, 1960s stuff, in fact I have that one somewhere on one of the shelves, probably haven't looked at it in 20 years.

As my father used to say, "The book is wrong."

He also used to say that . . . the torpedo plane business was the most self-sacrificing in all of naval aviation."

 

[SaparotRob]

The TBDs in a succession of attacks actually did contrive to keep the Japanese CAP low. First the VT-8 attack, then the VT-6 attack, then as VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3 SBDs were gathering overhead, came the VT-3 attack. That attack, on Hiryu, was still under way when the SBDs started in. Dick Best has said, and told me personally, that as he pulled out of his attack and was trying to make space between himself and the Japanese, he not only observed that there was a fourth carrier but that it was under attack by torpedo planes . . . these would be from VT-3.

In the popular mythology of Midway, VT-8's gallant loss is/was credited with drawing off the CAP so the SBDs could work their mischief. If someone says that is not the way it happened, then they are correct. Almost an hour elapsed between the destruction of VT-8 and the arrival of the various SBD squadrons. VT-6 had kept them busy in the meantime. Remember also the Yorktown strike arrived as a strike group, TBDs, SBDs, and F4Fs after a planned rendezvous in the vicinity of the Japanese. VT-3 and the VF-3 escort went low while VB-3 went high. So, no, VT-8 did not draw off the CAP for the SBDs' attack, nor did VT-6, but they both influenced the subsequent event when VT-3 arrived and did draw down the CAP.

It is also useful to consider just what the Japanese considered the greatest threat to their ships. Their thinking was colored by their possession of an excellent aerial delivered torpedo and the understanding that letting water in is worse then letting air in. They were un-aware of the mechanical problems of US torpedoes but viewed them in light of their own as the greatest threat to their ships.

Profile Pubs, 1960s stuff, in fact I have that one somewhere on one of the shelves, probably haven't looked at it in 20 years.

As my father used to say, "The book is wrong."

He also used to say that . . . the torpedo plane business was the most self-sacrificing in all of naval aviation."

Great post. It put it together. Yeah, I lost track of the Yorktown's group and the timing.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I've read and heard that the Zeros being at low altitude because of dealing with the Devastators is a myth. The source easiest for me to remember is a Drachinifel video on Midway about two weeks ago. He discussed the battle with either Tully or Parshall of "Shattered Sword" fame. There was a twenty minute or so gap after the destruction of the TBD's when the SBD's arrived. Plenty of time for the A6M's to get up to altitude. I have to watch it again as I can't remember why they weren't up there. Perhaps rearm/refuel the CAP? If that were so then perhaps the TBD's did get the Zeros down though perhaps indirectly.

I recently watched that video. Parshall does mention "fixation" on the part of CAP iirc, though as you say he points out that the Zeroes could climb back to altitude if needed. Parshall also mentions what I think is the critical advantage the disorganized strikes provided -- that of keeping the KdB continuously maneuvering to avoid attacks, which obviously means that spotting and launching a strike is delayed.

I've read elsewhere that one reason the CAP was cycling so busily is that with Zeroes carrying only about 8 seconds of 20mm ammo firing time, they would cycle to rearm. I don't know how true that is and welcome all corrections.

 

[SaparotRob]

I needed a Midway refresher. I just watched a YouTube vid called "Battle of Midway Mapped, part 1. It's by Battle of Midway 101. It shows the positions of all units at specific times. I guess I had been thinking all these years about the TBD attacks as separate assaults, forgetting that Yorktown's air groups launched a cohesive attack. Yes, the TBD's and Thach's F4F's were down low and the IJN CAP focused on them.
Also, the graphics are great in an Atari kinda' way.

 

[Greg Boeser]

VT-8 Detachment (6 x TBF-1), US Army Marauders - 69th and 408th BS detachments (2 x B-26B, 2 x B-26) spotted by Japanese at 0705. Attacks complete 0712. Losses 5 x TBF-1, 1 x B-26, 1x B-26B. All three surviving aircraft were written off upon return to Midway.
VMSB 241 (16 x SBD-2) spotted at 0748, commenced attack at 0755. Losses 6 x SBD shot down, 2 x SBD ditched, of the eight which returned Midway, only two were serviceable.
5th and 11th BG (15 x B-17E) attack Japanese fleet at 0815 - no losses.
VMSB-241 (11 x SB2U-3) attacks Japanese screen at 0820. Losses 4 x SB2U-3.

 

[R Leonard]

The gunner, Childers, died from his wounds; he was firing at the Zeros with his .45 after his machine gun jammed.

Golly, then who was that nice retired USMC LTC type naval aviator I once knew? Lloyd Childers recovered from his wounds and went off to flight training at Pensacola. He earned his wings and accepted a commission in the USMC and served for more than 25 more years. He commanded HMM-361, a helicopter squadron, in Vietnam. After his Marine Corps service he earned a PhD and had a second career as a college administrator. He passed in 2015. Decorations: 3 DFC, 1 LM, 1 PH, 14 AM.

Your source, Nesmith, must be referring to Robert B Brazier, ARM2c who was the radio-gunner in the TBD flown by Wilhelm G Esders, CAP. The Esders/Brazier TBD was the other TBD which ditched on the way back to Yorktown. Brazier had been hit by 20mm rounds. Esders got him out of the cockpit and into their raft, but he bled out before a destroyer could pick them up.

Also when both Yorktown TBDs ditched, Yorktown had not yet been bombed. They were sighted in the water by by crew of several of the returning SBDs. The returning VB-3 was warned off from attempting to land due to the approaching Japanese dive bombers. Not bothering to drag out my copy of No Higher Honor, if Nesmith claims that Corl and Childers had to ditch because any landing was foiled by bomb damage to Yorktown and/or Childers succumbed to his wounds . . . well, to quote my favorite Midway source, "The book is wrong."