The German Army...

[parsifal]

But that is not what the original question asked. It asked what made the Germany army successful at the Beginning of the war. Training, education, communications, transport and a number of other factors made the difference, not ideology or politics. Ideology and politics helped an awful lot with the down fall of the 3rd Reich

I know, but the basic premise...."wht was the German army so successful?" is a wrong premise. A better wording for the question would be "How did the Germans manage to snatch defeat out of certain victory?" The answer does not lie with their tactical handling. It lies in their strategic miscalculations and repeated bungling even during the salad years of victory.

Jim Dunnigan some years ago did a study on motivation. Why is it that the german Army, was so successful when armies like the Italians, which had a very similar military sytem for mobilzation and training , was so unsuccessful. Nationalism, and propaganda has very little to do with it. Those issues get people into the army, it doesnt make them good soldiers. At the end of the day, the important manpower issues psychologically are the desire to survive, and trust you have in your leaders. In the Italian army there was this enormous gulf between the men and their officers. Trust was zero. The soldiers were trained okay, but they just didnt believe the army would save them. the result is that they tend3ed to throw their arms up in surrender a lot. The heer did not suffer from this. Their soldiers were better educated, which in itself made them more effective, but there was not a huge gap between officers and their men. The men believed in their officers, and the ratio of officers (including NCOs) to enlisted ranks was fairly high. This meant the unit retained cohesion even when under stress, and the men kept fighting even when taking casualties.

These werent the problems that defeated the wehrmacht. Where they failed was in the strategic area. For example, they never quite got the concept of a front commander controlling all the assets in a TO, and fighting a battle for a strategic objective. Commanders tended to fight battles in isolation, with control over only some of the resources and with little knowledge or care as to what was happening around them. There was never a unified command, in the sense of a SoPac or a SHAEF. And certainly anything quite likie the JCS which pooled resources of many nations. Compare the relationship of the JCS to the German-Italian relationship, or the relationship of hitler to his military commanders, comp0ared to the much more constrained ability of people like Churchilol over their military . there is no comparison actually

 

[DonL]

I know, but the basic premise...."wht was the German army so successful?" is a wrong premise. A better wording for the question would be "How did the Germans manage to snatch defeat out of certain victory?" The answer does not lie with their tactical handling. It lies in their strategic miscalculations and repeated bungling even during the salad years of victory.

That was not the question and the intention of the thread!
The thread starter asked explicit after the german military.
As always, if the topic German pop up, you always will foward your agenda of anti german biases, equal of the thread intention, essential anti-german!
Perhaps you should sit in a plane and visit this country, but I bet you don't have the nuts to do it, because your biases and view of the world got crashed!

 

[GrauGeist]

That was not the question and the intention of the thread!
The thread starter asked explicit after the german military.
As always, if the topic German pop up, you always will foward your agenda of anti german biases, equal of the thread intention, essential anti-german!
Perhaps you should sit in a plane and visit this country, but I bet you don't have the nuts to do it, because your biases and view of the world got crashed!

Parsifal's post was in keeping with the theme of the original post. If you feel uncomfortable with what he said, too bad.

Personally, who'd want to visit Germany if there's people like you in it...

 

[parsifal]

I can see i need to simplify the issue even further.

These are the basic facts

Germany started the war with many advantages, military economic, strategic, tactical. Her enemies were weak, disorganized,outnumbered and stayed that way for a very long time. By decisions of her own choosing, Germany chose to expand the horizons of the war, and made decisions, strategic and tactical that eventually lost her the war.


how is that not stating the basic facts? Getting to understand why will require getting ones hands dirty. i cant help that. I have no problem dissecting it and calling it like it is. I dont get any joy out of it and i dont seek to denigrate the germans for it. They statred with great advantages, and her army did fight with great distinction. But they lost. How did that happen. I reject the hammed up arguments that it was all Hitlers fault.....

 

[Glider]

This is altogether the wrong question. The question that needs to be answered is why, despite having so many overwhelming advantages, they still manged to screw the pooch and lose.

The Germans entered the war with greater economic potential, better trained manpower, a more cohesive and decisive leadership, more friends, better and more numerous equipment levels, better leadership, effective doctrines, higher levels of motorization central positioninterior lines surprise, and many other advantages. They still managed to lose the initiaitve in the west by 1941, upset their friends, isolate themselves, fight too many wars at the same time, waste their strength on unimportant fronts, become sloppy in their security, waste their military leadership, lose their training edges, mismanage their economy and so many other failures. And yet, people across the world belive in the myth of superior german war performance during the war.

