The Falklands

[plan_D]

Official opinion? You mean the government's opinion that carriers, and the Royal Navy as whole is an expense that Britain doesn't need. Which is typical of suits with no practical, or even theoretical, knowledge of combat operations or strategy.

The Sea Harrier was a capable aircraft though, while Royal Navy pilots are some of the best in the world they do need a capable aircraft to make do. And the Sea Harrier certainly was, and is a capable aircraft.

I would like to point out that if a Finnish Buffalo ever shot down a Bf-109, it was a mistake. After all, Finland was on Germany's side.

Are you implying that Argentina held back from destroying the British completely? I think you are. "Argentia simply did not have the will to go all out to destroy the British totally..." Well, you're wrong. Argentina didn't have the capability to destroy the British task force completely, while the pilots were brave and the aircraft were sound, the British were able to defend themselves in most cases rather well. On top of that, certain weapons of the Argentine Air Force were poorly fused or dropped too low to be able to destroy anything. The fact of the matter is, Argentina gave it their all ...and they lost. Once British troops were ashore...game over.

British standing army vs. Argentine conscripts? Place your bets.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The British military had the capability to destroy the Argentinan military with out a whole lot of effort and they did not need the US to come over.

 

[CharlesBronson]

Argentia blinked at this game, where Britain had called its deadly bluff. Argentia simply did not have the will to go all out to destroy the British totally- there were too many worries about other countries such as the USA crying "Unfair Play" and rushing in shooting on the British side. Quite simply Argentia was playing a last roll of the dice in the Falklands to save its face.

Argentia...??? you just invented a new country

Now being serius the only real user of conventional carriers are USA and France other like Italy, Spain, Russia used a "Sky Jump" like the 1982 british "antisubmarine cruisers".

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Here's a site that gives a detailed perspective of the Falklands conflict.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html

Here is the writer's conclusions citing the good and bad of the Argentine Forces during this conflict..

The Falklands War provides some important lessons for the conduct of a modern air war. The British learned the importance of having an aerial long-range early warning system to protect the fleet. The successful Exocet attacks alerted all the world's navies to the dangers of antiship missiles. Britain's 20 air-to-air kills by Harriers carrying AIM-9L Sidewinders illustrated the importance of keeping a technological edge over the opponent in missile sophistication. Even a slight edge (and the Sidewinders had more than a slight edge over the Matra 530s) can translate into decisive air superiority.26

For the Argentinians it was less an issue of learning lessons than dealing with the shame of defeat. The senior military leadership was guilty of a string of poor decisions that resulted in the deaths of many brave and dedicated Argentine soldiers, airmen, and sailors—men who deserved far better leaders than they had. General Galtieri and the military junta had blundered into a war without a plan or a strategy. From the start, the junta's strategy of seizing the Falklands was delusional. Immediately after the Argentinian seizure of the Falklands and the British announcement that they would mount a campaign to retake the islands, the Argentine military contacted the US government and requested that the United States provide Argentina with full intelligence support in a conflict with Britain. When the US intelligence officials denied the Argentinian requests and declared that the United States would stand by its British ally, the Argentine leadership was dumbfounded.27 So convinced were they of the nobility of their cause that they simply assumed the United States and the whole world would line up with Argentine national ambitions. The Argentinians felt bitter about the rebuff, as the junta had never seriously considered that the United States would not wholeheartedly support an Argentine dictatorship and abandon its closest ally.

General Galtieri demonstrated a remarkable lack of understanding of modern military operations by insisting that the Falklands would be defended by a large land force, largely composed of half-trained conscripts, with few heavy weapons, cut off from sea supply and completely dependent upon a tenuous airlift capability. He and most of the senior military leaders also seem to have had little concept of the use of modern technology in war. For example, the Argentine Army and air force could have lengthened the airstrip at Port Stanley by 2,000 feet and forward based the Skyhawks and Daggers in the Falklands. On the mainland the Argentinians had the engineers, equipment, and pierced-steel planking that would have allowed them to extend the runway within a week or so of starting work.28 However, to get the engineers, materiel, and equipment to Port Stanley would have required reallocating much of the limited airlift capacity. General Galtieri's strategy to defend the islands with a large number of ground forces committed all the airlift to transporting troops and ruled out any reallocation—and there was simply not enough airlift to do both. In April 1982, in contrast to General Galtieri's decision, professional air force and naval officers in the United States and Europe thought lengthening the runway on the Falklands was the obvious thing to do.

