The Luftwaffe if Goering Died in WW1...

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

??? Udet was basically the Luftwaffe`s greatest 'fan' of dive bombers (which wasn`t a bad idea at all, it gave the LW it`s most iconic, and very successfull Ju 87 I might add), an idea he embraced after a visit to the US. So overall I believe with Udet at the steering wheel, such operational requirements would only receive encouregment from the high brass.

I certainly agree with you but I am talking about aircraft such as the He 177.

I agree. Basically what the Germans would need is a good deal of foresight and predict what was coming to them in 1944 (easy to say..); perhaps if they`d gave high priority for fighter production and prepeare for stragetic air defense in early 1943, thing would have been somewhat different in the air. But the war was lost on the ground, not in the air.

Agreed

 

[The Basket]

The reason the He 177 failed is because it was designed to be a dive bomber.

Ernst Hienkel said himself that all the Greifs problems were the dive bombing requirement and blamed Udet for it.

Hitler was not the type to be persuaded! Some Luftwaffe pilots wanted an attack on London because it would draw up the Raf.

How much did Goering do day to day in the Luftwaffe? not much I wager!

 

[Lucky13]

Here's another question about the Luftwaffe, I don't know if it would have done much of a difference, but anyhoo.....

What if Werner Mölders hadn't been killed in that accident caused by a thunderstorm on 22 November 1941, would it have affected the Luftwaffe as he was Inspector General of Fighters in a different way compared to Adolf Galland? Would they still have a mutiny in '45?

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The reason the He 177 failed is because it was designed to be a dive bomber.

Ernst Hienkel said himself that all the Greifs problems were the dive bombing requirement and blamed Udet for it.

Hitler was not the type to be persuaded! Some Luftwaffe pilots wanted an attack on London because it would draw up the Raf.

How much did Goering do day to day in the Luftwaffe? not much I wager!

I allways new that Udet was a big supporter of the Dive Bomber but I thought it was Goering who forbade Heinkel from designing a 4 engined version because he wanted it capable of dive bombing.

 

[AL Schlageter]

The reason the He 177 failed is because it was designed to be a dive bomber.

The dive bombing was an extra requirement on top of its regular duty as a level bomber.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Yes but one of the reasons that they did not want Heinkel to develop it with 4 engines in 4 nacelleswas because they did not believe it could dive bomb with 4 engines in 4 nacelles.

Atleast that is one of things I have allways read about the He 177.

 

[merlin]

Yes but one of the reasons that they did not want Heinkel to develop it with 4 engines in 4 nacelleswas because they did not believe it could dive bomb with 4 engines in 4 nacelles.

At least that is one of things I have allways read about the He 177.

I agree, if it had been designed and built at the start as a conventional four-engined bomber, it would have been a good aircraft, and got into service much earlier.

Very surprised at the favourable comments on Udet! The man was a clown!
As E. R. Hooton writes in 'Eagle in Flames the Fall of the Luftwaffe'
"The doyen of the Geat War aces, Udet wwas a brilliant barnstormer who flirted briefly with production, lost interest and watched his company absorbed by the Bayerische Flugzeugwerk. His new position reuired dedication, athorough knowledge of the aircraft industry and th ablilty to comprehend the potential of new technology - all features lacking from Udets character."

Goering was good at politics but IMO not a lot else, little appreciation of strategy or tactics. He did little in the BoB, which in the main was Kesselring against Park - where the latter proved the better, and to prove it wasn't a fluke did it again in Malta.

Though some differ, I think it had the potential to make a difference - if Wever was still around to develop the Do-19. If, for example the Lw had no Do-17's but yes had Do-19, yes fewer in number. But fewer no's mean fewer pilots to train, fewer airfields to service. In service a four-engined bomber under attack will fly longer than a twin-engined aircraft - especially against rifle calibre machine guns of the Spitfires Hurricanes.

With wever running the strategy and Milch sorting out the production, the Luftwaffe would have been a lot more effective.

 

[Freebird]

You are absolutely correct, however I firmly believe that someone who might not have been such a lackey to Hitler might have tried to convince Hitler to do things differently.

You know, upon more thought I think you may have been right, another commander could have won the BoB, IF they had a good plan on how to do it. I don't know enough about Udet, Kesselring or others, to know how they would have handled it.

The problem the Germans had in the BoB is that this was all new territory, I think it might be difficult for ANYONE to correctly determine the best strategy. They were also against some tight time constraints, as after "Alder Tag" (Eagle day - Aug 13) they would have only 40 - 50 days before the Autumn storms would make a channel crossing impossible. The Germans would try something for a few days, if it did not seem to be working, they could not keep trying for a few weeks, they would try something else.

