The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war. (4 Viewers)

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B-24s were used in bombing operations in the Mediterranean, flying with 178 Squadron and 10/227/462/614 Squadron.
Now we are into some murky waters.

10 and 76 Halifax squadrons sent detachments to the Med in June / July 1942. These Halifax detachments, along with a ground service unit labelled 227 squadron (see below), came together to form 462 squadron on 7 Sept 1942. This unit operated Halifax II through to March 1944 when it was renumbered 614 squadron. 614 continued to operate Halifax II through to March 1945, but from Aug 1944 began to receive Liberator VIII equipped with the AN/APS-15 radar. Then on 27 July 1945 it was renumbered again becoming 214 squadron. It moved to Palestine in Aug 1945 where it re-equipped with Lancaster I in Nov. It was renumbered again on 15 April 1946 as 37 squadron.

The 227 squadron label was in WW2 first allotted to a Beaufighter detachment on Malta which was absorbed into 272 in June 1942. Then it went to a ground service unit in Palestine meant to service the Halifax detachments sent out from Britain. In turn it was absorbed into 462 as noted above.

Confusingly a new 227 squadron had been formed on Malta on 20 Aug 1942 (some 3 weeks before 462 camee into existence) absorbing a detachment of 235 squadron Beaufighters sent out from Britain!

So 10, 76, 227 and 462 did not operate Liberators at any time.

159 formed on Liberator B.II in Jan 1942 in Britain. Its ground echelon left for the Middle East in Feb arriving in April before moving on to India in May after a spell servicing other squadron's aircraft. The aircraft were flown out to Palestine in July and they were used in raids from both Palestine & Malta against targets in Greece, Italy & North Africa from 1 Aug to 30 Sept 1942 when they moved to India. During this time their aircraft were serviced by personnel who went on to form 454 squadron.

160 squadron history is even more convoluted. Formed in Britain on 16 Jan 1942, its groundcrews left for India in mid-Feb 1942. On 8 June 1942 the aircraft began the journey to Palestine where they were held up as a ME bomber Force. This ME unit was relabelled 160 (Middle east Det) with retrospective effect from 16 Sept 1942 and was absorbed into 178 squadron on 15 Jan 1943 when it formed at Shandur in Egypt. Meanwhile a new 160 squadron formed in the UK in Oct 1942 and went to India in Jan 1943 having trained in the general recce role alongside 86 squadron of Coastal Command.

During 1942 there were quite a number of Britain based units that sent detachments to the Middle East where the aircraft were serviced by personnel from other squadrons. In some cases entire squadrons of aircraft were held up in the Middle East in time of crisis while their ground crews took the boat round the Cape to India where they would link up with the surviving aircrew.

178 was a new Liberator unit formed in Egypt on 15 Jan 1943 absorbing the ME Det of 160. It continued to operate Liberators through to Nov 1945 (plus some Halifax II May-Sept 1943). Other Med Liberator squadrons were 37 (from Oct 1944 to March 1946), 40 (from March 1945 to jan 1946), 70 (Jan 1945 to March 1946), 104 (Feb 1945 to Nov 1945).
 
51 and 77 Squadrons were loaned to Coastal Command and flew anti-submarine patrols (in the Whitley V) from June through October 1942 before being returned to Bomber Command.

B-24s were used in bombing operations in the Mediterranean, flying with 178 Squadron and 10/227/462/614 Squadron.
Hi
During June 1942 five Lancasters of No.44 Squadron were detached to CC at Nutts Corner to undertake mainly convoy escort. Two additional aircrew from No.220 Sqn. (Fortress I) were added to their crews. On 14 June R5858 KM-G ditched near an outbound convoy, the crew being picked up by the convoy and ended up in North Africa. On 15 June R5489 KM-X, while on a 10 hour patrol came across a surfaced U-Boat and made an attack from 50 ft. with depth charges but without effect. On 16 June L7568 KM-W, Flt. Lt. Barlow DFC on his first convoy sortie sighted a surfaced U-Boat and attacked dropping 6 depth charges and a 250-lb anti-submarine bomb, which straddled the boat. The aircraft reported the crew jumping into the sea and the U-Boat was listing. The squadron returned to BC at the end of the month.