Admiral Lombardo, the theater commander, does not come across much better than General Galtieri as an operational commander and strategist. His decision to base a large air force (24 Pucaras, six Aermacchi 339s, and six T-34s) in the Falklands is difficult for a professional soldier to comprehend. What did he think that a force of light counterinsurgency planes could do in an aerial environment full of Harriers with Sidewinders, British ships bristling with the latest antiaircraft missiles, and ground forces armed with Rapier and Blowpipe antiaircraft missiles? It was an exceptionally lethal environment for aircraft designed for fairly benign counterinsurgency operations. Many of the operations of the Falkland-based Argentine air units demonstrated a touch of the ethos reflected in Tennyson's Charge of the Light Brigade. The T-34 Mentors were basic-training aircraft armed with a light machine gun and some rockets suitable for artillery spotting. The Aermacchis were also lightly armed and not suited for antishipping strikes. However, this did not prevent one navy Aermacchi 339 from carrying out a valiant pass with its cannon against the British fleet, slightly damaging one vessel. That was, in fact, the total damage that the Falkland-based 36 fixed-wing aircraft and 19 helicopters inflicted upon the British fleet. The T-34s flew a few reconnaissance missions and managed to survive by hiding in the clouds. The Pucaras fought valiantly—but ineffectually—and most were destroyed or disabled by the end of the war.

Another of Admiral Lombardo's major operational decisions was to sortie the General Belgrano (an ancient 43-year-old cruiser) towards the British fleet with little antisubmarine defense. It was sunk by the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror and caused the greatest single loss of life in the war. The General Belgrano's sortie accomplished nothing offensively for the Argentinians, and its loss forced a change in strategy that caused them to keep their navy's capital ships in port for the rest of the war.

General Menendez, the commander of the Falkland garrison, demonstrated a poor grasp of the basics of the operational art. He deployed his poorly trained and poorly armed infantry units into an overextended and badly sited defense line. The British easily overran Menendez's positions one by one. Indeed, miserable weather and logistics problems caused the British Army and Royal Marines far more trouble than did the Argentine Army. One has to question how General Galtieri ever thought that half-trained, lightly armed soldiers could hold their own in battle against some of the best infantry in the world—the Gurkas, the Paratroop Regiment, and the Royal Marines. General Galtieri and the junta apparently felt that patriotism and valor could overcome all of their military disadvantages.

Indeed, the only Argentine senior commander who demonstrated real competence and professionalism in the Falklands War was the FAS commander, General Crespo. He had to minimize the effect of Argentina's liabilities: the technological inferiority of the Argentine air force and naval air arm, operations at his attack aircraft's maximum combat range, the lack of adequate air-refueling capability, and the lack of early warning and reconnaissance assets. Considering these limitations, General Crespo did very well with the forces and capabilities he had available. He used the three weeks prior to the beginning of hostilities to organize and train his strike force to conduct a naval air campaign—a mission in which only two of his small naval air units were previously trained. He learned from his mistakes—apparently the only Argentine senior commander who did. After 1 May, he avoided high-altitude ingress beyond the point where British radar could detect his forces and made great use of low-altitude attacks to avoid detection and achieve surprise. His improvised Fenix squadron creatively baited the British with decoys, forced a response, and stretched their CAP coverage to improve the chances of survival and success of his attack force. The professional competence of his headquarters staff was demonstrated by their ability to plan numerous long-range air strikes and coordinate the very limited air-refueling support.

The record of the FAS in the Falklands War is impressive. The pilots of the Skyhawk, Dagger, Mirage, and Etendard squadrons demonstrated remarkable piloting and navigation skills. The low-level attacks were exceptionally difficult and dangerous. One flight of Skyhawks flew so low during their ingress to attack the British fleet that on arrival at their home base they had to make instrument approaches to landing because a coating of salt (deposited by the spray off the ocean's waves) obscured their canopies. Argentine official historians continue to claim that the Argentine airmen inflicted far more damage on the British fleet than the British officially admit. However, the losses the British do document are still impressive considering the FAA's limitations and lack of antishipping training before the war. The destroyers HMS Sheffield and HMS Coventry, the frigates HMS Ardent, HMS Antelope, the support ship Atlantic Conveyor, the landing ship RFA Sir Galahad, and the landing craft LCU F4 were all sunk by Argentine bombs and Exocets. The destroyers HMS Glasgow and HMS Antrim, the frigates HMS Argonaut and HMS Plymouth, and landing ship RFA Sir Tristram all sustained heavy damage, and another six ships received minor damage. In all, the Fuerza Aerea Sur inflicted the heaviest damage and casualties suffered by the British task force. For that, the FAS paid a very heavy price, losing 22 Skyhawks—19 from Grupos 4 and 5 and three more from a naval Skyhawk squadron. Grupo 8 lost two Mirages, and Grupo 6 lost 11 of its 30 Daggers. The 2d Bomber Squadron lost two Canberras. In all, the FAS lost 41 percent of its aircraft to combat and operational accidents. This is an astounding attrition loss—but it never broke the FAS's high morale and fighting spirit.

The FAA Transport Command also performed superbly. During April, the small transport force mobilized everything that could fly and airlifted almost 8,000 troops and 5,037 tons of supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel into the Falklands.29 Even after the arrival of the British fleet and its proclamation of a full air blockade of the Falklands, the transports continued to fly into Port Stanley by night, bringing in supplies and airlifting out the wounded. FAA transports continued to slip past the British through the last night of the war. These were very dangerous missions—as evidenced by the loss of one C-130 transport to a Harrier sidewinder.

