The Luftwaffe if Goering Died in WW1...

[comiso90]

Im not sure. A cousin or nephew of his also was involved with helping Jews and everythind hide and escape.

Was that known during the war?

 

[The Basket]

Albert Goering...he was Hermanns brother. He saved many jews using the family name.

Hermann must have known...I think.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Yeah thats him Basket. Goering apparantly new and even helped him in some cases. That Herman Goering helped him in some cases cant be verified I think.

Here is a bit of info:

"Albert Göring

Albert Göring (1900 - 1966) was a German businessman, notable for helping Jews and dissidents survive in Germany during World War II. His older brother Hermann Göring held the rank of Reich Marshal of Nazi Germany and was a convicted war criminal.

Early life
Göring was born near Mauterndorf to a former cavalry officer and German consul general in Haiti Heinrich Ernst Göring and his wife Franziska "Fanny" Tiefenbrunn (1859-July 15, 1923), who came from a Bavarian peasant family. Among his paternal ancestors were the Eberle/Eberlin, a Swiss-German family who were Jewish converts to Christianity in the 15th century. Goring was a relative of numerous descendants of the Eberle/Eberlin in Switzerland and Germany, among them German Counts Zeppelin, including aviation pioneer Ferdinand von Zeppelin; German nationalistic art historian Hermann Grimm (author of concept of the German hero as a mover of history that was embraced by the Nazis); the great Swiss historian of art and cultural, political, and social thinker Jacob Burckhardt; Swiss diplomat, historian, and President of International Red Cross Carl J. Burckhardt; the Merck family, the owners of the German pharmaceutical giant Merck; major German Catholic writer and poet Gertrud von LeFort. (See Wolfgang Paul, "Wer war Hermann Goring. Biographie," Esslingen: Bechtle Verlag, 1983, p. 33.)

The Göring family lived with their children's aristocratic godfather of Jewish heritage, Ritter Hermann von Epenstein, in his Veldenstein and Mauterndorf castles. Von Epenstein was a prominent physician and acted as a surrogate father to the children as Heinrich Göring was often absent from the family home. Göring was one of five children, his brothers were Hermann Göring and Karl Ernst Göring; his sisters were Olga Therese Sophia and Paula Elisabeth Rosa Göring, the last of whom were children of his father's first marriage[1].

According to the author Leonard Mosley, who had interviewed Göring family members, von Epenstein began a long-term affair with Franziska Göring about a year before Albert's birth. Mosley also states that the strong physical resemblance between von Epenstein and Albert Göring led many people to believe that they were father and son. If this belief is correct, then Albert Göring had a Jewish paternal grandfather.

Anti-Nazi activity

Göring seemed to have acquired his godfather's character as a bon vivant and looked set to lead an unremarkable life as a filmmaker, until the Nazis came to power in 1933. Unlike his older brother Hermann, who was a leading party member, Albert Göring despised Nazism and the brutality that it involved. On one occasion he is reported to have gotten down on his hands and knees and joined a group of Jews who were being forced to scrub the street; the SS officer in charge, unwilling to see Hermann Göring's brother publicly humiliated, ordered the street scrubbing to stop.[citation needed]

Albert Göring also used his influence to get his Jewish former boss Oskar Pilzer freed after the Nazis had arrested him. Göring then helped Pilzer and his family escape from Germany. He is reported to have done the same for many other dissidents.[citation needed]

Göring intensified his anti-Nazi activity when he was made export director at the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia. Here, he encouraged minor acts of sabotage and had contact with the Czech resistance. On many occasions, Göring forged his brother's signature on transit documents to enable dissidents to escape. When he was caught, he used his brother's influence to get himself released. Göring also sent trucks to Nazi concentration camps with requests for labour. These trucks would then stop in an isolated area, and their passengers would be allowed to escape.[citation needed]

After the war, Albert Göring was questioned during the Nuremberg Tribunal. However many of the people whom he had helped testified on his behalf, and he was released. Soon afterwards, Göring was arrested by the Czechs but was once again freed when the full extent of his activities became known.

Late life
Göring then returned to Germany but found himself shunned because of his family name. He found occasional work as a writer and translator, living in a modest flat far from the baronial splendour of his childhood. Prior to his death, Göring was living on a pension from the government. He knew that if he was married, the pension would transfer to his wife after his death. As a sign of gratitude, Göring married his housekeeper so she could receive his pension and not have to work anymore. One week later, he died in 1966, without having his wartime activities publicly acknowledged."