At first they tried bombing the Radar towers, but after several days this did not seem to have an effect, the RAF were still scrambling to meet the LW. What the Goering did not know was that they HAD knocked out part of the radar net, but the British had developed a system of coast-watchers, who would call in the # and type of LW planes that crossed the channel, so they still had some advanced warning.

Next he concentrated on knocking the S.E. airfields out of action, this did have some effect, although they could not know exactly how much, as the RAF would still intercept the bombers. The Germans were losing a large # of bombers, so Goering ordered the fighters to concentrate on escorting the bombers more closely. This turned out to be an error, the LW fighters were more effective when intercepting RAF fighters, not tied down with escort duties. But it would be hard not to make the order that he did, considering that the bomber pilots were crying out for more support.

The Sept 6 order to let up on the airfields and begin the "Blitz" was another big mistake, but at the time it was hoped that the terror would make the Brits "come to their senses" and negotiate a truce. That was what Hitler would really prefer.

The biggest error though was the 28 days that were allowed to pass from Hitlers War Directive # 16 on July 16 1940, (desruction of the RAF to prepare for Sealion) and "Alder Tag". During this time the LW only made some minor attacks on British shipping in the channel, and allowed the RAF Fighter Command to build up again after Dunkirk. If the Germans had attacked the RAF during this month, they could probably have won contol over SE Britain.

The British fighter strength at the time of the final British evacuation from France (June 18 1940) was about 300, of which about 260 were Spitfires Hurricanes. (about 40 more were the obsolete Gladiators Defiants). There were also about 70 night fighters (Blenhiem Is). The British production was about 250 fighters per month, so by Aug 13 (Alder Tag) there were about 650 - 700 day-fighters, + about 80 or so Blenheims. I have checked 3 sources and none of them agree about the exact number of RAF fighters, if anyone else has more detailed #s please post them.

I think that an immediate attack on the RAF at the end of June would have had the best chance of success.

 

[Udet]

As i did say, with a man like Wolfram von Richtofen in command of the Luftwaffe, say, for the year of 1944 when the big aerial onslaught in the west was on its way, i see a more efficient allocation and utilization of the resources of the overstretched Luftwaffe.

A significant difference i see occurring with Richtofen at the controls is that that the bulk of the Jagdwaffe would instead have been committed to support the Wehrmacht and not to intercept/attack the numerous USAAF heavy bomber streams.

Saving the lives of innocent German civilians that would get killed by the thousands by enemy bombers was a noble plausible task for sure, but in my view it was not there where the war priorities were...the civilian population of the time was extremely resilient and there is no evidence to suggest any sort of civilian uprising came close to occur due to extenuation during those dark days of 1944 and 1945 when the heavies of both Spaatz and "Civilian Bomber" Harris gutted some major German cities.

From this idea i´d expect a response in the direction that might suggest if the large number of B-17s and B-24s that were shot down by the Luftwaffe carry on with their bombing runs -because less enemy fighters are committed to intercept them- then the damage caused to the German military industry -and civilians- is of course far greater, something that would still cause the war to have a very similar duration.

I would not think so.

With a greater number of Fw 190s and Bf 109s supporting the Wehrmacht during 1944, i see the allied advance on continental europe even slower than it was. Who knows, Paris is not taken until early 1945... but more importantly, now the truly heavy losses the USA would be suffering belong in the army, and not precisely in the ranks of the 8th Air Force, and high losses are -as i have suggested many times in the past- a significant issue in the military of the USA.

From the small number of Luftwaffe fighters committed to deal with heavy bombers, one can expect the skilled performance of Luftwaffe controllers to vector those few fighters to slam in the proper moment and still cause significant losses.

The flights of P-51s and P-47s are for sure committed to the sectors where the bulk of the German fighters are operating. So we would have the same bloody aerial battles taking place but this time right over the heads of the Panzer Lehr, 12 SS.Pz.Gr and other powerful German units in Normandy and not in the high skies over Europe.

The Wehrmacht units deployed to deal with the D-day offensive, and their supply lines, suffered critical delays due to the action of RAF and USAAF planes. With a significant part of the Jagdwaffe involved in this front, one can expect the delays to be less significant in their impact, enabling thus the Heer to arrive to the front sectors in a stronger position. It´s also possible to suggest that with the presence of friendly planes in numbers over their heads, the soldiers of an army are injected with a plus in terms of morale and performance.

Also, near the deck, the Fw-190s give the P-51s a more bitter time during the fight.

