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Funny how you choose to interpret what's in front of you. The Lancaster was not chosen by anyone. This has been pointed out to you in virtually every post you have replied with. Ramsay recommended the Lancaster, discussed it with Groves who ultimately rejected it along with Arnold, who had the final say in terms of delivery system, so no, you are once again wrong in interpreting the facts that you are presenting.
The final say as to which delivery system is NOT Ramsey, it is ARNOLD, which means that the Lancaster WAS NEVER SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED, since Arnold said NO! Which part of that do you not understand?
Ramsey did not choose the Lancaster. He recommended it. The Lancaster was not considered by anyone else. The ultimate decision was Arnold's AND HE SAID NO!
Read your source material RCAFson. Posting the same stuff over and over doesn't change anything. The facts still remain that the Lancaster was not seriously considered for delivery of the nuclear bombs. Ramsey's report, which I have posted in his words more than twice on this forum confirms this, as do Groves' and Arnold's, the three people at the centre of this debate.
"I don't quite understand why the logic of the situation, then, meets so much resistance today. Had the A-bomb been ready before the B-29, it's pretty obvious which Allied aircraft would have been chosen to deliver it, especially as the target would have been Germany."
"When I told Arnold there was a chance that we might not be
able to fit the bomb into the B-29, no matter how hard we tried, he
asked me what I would do then. I said that if the B-29 could not
be used, we would have to consider the use of a British plane, the
Lancaster, which I was sure the Prime Minister would be glad to
make available to us.
This brought from him the characteristic reply that I had hoped
and expected to bear: that he wanted an American plane to deliver
our bomb, and that the Air Force would make every effort to ensure
that we had a B-29 capable of doing the job. Because the use of
a British plane would have caused us many difficulties and delays,
I, too, was most anxious to use the B-29 if it could be done.
Fortunately, as time went on, we were able to make changes in the
design of both types of bombs, so that it became possible to fit them
into a specially modified B-29.
The answer is in your own post!
"Would have, could have, should have."
Now shall we compare that Merlin 85 engined Lancaster VI to the B-29D (B-50)?
What would have happened if the B-29 could not be used?
And a suggestion, not a decision by any means....Because Ramsey's suggestion to acquire Lancasters in 1943 wasn't acted upon, yes acquiring them in mid 1944 would have caused delays, but surely no more than happened with the B-29.
No I'm thinking the XB-44 and using the same wishful thinking you've been using!The Lancaster VI flew in mid (June, IIRC) 1943. The XB-44 (B-50 prototype) didn't fly until May 1945. You may be thinking of the Lancaster IV (Lincoln prototype) which flew in June 1944.
"I don't quite understand why the logic of the situation, then, meets so much resistance today. Had the A-bomb been ready before the B-29, it's pretty obvious which Allied aircraft would have been chosen to deliver it, especially as the target would have been Germany."
"When I told Arnold there was a chance that we might not be
able to fit the bomb into the B-29, no matter how hard we tried, he
asked me what I would do then. I said that if the B-29 could not
be used, we would have to consider the use of a British plane, the
Lancaster, which I was sure the Prime Minister would be glad to
make available to us.
This brought from him the characteristic reply that I had hoped
and expected to bear: that he wanted an American plane to deliver
our bomb, and that the Air Force would make every effort to ensure
that we had a B-29 capable of doing the job. Because the use of
a British plane would have caused us many difficulties and delays,
I, too, was most anxious to use the B-29 if it could be done.
Fortunately, as time went on, we were able to make changes in the
design of both types of bombs, so that it became possible to fit them
into a specially modified B-29.
The answer is in your own post!
"Would have, could have, should have."
Now shall we compare that Merlin 85 engined Lancaster VI to the B-29D (B-50)?
There are no flaws in the "magazine". It's a magazine sensationalizing it's articles like most magazines in a newsstand. It gets that breathless flavor right. Facts are for Walter Cronkite.The article has a few flaws.
It states that the Fatman would not fit into a Lancaster bomb bay without removing the doors, but the maximum width was short enough to have allowed for bulged doors to be fitted. Yes, there would have been some extra drag, but probably little more than that already produced by the radome and would have been largely offset by removal of the mid upper and front turrets.