Albert Göring - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[AL Schlageter]

What other conclusion can a person reach Udet for when reading your posts one sees snide and uncomplimentary comments with regards to the Allies and the Germans are always the best. ie "Civilian Bomber" Harris, and the quote below. Then there is your personal comments. ie 'clearing your mental issues'.

Now this visions that during Bodenplatte we had Mustangs shooting down Bf 109s and Fw 190s while still on the ground seems like more of the allied mythology that has been served on our plates for too long now. If someday i come across accounts suggesting P-51 pilots "shot down" german fighters resorting only to poontang i can say i will not be surprised.

Read the passage again Udet. 12 P-51s of the 352FG were waiting to take off to escort some P-47s of the 266FG. Read Bodenplatte Chap 7, Dogfight over Auch. Those bomb laden P-47s, at low level, had good success against the LW fighters and we all know what a dog the P-47 was at low level.

One only has to read the casualty list from Bodenplatte to see how the LW would have faired in your 'what if' scenario and this with the RAF and USAAF taken by surprise.

Luftwaffe controllers proved their worth several times during 1944 vectoring a German fighter force that would gut a heavy bomber formation.

Only several times? That leaves very very many times they did not.

Also, the bombers do not roam at will...they still have to make their way through the Flak lines of the Reich, including the fighter force that would still be committed for bomber interception duties.

The flak lines were breached anyways. Did you not say the interceptor force would be reduced in numbers. You forget that when it is said 600 escorts flew a bomber escort mission not all 600 were with the bombers at the same time. Only a 1/4 to 1/3 were and they did not have that much trouble with the larger number of LW fighters that tried to attack the bombers.

So yes, the bombers were basically free to roam all over Germany at will.

I said that since the bulk of the Jagdwaffe is committed for supporting the Wehrmacht, the fighters of the USAAF are deployed accordingly...if you bother to read what i said, nowhere it is suggested USAAF fighters remain committed to escort bomber streams in the numbers records show they did since there are not that too many German fighters trying to hit the bombers.

Did you miss where I said less escorts would be required? That leaves those taken from escort duty to flying CAP over LW fighter airfields. Now that means a LW CAP over the bases and less LW fighters closer to the front.

You seem to think the Allies would not change their tactics in your 'what if' scenario. As I said, the bases these LW fighters were based at would be destroyed forcing the fighters further back just like was done to the 262 bases. That gives more time for interception and destruction.

You have yet to say where these fighters, jabos and especially, adequately trained pilots would come from.

As you said in your 'what if' von R does not show up til 1944.

As i did say, with a man like Wolfram von Richtofen in command of the Luftwaffe, say, for the year of 1944 when the big aerial onslaught in the west was on its way, i see a more efficient allocation and utilization of the resources of the overstretched Luftwaffe.

You also forget that USAAF tactics changed in early 1944 from defending the bombers to actively going after LW fighters. Your 'what if' scenario would be an aid to the Allies.

The RAF and USAAF dealt "easily" with the Luftwaffe efforts to slow their advance for a very simple reason Mr. Schlageter: there was no serious attempt carried out during 1944.

No serious attempt, then why the transfer of LW units to the west which were decimated?

Now lets look at what the LW had.

The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Overlord, 31 May 44
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 1063
Twin-engined fighters 151
Night fighters 572
Fighter-bombers 278
Ground-attack aircraft 352
Night harassment aircraft 305
Twin-engined bombers 840
Four-engined bombers 97
Long-range reconaissance aircraft 153
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 210
Coastal aircraft 123
Transport aircraft 719
Kampfgeschwader 200 (misc. aircraft 65
Total 4928

For argument sake, lets say 1/4 of the fighters were on the EF and 1/8 were on Defense of the Reich. That leaves only ~625 fighter for your 'what if' against some 3000 USAAF fighter and whatever the RAF had (1000?).

To take this further, that ~625 would be reduced by those LW fighters flying CAP over their bases. Your 'what if' puts more Allied fighters in contact with the LW hastening it destruction.