I think this sums up my views on the topic, an excellent post. The first part sums up their advantages for the first part of the war and the second what went wrong and ultimately cost Germany the war

 

[DonL]

Parsifal's post was in keeping with the theme of the original post. If you feel uncomfortable with what he said, too bad.

Personally, who'd want to visit Germany if there's people like you in it...

Post 1:

The German Army...

What was it that made the German Army so successful in the Beginning of WWII, was it their training, education, officer schools etc.?
How did these factors compare between the fighting armies?
What education did the NCO's and higher ranking officers receive?
Was it much of a difference between Army, Navy and Air Force?

Not interested in the 'political education' here, just the pure military one...

Perhaps english is not my first language, but to my understanding the thread had the intention, to discuss the above examples and questions.

I don't deny in summary Parsifal's arguments (not all, but the most), but all his examples were decisions of the political leaders and have very minor to do with the questions of the thread poster.
But perhaps my language understanding is so bad, that you cam explain to me, why you think I'm wrong and also that Parsifal was keeping to the theme with all of his posts of the original post?

 

[GrauGeist]

Because parsifal was putting forth a good summary of the demise of one of the modern age's most powerful armies and in a non-biased light.

He summed it up well and just because it doesn't seem favorable in your eyes, it's what happened.

My ancestry is rich in German and Prussian lineage and it pains me to see how Germany fell to ruin and then rose from the misery of WWI to become a super power, only to sh!t it away and leave the country broken, devestated and fragmented. But I look at the historical aspect of what happened and don't wear blinders and carry a torch what "could have been" or "should have been".

The bottom line is Germany got it's ass kicked because of stupidity all across the board in it's leadership and the burden fell on the shoulders of the landser who performed his task as he was trained and ordered to do. If there was any credit due to anyone, it was the sailors, soldiers and airmen of Germany who had to suffer the folly of those a**holes who led them into the breech.

 

[pattle]

I feel it is often difficult to distinguish whether victories or defeats can be attributed to one of either generals or politicians because the two are mostly intertwined. If you look at D-Day for example it was the generals who were responsible for planning and directing the operation but it was the politicians that ordered it's planning and execution, the same goes for any other major offensive so it is difficult to know who to thank or blame. After all with the possible exception of Japan it was the politicians that had ultimate control of the armed forces.

 

[pattle]

My ancestry is rich in German and Prussian lineage and it pains me to see how Germany fell to ruin and then rose from the misery of WWI to become a super power, only to sh!t it away and leave the country broken, devestated and fragmented. But I look at the historical aspect of what happened and don't wear blinders and carry a torch what "could have been" or "should have been".

I hope this does not mean you are not glad that Germany lost the war as Germany's aims and intentions were very negative to say the least.

 

[DonL]

Because parsifal was putting forth a good summary of the demise of one of the modern age's most powerful armies and in a non-biased light.

He summed it up well and just because it doesn't seem favorable in your eyes, it's what happened.

My ancestry is rich in German and Prussian lineage and it pains me to see how Germany fell to ruin and then rose from the misery of WWI to become a super power, only to sh!t it away and leave the country broken, devestated and fragmented. But I look at the historical aspect of what happened and don't wear blinders and carry a torch what "could have been" or "should have been".

The bottom line is Germany got it's ass kicked because of stupidity all across the board in it's leadership and the burden fell on the shoulders of the landser who performed his task as he was trained and ordered to do. If there was any credit due to anyone, it was the sailors, soldiers and airmen of Germany who had to suffer the folly of those a**holes who led them into the breech.

Please read the whole thread from the beginning!
I have no problem with your above post and also with most of parsifal's arguments. The most are correct!

But what the hell had these arguments to do with this questions?

The German Army...

What was it that made the German Army so successful in the Beginning of WWII, was it their training, education, officer schools etc.?
How did these factors compare between the fighting armies?
What education did the NCO's and higher ranking officers receive?
Was it much of a difference between Army, Navy and Air Force?

Not interested in the 'political education' here, just the pure military one...

To make it clear, I have no problems with the arguments that parsifal posted in this thread, I have a problem that this arguments weren't ask for, to my language understanding and to my feeling he had rededicate the thread, because as always he wanted to post his anti-german agenda.

