The Great P-47 Range Debate on you tube now. (3 Viewers)

[SaparotRob]

Because the Bomber Mafia was desperate to suppress the P-39.

Knew it!

 

[ColFord]

But the RAF did escort daylight raids but due to a lack of range were pretty much useless,

Really? Escorting the USAAF and RAF medium bombers freeing up the USAAF units with the longer ranged fighters to perform the long range daylight bomber escort role? Providing the ingress and egress escort, again removing the longer ranged USAAF fighters from that part of the escort requirement. Providing the home airfield protection for the airfields the USAAF medium and heavy bomber units operated from, freeing up the USAAF longer ranged fighters to perform the daylight bomber escort role. If they don't do that, who does?

In 1942 and 1943 the Air Ministry and the Air Staff and the Ministry of Aircraft Production were all grappling with the emerging requirement for RAF day time fighters to have longer effective fighting range, not just straight line ferry range at best economical cruising speed and no combat requirement. They were already considering what the range requirements would need to be for effective fighter cover for an invasion of occupied Europe in 1943 or 1944 in a location other than the Pas de Calais, with the need for more internal fuel as well as improved external fuel carrying capabilities - which also had flow on benefits for other theatres of operations eg MTO, CBI, SWPA. At the same time they had to work within the capacity of the UK aircraft manufacturers, the demands for types already in service (supplying RAF, USAAF in MTO, other Allied Air Forces overseas, as well as the supply commitments to the USSR), issues with a number of types already in service (eg Hawker Typhoon), delays in development of new types beyond expected first date into service, and responding to the known performance of enemy fighters already in service and anticipating the potential performance of future enemy fighters (with intelligence on the progress being made by the enemy in a number of fields including jet propulsion and rocket technology) that needed new or improved types to be introduced into RAF service to counter them.

RAF Bomber Command - Nuremberg 30-31 March 1944 - 96 lost out of 795 dispatched, plus a substantial number of others written off or requiring lengthy periods out of service for repair after return.

 

[drgondog]

But the RAF did escort daylight raids but due to a lack of range were pretty much useless,

Yes, they did - Feb through April 1944 - 122 Wing with Mustang III's, but without fuselage tank so they were performing same mission and tactical radius of the 8th and 9th AF P-47s

 

[J.D.]

The lost ~70 in one raid to Berlin in 1944 - with escort all the way.

69 on Mission 250, 6 March, 1944.

 

[J.D.]

Like I stated earlier, use the P47 and MkV's to sweep ahead of the longer ranged MkXVIII/IX's as escorts, use what you have, make it work, the P47's that were used on these raids were fitted with unpressurised ferry tanks just to get a bit further, I'm looking at the USAF that were desperate enough to use whatever they could, who cares if Spitfires were hit earlier in the fight, use the top 42g rear tank to get out over France at 30,000ft, at that height they won't be bounced and won't be hit by FW190's, if they do get intercepted by 109's great, ditch the dropper and get stuck in, that's one less fighter attacking the bombers.

Also worth noting the fact that the RAF were flying other missions, like diversionary raids over Northern France and the Low Countries, so that the bomber formations would have a better chance of getting through. They also attacked German fighter stations and radar. Any notion that the RAF was just sitting around pinching buttons... well, that's rather unfair.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

But the RAF did escort daylight raids but due to a lack of range were pretty much useless,

James Stewart story, his B-24 group was returning, no escort, under sustained fighter attack, then the Luftwaffe fighters broke off only for the B-24 crews to spot another group of fighters coming fast, just before they came within range the fighter leader broke formation and showed off that elliptical wing and the B-24 people relaxed.

The RAF was doing plenty of light and medium bomber escorting, having figured out the bombers attracted more Luftwaffe fighters than pure fighter only operations.

That's all well and good but 60 bombers went down in one raid over Schweinfurt, I'm just looking at what we had and what we could use to combat this.

Do NOT go to Schweinfurt or ANY other target beyond escort range. Not only theoretical fighter range but keeping distances short enough to ensure the numbers of escorts are adequate at all times based on available Luftwaffe interceptors.

