The B-17 Flying Fortress Was The Most Overrated Bomber Of World War 2

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Right. The IJN also learned a lesson in what happens to an air force that doesn't care for its human resources. I bet by 1944 they wished they'd practiced better SAR in 1942.

the IJN was short of manpower because of the insane critera up it stuck with for selecting aircrew until it was too late. The USN wasn't washing out excellent potential pilot recruits because they didn't have exceptional night vision.
 
the IJN was short of manpower because of the insane critera up it stuck with for selecting aircrew until it was too late. The USN wasn't washing out excellent potential pilot recruits because they didn't have exceptional night vision.

As I mentioned in my post, their lousy SAR cost them many fine aircrew. Their aircrew losses at Santa Cruz devastated their carrier aircrews, which never recovered due to -- yes -- slow training.

Still awaiting your reply to the meat of my post above in post #65.
 
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Personnel were 100% expendable.
The B-17 was past its sell by date by 1942 and exited production very early 1945.
Orders for over 5,000 B-24's were cancelled on VJ Day
The short answer to the above three statements is no.

As of December 1944 the USAAF plan was to end B-17 production at Boeing in April 1945, and Douglas and Lockheed in January 1946, the B-24 was already down to 2 open production lines, San Diego scheduled to finish in July 1945 and Ford in June 1946, with 2,952 B-17 and 5,588 B-24 outstanding on current orders. End April 1945 the B-17 lines were to remain open until November and December 1946, delivering another 2,054 B-17, the B-24 lines were to shut in July 1945, delivering another 601 B-24. Actual B-24 end of production June 1945, B-17 end of production July 1945.

In an industrial war you run out of people before weapons, think of all those Bf109, Fw190, A6M sitting at factories without trained pilots. Arthur Harris noted trained aircrew cost about the same as an undergraduate university degree.

The 1944/45 B-24 from Ford, from the USAAF RC-301 reports, S.number = Supplement.number, G program "follow on" approved January 1942. H program "acceleration" approved April 1942. J program fiscal year 1944, approved June 1943, K program fiscal year 1945 approved June 1944.

April 1944,
G program S.? 1,214 B-24J on unapproved contracts,
H program S.5 125 B-24J on approved formal contracts
J program S.24 has 4,100 B-24J on approved formal contracts, CTI-1400 Addition 43, 1,000 B-24J no procurement action.
B-24H production ends (1,780 built), J production begins.

July 1944,
G program S.32 1,214 B-24J on approved formal contracts,
H program S.5 125 B-24J on approved formal contracts
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 605 B-24K, 3,247 B-24M on approved formal contracts, total 4,100
J program S.32 1,000 B-24K on approved formal contracts
So B-24J will be followed by K then M.

August 1944
G program S.32, 1,214 B-24J on approved formal contracts,
H program S.5 125 B-24J on approved formal contracts
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 1 xB-24K, 2,504 B-24M, 1,347 B-24P on approved formal contracts, total 4,100
J program S.32 1,000 B-24P on approved formal contracts
B-24K cancelled, J followed by M then P. J production ends except for 1 in September (1,587 built). L production begins but no mention of L in the contracts list.

September 1944
G program S.32, 1,214 B-24J on approved formal contracts,
H program S.5 125 B-24J on approved formal contracts
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 2,504 B-24L, 1 XB-24N, 1,347 B-24N on approved formal contracts, total 4,100
J program S.32 1,000 B-24N on approved formal contracts
B-24J to L to N, looks like what was going to be the K becomes the N model.

October 1944 Dropping G and H program orders as they have finished.
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 1,000 B-24L 1,504 B-24M, 1 B-24N prototype, 1,347 B-24N on approved formal contracts, total 4,100
J program S.32 1,000 B-24N on approved formal contracts
B-24J to L to M to N.

November 1944
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 1,250 B-24L 1,754 B-24M, 1 B-24N prototype, 847 B-24N on approved formal contracts, total 4,100
J program S.32 1,000 B-24N on approved formal contracts
XB-24N accepted.

December 1944
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 1,250 B-24L 1,625 B-24M, 1 B-24N prototype, 976 B-24N on approved formal contracts, total 4,100
J program S.32 1,000 B-24N on approved formal contracts
K program TI-2145 addition 7, 1,500 B-24N, released but no procurement action.
B-24L production ends except for 1 in January (1,250 built), B-24M production begins.

January 1945,
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 1,250 B-24L 1,798 B-24M, 1 B-24N prototype, 803 B-24N on approved formal contracts, total 4,100
J program S.32 1,000 B-24N on approved formal contracts
K program, S.?, 2,175 B-24N, on AFP or unapproved letter contracts.

March 1945,
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 1,250 B-24L 1,800 B-24M, 1 B-24N prototype, 801 B-24N on approved formal contracts, total 4,100
J program S.32 1,000 B-24N on approved formal contracts
K program S.47 2,175 B-24N on approved letter contracts.

April 1945
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 1,250 B-24L 1,801 B-24M, 1 B-24N prototype, 7 YB-24N on approved formal contracts, total 3,307
Supplements 32 (J program) and 42 (K program) cancelled.

May 1945
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 1,250 B-24L 1,677 B-24M, 1 B-24N prototype, 7 YB-24N on approved formal contracts, total 3,183
1 YB-24N accepted, 6 outstanding, also outstanding 119 B-24M

June 1945
J program S.24 has 248 B-24J, 1,250 B-24L 1,677 B-24M, 1 B-24N prototype, 7 YB-24N on approved formal contracts, total 3,183
All production ends, 1,677 B-24M, 1 XB-24N, 7 YB-24N built.

B-24 production at San Diego also ended in June 1945, PB4Y-2 production ended in October.
 
