The German Army...

[fastmongrel]

I heavily disagree!

The education and training of the german Army had nothing to do with the Nazi Regime.
The doctrine of Auftragstaktik and combined all-arms (Infantry, LW, tanks, artillery and anti-tank units), had also nothing to do with the Nazi regime.
The whole organisation of the Wehrmacht, regiments and division (infantry and tank), except the Oberkommando of the Wehrmacht had also nothing to do with the Nazi regime.
All this was developed and worked out between 1920-1939 from the german military leadership of the Reichwehr and the Wehrmacht.
It is well known that the german military leadership was educated unpolitical. The highest General, which was a real Nazi was von Reichenau, not anyone which much influence to the named issues.
The Wehrmacht and it's leadership was weather involved which were the Allies of Germany, nor at which time the Nazi Regime declared war on other Nations. Also it was to no time involved in the war economy organisation!

Now we can discuss the military success compare to the Polish-, French, GB- and Russian Army at the first three years and the reasons, or we can make destructive comments and posts, which only involve political and econimical Nazi reasons.

I dont believe that the German armed forces operated in a political vacuum thats impossible an army is an arm of government. Armies dont usually go to war with another country, nor do the the army leaders do what they fancy they are directed by the government's policy. Better tactics which the Germans certainly had and better weapons (debatable) do not win campaigns. Without the Nazi government the Army wouldnt have had the new weapons to go with the tactics, without the Nazis the Army wouldn't have been anywhere near as big and without the Nazis or a similar government the Army wouldnt have gone to war no matter how much they wanted to.

As for the Army leadership being apolitical well they must have been the first and so far unique in that respect, generals are politicians first and soldiers second.

 

[DonL]

I dont believe that the German armed forces operated in a political vacuum thats impossible an army is an arm of government. Armies dont usually go to war with another country, nor do the the army leaders do what they fancy they are directed by the government's policy. Better tactics which the Germans certainly had and better weapons (debatable) do not win campaigns. Without the Nazi government the Army wouldnt have had the new weapons to go with the tactics, without the Nazis the Army wouldn't have been anywhere near as big and without the Nazis or a similar government the Army wouldnt have gone to war no matter how much they wanted to.

As for the Army leadership being apolitical well they must have been the first and so far unique in that respect, generals are politicians first and soldiers second.

I totaly disagree!

Your claim of how big the Army was is right all other claims are to my opinion wrong.

The first and main goal of every government of the Weimarer Republik was to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr later Wehrmacht, equal if it was SPD, Zentrum or other parties. And the rearm included an Air Force, Navy and at least 500000 men Heer.

The combined arms doctrine were developed from Ludwig Beck and his stuff at 1932-1933, also the doctrine of modern tank doctrine were developed from Nehring, Guderian and Lutz also 1932-1933.

So all Allied Generals and German Generals in WWI and WWII were politicans first?
Which of these generals equal from which nation had real political power through elections or Houses of Parliaments?
You are aware that the Nazi Regime was a dictatorship with SS and Gestapo, which of the german Generals had political power?

Ludwig Beck withdraw from the Oberkommando des Heeres, because he didn't agree with the politics of Hitler since 1936 and also the german military leadership planed a subversion 1938 through the CSSR issue, which was prevent through the conference of Munich.

Please name Allied Generals/Admirals which had political power to avoid the WWI or WWII?
At which non military dictatorship or democracy the military leaders had the political power to decide about the declarations of war?

 

[stona]

The doctrine of Auftragstaktik and combined all-arms (Infantry, LW, tanks, artillery and anti-tank units), had also nothing to do with the Nazi regime.

But without the Nazi regime there would have been much less of all the above and no Luftwaffe at all! Difficult to develop or implement such a doctrine in that case.

It is impossible to separate the military and political in any state. National Socialist Germany was no different.

You cannot separate the German armed forces from Nazism, that is a dangerous revisionism completely unsupported by historical fact.

Cheers

Steve

 

[DonL]

But without the Nazi regime there would have been much less of all the above and no Luftwaffe at all! Difficult to develop or implement such a doctrine in that case.

It is impossible to separate the military and political in any state. National Socialist Germany was no different.

You cannot separate the German armed forces from Nazism, that is a dangerous revisionism completely unsupported by historical fact.

Cheers

Steve

Please Stona do not assume something to me, what I haven't post or said.

I don't deny that the Wehrmacht (military leadership) was involved in war crimes and also was partly (begining 1933)to be game to be exploit from the Nazi regime!