Where does the replacement fighters and pilots come from? The EF? That allows the Soviets to advance quicker and results in an earlier defeat for Nazi Germany.

the soviets who were overbled and exhausted

Not so in 1944. All one has to do is look at a map and see the vast territory the Soviets retook til Apr 1945.

 

[plan_D]

I just wish the German units on the ground the best of luck when unintercepted heavy formations decided to off-load into their jumping off zones.

 

[timshatz]

Think we might want to distinguish between a Leader/Manager and a Combat Leader when figuring what would've happened to the Lufwaffe if Herman had died in the First World War. A good example of the right people in the right places would've been the US Army in WW2.

A farsighted Leader/Manager such as Marshall would've been a very effective head of the Lufwaffe. A person at that level has a to have extensive organizational skills to succeed. Hence the manager part. Milch was a good organizer, but I doubt he had the personality to make it as the head of the Luftwaffe. But he did revamp production after Udet's death, re-evaluated projects in the works and generally made things more efficient. But, as noted, I doubt he had the interactive ability to inspire personel by example or leadership skills.

As for Combat Leaders, the Luftwaffe had plenty of them, many already named. The Patton/Bradley types were well available. One that comes to mind right away is Josef Kammhuber. Developed and implemented an effective night fighter operation for the Riech. Generally considered one of the better Germman Air Generals to the point that he was IG for the reconstructed Luftwaffe after the war.

 

[comiso90]

Yeah thats him Basket. Goering apparantly new and even helped him in some cases. That Herman Goering helped him in some cases cant be verified I think.

Here is a bit of info:

"Albert Göring

Albert Göring (1900 - 1966) was a German businessman, notable for helping Jews and dissidents survive in Germany during World War II. His older brother Hermann Göring held the rank of Reich Marshal of Nazi Germany and was a convicted war criminal.

Early life
Göring was born near Mauterndorf to a former cavalry officer and German consul general in Haiti Heinrich Ernst Göring and his wife Franziska "Fanny" Tiefenbrunn (1859-July 15, 1923), who came from a Bavarian peasant family. Among his paternal ancestors were the Eberle/Eberlin, a Swiss-German family who were Jewish converts to Christianity in the 15th century. Goring was a relative of numerous descendants of the Eberle/Eberlin in Switzerland and Germany, among them German Counts Zeppelin, including aviation pioneer Ferdinand von Zeppelin; German nationalistic art historian Hermann Grimm (author of concept of the German hero as a mover of history that was embraced by the Nazis); the great Swiss historian of art and cultural, political, and social thinker Jacob Burckhardt; Swiss diplomat, historian, and President of International Red Cross Carl J. Burckhardt; the Merck family, the owners of the German pharmaceutical giant Merck; major German Catholic writer and poet Gertrud von LeFort. (See Wolfgang Paul, "Wer war Hermann Goring. Biographie," Esslingen: Bechtle Verlag, 1983, p. 33.)

The Göring family lived with their children's aristocratic godfather of Jewish heritage, Ritter Hermann von Epenstein, in his Veldenstein and Mauterndorf castles. Von Epenstein was a prominent physician and acted as a surrogate father to the children as Heinrich Göring was often absent from the family home. Göring was one of five children, his brothers were Hermann Göring and Karl Ernst Göring; his sisters were Olga Therese Sophia and Paula Elisabeth Rosa Göring, the last of whom were children of his father's first marriage[1].

According to the author Leonard Mosley, who had interviewed Göring family members, von Epenstein began a long-term affair with Franziska Göring about a year before Albert's birth. Mosley also states that the strong physical resemblance between von Epenstein and Albert Göring led many people to believe that they were father and son. If this belief is correct, then Albert Göring had a Jewish paternal grandfather.

Anti-Nazi activity

Göring seemed to have acquired his godfather's character as a bon vivant and looked set to lead an unremarkable life as a filmmaker, until the Nazis came to power in 1933. Unlike his older brother Hermann, who was a leading party member, Albert Göring despised Nazism and the brutality that it involved. On one occasion he is reported to have gotten down on his hands and knees and joined a group of Jews who were being forced to scrub the street; the SS officer in charge, unwilling to see Hermann Göring's brother publicly humiliated, ordered the street scrubbing to stop.[citation needed]

Albert Göring also used his influence to get his Jewish former boss Oskar Pilzer freed after the Nazis had arrested him. Göring then helped Pilzer and his family escape from Germany. He is reported to have done the same for many other dissidents.[citation needed]