A major flaw is in the range calculation. The Lancasters that flew the Tirpitz raids from Scotland covered about 2400 miles, and one even managed to fly the mission and return with a hung up bomb and this was achieved by using a 400IG internal Wellington aux tank, for a total of about 2560 IG of internal fuel. By the use of custom internal aux tanks, maximum fuel load of a Lancaster VI, minus the front and upper turrets, whilst carrying a FATMAN would be about 3000IG (with aux tanks fore and aft of the bomb) and a range of ~3000 miles. Like the Silverplate B-29s the mission would use a low-high-low flight profile, so that minimal time is spent at high altitude and initial climb to attack altitude is done with a large amount of fuel (1200-1500IG or ~8600-11000lb) of fuel burned off. However, even this is insufficient range for safe mission planning with a return to Tinian, and so TO from Tinian would involve a mission plan that included landing at Okinawa or Iwo Jima after weapon release.
A 'Silverplate' Lincoln should have been able to fly to and from Tinian with aux bomb bay tanks.
I like the cut of your jib, mate!I don't figure out why the "black Lancasters" had no markings because they were on some secret project. If something is secret why draw attention to it by having no markings at all? Just mark them up as individual members of a dozen existing squadrons?
Even as a civilian today a plane with no markings at all looks unusual, its like disguising a car by taking the number plates off, the first thing everyone notices is it has no number plates on.I like the cut of your jib, mate!
What would have happened if Hitler was killed in WW1?
And a suggestion, not a decision by any means....
No I'm thinking the XB-44 and using the same wishful thinking you've been using!
Again I ask, what would Ramsey have to do with aircraft choice? I imagine it was certainly within his purview to make suggestions but I also imagine that's about all.
Ramsey: We should use the Lancaster.
Arnold: Thanks for the input, now go back to bomb case design bub.
Humor to lighten the moment gentlemen.
In 1943 and early 1944, there was no certainty that the B-29 could be modded to do the task at hand. Groves states that clearly. If the B-29 doesn't work it was either can the entire program or use the Lancaster.
I'm not the only one who states that the Lancaster was seriously considered:
"Scientists working on the atomic bomb quickly realized that the unusual size and weight of the devices--both the tubular "gun-type fission weapon" shape (Little Boy) and the oval plutonium implosion weapon shape (Fat Man)--would be too large to be delivered by a conventional bomber such as the B-17 or the B-24. In October 1943, Dr. Norman Ramsey, a member of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Group, suggested that the only airplane in the U.S. inventory capable of carrying either type of the proposed weapons shapes was the B-29 Superfortress. Even the B-29, however, would require extensive modifications to both its engines and its bomb bay in order to accommodate the enormous weapon.
Prior to the decision to use the B-29, military officials had given serious consideration to using the British Avro Lancaster to deliver the weapon, which the Royal Air Force had used to deliver the 5-ton Tallboy bombs developed in 1944. The Avro Lancaster would have required much less modification, but Major General Leslie Groves, the commander of the Manhattan Project, and General Henry H. Arnold, the Chief of United States Army Air Forces, wished to use an American plane."
Project Silverplate
and:
"It was a display of nationalism by US General Leslie Groves who thought it "beyond comprehension to use a British plane to deliver an American A-bomb" (he wrote his own book, Now It Can Be Told, still in print in many different versions, even a Kindle edition) that tipped the scales in favor of the B-29 being selected over the British Avro Lancaster. While the B-29 was sophisticated for its day—fully pressurized crew compartments, trick bombing radar, remote-controlled gun turrets with computing sights—it cost a staggering five times as much as a Lanc, over $500,000 apiece, which also would have been much easier to modify. It may well be said, and this book certainly leans in that direction, that the Silverplate program redeemed an otherwise problematic (in terms of performance, safety, bombing accuracy) aircraft that had failed to live up to expectations in its role as conventional high-altitude daylight strategic bomber and had been only provisionally successful as a low-altitude nighttime fire bomber." » The Silverplate Bombers: A History and Registry of the Enola Gay and Other B-29s Configured to Carry Atomic Bombs
It "could have" easily been accelerated and provided better performance than any other Lancaster or Lincoln mark. I'm now using your rationale.I don't understand the relevance of the XB-44 as it was too immature to have been considered.
Arnold was not Ramsey's superior, nor even Groves' superior, since Groves didn't report to Arnold.
OK so now it was "considered," (recommened, whatever) but at the end of the day the bugs were worked out and the superior delivery platform was chosen. You seem to keep driving this home to reflect that the Lancaster, because it was "considered" was the superior platform and it was not, no matter how you try to twist this or emphasize the B-29s teething issues, at the end of the day the B-29 stood a generation ahead over the Lancaster and as I repeated before, that's not taking anything away from the Lancaster.