The lost ~70 in one raid to Berlin in 1944 - with escort all the way.

That would be 6 March 1944, Roger Freeman reports losses as 69 bombers MIA plus 6 write offs (53+5 B-17, 16+1 B-24), total 75, from 730 sorties, escort being 65 P-38, 615 P-47, 100 P-51 total 801, with 11 MIA and 3 write offs, 55th FG P-38 aborted due to engine failures, 358th, 359th and 362nd FG, P-47, flew double missions. The fighters claimed 81 and the bombers 97 enemy aircraft destroyed. The Luftwaffe Quartermaster puts Luftflotte Reich fighter losses in combat as 25 Bf109, 17 Fw190, 10 Bf110, 6 Me410, plus 10 Bf110 night fighters, total 68

Looking at the various loss lists comes up with 64 B-17 and 17 B-24 lost, total 81, 3 Battle damage, 2 collision (caused by shot down aircraft hitting other bombers), 1 crash, 6 flak plus fighter, 52 fighter, 15 flak, 1 take off accident, 1 taxi accident.

Like I stated earlier, use the P47 and MkV's to sweep ahead of the longer ranged MkXVIII/IX's as escorts, use what you have, make it work, the P47's that were used on these raids were fitted with unpressurised ferry tanks just to get a bit further,

The Spitfire IX theoretical combat radius was around 155 miles, the Spitfire V would be slightly more, regardless of how much external fuel carried. The Merlin 40 series engines were shorter and weighed around 200 pounds less than the Merlin 60 series, that makes a difference when trying to carry loads aft of the cockpit, 33 gallons of 100 octane is about 235 pounds, plus tank weight, piping and support structure. Spitfire aft tanks were a second half of 1944 appearance.

P-47 use of the ferry tanks was confined to a few raids in July 1943, after that came the use of the 75, actual 84, gallon US type and the arriving 108 gallon types, after converting the P-47 to use standard belly racks. The amount of room under the P-47 fuselage was small, Republic did a good job to get 200 gallons there but the tank was ferry only, hard to jettison and used non standard fittings.

I'm looking at the USAF that were desperate enough to use whatever they could, who cares if Spitfires were hit earlier in the fight, use the top 42g rear tank to get out over France at 30,000ft, at that height they won't be bounced and won't be hit by FW190's, if they do get intercepted by 109's great, ditch the dropper and get stuck in, that's one less fighter attacking the bombers.

I would be surprised if a Spitfire V could be combat cleared with any fuel in a rear tank, and that is the majority of Fighter Command's force. A Spitfire VIII or IX with more than 33 gallons aft has to avoid combat, to escape interception means losing the drop tank, which would be full if any rear tank has yet to be drawn down to safe levels. Assuming 42 gallons has to be lost, it takes 23 gallons to get to 20,000 feet (no external fuel carried), the remaining fuel is good for say 90 miles plus about another 30 to 40 moved during the climb.

If escort tactics are stay within sight of the bombers then at best fighter range is 80% of theoretical given the speed difference.

Getting the mark VIII wing tanks into the mark V and IX is within 1943 engineering capacity, enables them to fully use a 90 gallon external tank, ups theoretical combat radius to around 260 miles, which gets you over the north German border, 300 miles gets you to the Ruhr. Meantime the P-47 with 108 gallons external has a similar radius, depending on source and flight conditions, 275 to 300 miles.

Using the RAF census, Fighter Command operational unit Spitfire strength
end May 1943, 3 I, 28 IIa, 9 IIb, 1 Va, 583 Vb, 86 Vc, 36 VI, 5 VII and 147 IX, total 898 (817 V/IX), there were 171 VIII on RAF strength
end August, 3 I, 44 IIa, 10 IIb, 3 Va, 458 Vb, 72 Vc, 26 VI, 20 VII, 169 IX and 36 XII, total 841 (702 V/IX), there were 446 VIII of which 59 were overseas and 287 in transit.
end October, 6 I, 37 IIa, 7 IIb, 1 Va, 466 Vb, 70 Vc, 25 VI, 27 VII, 212 IX and 43 XII, total 894 (749 V/IX) there were 581 VIII of which 348 were overseas and 86 in transit.