Göring intensified his anti-Nazi activity when he was made export director at the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia. Here, he encouraged minor acts of sabotage and had contact with the Czech resistance. On many occasions, Göring forged his brother's signature on transit documents to enable dissidents to escape. When he was caught, he used his brother's influence to get himself released. Göring also sent trucks to Nazi concentration camps with requests for labour. These trucks would then stop in an isolated area, and their passengers would be allowed to escape.[citation needed]

After the war, Albert Göring was questioned during the Nuremberg Tribunal. However many of the people whom he had helped testified on his behalf, and he was released. Soon afterwards, Göring was arrested by the Czechs but was once again freed when the full extent of his activities became known.

Late life
Göring then returned to Germany but found himself shunned because of his family name. He found occasional work as a writer and translator, living in a modest flat far from the baronial splendour of his childhood. Prior to his death, Göring was living on a pension from the government. He knew that if he was married, the pension would transfer to his wife after his death. As a sign of gratitude, Göring married his housekeeper so she could receive his pension and not have to work anymore. One week later, he died in 1966, without having his wartime activities publicly acknowledged."

Albert Göring - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

thanks

 

[Udet]

So in conclusion...what you seem to suggest here is that the Germans chose the most adequate course of action to attempt dealing with the USAAF -outcome known- and that any other scheme which might differ from that would have done nothing but accelerating the German defeat. Very interesting.

I have read almost every book available that directly or indirectly deals with Bodenplatte, and all i am going to say about them is that i find them confusing to say the least. The Allies failing to put their stuff together, something that is not rare by the way.

With regard to your conclusions reached after reading my comments all i will say is i am not responsible about them, at all.

 

[drgondog]

A significant difference i see occurring with Richtofen at the controls is that that the bulk of the Jagdwaffe would instead have been committed to support the Wehrmacht and not to intercept/attack the numerous USAAF heavy bomber streams.

Saving the lives of innocent German civilians that would get killed by the thousands by enemy bombers was a noble plausible task for sure, but in my view it was not there where the war priorities were...the civilian population of the time was extremely resilient and there is no evidence to suggest any sort of civilian uprising came close to occur due to extenuation during those dark days of 1944 and 1945 when the heavies of both Spaatz and "Civilian Bomber" Harris gutted some major German cities.

Udet - I have read several times and in multiple publications that Goering rejected the notion of concentrating LuftFlotte Reich in a central area (for greater intercept efficiency) because his (or Hitler's) view was the the German people needed some tangible view that Luftwaffe was doing everything it could to stop Allied airpower? If this is true, 'zero' effort to stop Daylight bombing could, by their point of view, have been a bad morale factor?


With a greater number of Fw 190s and Bf 109s supporting the Wehrmacht during 1944, i see the allied advance on continental europe even slower than it was. Who knows, Paris is not taken until early 1945... but more importantly, now the truly heavy losses the USA would be suffering belong in the army, and not precisely in the ranks of the 8th Air Force, and high losses are -as i have suggested many times in the past- a significant issue in the military of the USA.

Let's take June-July 1944 as a scenario for discussion to consider possible consequences of putting perhaps 90% of LW Day Fighters on the West German/Ducth/Belgium region. This puts all of these trained pilots in striking range of All of UK based fighter forces - an event that I believe would have played more into Allied hands than German.

The 8th AF FC doctrine was protect the bombers and kill Luftwaffe. Luftwaffe controllers WERE skillful at finding weak spots and directing LW day fighters to them - but Allied Type 16 Control was also very adept at locating concentrations in the above areas - usually with disastrous effects to LW

From the small number of Luftwaffe fighters committed to deal with heavy bombers, one can expect the skilled performance of Luftwaffe controllers to vector those few fighters to slam in the proper moment and still cause significant losses.

Given that the Escort strength of 8th FC was about 50% Mustang and 15%Lightning, and no Jugs were goind deep, and generally bored with Penetration and Withdrawal support with no action, I believe your propsal would have had the following effect;

Virtually ALL of the 8th AF, and all of the 9th AF P-47s, who mostly had no air to air combat when engaged in Penetration and Withdrawal support are now effective against LW.. and the remaining LW available to attack bomber streams going heavily after oil are escorted by exactly the same amount of 8th AF P-51 and P-38s - meaning that when the LW found unguarded bomber wings (like July 7 - Leipzig area), that the same amount of US Escort fighters are there - creating overwhelming odds in those fights.