 

[Marcel]

To be considered the best, you should be measured against the rest. And the rest was not very good. Other countries were not very well prepared, to say the least. Germany started the rearmament race and were ahead. Other countries suffered from years of pacifism, cutting expenses for defence to a criminal low and realised too late what was happening in Germany. The rearmament of those armies were like panic football, chaotic, slow and full of indecision. You can see it in the french army, where standardisation was non-existant. An extra handicap was that for a long time, the minds of the people did not catch up with the political situation, so that large pasifist movements still disrupted the rearmament in democratic countries. No wonder that thes countries had no time to also modernise their military philosophy. The Germans had no democraty and had their mind set long before the other countries did. They used it to their advantage and the result is obvious.

 

[stona]

An extra handicap was that for a long time, the minds of the people did not catch up with the political situation, so that large pasifist movements still disrupted the rearmament in democratic cou tries.

True. I would have used 'a movement for appeasement' rather than 'pacifist movements' but I know what you mean and English is my first language

The British people were definitely against any war and supported appeasement. Their sentiment was judged by their own government during this period as strongly anti-French, not anti-German.
Many German complaints, particularly regarding the Treaty of Versailles seemed reasonable to the British.

A strong Germany was seen as a buffer to the expansion of every western capitalist nation's favourite bogeyman...."bolshevism".

Hitler had many admirers both within and outside Europe. We shouldn't forget that he was Time magazines 'man of the year' in 1938, though to be fair it was for avoiding a war over Czechoslovakia . (In 1937 it was Chiang Kai-Shek and his missus and in 1939 Stalin, which makes you wonder!)

In the 1930s the policy of appeasing Hitler was popular with the British people who remembered all too well the carnage of the previous war. It was based on the fallacy that Hitler and the Nazi government were reasonable and could be reasoned with. We know that this was a fallacy now, the British and the French did not at the time.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

One of the earliest mistakes made by the Germans was in their Naval Construction. They set their sights on a massive building plan that in the end came to nothing, because war came too early, and in any event was still not enough to overtake the British Navy. Building submarines, prewar, instead of the Heavy Cruisers, Battlecruisers, and the two dreadnoughts was a better optioon. And permissible under the Anglo German Naval Treaty of 1935.

Clause 6 of the treaty stipulated that "In the matter of submarines, however, Germany, while not exceeding the ratio of 35:100 in respect of total tonnage, shall have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government, however, undertake that, except in the circumstances indicated in the immediately following sentence, Germany's submarine tonnage shall not exceed 45 percent. of the total of that possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government reserve the right, in the event of a situation arising, which in their opinion, makes it necessary for Germany to avail herself of her right to a percentage of submarine tonnage exceeding the 45 per cent. above mentioned, to give notice this effect to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and agree that the matter shall be the subject of friendly discussion before the German Government exercise that right".

in 1921 the Royal Navy had 83 submarines. by 1935, only 23 of these remained in service, but by 1939, the RN had 103 subs in commission. If the Germans had not built their cruisers, Battleships and aircraft carriers, they would have freed about 300000 tons of naval construction and around 15000 naval personnel afloat. Roughly, that would have given them the tonnage to build and man up to 300 subs. if they had elected to not build the aircraft carriers (alone), they would have freed sufficient tonnage to build another 60 subs. 60 subs was well within their treaty obligations. If they had not built the carriers or the heavy cruisers, they could have gone to war with 120 subs, and have had about 80 additional subs being completed 1939-40. A submarine fleet of those proportions would have destroyed the British ability to resist, and forced them to th peace table

 

[stona]

A submarine fleet of those proportions would have destroyed the British ability to resist, and forced them to th peace table

This last bit is debateable and I'd have to look at the figures. The actual German submarine fleet never came close to sinking enough shipping to cause that, I remember posting the figures a while back, despite Churchill's much quoted view.

As for the rest I pretty much agree.

Cheers

Steve

 

[DonL]

This last bit is debateable and I'd have to look at the figures. The actual German submarine fleet never came close to sinking enough shipping to cause that, I remember posting the figures a while back, despite Churchill's much quoted view.

As for the rest I pretty much agree.

Cheers

Steve

I think parsifal is refering to the beginning of the war (September 1939) till the whole year 1941.
I don't agree fully with him, but the submarine war took GB as a suprise (they felt save through Asdic) and they needed nearly 3 years to have a effective defense, so imagine Germany could field something about 150 subs at September 1939 which will increase till 1941.
So the wolfpack tactic would be in charge from the beginning, this would cause a lot of losses to GB's merchant fleet

Anyway I have douts that such a one-dimensional naval tactic and building program is the best thing, it is very unsurprising, as soon as the enemy knows your naval tactic and you have not a single other option.

