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From GlobalSecurity.org:
B-24 performance problems, coupled by the fact that B-17 production was to taper off prior to B-24 production, prompted the Army Air Force (AAF) to investigate the combat effectiveness of the plane in comparison to the B-17. A comparative analysis conducted in the spring of 1944 by the AAF Operations and Requirements Division concluded that "it would be desirable to increase B-17 production and decrease that of the B-24, because the former airplane is a much more effective combat weapon."
This recommendation was based on statistical comparisons:
- Statistical data compiled on the utilization of both planes showed that the B-17 was easier to maintain and therefore more available for combat.
- Statistical data on time from aircraft acceptance to delivery in theater showed that the B-17's spend only half as much time in modification centers thus are availableat the theaters in a shorter time.
- Use of B-17 combat sorties, versus B-24, resulted in a 40% savings in personneland material.
- The average man-hours expended in producing and modifying one B-24 weregreater than for a B-17.
- Statistical comparisons done on loss rate per sortie showed that the B-17 had a 35% longer combat life than the B-24.
Another study was conducted in the fall of 1944 by the AAF Unit Training Division. In the final report,Colonel Walker, Chief of the Unit Training Division, states the following: "The extensive use of the B-24 is inconsistent with the blunt fact that it is the most extravagant killer of any airplane in the AAF. Since Pearl Harbor through September 1944, B-24 accidents in the U.S. have resulted in 2,188 fatalities. In the first 9 months of 1944, B-24's did only 6% of total flying in the U.S. but accounted for 26% of all fatalities. They flew 5% less than B-17's but had 105% more fatalities and 85% more wrecks. Had the B-24 had as good accident rate as the B-17 during the period 7 December 1941 through September 1944, there would have been a saving of 230 aircraft wrecked, 904 lives, and approximately $60,000,000."
Sorry. It probably wasn't. It was a horrible and ungainly aircraft to fly. Evasive manoeuvres difficult, if not impossible. Dad said It handled like a cow. It did however have it's role as long range maritime patrol aircraft.
Jim
Personnel were 100% expendable.
The mission was to get bombs onto targets at the cheapest and fastest possible rate.
The B-24 was faster to build and went further on the same amount of materials.
Wars are won by getting there 'firstest with the mostest'. Comfort and safety are not war winning attributes - see the B-29
The B-17 was past its sell by date by 1942 and exited production very early 1945.
Orders for over 5,000 B-24's were cancelled on VJ Day
Let's remember that EVERY weapon developed in WWII contributed to the result. Even the most abject failures showed the weaknesses of using that technique or design. It is absolutely useless to argue better or worse ... it takes a forum exchanging interesting, curious and useful information into the realm of a drunken "mine's bigger than yours!" bar squabble.
And it's the contribution to the war effort that counts. In the role it was used, it was a capable aircraft. I don't have the stats at hand: what was the proportion of B-17's on missions over Germany as compared to the B-24? That would speak volumes.As far as the B-17 goes, sure it was not the best bomber in the sky performance wise, and it was an outdated design. Look at when it was designed for crying out loud. Its days were certainly numbered, especially once the B-29 would be produced in sufficient numbers.
Having said that, it was not even close to being overrated. Especially when you look into its contribution to the war effort.
Besides it was a Boeing product, that alone gives it cool points.
You seem to ignore the points made by the contemporary bean counters that the B-24 was not a more efficient aircraft for performing the mission of "getting there 'firstest with the mostest'."Personnel were 100% expendable.
The mission was to get bombs onto targets at the cheapest and fastest possible rate.
The B-24 was faster to build and went further on the same amount of materials.
Wars are won by getting there 'firstest with the mostest'. Comfort and safety are not war winning attributes - see the B-29
The B-17 was past its sell by date by 1942 and exited production very early 1945.
Orders for over 5,000 B-24's were cancelled on VJ Day
What?! That's a stupid reply! What's your combat experience in a 4-engined heavy bomber? Ever heard of the cork-screw manoeuvre?! Suggest you have a bit more research to do!Its a warplane, not a weekend pleasure flight flivver.
Fly in formation to Point X, drop bombs, everything else is academic.
What?! That's a stupid reply! What's your combat experience in a 4-engined heavy bomber? Ever heard of the cork-screw manoeuvre?! Suggest you have a bit more research to do!