If 10% of LuftFlotte Reich is left behind that means perhaps 50-60 effectives to meet perhaps 50-100 escort fighters in any one area.. but you could argue that 10 times that much didn't hurt the 8th AF so many times after May 12 - so it has merit,,

The flights of P-51s and P-47s are for sure committed to the sectors where the bulk of the German fighters are operating. So we would have the same bloody aerial battles taking place but this time right over the heads of the Panzer Lehr, 12 SS.Pz.Gr and other powerful German units in Normandy and not in the high skies over Europe.

What this strategy gives you is an edge in performance where the P-47 was not as manueverable - but still they did well overall during the Normandy campaign (as well as took some hits, proportionately, more often than high altitude engagements) and ALL of RAF TAC is in position to engage. Perform the same interdiction when no LW air cover present, drop loads and egage 109s and 190s w/Spit, Typhoons and Tempests and RAF Mustangs.. I suspect that Allied Tactical Air contribution somewhat reduced but believe far too many losses for LW against the value of shooting down more Allied Fighters and enabling more (uncertain quantitative positive effect) mobility

The Wehrmacht units deployed to deal with the D-day offensive, and their supply lines, suffered critical delays due to the action of RAF and USAAF planes. With a significant part of the Jagdwaffe involved in this front, one can expect the delays to be less significant in their impact, enabling thus the Heer to arrive to the front sectors in a stronger position. It´s also possible to suggest that with the presence of friendly planes in numbers over their heads, the soldiers of an army are injected with a plus in terms of morale and performance.

I suspect this to be true Udet, but equally suspect horrendous LW Day Fighter losses at a much faster rate than over Central Germany. Allies would also take corresponding losses but negligible effect at this stage of war for Allies?

Also, near the deck, the Fw-190s give the P-51s a more bitter time during the fight.

True, but in your scenario - the 51's are more likely doing target escort, although June, July and August had far more Area Support missions over France - and the LW did clobber the 4th FG on 18 August for their worst air to air loss of war, when the 51s had their noses in the ground.

I do not see the British, U.S. and allied armies reaching the German border before the end of 1944...so perhaps the futile Ardennes Offensive is not even seriously contemplated, so more German forces are available for launching against the soviets who were overbled and exhausted.

I think the key to your strategy is balancing accelerated attrition of LW in June-August by throwing them into the area with highest Allied number advantage in favor of Allies, versus possible slowdown of Allied advance - specifically the Breakout and collapse around Averanche/Falais region.

I really think this more likely to collapse LW far faster and Might have the effect of slowing down Allied advance.. but then reversing the effect by no longer having but a few exerienced pilots to provide any effective support from that point forward?.

But remember Patton was on German border in August. Who knows what the situation would have been if your strategy slows the advance to point of Operation Market Garden being no longer feasible, and all the primary assets punch from south and southwest?

It is an interesting notion

Regards,

Bill

 

[drgondog]

So, what would the Luftwaffe have been like if Hermann Goering died during World War 1??? Would things have worked out differently???

Dan - I think he was responsible for at least three citically bad decisions wrt Air Battle Over Germany.

1. He ordered his commanders to 'avoid' escort fighters and go for the bombers. The consequence is that the 8th FC gradually got their nose bloodied by more experienced German fighter pilots in as good or better aircraft below 20,000 feet - and resulted in increased skills and confidence of the new American Fighter pilot with little relative attrition. These guys became the flight leaders and squadron CO and Group Commander cadre during the 8th FC build up.

These guys (the US fighter pilot) went completely aggressive and engaged German aircraft at will independent of odds.

2. Goering didn't order putting several flights of fighters over Channel to bounce US escorts at the Channel, forcing drops of belly and wing tanks - killing long range capability for those attacked.

3. Refrained from Night Intruder (or day) missions over US airfields, destroying fuel and bomb dumps, aircraft etc. I can't believe Me 410s could not have wreaked bloody havoc over English/US airfields at night.

There are so many other examples but the above examples resulted in defeating the Luftwaffe over Germany.