The Argentine air force's antiaircraft gunners and radar operators performed their jobs with great bravery and competence throughout the campaign. Argentine ground-based air defenses destroyed seven British aircraft, including four Harriers.30 The FAA's radar operators at Port Stanley were Argentina's most effective asset for locating and monitoring British ships and planes. They warned Argentine Skyhawk and Dagger pilots of the location of defending British Harriers during their antiship attacks and were credited with preventing the loss of several FAS pilots and their aircraft.

In short, the Argentine air force did surprisingly well in the face of many great disadvantages. Old-fashioned words like courage, gallantry, and honor are the only ones that can be used to describe and explain the combat wartime performance of the Argentine air force and naval air personnel. While the junta and most of the senior Argentine military leadership offer a model of how not to wage war, the Argentine airmen provide a positive and impressive model of competence and courage at the operational and tactical levels of war.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Hmmm very interesting post there and I love the siggy FBJ.

 

[Glider]

If I can add one point to FJ's posting. There were three reasons why the Argentines thought that they would get help or at least stop the USA from assisting the UK, they were: -
a) The American Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick was adamant that that should be the official policy of the USA. She saw relations with Argentina as being more important than with the UK. American 'advisers' to allies in South America were limited by Congress and Argentina were happy to help fill the gap.
b) On a visit that Galtieri made to the USA he was treated as a superstar. In 1981 the year before the invasion, a senior US official described him as 'A Majestic Figure'. He was often described as 'Argentina's General Patton' in speeches made by the American government and in quotes to the press. Casper Weinberger (Secretary for Defense), Richard Allen (White House National Security Adviser), General Meyer (US Army Chief of Staff) all went out of their way to laud him.
c) He was trained by the US Army on a number of occasions and he described those as being the happiest days of his life.

He had good reasons for believing that the USA would stay out of it. The fact that they didn't, says a lot for the common sense of the President in overriding the recommendations of a number of his advisors and the skill of our diplomats in the USA and UN.

 

[CharlesBronson]

General Galtieri demonstrated a remarkable lack of understanding of modern military operations by insisting that the Falklands would be defended by a large land force, largely composed of half-trained conscripts, with few heavy weapons, cut off from sea supply and completely dependent upon a tenuous airlift capability. He and most of the senior military leaders also seem to have had little concept of the use of modern technology in war.

Very true, and except for his Air Arm the Argentine Navy also doesnt colaborate almost in nothing in the war effort.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The only reason I could see relations with S. America more important than with those of the United Kingdom would be the fact that the US wants an influence in S. America.

 

[Gnomey]

Interesting posts FBJ and Glider, good info.

 

[CharlesBronson]

For sometime has been in development a extensive Flight Sim about the air war in the Falkland-Malvinas, it promise to be veeeeery good one.

The project started in late 2002 as a simple simulation of just the Harrier, and first we thought of having only the islands as scenary, as terrain making would be easier with only the isles represented, intended for simple self-publishing in a shareware style... But the positive feedback was so strong and unexpect, and the project quickly has grown to a organized, professional effort with a programming team, art / 3D modelling team, and extensive research work, with full order of battle, historical accuracy, argentine and british flyable aircraft and detailed cockpits/avionics.

Some pics.

For more info check their homepage.

http://www.thunder-works.com

 

[Nonskimmer]

That looks like it'll be cool!

 

[marconi]

Does anybody know anything about how Argentina managed to capture the Falklands? If I'm not wrong they used their Special Forces to defeat British forces.

 

[Nonskimmer]

When the Argentines first attacked, the Falklands were being defended by about sixty-seven Royal Marines and about 120 local militia volunteers.
It wasn't much of a force.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

When the Argentines first attacked, the Falklands were being defended by about sixty-seven Royal Marines and about 120 local militia volunteers.
It wasn't much of a force.

If I remember right they put up a hell of a fight...

 

[Nonskimmer]

Undoubtedly. They were British after all.
But 67 marines and a small number of "weekenders" simply weren't enough to hold out for very long. The governor finally ordered them to surrender.

 

[plan_D]

Yes, but now we've got a full base and a permenant complement of troops.

 

[the lancaster kicks ass]

and four tornadoes, for all the good they'll be

 

[CharlesBronson]

Does anybody know anything about how Argentina managed to capture the Falklands? If I'm not wrong they used their Special Forces to defeat British forces.

Seems that you dont want to bother in browsing the 5 pages of this topic... You lazy boy.

I already posted a pic of the Argentine navy commandos taking british prisoners in here:

http://img36.imageshack.us/img36/3298/15qg.jpg

 

[marconi]

Sorry, didn't noticed it
Any details of this operation?

 

[CharlesBronson]

A good article is this:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/KAA.htm

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By the way here is an actual audio from Argentine pilots during mission in 1982.
It's interesting material, if you understand spanish. For those who don't, I am affraid there is no transcription that I know of (learn spanish, you limeys!)

It starts with a pilot excited about seing other aircraft impacting its bombs on a british ship, then pilots exchanging damage reports (one is leaking fuel and he's assesing if he can make it back to base), then the Malvinas radar reporting 2 CAPs over the area where the attack was made plus another one farther north and a fourth CAP incoming from the carrier's location area.