I deny that the german combined arms and tank doctrine had anything to do with the Nazi-regime and I also deny that the military leadership of the Reichswehr or Wehrmacht was involved in the political decissions from 1935 to 1939. (Rhineland, Austria, CSSR and Poland)

This was all Hitlers and Nazi-regime political decissions.
You should read why Blomberg and Fritsch were removed from their positions.

Hossbach Memorandum - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blomberg-Fritsch-Krise

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Beck

 

[Angels one-five]

But without the Nazi regime there would have been much less of all the above and no Luftwaffe at all! Difficult to develop or implement such a doctrine in that case.

It is impossible to separate the military and political in any state. National Socialist Germany was no different.

You cannot separate the German armed forces from Nazism, that is a dangerous revisionism completely unsupported by historical fact.

Cheers

Steve

Auftragstaktik pre-dated Nazism by some measure and the German army had a strongly embedded sense of Mission Command that did not exist within the French or British Armies (in fact, one could make an argument that the British Army didn't adopt mission Command as a formalised doctrine until the 1980s). When going back to the OP, the low level understanding of 'the plan' contributed significantly to the Wehrmacht's ability to do things quicker and more effectively than the opposition. That doctrine was not developed by the Nazis, rather it was a continuation of a teaching process that had commenced in the 19th Century.

A quote attributed to Rommel is contained within the current version of ADP (Ops) "The British write some of the best doctrine in the world; it is fortunate that their officers do not read it". Whether apocryphal or not, for me it sums up one of the key differences in approach between the Germans and British in the early part of WW2.

 

[stona]

I don't deny that the Wehrmacht (military leadership) was involved in war crimes and also was partly (begining 1933)to be game to be exploit from the Nazi regime!

I never mentioned either of the above, they have nothing to do with the thread. I simply pointed out that the "combined arms" doctrine of the Wermacht was facilitated and made possible by the Nazis. So were any number of other strategies, Doenitz got his U-Boats for example.
The military strategists could dream up any methods they liked, but they still needed the tools for the job, and the political will to use them.
Cheers
Steve

 

[DonL]

You haven't read my post 22.

And I think you are not aware about the goals of the german democratic parties of the Weimarer Republik!

The first and main goal of every government of the Weimarer Republik was to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr later Wehrmacht, equal if it was SPD, Zentrum or other parties. And the rearm included an Air Force, Navy and at least 500000 men Heer.


Edit:

The Reichswehr operated airebases and tank training grounds since 1927 at the UDSSR through the Treaty of Rapallo
and also was involved in the development of submarines at the Netherlands through dummy companys since 1925.

This all happened with the full agreement, support and financial support of the german democratic parties and governments of the Weimarer Republik..
There was a very big shadow budget of the Reichswehr to fund this illegal programs and the governments gave the money.

You are all a little bit to focused on the Nazi's, the Versaille Treaty was very big german writing on the wall and all people inclusive all democratic parties worked very hard to eliminate it.

 

[stona]

It was Hitler who stated that the purpose of the German economy was to support "Germany's self-assertion and the extension of her Lebensraum". No democratic politician ever made such a statement.

It wasn't until March 16th, 1935 that the German government announced its intention to rebuild the army, in contradiction to the Treaty of Versailles, long after the Nazis had been voted in.

Military spending rose from RM 1,9 billion in 1933/4 to RM 18.4 billion in 1938/9 under the national socialist government, this during a global depression.

Cheers

Steve

 

[DonL]

What has this to do with german military doctrine?

And was this a political decision or a military or forced military decision?

 

[stona]

What has this to do with german military doctrine?

And was this a political decision or a military or forced military decision?

I am was replying to your post in which you said.

"The first and main goal of every government of the Weimarer Republik was to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr later Wehrmacht, equal if it was SPD, Zentrum or other parties. And the rearm included an Air Force, Navy and at least 500000 men Heer."

That may have been an intention of pre-Nazi governments but they lacked the will or means to do much about it.
Large scale re-armament and massive increases in military spending did not start until after the Nazis came to power. You surely don't expect to make such assertions unchallenged?

Cheers

Steve

 

[DonL]

You are aware that Nazi's couldn't have done this without the preliminary work of all Weimarer goverments?

And now you kew exactly what democratic partys have done 1935?

"The first and main goal of every government of the Weimarer Republik was to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr later Wehrmacht, equal if it was SPD, Zentrum or other parties. And the rearm included an Air Force, Navy and at least 500000 men Heer."

This are facts from sources and 500000 men is not a large force for a 80 million nation at 1930.
The elimination of the Versaille Treaty was the goal of all parties, also all democratic parties also rearnament!

Edit:

You should think about your logic, why democratic party's and governments spent lot of money to develop tanks, submarines and a/c's illegal, if they don't have the goal to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr with this weapons?
You should think about this.

