The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread.

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That is two sides of story - if RAF hardly flying it is no surprise to anyone few planes lost... you say, 2 Group flied 5531 sorties in 1943. In one year. Loss: 108 (all cause)

Please compare that to 4970 bomber sortie fly by German in 1-15 September 1940. Two week..

If enemy does not show, he cannot shot down. Of course.. but if you ask air superiority, you have to ask: why does enemy does not show..? Why did RAF did not show? Surely not - not enough bomber. RAF had bomber enough. Will to show up daylight - no.

Since RAF was denied of sustain air bomber operations over Europe during day, it is clear who had air superiority in opinion mine. I know you agree not, but that is my opinion. I think this thesis of parsifal is far-reached. But it is interesting discussion, too.


I agree with Jim. This is usual discussion - data I saw suggest P-51 type had advantage in speed over medium altitude, 109G-6 or G-14 with 605A, 605AM. Means high alitude over. Generally in speed but not in climb, or turn. This favours 109.

P-51B is good performance, but not mature type - problem with vision, too light guns, reliability with them. P-51D is mature type.

Case is different with high altititude AS or D type engine - this is G-6/AS, G-14/AS G-10 or K-4 type. All equal to P-51 at altitude. 109K also slightly better in speed etc. At altitude, climb better, turn better. It is question of engine.
General - speed characteristics of both types excellent.. top speed, cruise speed. Equal. Bf 109 is more suited for close fights, because it is superior in turn, roll, climb. P-51 is superior in high speed fights. There are also many other factors - gun, vision, range etc. This gives mixed picture. Both types excellent for purpose, equal in combat.
 
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A Mustang pulling 75" is using 150 fuel and put out ~2000hp. At higher speeds the Mustang's control surfaces needed less force on the control stick by the pilot, than on the 109.

Max speed of the K-4 was at 23,000ft while the top speed of the P-51D was at 26,000ft.

The 109 was also a razorback, so I see no reason why the 109 had better pilot vision.
 
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well the Mustang has to be the best fighter of world war two simply because it can do everything all the other types could do but they could not do what it could!

quoting performance figures is pretty much irrelevant when the tactical situation is the most relevant in all air to air combats, and the fact the P51 could be there to make that tactical situation speaks volumes!
 

At the end of the day, the Luftwaffe fighters were shooting down on average 2-3 bombers a Month, over northern Europe in 1943 approx 0.45% of the bomber sorties launched against them.

Now you have every right to consider that an acceptable defence, one that shows that the Luftwaffe had command of the air but I suspect that you would be in a very small minority.

Bomer Command itself as you know was a strategic force that generally didn't operate during the day.
 
Hi Tante

Just a quick note about No2 Group and the Luftwaffe. No 2 Group is not the entire RAF. Its just one group (about 100 aircraft), tasked with the operations over France after June 1940, I believe. In 1939 it had 76 Blenheims attached, which remained its main equipment until somrtime in '42 (I think, I will stand corrected on that). It was then re-equipped with American equipment. In the latter part of 1943 it was transferred out of BC and became part of 2 Tactical Air Force, equipped with Mosquitoes and B-25s. Ny wars end it had a strength of about 260 aircraft.

Its certainly not the entire RAF, and during the whole course of the war is credited with over 57000 sorties overall. I think the number quoted by Glider are those just over France.

I dont know if 5000 sorties for a year is a lot or a little. Its an average of 14 aircraft over the continent every day. The usual cycle for daylight tactical operations over France in April-May 1941 was about 1 major mission every four days or so. At that rate, the group was sending 55 bombers to the continent every four days. I am unaware of that many bombers being the bomber force for the 17 fighter squadrons assigned to the offensive, perhaps some sorties were flown at night, or to areas where the JGs were not deployed (though with over 32 staffeln deployed in France at that time, its hard to imagine any part of France not being covered) .

No 2 Gp at the beginning of the offensive consisted of 7 squadrons, Nos 18, 21, 82, 101, 105, 110 139. All were equipped with Blen IVs. Average frontline strength of BC squadrons at that time was about 12 aircrcraft, so the styrength of the Gp was about 84 aircraft or so.
 
Glider said:
At the end of the day, the Luftwaffe fighters were shooting down on average 2-3 bombers a Month, over northern Europe in 1943
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No, this is false. Sudden - your No 2 Group bomber sorties become the all the bomber sorties flown against Luftwaffe. Of course and 2-3 bombers shot down - in fact many more. You know well this was not true. Your data only refers 2 Group.

approx 0.45% of the bomber sorties launched against them.
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While we discuss - what were these bomber sorties good for? What damage do they make to German? All this - bombing France? So why would German care? France is enemy country. Britain is enemy country. Britain bombs France. Good..

Now you have every right to consider that an acceptable defence,
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I do not consider this "defence". You can only defence against attack. RAF had no attack of meaning. You said 5513 sorties a year. 460 sortie a month.. insignificant. Diversion raid at best.

one that shows that the Luftwaffe had command of the air but I suspect that you would be in a very small minority.
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This "small minority" include USAAF Bomber Command after Schweinfurt and and RAF bomber command who did not fly exactly because it knew Luftwaffe had command of air.. I know, annoying fact, but little difficult to avoid it.