Sorry!Attack the content, not the poster.
Let's remain civil.
The B-24 was the 'new aerodymanics', it was a generation on from the B-17 - it was a 'hot ship', and like the B-26, its 'hot handling' was a problem until people got there head around the fact is wasn't a slow lumbering pleasant flying pre war design.
The B-24 was a faster plane having a greater range and payload capacity. However, in the ETO, the B-24 operated with the B-17 which constrained the aircraft's operating speed. The B17 was a sedate aircraft and placed fewer demands on the flight deck crew. The B-17 was also an easier aircraft to fly in formation. On the other hand, the B24 demanded constant attention causing extreme fatigue in pilots on long missions.
The B-24 was "hot-handling"? Everything I've read indicates that it was a sluggish plane in handling. In The Wild Blue, George McGovern makes specific mention of its poor handling characteristics, resulting in pilot fatigue.
There's also this (forgive the horrible webpage appearance):
Anyone who thinks crews are expendable is underestimating the importance of training and experience in combat. The Luftwaffe says hello. They also are not taking into account the costs and time to get that necessary training.
Personnel were 100% expendable.
The mission was to get bombs onto targets at the cheapest and fastest possible rate.
The B-24 was faster to build and went further on the same amount of materials.
Wars are won by getting there 'firstest with the mostest'. Comfort and safety are not war winning attributes - see the B-29
The B-17 was past its sell by date by 1942 and exited production very early 1945.
Orders for over 5,000 B-24's were cancelled on VJ Day
There were certain other contrasts between the two aircraft which were becoming apparent to men who were acquainted with both. For example the overall impression one got from the Fortress interior was that it was, like its exterior, round and smooth — with its equipment built-in rather than added-on. Each B-17 crew member had a place to sit down and strap himself in — a small point, perhaps, but psychologically important. On the other hand the Liberator fuselage, while of larger dimensions than the Fortress, offered little in the way of comfort for the crew. There seemed to be draughts everywhere, and of such magnitude that they were far more than the troublesome spot heaters could contend with. Movement throughout the ship was awkward and difficult in full flight gear, and more often than not resulted in jarring collisions with various sharp-edged and unyielding structural members and/or installed equipment. Idle gunners sat on the floor — if they sat — and likely as not pondered possible fates for the design engineer who was responsible for a fuel-transfer system that required any prudent B-24 pilot to crack open the bomb bay doors in flight to disperse the petrol fumes. Or perhaps the ball and tail gunners thought about the greater speed with which their B-17 counterparts could exit their stations in a emergency. (p.184)
Inevitably the Liberator continued to be compared with the Flying Fortress and, as far as the later versions of the two bombers were concerned, suffered by the comparison. This was due not so much to short-comings of the Liberator — although it certainly had them — as to the fact the B-17 was in many respects an exceptional aircraft, with many of its merits having particular — and personal — appeal to the men who flew it and flew in it. From the beginning the Fortress was an honest aircraft, easy to fly in formation, with a low landing speed and with no major vices. 'A four-engined Piper Cub' was the popular and rather apt description. Most important, the Fortress retained its original characteristics throughout its development, while the Liberator did not. (p.186)
Actually the Liberator never did lose its performance edge over the B-17, as a series of tests run at Elgin Field demonstrated conclusively late in the war. Rather, the areas in which the B-24 excelled became less important in the European and Mediterranean theatres. The range of the Fortress was adequate for Europe, and individual aircraft speed became academic because of formation requirements. Altitude, however, became paramount and here, literally, the B-17 remained on top. In addition, with over 70% of Eighth Air Force mission failures being attributed to navigational errors, the superior accommodations of the B-17 nose were highly desirable. General Doolittle, in fact, considered poor visibility the number one fault of the B-24.
In the Pacific theatre there was no vocal contest between the two aircraft, for although B-24's were originally requested by Pacific theatre commanders because they felt there was a better chance of getting them than the more popular B-17, the Liberator's longer legs soon demonstrated that it was a natural choice for an air war conducted for the most part at extreme range. The European requirement for tight formation flying was not as severe, and the typical maximum-range mission allowed Pacific Liberators, when necessary, to approach the target at adequate altitude because of the large amount of fuel burned on the way. (p.186-187)
During World War II, complaints from the operational theatres concerning lack of aircraft performance could often be traced to the fact that the aircraft was being operated under conditions far in excess of design specifications. Yet when changes were made to improve lagging performance, the theatres invariably used these improvements to further increase maximum loads instead of taking the improvement in terms of the increased performance that was originally requested.