 

[stona]

I refer the honourable gentleman to the figures for military spending posted earlier. RM 1.9 billion in 1933/4 and 18.4 billion in 1938/9. An increase AFTER the Nazis came to power of over 900%.

If the government(s) of the Weimar Republic, even the post 1930 Hindenburg governments, had survived the Nazis do you believe any of them would have carried out the long series of treaty contraventions from the occupation of the Rhineland to the invasion of Poland?

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Some books claim that the 1920s German army was training their troops to a level 2 -3 ranks above the actual ranks that they held in order to have a a good cadre of men for when expansion did come. This does not require big spending but does allow for a fast growth in size without some of the problems that dogged the rapid expansion of both the American and British armies. I am not saying the Germans had no problems but if corporals are trained as sergeants and sergeants trained as lieutenants/captains and lieutenants trained as captains/majors (or at least have working knowledge of their duties/responsibility's) a fast expansion is much smoother.
The German army was planning for expansion years before it came.

 

[stona]

But surely the British system was to build an army around the core of the regular Army, even using experience from overseas. My own grandfather was a senior non-commissioned officer who found himself brought back from India in 1938 to do precisely that.
There were problems in the rapid expansion of the British Army in the late 1930s, but the performance of the army in France had little to do with this.
Others have already alluded to the doctrinal differences between it and its German opponents. Of all German commanders the one who seems least to have understood the new methods used by men like Guderian was Hitler !
Cheers
Steve

 

[DonL]

If the government(s) of the Weimar Republic, even the post 1930 Hindenburg governments, had survived the Nazis do you believe any of them would have carried out the long series of treaty contraventions from the occupation of the Rhineland to the invasion of Poland?

I'm convinced they would (all democratric partys) try it mid to end 1930's till the Rhineland, which was no occupation only a rearm of the Rhineland.
That was the foreign-policy agenda of every democratic party.

 

[parsifal]

Because it was NOT a myth on the unit level. Say Division or smaller. Either that or studies made during the war were attempts to cover up allied bungling of small unit tactics and training. If German troops were ( to pick a number out of a Hat) 1.3 times more effective than allied army "A" troops it doesn't matter to the out come of the war if the German leadership bungles things so badly that they have to fight 2-3-4 times their numbers. Their "edge" gets swamped.

Im not arguing that at a tactical or operational level the Germans did not excel. Go back and read my post carefully. They had tremendous advantages....and still lost, In the end they were out numbered, and badly so, but that just didnt happen, it arose because of the attrocious Nazi leadership.

At the beginning of the war the Germans commanded the second most powerful economy in the world, and the most powerful was neutral and disorganised. They were several orders of magnitude stronger than both the British and the Russians. And at the beginning the Russians were on their side. The French economic power was negligible....about 2% of world GDP compared to over 15% for the Germans. Britain was about 10%, but was falling rapidly.

Strategically the germans were short of manpower, that is, over the long haul. But at the beginning of the war they had vast reserves of trained manpower, as did the Italians. The British had fairly good reserves of manpower, but it was largely untrained. And it took about 18 months for them to rectify that. When the Americans came ito the war, it took them even longer to train their vast reserves of manpower, and it remained a problem for both armies to keep up even with modest casualty rates even at the end of the war.

The Germans used a combination of motorization, tactics and numbers to win their early victories. at Sedan, for example, they were able to hit the poorly trained and equipped French with well trained and well led troops, that because of their motorization were able to achieve decisive concent5rations at the decisive point and moment.

This was rfepeated in the following year in Russia where the purges made the Soviets even more vulnerable.

These are by no means the only advantages enjoyed by the germans. But to illustrate my point, in one or another, the German leadeship, including the army heads, squandered all these advantages, and not because they were being pressured or outnumberd. They lost these advantages because of very poor management.

In the case of motorization, the failure to rationalise the MT park by overhauling their support industries, meant they steadily lost their mobility advantages (more rapidly than it should have, because the plethora of types made maintenance and spares a nightmare for them) . This particualarly affected the line Infantry formations. In 1941, the average German Infantry Div had over 6500 Draft animals (in part coutesy of the British Army, who had sold their horses to the heer before the war), and nearly 1000 other MT vehicles attached. By 1943, the average numbers of Draft animals were down to about 3000, and the average number of MT vehicles to about 300. On the eastern front in particular, the Germans were no longer capable of even fighting a defensive mobile war on a front wide basis . they were able to strip out sections of the front so that other bits could get mobile, but once the initiative was lost, after Kursk, they could not retreat or advance without suffering huge losses due to a lack of mobility. this was a totally avoidable crisis, and arose because of stupidity more than anything.