Bomer Command itself as you know was a strategic force that generally didn't operate during the day.
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It operated in the day until the Luftwaffe denied it of that possibility in 1940. The reason it operated during the night was forced on it, by fact that the LW had air superioity over Europe.

The RAF wasn't flying many day bomber sorties because it couldn't. If enemy planes do not fly, they can't be shot down. Of course if you already force them do not fly to effect, LW already achieve mission success, RAF failed.
So claim air superiority if you wish, it is good propaganda, play numbers a little... say few shot down, forget they hardly fly at all this is real reason..

Basical: RAF goal was use bombers bait, force German fighter into fight, and shoot them down with strong fighter numbers, ie. having advantage. But German did not play this game.. they played theirs. RAF failed.
German goal was simply to skirmish RAF in West, with minimal force, cause maximum casulties... LW succeed in goal, until 1944, and USAAF escort, that is.

I fear I am on firm opinion is that thesis that RAF was gaining air superiority in West after 1940 is like alternate history... like rezunism. It was allowed to fly when it did not hurt German interest. But how German could take it back anytime - shown during Cerberus, Dieppe.. LW had complete superiority when wanted.

PS. @parsifal. ''Just a quick note about No2 Group and the Luftwaffe. No 2 Group is not the entire RAF.'' '- I agree. Good information you share, thank you, even if I do not agree thesis. That is I point out to Glider - No 2 Group is not RAF, so if he lists what LW shoots down from No 2 Group sortie, it is not equal to what LW shoots down from all RAF sortie..
 
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Bomber operations over france were carried out for a number of reasons. No.2 Gp was not the only Bomber force committed to the offensive, but it was a significant part. For example the attacks against the German Naval Heavy units in Brest were carried out mostly by Coastal Command units, as was the suppression of marine traffic in the Channel

2 Group were the poor devils who provided the decoy forces for the RAFs fighter sweeps, so to that extent their bombing attacks were insignificant.....at first. However they were also responsible for forcing the LW to pull back their bomber elements later on, thereby rendering the British Isles more safe from LW attack.

Later on the Group also undertook attacks of the French transport networks, bombing bridges, rail junctionsetc. This slowed, but did not stop, the construction of fortifications along the coast, and always made re-supply difficult for the forward elements. Of course, a much heavier effort, of which 2 group was a part, occurred in 1944, but in 1941-2, he germans had far less materiel to lose in these attacks.

Lastly, the Germans looked to French industry as a supplement to their own industrial resources. They had expected that the French auto industry could supply aomething like 100000 MT for the german military. In the finish they received about 30000. The bombing of the great automotive works in France and the supply chains leading to them, is credited with part of that suppressive effort.

Lastly, though I dont think 2 group was directly involved, the overall offensive did allow support to be provided to the emerging French resistance, which was always a thorn in the side of the Occupying power, and a great source of intell for the allies.

The efforts of 2 Group, was a small, but nevertheless noteworthy contribution to those overall outcomes
 
parsifal said:
2 Group were the poor devils who provided the decoy forces for the RAFs fighter sweeps, so to that extent their bombing attacks were insignificant.....
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That must have been fun for the crew of a obsolete Blenheim. Not the ideal aircraft for raids over France but I suppose thats all that was available till US twins got into service.
 
Fantastic resources guys....goes straight to the favourites...

What I would say about all this is that the RAF enjoyed considerable freedom of action over occupied Europe from the end of May 1941 onwards. Of course there were many reasons for this, including the redeployments of many LW units to the Eastern Front. However, what is blindingly apparent is that to an ever decreasing extent the LW challenged the RAF along the coastal areas of occupied Europe. When they did, they tended to be devastating. I am not trying to prove that the LW was inneffective. Anything but. However the original point being made was that the RAF suffered enormous losses over France 41-3, for no point. That I do contest. The losses were heavy, on occasion, but most operations were untroubled by LW activity, until the RAF vextended itself into Germany proper.

If you want to go back to the air superiority issue, this all suggests a rather complex relationship. My reading of the situation is that over Britain, and the channel, the Brits had won air supremacy by the latter part of 1942. The one big exception to that was the channel dash by the two Battlecruisers....a source of intense embarrassment for the RAF by that stage. Over France and most of the western euriopean occupied nations, the RAF could claim air superiority (remember the deefinition of what that means). Over Germany, the Germans retained air superiority to air supremacy by day, and air parity to air superiority by night
 
I'm more with the Tante Ju on the air superiority over France, the balance began to turn against LW only in 43. Fighter Command had taken beating from LW fighters in 41-42 but in 43 situation was much more even, sometimes LW roughed RAF sometimes it was other way around, and when the year wear out FC began to get upper hand. Still in July 43 it was rather even, LW had a slight advance but in Nov 43 Spitfires seemed to have won all the bigger fighters vs. fighters engagements.