Slowing the western allied advance on continental Europe within this scenario could also bring posstive effects with regard to the eastern front.

I do not see the British, U.S. and allied armies reaching the German border before the end of 1944...so perhaps the futile Ardennes Offensive is not even seriously contemplated, so more German forces are available for launching against the soviets who were overbled and exhausted.

 

[AL Schlageter]

You can't be serious Udet. You are robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The USAAF alone in the ETO had just under 9000 combat planes on hand and just under 4500 combat planes on hand in the MTO. You are looking at close to 20,000 combat planes when the RAF is included.

Even fully fueled P-51s which were sitting on the runway waiting to takeoff had good success against the LW fighters during Bodenplatte. These LW fighters didn't even carry bombs, yet you expect bomb laden fighters to slow the Allied advance. How are these bomb laden LW fighters to take off with an Allied aluminum air umbrella over their bases?

Basically you are allowing the heavies to roam at will over occupied Europe. That means your German transportation system would be wrecked sooner (so much for the re-supply of your German troops at the front), airbases would be bombed into the stone age forcing those units based on those bases to pull back further from the front allowing more time for interception by RAF and USAAF fighters of the slow unwieldy LW fighter bombers and their escorts, and more precise bombing of your German war industries.

You expect significant heavy losses with fewer LW fighters when larger numbers could not? Fewer LW fighters attacking the heavies means less escorts required.

The RAF and USAAF dealt quite easily with attempts by the LW to slow the Allied advance. A few more LW planes would just decimate the LW sooner than it was historically and quicken the collapse of Nazi Germany.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

You know, upon more thought I think you may have been right, another commander could have won the BoB, IF they had a good plan on how to do it. I don't know enough about Udet, Kesselring or others, to know how they would have handled it.

The problem the Germans had in the BoB is that this was all new territory, I think it might be difficult for ANYONE to correctly determine the best strategy. They were also against some tight time constraints, as after "Alder Tag" (Eagle day - Aug 13) they would have only 40 - 50 days before the Autumn storms would make a channel crossing impossible. The Germans would try something for a few days, if it did not seem to be working, they could not keep trying for a few weeks, they would try something else.

At first they tried bombing the Radar towers, but after several days this did not seem to have an effect, the RAF were still scrambling to meet the LW. What the Goering did not know was that they HAD knocked out part of the radar net, but the British had developed a system of coast-watchers, who would call in the # and type of LW planes that crossed the channel, so they still had some advanced warning.

Next he concentrated on knocking the S.E. airfields out of action, this did have some effect, although they could not know exactly how much, as the RAF would still intercept the bombers. The Germans were losing a large # of bombers, so Goering ordered the fighters to concentrate on escorting the bombers more closely. This turned out to be an error, the LW fighters were more effective when intercepting RAF fighters, not tied down with escort duties. But it would be hard not to make the order that he did, considering that the bomber pilots were crying out for more support.

The Sept 6 order to let up on the airfields and begin the "Blitz" was another big mistake, but at the time it was hoped that the terror would make the Brits "come to their senses" and negotiate a truce. That was what Hitler would really prefer.

The biggest error though was the 28 days that were allowed to pass from Hitlers War Directive # 16 on July 16 1940, (desruction of the RAF to prepare for Sealion) and "Alder Tag". During this time the LW only made some minor attacks on British shipping in the channel, and allowed the RAF Fighter Command to build up again after Dunkirk. If the Germans had attacked the RAF during this month, they could probably have won contol over SE Britain.

The British fighter strength at the time of the final British evacuation from France (June 18 1940) was about 300, of which about 260 were Spitfires Hurricanes. (about 40 more were the obsolete Gladiators Defiants). There were also about 70 night fighters (Blenhiem Is). The British production was about 250 fighters per month, so by Aug 13 (Alder Tag) there were about 650 - 700 day-fighters, + about 80 or so Blenheims. I have checked 3 sources and none of them agree about the exact number of RAF fighters, if anyone else has more detailed #s please post them.

I think that an immediate attack on the RAF at the end of June would have had the best chance of success.

I am certainly not saying Udet would have done any better but they needed a Military Commander and not a Politician in the position.

 

[Freebird]

I am certainly not saying Udet would have done any better but they needed a Military Commander and not a Politician in the position.

I agree with that, there were bad political decisions made by both sides. I think Pearl Harbour could be considered as one. The Greek intervention by the British was another.

During July 1940 Hitler was really trying to sign an armistice with the British, he knew that the KM was not prepared for a cross-channel invasion. But this delay killed their chance to invade.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I agree with that, there were bad political decisions made by both sides. I think Pearl Harbour could be considered as one. The Greek intervention by the British was another.