In terms of manpower, the germans retained the largeest army of any nation on earth until 1943. That inludes the Soviets, if one does not include the hasty conscripts dragged off the street, handed a rifle (or often, not even a rifle) and sent to the front. If you want to argue these drafts were "soldiers", then the Soviets had the largest army from June 1941. But according to Dupuy, at this time, the Soviets were qualitatively outgunned to the tune of being only about 10% effective per man as the germans. By the middle of 1943, Dupuy estimates this advantage had shrunk to 2.31 times. But what was known by the germans was that the Russians would have tremendous resilience in terms of their manpower reserves and their ability to trade space for time. They should have made massive adjustments to their replacement army, increasing its ability to train and process men when they were needed. They failed to do anything, and as a result, by 1942,, the German Army in the East was nearly 1 million billets short, and by 1943 the frontline formations were down to about 40% authorised strengths. despite this, they insisted on continuing their offensives, moreover it was a situation that could have been handled far better but was not. No other army made that mistake, including the Soviets. everyone else had the ability to check how much cloth was in the cupboard before embarking on major offensives. Yet, somehow, the Germans were the best military planners on earth. you think!!!!!u

And there is only so much that combat units can do. They are dependent on supply and the German army units almost always operating on a shoestring ( a broken, tied together one at that) after the first few campaigns.

Logistics is still a part of military planning, and in this the germans failed miserably. it neednt have been so. They entered the war with the largest reserves of trained manpower, one of the largest armiues, the largest wartime ecomomy (the US was not at war), motivated leadership, a good plan, and yet they still failed. And it wasnt all Hitlers fault either

 

[stona]

In British government papers it is always referred to as "the German re-occupation of the Demilitarised Zone". You can argue semantics if you want. Britain was a guarantor of the Treaty of Locarno and this caused considerable consternation for the government as they were well aware that there was no stomach for any kind of military action against Germany, even if it was militarily possible, which is debatable. British sentiment at the time was judged to be strongly "anti-French".
Cheers
Steve

 

[DonL]

Im not arguing that at a tactical or operational level the Germans did not excel. Go back and read my post carefully. They had tremendous advantages....and still lost, In the end they were out numbered, and badly so, but that just didnt happen, it arose because of the attrocious Nazi leadership.

At the beginning of the war the Germans commanded the second most powerful economy in the world, and the most powerful was neutral and disorganised. They were several orders of magnitude stronger than both the British and the Russians. And at the beginning the Russians were on their side. The French economic power was negligible....about 2% of world GDP compared to over 15% for the Germans. Britain was about 10%, but was falling rapidly.

Strategically the germans were short of manpower, that is, over the long haul. But at the beginning of the war they had vast reserves of trained manpower, as did the Italians. The British had fairly good reserves of manpower, but it was largely untrained. And it took about 18 months for them to rectify that. When the Americans came ito the war, it took them even longer to train their vast reserves of manpower, and it remained a problem for both armies to keep up even with modest casualty rates even at the end of the war.

The Germans used a combination of motorization, tactics and numbers to win their early victories. at Sedan, for example, they were able to hit the poorly trained and equipped French with well trained and well led troops, that because of their motorization were able to achieve decisive concent5rations at the decisive point and moment.

This was rfepeated in the following year in Russia where the purges made the Soviets even more vulnerable.

These are by no means the only advantages enjoyed by the germans. But to illustrate my point, in one or another, the German leadeship, including the army heads, squandered all these advantages, and not because they were being pressured or outnumberd. They lost these advantages because of very poor management.

In the case of motorization, the failure to rationalise the MT park by overhauling their support industries, meant they steadily lost their mobility advantages (more rapidly than it should have, because the plethora of types made maintenance and spares a nightmare for them) . This particualarly affected the line Infantry formations. In 1941, the average German Infantry Div had over 6500 Draft animals (in part coutesy of the British Army, who had sold their horses to the heer before the war), and nearly 1000 other MT vehicles attached. By 1943, the average numbers of Draft animals were down to about 3000, and the average number of MT vehicles to about 300. On the eastern front in particular, the Germans were no longer capable of even fighting a defensive mobile war on a front wide basis . they were able to strip out sections of the front so that other bits could get mobile, but once the initiative was lost, after Kursk, they could not retreat or advance without suffering huge losses due to a lack of mobility. this was a totally avoidable crisis, and arose because of stupidity more than anything.