RAF pilots had learned from past errors, they got Spitfire IX with Merlin 63s and 66s which were better than those with Merlin 61s and more and more reliable Typhoons for lower altitude combats. Also during early part of 43 RAF got new, longer range radars for fighter control over France which meant better situation awareness to RAF formation leaders over France.

All this had nothing to do with Bf 109's landing gear but IMHO Snautzer's message # 7 gives answer to the question on the problems with the gear. T/o and landing in 109 was more demanding than in Hurricane or in Merlin Spitfire but with right training and concentration it was not overly difficult.

Juha
 
hello Juha


You and tante are not understanding what the definition of air superiority is. You do not need air superiority to shoot down a lot of enemy attackers. LW was not enjoying air superiority when they did this. They were exploiting the advantages of defence, and were also being selective in what strikes they were intercepting. By latter half of 41, they were not intercepting many strikes that were in the coastal region. Only those left deliberately under-defended, to entice them up off ther deck. RAF had to place itself in unfavourable positions deliberately to entice the Luftwaffe up.

This only applied close to the coast, not further inland. here the LW continued to enjoy the advantage.

Other main reason to support that LW no longer enjoyed air superiority was that they were forced to pull their bomber units well back. If it was they who had the advantage, it would have been RAF pulling their bombers back. This never happened.

Remember the five main states of air activity.....air supremacy, air superiority, air parity, air denial and no action. And what your air force must be doing to claim those various state. LW was not doing what needed to be done to claim air superiority, as defined by NATO handbook. Anything else is mis-use of the term.
 
I never claimed that 2 Group were Bomber Command clearly they were not. However they were the Group that operated normally by daylight, on a regular basis, over the French Coast. Throughout that time German fighters were not the major threat, Flak was, I mentioned 1943 as that was the year when the Luftwaffe fighters did the best and even here the fighters only shot down a tiny percentage of the bombers.

Even in 1941, despite the accepted obsolescence of the Blenheim, the superiority of the Fw190 over almost anything the RAF had, plus being used as a decoy, far more bombers were lost to Flak, than to fighters.

I was trying to show that the RAF could and did operate over France whenever they wanted with limited interference by Luftwaffe fighters. Of course the Luftwaffe shot down more fighters than they lost, they should have done, they had all the advantages. However, they didn't stop the raids or inflict serious losses to the bombers. They did not have control of the air.

To use Bomber Command figures would have been misleading as the Me109 and Fw190 day fighters would be powerless to stop them. We can only speculate how well large daylight raids by Bomber Command on limited incursions similar to the luftwaffe during the BOB would have done when escorted by fighters, to the best of my knowledge it wasn't really tried.
 

Yes, bomber losses over France were limited, with day bomber losses about half those lost at night, and as you say, the majority of combat losses were to flak, not the LW fighters. Even the few attacks on inland targets do not seem to have been intercepted....my best guess is because of the limited endurance of the LW fighters, the location of the target and the location of the interceptors.

But when RAF placed themselves deliberately in harms way, at a disadavantage in numbers and/or position, for the sole purpose of enticing the LW up for a "circus", the LW would generally oblige, and generally get the upper hand. But apart from getting the best tallies of those encounters, these affairs gave the Germans absolutely nothing, because strategtically it was the RAF dictating, when, how often, and how serious these battles were. In other words, and to put it crudely, the RAF only gambled what it was prepared to lose.

Moreover, by mid 1941 the RAF had already established the strategic victory....air superiority over France and the Channel. From there it became a battle for air supremacy, which they had largely won by late 1943.

As far as massed escorted raids, well, it was never attempted, but this was precisely what the fighter commanders were advocating from July '41. In hindsight they were probably right....the night bombing offensive in 1941 was about as near to defeat as the RAF ever came. That was the era of the Butt report, casualty rates of 7%. It would take additional technolgy, new aircraft and the arrival of a very controversial figure named Harris to turn BC fortunes at night around in 1942.
 
Hello Parsifal
not being interested in NATO terminology all what I said was that IMHO RAF didn't enjoy air superiority over France in 41-42 in daytime, even with strong escorts its small bomber formations suffered rather heavy losses, day-time bomber sortie rates were fairly low. Or at least RAF didn't use its claimed air superiority effectively, look 2 Group sortie rate in 42. To be able to sent a couple sqns of bombers, usually light bombers, with the need of 5 or more fighter wings to escort that token force, doesn't show at least a clear air superiority. IMHO if the RAF has been able to sent a wing of heavy bombers with 3 fighter wings acting as escorts rather regularly deep into France without heavy losses, that would have been IMHO air superiority. IMHO LW didn't win air superiority over southern England during the BoB even if it was able to sent sizeable bomber formations regularly to bomb targets in southern England during it.

And LW was not forced to move bomber units more rear during 41-42. Its main bomber unit in West, KG 2, used more or less same bases during 41-43 but when part of it was transferred first to Balkans and then to East during the second half of 41.

Juha
 
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