 

[pattle]

And don't forget how many British ships the German Battleship threat tied up.

 

[Shortround6]

It is very doubtful that the Germans could have hidden such a building program from the British and the British may have been able to adjust their own building program accordingly, at least to some extent.

And simple tonnage swaps paint a very biased view of what was actually possible. A battleship has an awful lot of "stuff" made out of plain steel. But plain steel is NOT the production bottle neck. Armor steel, guns (and mounts) and machinery are.

Sub hulls are not made of "plain steel" but alloy steel, not the same alloy as armor but using lesser percentages of some of the same elements. Gun makers are not torpedo makers ( and torpedoes are a specialty unto themselves), Trying to turn 12 boilers and tree 50,000hp steam turbines ( Bismark main machinery) into 100 diesel engines totaling about the same HP might be a little difficult too.

Not all sailors can be submariners ( and you might not want them to try) so crew numbers don't quite line up either.

Most sources agree that on the unit level ( division and smaller) the Germany army was better than most if not all of it's opponents on average until at least the middle of the war, say 1943 or so. Granted ALL armies exhibited a rather wide variation ( and many late war SS divisions were pretty sorry units).

It is this small scale superiority that can use study and discussion. Rush to rearm is not quite a good excuse. German tanks were pretty much crap in France in 1940, why did they work so well? (one hint, they fought few tank to tank battles).
The French use of motorcycle messengers to transmit orders, while safe from radio interception also guaranteed that most orders were received too do any good in the situation that existed when the orders did arrive (if they did).
There are dozens of reason that the German "system" worked so well and it's opponents 'systems' failed so often.

 

[stona]

And simple tonnage swaps paint a very biased view of what was actually possible. A battleship has an awful lot of "stuff" made out of plain steel. But plain steel is NOT the production bottle neck. Armor steel, guns (and mounts) and machinery are.

It's not really a simple tonnage swap so much as a different application of resources. The Germans could have built many more U-boats, but there are numerous reasons (not just battle ships and aircraft carriers) why they did not.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

True but in some cases the plans for such a "different application of resources" have to be made years ahead of time. Boiler shops do not make diesel engines. Even the US had to make DE's with three different propulsion systems because there wasn't enough production capacity to standardize on one system. And in some cases it wasn't even the shortage of the ability to make steam turbines but the shortage of the ability to make the reduction gears for them. Which is one reason for the diesel electric escorts. The US was also lucky in that it could easily adapt the new Diesel railroad locomotive power plants to marine use.

In the US ALL submarines up until 1944 were built in just 4 yards, Electric boat in Groton, Portsmouth Navy yard, Mare Island Navy yard and Cramp Shipyard.

Not just any shipyard can build submarines ( not if you want them to come back up from the first test dive) without a steep learning curve.

 

[DonL]

From german sources it was the main reason, because the shipyards were blocked from the BB's, Cruisers and Destroyers, but most important the skilled workers were blocked and also through the mobilization at 1939 this problem tightened massively.

To come back to the Army,

I think also german corps and Army's had tactical advantages over their enemys.

I disagree about the most named reasons why the german were better, except their developed doctrine.
I think the main reason is, that the german officer corps (Heer) of the Reichswehr, did a very deep and extensive analyse about the WWI, why they lost, why the war was faught as a static warfare with very huge material battles and casualtys.
There are countless of memoranda from the 1920's, which were written to this issues and how to avoid such a style of warfare.

The Reichswehr was from the beginning open to new ideas and technical developments to avoid static warfare. You can say they searched and researched with great effort, every possibilty to develop a counter strategy and they had the possibility and time to test "new", technical development, doctrine and ideas at the UDSSR.
As I said before in this thread the combined arms doctrine and tank doctrine were developed at 1932-1933 without any Nazi influence.

For example no other Army in the World had and was experimenting with massive radio use since 1933. Every german tank had from the beginning a radio and many many other smal units and that was all to coordinate the combined arms doctrine and to be faster on battlefield reaction then other Armys, also this was massively trained since 1934.

I think the reintroduction of the compulsory military service was also a big advantage, because the new doctrine, technical developments and ideas could be trained with much more soldiers.

Anyway I think the huge efforts of the Reichswehr at the 1920's, to brutally honest analyse the WWI and the own failures (from a military viepoint) and to do all to develop a counter stategy to static warfare, was the cornerstone of the tactical success of the Wehrmacht.