During July and August 1942 eight Lancasters of No. 61 Sqn. with 12 crews were detached to St. Eval to operate with CC. They were required to send out four patrols each day. On 17 July on first patrol of squadron R5724, Flt. Lt. Casement sighted U-Boat (U-751) and made two attacks, one from 700 ft. and the other from 50 ft. Reported crew abandoning ship as it went down stern first. No. 61 sqn. carried on patrols the rest of the month and into August and started to suffer increasing engine failures. On 10 August two more U-Boats were attacked without result. On 19 August the squadron was sent after the German blockade runner 'SS Corunna'. It is thought that R5661 found the ship but was shot down, FO. Searby and crew being lost. Later Sqn. Ldr. Weston attacked in R5543 but his bombs missed. Then FS Shriner in R5563 attacked but he failed to return. Two unsuccessful bombing runs were made by FS Hobson in R5562. FS Turner in R5679 claimed to have hit the ship with two bombs as it steamed 35 miles off Cape Ortegal, but was severely damaged in the process. In late evening FS Dale in W4111 sighted a ship but was driven off by flak. The final sortie of the day was FS Haynes in R5605, but they did not return. On 20 August the three remaining serviceable aircraft of No. 61 Sqn. took off on further searches, R5543 PO Harrad and crew failed to return.

Considering the squadrons had only been equipped with Lancasters from December 1941 and April 1942 respectively, and BC did not have that many Lancasters at the time, it was probably not the best use of them or their crews. Maybe Harris should have opposed these detachments more? The Lancasters were not equipped with radar at this period so I presume the searches were all Mk. 1 eyeball.

Mike
 
This seems relevant to the recent discussion.


One thing I've understood about aircraft in the North Atlantic was the value in forcing the U'Boat to submerge and lose contact with the convoy. The long range patrol aircraft didn't have to sink the U-Boat to protect the convoy.
 
One thing I've understood about aircraft in the North Atlantic was the value in forcing the U'Boat to submerge and lose contact with the convoy. The long range patrol aircraft didn't have to sink the U-Boat to protect the convoy.
That was actually true in WW I. Which was known and ignored by the British bomber barons.

Number of boats sunk is a crude way of estimating activity. Very crude.

In the first 4 months of WW II CC aircraft had sighted 57 U-boats, attacked 40 and damaged 8 (?) and sunk none.
Without radar, without actual depth charges (mostly) and usually with a very light bomb load and mostly in daylight.
Even with better and more weapons and faster aircraft the number of attacks turned into kills was fraction of the sightings.

The battle swung back and forth with different sensors and tactics. Mostly with the British playing catch up in the early part of the war and then pulling ahead with better technology.

A Sunderland played a hand in the first air assisted kill of a U-boat on Jan 30th 1940 when a plane from No 228 squadron located U-55 twice after it shook surface pursuers and was able to bring the surface ships back into contact with the U-boat. The surface ships could not kill the U-boat either but hounded it enough to exhaust the batteries and force it's commander to surface and scuttle the boat.
 
The most effective air defence for convoys was provided by escort carriers. As they were always in company
with a convoy air assets were "on hand" all the way across the Atlantic. Working in conjunction with other
defence assets they were able to ensure U-boats stayed well away or at least submerged where they were
too slow to follow the convoy or form groups effectively.

Long range land based aircraft could patrol lanes to create larger buffer zones for the convoys and a very dangerous
run in for U-boats.

In 1944 MAC ships were added to complement the escort carriers and U-boat attacks started to tail off. Even though the
Atlantic battle was already won in 1943 the extra protection afforded to convoys was still necessary.

As has been noted it wasn't so much a case of find and sink, it was more a case of find and negate.
 
In 1944 MAC ships were added to complement the escort carriers and U-boat attacks started to tail off. Even though the
Atlantic battle was already won in 1943 the extra protection afforded to convoys was still necessary.
The first MAC ship, Empire MacAlpine, completed in April 1943 and sailed with its first convoy in May 1943, with the last of the 19 MAC ships entering service in April 1944. They served exclusively on the North Atlantic convoy routes. By 1944 there were enough in service, that many convoys were able to sail with a pair of these ships.

With their 3 or 4 Swordfish they could not provide total immunity to the convoys they escorted, but the majority of the convoys they escorted came through without loss. Of course the changing pattern of U-boat deployment also helped enormously.

After Sept 1944 the last of the RN escort carriers were withdrawn from the North Atlantic and Gibraltar convoy routes to be redeployed to support the Arctic convoys. Again it was a reflection of where the U-boat threat lay.
 
I think we all recognise that no one plane (or anything else) changed the course of the war as that would imply that the benefit stayed for a long time. It didn't as countermeasures almost invariably came to reverse the situation.

In no particular order these are my thoughts, and I expect there are people who will have their own comments, but here goes.

Hellcat.
The Wildcat held the onslaught of the IJN Zero, but it was the Hellcat that turned the corner and defeated the Zero. No Japanese naval aircraft surpassed the Hellcat, at sea.

Me109E (in France)
The 109D was a very average fighter which suffered serious losses to the French airforce and would have found the Hurricane in France hard going. Even the Poles considered the Me110 to be more dangerous than the Me109D. It was the 109E that dominated the war in France. The countermeasure was of course the Spitfire, which first matched and then surpassed the 109E and later versions, with periods where the advantage switched between the two aircraft.