In terms of manpower, the germans retained the largeest army of any nation on earth until 1943. That inludes the Soviets, if one does not include the hasty conscripts dragged off the street, handed a rifle (or often, not even a rifle) and sent to the front. If you want to argue these drafts were "soldiers", then the Soviets had the largest army from June 1941. But according to Dupuy, at this time, the Soviets were qualitatively outgunned to the tune of being only about 10% effective per man as the germans. By the middle of 1943, Dupuy estimates this advantage had shrunk to 2.31 times. But what was known by the germans was that the Russians would have tremendous resilience in terms of their manpower reserves and their ability to trade space for time. They should have made massive adjustments to their replacement army, increasing its ability to train and process men when they were needed. They failed to do anything, and as a result, by 1942,, the German Army in the East was nearly 1 million billets short, and by 1943 the frontline formations were down to about 40% authorised strengths. despite this, they insisted on continuing their offensives, moreover it was a situation that could have been handled far better but was not. No other army made that mistake, including the Soviets. everyone else had the ability to check how much cloth was in the cupboard before embarking on major offensives. Yet, somehow, the Germans were the best military planners on earth. you think!!!!!u




Logistics is still a part of military planning, and in this the germans failed miserably. it neednt have been so. They entered the war with the largest reserves of trained manpower, one of the largest armiues, the largest wartime ecomomy (the US was not at war), motivated leadership, a good plan, and yet they still failed. And it wasnt all Hitlers fault either

Where are your proves that your arguments, which are mostly correct, goes to the military leaders except the OKW.
All your arguments are political, because the Wehrmacht was forced to do all the things you described, by the political leadership.

At the beginning of the war the Germans commanded the second most powerful economy in the world, and the most powerful was neutral and disorganised. They were several orders of magnitude stronger than both the British and the Russians. And at the beginning the Russians were on their side. The French economic power was negligible....about 2% of world GDP compared to over 15% for the Germans. Britain was about 10%, but was falling rapidly.

The german economy wasn't stronger then the Commonwealth economy, it wasn't only GB, it was also Australia, Canada and Indian.

Strategically the germans were short of manpower, that is, over the long haul

This is very wrong, if you not only look at the military men, but also on the economy.
Germany had a shortage of economy manpower, especially skilled engineering worker since the early mobilization of 1939, this was totaly the opposite at all Commonwealth countrys and the UDSSR.

These are by no means the only advantages enjoyed by the germans. But to illustrate my point, in one or another, the German leadeship, including the army heads, squandered all these advantages, and not because they were being pressured or outnumberd. They lost these advantages because of very poor management.

Also you should explain, what this claim has to do with the Army leaders plus the next passage of your post.
Through several primary sources, espicially Halders diaries, it is very explicit described, what the Army leaders thought about Operation Blue! All this Army leaders were well aware about their short commings and Halder wanted a totaly other plan, through the short comming of reserves and motorized vehicles.

Again all your claims has to do mostly and mainly with the political Nazi leadership and very minor with the classical Army/Wehrmacht leadership.
It didn't help myour argument to write:" It wasn't only Hitler's fault"!
Please present your sources for the involvement of the Army leaderships to your described arguments.

 

[pattle]

Which decisive battles or any battles were lost through crucial mistakes of the military Army leaders?

What about North Africa, Rommel was not given a brief to out stretch his supply lines as he did, he was sent only to stop a Italian defeat. The Battle of Crete was another notable failure, yes Crete was eventually taken but at a terrible cost which caused at a lot of problems later on. The whole idea of using Crete as a springboard to capture Cyprus and hop across to the middle east was flawed. Governments will always have a say in military plans and you can not lay all of the blame on government, if you look at it the opposite way around who should take credit for the successes of the German army, the Generals or the politicians?

 

[Shortround6]

Im not arguing that at a tactical or operational level the Germans did not excel. Go back and read my post carefully. They had tremendous advantages....and still lost, In the end they were out numbered, and badly so, but that just didnt happen, it arose because of the attrocious Nazi leadership.

But that is not what the original question asked. It asked what made the Germany army successful at the Beginning of the war. Training, education, communications, transport and a number of other factors made the difference, not ideology or politics. Ideology and politics helped an awful lot with the down fall of the 3rd Reich

Logistics is still a part of military planning, and in this the germans failed miserably. it neednt have been so. They entered the war with the largest reserves of trained manpower, one of the largest armiues, the largest wartime ecomomy (the US was not at war), motivated leadership, a good plan, and yet they still failed. And it wasnt all Hitlers fault either

Your right, it was Goring's Fault

They got carried away with some of the early successes and started to believe their own propaganda. What "planning" there was tended to devolve to crisis management instead of long term planning. And weapons procurement started to shift from workman like products to trick toys in too many cases and weapons that could have prolonged things ( they were never going to win) were sometimes turned down due to prejudice.