 

[AL Schlageter]

So in conclusion...what you seem to suggest here is that the Germans chose the most adequate course of action to attempt dealing with the USAAF -outcome known- and that any other scheme which might differ from that would have done nothing but accelerating the German defeat. Very interesting.

I have read almost every book available that directly or indirectly deals with Bodenplatte, and all i am going to say about them is that i find them confusing to say the least. The Allies failing to put their stuff together, something that is not rare by the way.

With regard to your conclusions reached after reading my comments all i will say is i am not responsible about them, at all.

Glad you finally see what your 'what if' will accomplish.

I had no trouble with the Manrho and Purz book on Bodenplatte. I don't know what your problem is with this book.

You have another posting using your name and password?

 

[AL Schlageter]

posted by Erich on another forum here:

frontal attacks on bombers ceased almost immediately after May of 44 when nearly all the Geschwader were posted to the Normandie battles, a change occurred and attacks from the rear were standard from mid July till wars end

So Udet, it seems the Germans did exactly what you said von R should do.

 

[drgondog]

posted by Erich on another forum here:

frontal attacks on bombers ceased almost immediately after May of 44 when nearly all the Geschwader were posted to the Normandie battles, a change occurred and attacks from the rear were standard from mid July till wars end

So Udet, it seems the Germans did exactly what you said von R should do.

Al I have deep respect for Erich's knowledge but here is a website with the Luftwaffe Geschwader equipment, commander and bases. Erich is completely correct that the Luftwaffe shifted most of LuftFlotte Reich westward and a significant population in Western and SW Germany.

The Luftwaffe, 1933-45

Near as I can tell however, here are the Staffeln that did not move into France or were there only a short time

II./JG1, I.&III./JG2, I. IV./JG3, II./JG5, Stab II. III./JG4, Stab I. II./JG11, II./JG27, Stab and III./JG53, Stab and III./JG76, JG300, Stab JG301

Having said this, a lot of those bases were in Koln, Frakfurt, Wunsdorf and therfore flexible in reacting to daylight bombing or attacks on beach head.

Regards,

Bill

 

[The Basket]

Goering had a pet lion cub called Ceaser...he created the GESTAPO and the first concentration camps...his huge house was call Karinhall after his first wife...He may/may not have burnt down the Riechstag...Prime minister of Prussia...First hunter of the Riech...stole art treasures from all over Europe...loved jewels...drug addict from taking morpine from the injury he sustained in the Beer hall Putsch...Hitlers 2nd command...leading officer of the German military...Had a big bowl of diamonds which he used to run his hands through to make him feel better....
And couldnt fly the Bf 109 because he was too fat!

 

[HoHun]

>Goering had a pet lion cub called Ceaser...he created the GESTAPO and the first concentration camps...

One mean cub!

 

[The Basket]

>Goering had a pet lion cub called Ceaser...he created the GESTAPO and the first concentration camps...

One mean cub!

You guys....

 

[Udet]

Mr. Schlageter i let you enjoy your little victories here. Have fun.

Dragon: i can say i agree for the most part with what you said here. Keep in mind losses for 2nd TAF, 8th and 9th AFs over France in a period of ~5 weeks (June/July) 1944 reached nearly ~1000 planes...lost to Flak and Fw 190s and Bf 109s.

It is easy to undestand this sort of automatic response to consider any other type of German plan to deal with the USAAF as more doomed than what was really attempted. Not surprised by this at all.

With a smarter overall deployment and utilization of Jagd resources that could have occurred with von Richtofen in command, as hypothetically suggested here, we can not confirm in all boldness things would have resulted in greater loss for the Luftwaffe.

Also you brought up interesting points i too have commented in the past...why not to bounce or intercept P-51 formations before they fly over continental Europe, forcing them to drop their tanks in order to deprive them of one of their essential features: long range.

Let´s bring von Richtofen back to the analysis.

I´d address one situation that occurred -under Richtofen- in the eastern front we could perhaps extrapolate to the West for 1944.

When commanding Luftflotte 4, during bloody Stalingrad, von Richtofen made emphasis on deploying the bulk of his dive bombers to attack the trains that were bringing soviet soldiers and war materiel forward for delivery to the opposite side of the Volga.