Fw190
Had a clear advantage over the Spit V which cause serious losses to the RAF, was matched by the arrival of the Spit IX, but it wasn't until the Spit 12 that the Fw190 was surpassed. It severely limited the RAF incursions over France in 1941/2

P38 (in the pacific)
First American fighter to dominate the IJAF with its speed, range and reliability. Germany never considered the P38 to be dominant fighter

Zero
Gave the IJN a fighter that was at least as good as the best of its adversaries plus the significant tactical advantage of its range.

P51
Similar to the Zero in that its was a fighter at least as good as its opponents but had the significant tactical advantage of an unmatched range.

Beaufighter
Was the first true nightfighter with range, performance, firepower and radar. Turned Luftwaffe night raids from being a milkrun, to a very dangerous occupation. Clearly surpassed by the Mossie, but it was the Beaufighter that turned the night battle in favour of the RAF.

B24
For the closing of the Atlantic gap.
Strong arguments.
FWIW:
Years ago I wrote about the three essential aircraft in winning the Pacific War. In order of appearance:
The SBD, without which, 1942 would not have been possible for the United States.
The F6F, which destroyed Japanese Airpower (nearly as many credited kills as all AAF fighters against Japan) and established air superiority in the Central and Western Pacific.
The B-29, no explanation needed. (But note that 29s flew from bases that F6Fs had done so much to obtain.)

As a sidebar: it's nearly inconceivable that Japan would've embarked upon the Pacific War without the Zero. In that respect it's one of only three truly strategic fighters--aircraft that affected the broader strategy of a war or theater of operations. The others: Hellcats and Mustangs.
 
The entire idea from the onset, was to get Britain to negotiate for a peace - Hitler's ultimate goal nwas to quickly neutralize Europe so he could turn full force to the east.

Italy's idiocy in North Africa and Britain's resistance and eventual denial of Germany's offensive derailed that plan.
Agree but they wanted return of WW1 colonies which UK would never agree.

Can you make a sweet spot for Germany where they win BoB and terms cause UK to drop out without testing RN?
 
Strong arguments.
FWIW:
Years ago I wrote about the three essential aircraft in winning the Pacific War. In order of appearance:
The SBD, without which, 1942 would not have been possible for the United States.
The F6F, which destroyed Japanese Airpower (nearly as many credited kills as all AAF fighters against Japan) and established air superiority in the Central and Western Pacific.
The B-29, no explanation needed. (But note that 29s flew from bases that F6Fs had done so much to obtain.)

As a sidebar: it's nearly inconceivable that Japan would've embarked upon the Pacific War without the Zero. In that respect it's one of only three truly strategic fighters--aircraft that affected the broader strategy of a war or theater of operations. The others: Hellcats and Mustangs.
In the thread upstream there is some debate about the B-29. In my opinion, it was the most important weapon system to hasten the end of the war, with or without the atomic bomb. Its worth remembering that prior to the Japanese surrender the catchphrase was "Golden Gate by '48" based on the assumption that it would take three years to finish the war if it required ground forces to invade and take the Japanese homelands. The experience in Iwo Jima and Okinawa called into question whether that would be possible or would the invasion of Japan be un-winnable. The B-29 as it evolved as a combat system significantly eroded the Japanese population's willingness to fight in a manner that was more significant than the bombing campaign in Europe. I'm attaching the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys summary reports for the European and Pacific Wars. Its worth reading the Pacific War especially the impact of the bombing campaign.
 

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In the thread upstream there is some debate about the B-29. In my opinion, it was the most important weapon system to hasten the end of the war, with or without the atomic bomb. Its worth remembering that prior to the Japanese surrender the catchphrase was "Golden Gate by '48" based on the assumption that it would take three years to finish the war if it required ground forces to invade and take the Japanese homelands. The experience in Iwo Jima and Okinawa called into question whether that would be possible or would the invasion of Japan be un-winnable. The B-29 as it evolved as a combat system significantly eroded the Japanese population's willingness to fight in a manner that was more significant than the bombing campaign in Europe. I'm attaching the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys summary reports for the European and Pacific Wars. Its worth reading the Pacific War especially the impact of the bombing campaign.

Another important effect of the B-29 was psychological: it allowed the Japanese population to understand that all the propaganda about the war was clearly BS.
 
The war really turned after the RAAF received F-35s thanks to the time wormhole that opened in late 1944...

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Hey, indulge me...it's April Fool's day...and these are some great photos... :cool:
 
Duplicate post
 

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FFS...another duplicate?!
 

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Another duplicate - damned computer!!!
 

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