Under this axiom, the B-24J was as a routine being flown on missions at gross weights in excess of 36 tons and flying characteristics suffered accordingly. Liberator controls had always been heavy, and continual addition of weight made them worse. It was extremely difficult to fly a tight formation with the B-24J, and so tiring that many pilots found it physically impossible after a few hours. The slow rate of roll, an inborn characteristic of the Liberator because of the large wing span, had been made slower by the addition of the outer wing tanks. Initial climb of a combat-loaded B-24 was slow, usually taking about six minutes to reach the 1,000 ft mark. Visibility from the flight deck was inadequate for formation flying. Because of the manner in which the side windows sloped inward, the pilot and co-pilot had be be seated low in order to have enough head room. This made it difficult to see over the instrument panel. In addition, the astrodome and the top of the nose turret were directly in front of the windshield which, to begin with, was considered too narrow and already partly blocked by the above-the-dash location of the compass. Furthermore, the side windows were so small that it was dangerous for the pilot to put his head through the window while taxiing. Lack of visibility from the nose compartment was equally serious—the only way the bombardier could adequately see was to get down on his hands and knees, and it was impossible for the navigator to help in target identification because of the lack of window area.
The Eighth Air Force experimented with various means of reducing the weight and visibility problems of the Liberator, including the removal of all ball turrets in July 1944 and the addition of various additional window areas in the nose. General Doolittle eventually rejected the Liberator on the grounds of too much weight and too little visibility and it was his intention, if sufficient B-17's could be obtained, to convert the entire Eighth Air Force to the Fortress. (p.61 and p.63)
Consolidated recognized at an early date that a single tail configuration for the Liberator might prove highly desirable, but because of the press of early production commitments it was not until 10 October 1942 that the first wind tunnel tests got under way on a model incorporating this feature. When they gave encouraging results, B-24D 42-40058 was selected as a test article. Known as the B-24ST (for Single Tail) . . . [t]his version continued the flight test programme until June when, on the 29th of that month, the entire rear fuselage assembly of 42-40058 was removed and spliced to another similarly-dissected Liberator, B-24D-40-CO 42-40234 . . . [n]ow with its grafted on single fin empennage, 42-40234 was given the designation XB-24K . . .
After a series of flights from San Diego, the first of which took place on 9 September 1943, the XB-24K was flown to the USAAF Proving Ground Command at Elgin Field for official tests. Elgin's experienced B-24 pilots—not usually given to superlatives in their reports—found it decidedly superior to any other B-24 they had flown. Handling characteristics and manoeuverability were excellent, controls more sensitive, directional stability increased, and performance with two engines out on the same side was a great improvement over the standard B-24. Also noted were large increases in the fields of fire of the top turret, ball turret, tail turret and waist guns. Without qualification, Elgin recommended on 26 April 1944 that 'an empennage of similar design be incorporated in all future production B-24 aircraft' and preliminary contract negotiations were initiated for an unprecedented order of 4,500 B-24K machines. In time this resulted in the B-24N. (p.59)
What?! That's a stupid reply! What's your combat experience in a 4-engined heavy bomber? Ever heard of the cork-screw manoeuvre?! Suggest you have a bit more research to do!
You seem to ignore the points made by the contemporary bean counters that the B-24 was not a more efficient aircraft for performing the mission of "getting there 'firstest with the mostest'."
Aircrew are expensive to train in both time and money. Pushing an aircraft out the factory door faster means nothing if it then requires extensive, expensive, time consuming, modifications to make it combat ready. All those planes are of no value if they are grounded due to servicibility issues.
As a rebuttal, I will offer the following selected passages from the book The B-24 Liberator: A Pictorial History by Allan G. Blue.
Regarding the comparison between the B-24 and B-17:
Regarding the B-24's performance shortcomings:
Regarding the B-24 and a design change which improved its characteristics (a change which emulated the design of the B-17):