His recon planes flew thoroughly far beyond the city, and spotted the large numbers of trains the soviets were using for transporting troops that once delivered, would cross the Volga, enter the city, and engage the German troops positioned there. His recon planes would produce highly illustrative reports on the matter that were promptly submitted to Richtofen.

The decision was logical: let's hit them before they reach their unloading points...the more we hit them while still en route to the city, the less enemy soldiers our troops will have to confront.

The views and proceedings of a smart skilled commander. In addition to timely detect the Red Army assembly northwest of the city which i did mention -the Kruschev incident-, his eyes were also placed far east the city, from where soviet reinforcements for the battle were coming.

Several times his Stukas proceeded accordingly, hitting trains heavily laden with troops and materiel, causing sickening carnages of soviet soldiers...still this did not happen as often as the General wished for his command was frequently disrupted by both Hitler and even von Paulus who insisted BADLY on giving direct dive bomber support to German troops fighting in the rubble of the city, a task von Richtofen started considering pointless as the battle within the city showed clear signs of indefinite protraction.

Stalingrad was to a good point, the engagement between two massive egos: Hitler's and Stalin's.

I know this thread goes on with Göring absent, but even with Göring who also had an ego, i can say that by 1944, and given the circumstances of the moment, he would have liked and approved the presentation of a scheme like the one we are talking about: attacking the long range escorts of the enemy to cause loss of long range capabilities.

If Dragon and myself are capable of seeing this today, i do not see why would von Richtofen not see it himself had he been in command of the Luftwaffe for 1944.

As i did say, the general was a man with a broad vision of things. That this was never really seriously considered by people like Galland seems surprising.

Like he saw it in the eastern front, let's hit them during the initial stages of their flight, and that long range issue becomes seriously affected. With a good part or with a greater part of their long range escort lost due to our fighters actions either shot down or being uncapable to follow the bomber streams due to loss of drop tanks, our fighters stationed inside Germany will have much less trouble when confronting the bombers.

I do not have the intelligence von Richtofen had; who knows what other interesting things that are well beyond me he could have considered.

 

[AL Schlageter]

Al I have deep respect for Erich's knowledge but here is a website with the Luftwaffe Geschwader equipment, commander and bases. Erich is completely correct that the Luftwaffe shifted most of LuftFlotte Reich westward and a significant population in Western and SW Germany.

The Luftwaffe, 1933-45

Near as I can tell however, here are the Staffeln that did not move into France or were there only a short time

II./JG1, I.&III./JG2, I. IV./JG3, II./JG5, Stab II. III./JG4, Stab I. II./JG11, II./JG27, Stab and III./JG53, Stab and III./JG76, JG300, Stab JG301

Having said this, a lot of those bases were in Koln, Frakfurt, Wunsdorf and therfore flexible in reacting to daylight bombing or attacks on beach head.

Regards,

Bill

Slight correction Bill, the units you listed are Gruppen, not staffel. A Gruppe usually consisted of 3 staffels.

At the time of D-day,
II./JG1 was already in France (Montdidier, LeMans, Essay, Lonrai) and had to retreat

I./JG2 was already in France (Aix, Cormeilles-en-Vexin, Creil) and forced to retreat

III./JG2 was already in France (Beaumont-le-Roger, Cormeilles-en-Vexin, Fontenay-le-Comte, Creil) and forced to retreat

Stab II. III./JG4 were not formed til after D-day

I. II./JG11 were forced to retreat from France after being posted their from western Germany bases

III./JG53 was pulled out of Italy and back to Germany

Stab and III./JG53 were not formed til after D-day

 

[AL Schlageter]

Dragon: i can say i agree for the most part with what you said here. Keep in mind losses for 2nd TAF, 8th and 9th AFs over France in a period of ~5 weeks (June/July) 1944 reached nearly ~1000 planes...lost to Flak and Fw 190s and Bf 109s.

What was the German losses? You tell only 1/2 the story Udet.

For example,
I./JG26
- started with 33 planes June 1 and lost 36 planes during the month
- started with 25 planes July 1 and lost 37 planes during the month
- started with 28 planes Aug 1 and lost 41 planes during the month

Most of these LW fighters would have been shot down by RAF and USAAF fighters while most of the Allied losses would due to flak.

 

[AL Schlageter]

Udet, did the Soviets have the over whelming numbers of planes at Stalingrad like the RAF and USAAF did in 1944?