Fighter Command Typhoon strength, 355 end May, 348 end August (drop tanks available), 337 end October.

In 1943 the 8th Air Force generally managed to keep its P-47 group strength at 75 aircraft, 3 groups from April, another from 12 August, the fifth on 9 September, the sixth on 14 September, the seventh on 15 October, the first P-38 group on 15 October.

Counting only Spitfire V and IX, end May 1943, Fighter Command has around 11 US fighter groups, end August around 9, end October around 10, given the number of units in Scotland etc. you can double the available escorts to end August, end October say a third more.

The USAAF Statistical Digest reports the 8th Air Force lost 599 heavy bombers to enemy fighters to end October 1943. The loss lists indicate the raids of 17 August and 14 October lost 106 bombers to fighters and 5 to flak and fighters, the 25 to 31 July raids 48+4, 8 to 10 October 55+10.

Stay WITHIN escort range, otherwise there is little chance in a significant reduction in bomber losses, the RAF can provide a useful boost in escort numbers to about the German border or so until around Q3/43 after that the USAAF is arriving but the Luftwaffe is building up the fighter defences of Germany faster in the second half of 1943.

November 1943 to May 1944 the 8th Air Force lost 1,150 heavy bombers to enemy fighters from many more sorties than earlier, then another 703 to the end of the war from many more sorties again.

The Dream Spitfire VIII, 199 gallons internal (75 gallon rear fuselage), 265 miles fast cruise combat radius, add 90 external, 480 miles, maximum internal fuel allowed when entering combat 157 gallons (33 rear tank), less 54 gallons reserve and combat, leaves 103 gallons, or about 500 miles at fast cruise, the VIII was cleared to 1,000 pounds external load, the 75 internal + 90 external would add 1,250 pounds or so. Getting a rear 33 gallon tank plus 90 external (around 925 pounds) gives a radius of 380 miles. Explains how Spitfires based in Britain could escort raids on the Ruhr in the second half of 1944, aided by plenty of friendly territory on the way to do economic cruise over and emergency airbases quite close to target.

Schweinfurt had a pre war population of around 36,000, asking Bomber Command to find a target that small, that deep in 1943 was really setting a task. The full moon was on 15 August 1943, rising at 1924 GMT and in the second half of 1943 the German defences had largely denied the use of full moon periods to the heavy bombers, a raid on Nuremburg on 10 August, when the moon set before midnight GMT, was followed by four raids on Italy, Peenemunde on 17 August, then Leverkusen on 22 August with the moon 3rd quarter rising at 2242 GMT. The moon was full on 13 October 1943, rising at 1743 GMT. Bomber Command did no major night raids 9 to 17 October.

 

[PAT303]

Why couldn't they make internal eternal tanks?

That would be much better, and Pat could have his wish of Spitfires escorting bombers to Berlin.

Not to Berlin, Ruhr Valley from 1943, leave Berlin to Mustangs from '44.

 

[wuzak]

Not to Berlin, Ruhr Valley from 1943, leave Berlin to Mustangs from '44.

Eternal tanks will get Spitfires to Berlin!

 

[BiffF15]

Eternal tanks will get Spitfires to Berlin!

With "Eternal tanks" range won't be a limiting factor…

 

[SaparotRob]

With "Eternal tanks" range won't be a limiting factor…

Even I know that.

 

[Just Schmidt]

The zero only nearly got it right with its Infernal tanks

 

[Shortround6]

The zero only nearly got it right with its Inferno tanks

Fixed it

 

[Gilder]

All
This may be of interest. Its an official paper giving the ranges af various RAF aircraft. Please note the comment on the bottom that for planning purposes actual ranges were 75% of the theoretical paper ranges and this would be subject to the actual situation on the day.