The B-24 was faster and cheaper to build than the B-17.

The B-24 was not cheaper. According to the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest — World War II, the average unit cost of airplanes authorized (Table 82 on page 134):

1939–41
B-17: $301,221
B-24: $379,162

1942
B-17: $258,949
B-24: $304,391

1943
no figures listed

1944
B-17: $204,370
B-24: $215,516

1945
B-17: $187,742
B-24: no figure listed

The B-24 was 25.9% more expensive per unit in 1939–41, 17.5% more expensive in 1942, and 5.5% more expensive in 1944.

The table defines average cost this way:

Average cost per airplane is the weighted average of all programs approved during a designated fiscal year and represents the estimated cost of a complete airplane ready for flyaway, including factory installed ordnance and radio equipment. Costs exclude equipment installed at modification centers and airplane spare parts. Unit costs reflect renegotiation of contracts only to the extent of reductions in contract prices for future deliveries but do not reflect reductions in prices effected by cash refunds.
 
The B-17 might have been outclassed by the "Heavies" in performance and payload, but it was one of the toughest aircraft when it came to survival. My mother was stationed at one of the diversion airfields and saw many a B-17 stagger in shot up to hell and gone. Certainly more rugged than the B-24. Irrespective of whatever planes were used, the skill and bravery of their crews was of the highest order.

When my dad came back from pilot training in Texas, he and the other pilots were gathered at Eaton (Heaton??) Hall in Manchester to receive their "career path". The officer walked in and said "This side of the hall, bombers, that side, gliders". My dad said he only knew of three others who survived; and this was after D-Day!!
 
The wing racks made for a picture of an impressive load out. Then again, Boeing.
(Someone post a picture of a Stratofortess!)
Yes, with wing racks installed, the B-17 could carry up to 17,000 pounds (internal/external).

While that did limit it's range, it was very capable of striking targets across the Channel.

The original concept of the max. load of the B-17, was to intercept enemy ships off the U.S. coast - as time went by, this never happened and high altitude bombing of enemy shipping proved to have poor results.

However, the max. load capability remained a standard feature through it's operational lifetime.
 
Yes, with wing racks installed, the B-17 could carry up to 17,000 pounds (internal/external).

While that did limit it's range, it was very capable of striking targets across the Channel.

The original concept of the max. load of the B-17, was to intercept enemy ships off the U.S. coast - as time went by, this never happened and high altitude bombing of enemy shipping proved to have poor results.

However, the max. load capability remained a standard feature through it's operational lifetime.

The maximum internal load for the B-17 was six 1,000-lb GP bombs or eight 1,000-lb SAP bombs. Only two 2,000-lb GP could be carried internally. The number of smaller bombs carried was increased through the use of cluster adapters: the number of 100-lb GP bombs and 120-lb fragmentation cluster bombs were each raised from 24 to 38, while the number of 100-lb incendiary bombs increased from 24 to 42. The number of 250-lb GP was bombs was also increased, from 16 to 20.

The external racks could hold bombs up to 4,000 lbs. They were used on a couple of operations to carry 1,000-lb bombs, but the additional drag, reduced range, and handling penalties associated with external ordnance were deemed too large to make the effort worthwhile.
 
From the Armorer's guide:

b-17_bombload_chart-jpg.jpg
 
Yes, with wing racks installed, the B-17 could carry up to 17,000 pounds (internal/external).

While that did limit it's range, it was very capable of striking targets across the Channel.

The original concept of the max. load of the B-17, was to intercept enemy ships off the U.S. coast - as time went by, this never happened and high altitude bombing of enemy shipping proved to have poor results.

However, the max. load capability remained a standard feature through it's operational lifetime.
But the concept was proved by the "interception" of the Italian liner Rex. If once is statistically significant.
 
From the Armorer's guide:

View attachment 708163

Yes, those are the limits for bombs attached to each station. The cluster adapter allowed multiple bombs to be hung from one station, as shown in the following image from A Study of Incendiary Bombs for Employment by the United States Army Air Forces (p.44). (Note that the AN-M47 incendiary bomb was classed as a 100-lb weapon, but its actual weight was about 70 lbs).

load01.jpg


The B-24 saw similar increases in its smaller bomb capacity through the use of such adapters, with the number of 100-lb GP, 100-lb incendiary, and 120-lb frag clusters increased from 20 to 52. The number of 250-lb bombs was also doubled from 12 to 24.

The difference between the number of 1,000-lb SAP and GP bombs in the B-17 is due to the smaller diameter of former compared to the latter (15.1" versus 18.8"), allowing more stations to be used. (A similar increase occurred for the 500-lb SAP bomb, as 16 could be carried internally compared to only 12 of the 500-lb GP bomb.)
 
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As a general comparison, the 1944 unit cost by aircraft model according to the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest — World War II (Table 82 on page 134), arranged from most expensive to least expensive.

$790,433 = B-32
$605,360 = B-29
$215,516 = B-24
$204,370 = B-17
$192,457 = A-26
$192,427 = B-26
$142,194 = B-25
$109,471 = P-80
$100,800 = A-20
$097,147 = P-38
$085,578 = P-47
$059,966 = P-63
$051,572 = P-51
$050,666 = P-39
$044,892 = P-40

The only major AAF combat aircraft missing in the 1944 data is the P-61, which had a unit cost of $180,711 in 1943 and $199,598 in 1945.

The developmental P-59 clocked in with a unit cost of $236,299. Other expensive aircraft were the C-82 ($478,549), C-54 ($285,113), C-46 ($233,377), OA-10 ($216,617), and C-87 ($208,780). The least expensive aircraft were the L-4 ($2,620) and L-5 ($9,704).
 

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