It "could have" easily been accelerated and provided better performance than any other Lancaster or Lincoln mark. I'm now using your rationale.
Ultimately they ALL worked for Arnold with regards of developing how this weapon was going to be deployed. If you look at the AAF command structure Arnold reported directly to General Marshal. There was also a reporting line from Arnold to the Assistant Sec. of War (for air) Robert Lovett. While Groves was the head of the Manhattan project, he was "just" a Major General. Regardless of how many people you show who "recommended," suggested," "considered" the Lancaster, at the end of the day General Arnold had the final word for the delivery system.
The only "what if" to this is if the bomb was ready earlier and Roosevelt wanted it immediately deployed (as you pointed out). I think Arnold "would have" pushed back and tried to hold out to an American delivery system. Whether he would have been overruled by Marshal, Lovett or even Roosevelt is another "what if" discussion.
Lordy :rollseyes: thought I'd continue this here since it is more appropriate.
Yes, I have read these sources and have even referenced these highlighted sections in brief in my article, but it in no way changes my statement that the Americans never seriously considered the Lancaster for carrying the Little Boy or Fat Man bombs operationally. Within the passages is the following:
"Groves had not been Informed about Ramsey's preference and was at a loss for words
when he found out. It was beyond comprehension that Ramsey could consider using a
British plane to deliver an American atomic bomb. Needless to say, Groves found an ally in
General Arnold when he discussed this matter with him. The new Boeing B29
Superfortress would carry the atomic bomb."
This is after this:
"When Ramsey returned, he wrote to Parsons suggesting that the Lancaster be seriously
considered and planned a memo to General Groves recommending that a modified
Lancaster be used.(13)"
So, we know that Ramsey wanted the Lancaster to be seriously considered, because it was not being so at the time, otherwise, why would he suggest something that was already happening?
Next, Groves, in charge of the Manhattan Project states that he was at a loss for words when he found out about Ramsey's suggestion, which means that this is the first he is hearing of it. If the Lancaster was being seriously considered, why would he react that way?
The final nail in the coffin is the last two sentences, which state that Groves found an ally in Arnold, which means he was obviously opposed to the idea and that the B-29 was to be the atom bomber. The term beyond comprehension reflects his attitude toward the suggestion.
This ties in neatly with Ramsey's own subsequent official report on the situation and he apparently agreed, emphasising that the Lancaster was to be used for trials only, while the B-29 would be the operational platform. Taken from a report that Ramsey wrote on 27 September 1945 to Brig Gen T.F. Farrell, within which is a history of Project A:
"In view of the critical shortage of B-29's it was at first proposed that a British Lancaster be used for the test work even though a B-29 would almost certainly be used as the combat ship."
Finally, we see that even Ramsey had changed his mind about the use of the Lancaster, indicating that the decision not to use it for testing was the right one, as follows:
"The Air Forces, however, wisely recommended that a B-29 be used for the test work as well, both to avoid non-standard maintenance and to accumulate experience in B-29 operations with such a bomb."
All this does is reinforce what I have maintained all along, that the Lancaster was only ever suggested in letters and conversation, with Ramsey as its biggest supporter and the origin of the suggestion, and even then he later demonstrably changed his stance on the matter in official sources. The theory that it was "seriously considered" just doesn't hold water, not when the head of the Manhattan Project and the Chief of the USAAF both rejected it outright.
There is a good YouTube Podcast by doctor mark Felton, a non aviator academic about this topic. It seems the Lancaster' could probably have done it with in flight refueling. The low top speed and ceiling though would make the blast wave a bit sporty I would think.The fact that Arnold wanted an American delivery system is not in doubt, why is the interesting point. Arnold was heavily invested in the B-29 and determined to make it work, for good reason, it was very advanced and offered performance unmatched by any other heavy bomber in service at the time. I don't know what Arnold had in mind as an alternative, but I'm willing to bet that Arnold believed that the B-29 was the only answer, despite its various issues. I'm also willing to bet that regardless of the seriousness of the issues that arose with the B-29 that he was prepared to keep throwing money and resources at it until it was able to do the mission. That it succeeded and carried out the mission using parameters that no other bomber could have flown at the time was evidence that Arnold back the right horse.