 

[Frog]

69 on Mission 250, 6 March, 1944.

24 B-17 were lost to flak.

German losses : 66 fighters vs 11 escorts.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The first page of the following is the page after the one in message 213, note the dates, schedules and how extra fuel was going to be added to the Spitfire.

 

[PAT303]

The first page of the following is the page after the one in message 213, note the dates, schedules and how extra fuel was going to be added to the Spitfire.

So it could be done, there ya go.

 

[ggiumarra]

On the first Schweinfurt mission August 17th, the 56th FG did precisely that for the Withdrawal escort. He led the mission inbound at 18,000 feet until all of the 200 gallons loaded for that mission and dropped the empty tanks over Belgium, then climbed to 28,000 feet on internal fuel, met harassing GAF fighters near Aachen for a successful interception at the R/V point.

First, thank you for the detailed reply (sorry it took me so long to acknowledge it). My question now is, why did they not continue to use that approach? Rattling in my head was the recollection of reading about a very successful interception by P-47s at around this time so I looked it up in a couple of sources and found that 56th FG claimed 17 fighters shot down for the loss of 3 of their own (The Mighty Eighth War Diary, 90). Of course, as per normal, that number was inflated as it seems they only shot down 2 with 3 more damaged (a couple of which force landed, so perhaps total losses after all), but they did not know that at the time (even the source for the true GAF losses, The Luftwaffe over Germany, p. 273, termed it "the most successful escort mission to date by an American fighter group"). So why no repeat performances? Or did they, with less success? Or perhaps they thought they would not be so successful in the future since the Germans would not be so surprised going forward?

 

[drgondog]

First, thank you for the detailed reply (sorry it took me so long to acknowledge it). My question now is, why did they not continue to use that approach? Rattling in my head was the recollection of reading about a very successful interception by P-47s at around this time so I looked it up in a couple of sources and found that 56th FG claimed 17 fighters shot down for the loss of 3 of their own (The Mighty Eighth War Diary, 90). Of course, as per normal, that number was inflated as it seems they only shot down 2 with 3 more damaged (a couple of which force landed, so perhaps total losses after all), but they did not know that at the time (even the source for the true GAF losses, The Luftwaffe over Germany, p. 273, termed it "the most successful escort mission to date by an American fighter group"). So why no repeat performances? Or did they, with less success? Or perhaps they thought they would not be so successful in the future since the Germans would not be so surprised going forward?

Because the new keel kits arrived with standard AN-B-7 bomb rack capable of utilizing all the 75-gal drop tanks delivered during the 8th AF build-up July through August 1942. The kits arrived circa August 24 and completed on al C-2 through D-4 in theatre as the new D-5 and D-6 had production articles installed. The 75-gal pressurized tank enabled the same basic combat radius and were far better with respect to flight speed/stability and altitude capability.

Had any P-47s been modified with wing racks and fuel feed at that time they could have used the 150-gal tanks left behind when the P-38s migrated to Torch.

Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich states 40 lost, 19 damaged on 102-102. The bulk of the losses were from JG 1, 3 and 11

 

[J.D.]

Yes. Yes. We know the history. But think what you could do with eternal tanks on a P-39. It's the Expert's fever dream.

"If the Bomber Mafia did not exist it would be necessary for the P-47 Bros to invent it" - with apologies to Voltaire.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

17 August 1943, Western Europe,

Williamson Murray reports Luftwaffe fighter losses in the west as
24 single engine and 12 BF110 lost plus 10 single engine and 2 Bf110 written off due to battle damage. Another 25 fighters damaged.

The Luftwaffe quartermaster says Luftflote Reich
Bf109, 9 destroyed, 7 damaged in combat, 6 destroyed, 2 damaged on operations not enemy action, 1 damaged not on operations
Fw190, 8 destroyed, 2 damaged in combat, 2 destroyed, 4 damaged on operations not enemy action, 1 destroyed and 1 damaged not on operations
Bf110, 3 missing, 10 destroyed, 2 damaged in combat, 6 destroyed on operations not enemy action, 1 damaged not on operations

Total 3 missing, 27 lost in combat, 10 on operations, 2 not on operations. For the 24 hour period. No information on Luftflotte 3 losses.

Donald Caldwell, 42 lost (12 Bf109, 12 Fw190, 18 Bf110), 21 damaged (8 Bf109, 10 Fw190, 3 Bf110). Losses,

6 JG1
4 JG3
8 JG11
4 JG26
2 JG50
11 NJG1
1 NJG2
2 NJG4
4 NJG6
42 Total

Nachtjagd War Diaries notes 21 night fighters lost or written off on day operations on 17 August, 12 more on 17/18 August. (Luftwaffe quartermaster for 18 August, 5 night fighters lost in combat, 3 damaged, 3 destroyed, 4 damaged on operations not enemy action, no major allied raids on 18th or 18th/19th)

Air 16/924, allied day fighter claims, 10 Bf109, 13 Fw190, 11 Bf110, 1 Me210, total 35, all on Ramrod operations,

Group	Sqn	Qty	ftr	time	enemy	enemy	enemy	enemy	Friendly	Location	Personnel
Group	Sqn	Qty	ftr	time	Type	Dest	prob	Dam	Lost	Location	Personnel
11​	341​	12​	Spitfire	1000-1140	Fw190		1​		1​	Bruges	Sgt. Poiquier missing
11​	485​	12​	Spitfire	1000-1130	Bf109	2​				Bruges
11​	183​	8​	Typhoon	1005-1220					1​	Poix
11​	222​	12​	Spitfire	1308-1429	Bf109	4​				Westerschelde
11​	126​	12​	Spitfire	1315-1429	Fw190	1​				Westerschelde
8thFC		1​	P-47	0923-1123	Bf109	1​				South of Diest	Maj. McCollum
83​	182​	6​	Typhoon	1047-1148					1​	Lille	F/Lt. Bewg missing
8thFC	63​	n/a	P-47	0924-1140	Bf109			1​		Hasslet
11​	303​	12​	Spitfire	1309-1459	Fw190	3​	1​			Antwerp
11​	331​	11​	Spitfire	1614-1755	Bf110	1​				Antwerp
11​	332​	13​	Spitfire	1614-1755	Bf110	1​				Antwerp
11​		1​	Spitfire	1614-1755	Bf110	1​				Antwerp	Maj. Birksted
83​	403​	12​	Spitfire	1652-1706	Bf110	1​			1​	Ghent	F/lt. Conrad missing
83​	403​				Fw190	1​
8thFC	84​	16​	P-47	1312-1549	Bf110	1​				Aacen
8thFC	84​				Me210	1​
8thFC		1​	P-47	1520-1735	Bf110	1​				Antwerp	Col. Zemke
8thFC	61​	n/a	P-47	1520-1725	Fw190	2​		1​		Antwerp
8thFC	61​				Bf109	2​
8thFC	61​				Bf110	1​
8thFC	62​	n/a	P-47	1520-1735	Bf110	2​			2​	Antwerp	Lts. Day & Stultz Missing
8thFC	65​	n/a	P-47	1520-1735	Fw190	6​	1​		1​	Antwerp	Lt. Sugas Missing
8thFC	65​				Bf109	1​	1​
8thFC	65​				Bf110	2​	1​	1​
Totals						35​	5​	3​	7​
RAF						15​	2​	0​	4​
USAAF						20​	3​	3​	3​

Mighty Eighth War Diary, USAAF fighters, claims 19-3-4, for 3 aircraft missing, USAAF bombers, claims 288-37-99, for 60 missing, 4 write offs, 168 damaged,

Fighter Command War Diary, RAF fighters, claims 14-2-1, for 2 Spitfires and 1 Typhoon missing, 1 Spitfire write off, the RAF encountering at least aircraft from II/JG2 and III/JG26

Total Luftwaffe losses during the day were split between the allied fighters, US bombers and accidents.