During July 1940 Hitler was really trying to sign an armistice with the British, he knew that the KM was not prepared for a cross-channel invasion. But this delay killed their chance to invade.

I saw an interesting documentary on German TV the other day about how the Nazi Party used the occult and astrologists to make some of there most political and strategic war time decisions.

That was pretty crazy.

 

[The Basket]

A significant difference i see occurring with Richtofen at the controls is that that the bulk of the Jagdwaffe would instead have been committed to support the Wehrmacht and not to intercept/attack the numerous USAAF heavy bomber streams.

Saving the lives of innocent German civilians that would get killed by the thousands by enemy bombers was a noble plausible task for sure, but in my view it was not there where the war priorities were...the civilian population of the time was extremely resilient and there is no evidence to suggest any sort of civilian uprising came close to occur due to extenuation during those dark days of 1944 and 1945 when the heavies of both Spaatz and "Civilian Bomber" Harris gutted some major German cities.

From this idea i´d expect a response in the direction that might suggest if the large number of B-17s and B-24s that were shot down by the Luftwaffe carry on with their bombing runs -because less enemy fighters are committed to intercept them- then the damage caused to the German military industry -and civilians- is of course far greater, something that would still cause the war to have a very similar duration.

I would not think so.

From the small number of Luftwaffe fighters committed to deal with heavy bombers, one can expect the skilled performance of Luftwaffe controllers to vector those few fighters to slam in the proper moment and still cause significant losses.

I do not see the British, U.S. and allied armies reaching the German border before the end of 1944...so perhaps the futile Ardennes Offensive is not even seriously contemplated, so more German forces are available for launching against the soviets who were overbled and exhausted.

The whole purpose of an air force is to defend the homeland. To allow the deaths of your own civilians is amazing.

 

[comiso90]

I recently found out that Goering's nephew was a B-17 pilot over Germany..

48 missions!

Werner G. Goering Crew

Werner Goering was born and raised in Salt Lake City, the young Goering spoke fluent German. After an extensive background check, he was assigned to the 303rd Bombardment Group -- Hell's Angels -- of the 8th Air Force, based at Molesworth, England.[1] This fact was kept secret by the Army Air Force during the time that young Goering flew missions against Nazi Germany. However, the AAF still assigned him a "uniquely qualified" co-pilot -- First Lt. Jack P. Rencher. Rencher was given orders to shoot him if he ever tried to land in Germany. According to Rencher, however, the only time young Goering wasn't eager to rain destruction on Nazi Germany was when he had to bomb Cologne, where his grandmother lived. "He was neat, clean, a sharp dresser and in every sense military minded," Rencher said. "While I served with him he and I got along well together and I believe made an excellent team. I know of no one I would rather serve as copilot with."

 

[Udet]

You can't be serious Udet. You are robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The USAAF alone in the ETO had just under 9000 combat planes on hand and just under 4500 combat planes on hand in the MTO. You are looking at close to 20,000 combat planes when the RAF is included.

Even fully fueled P-51s which were sitting on the runway waiting to takeoff had good success against the LW fighters during Bodenplatte. These LW fighters didn't even carry bombs, yet you expect bomb laden fighters to slow the Allied advance. How are these bomb laden LW fighters to take off with an Allied aluminum air umbrella over their bases?

Basically you are allowing the heavies to roam at will over occupied Europe. That means your German transportation system would be wrecked sooner (so much for the re-supply of your German troops at the front), airbases would be bombed into the stone age forcing those units based on those bases to pull back further from the front allowing more time for interception by RAF and USAAF fighters of the slow unwieldy LW fighter bombers and their escorts, and more precise bombing of your German war industries.

You expect significant heavy losses with fewer LW fighters when larger numbers could not? Fewer LW fighters attacking the heavies means less escorts required.

The RAF and USAAF dealt quite easily with attempts by the LW to slow the Allied advance. A few more LW planes would just decimate the LW sooner than it was historically and quicken the collapse of Nazi Germany.

"your German transportation system..", "of your German troops at the front...", why is it that this style in tone seems so familiar to me...

I am as serious as one can be if referring to situations that did not occur.

Your assertion here is infatuated by the fact it is based on the deeply rooted notion nothing the Germans might have done would made any significant difference.

In the months previous to D-day, RAF and USAAF fighters committed to ground attack missions inflicted very low losses to German armored and infantry units moving toward the front. Allied fighters claimed a number of panzers and other AFV´s destroyed during this time that did not even exist in the German order of battle. Reading Niklas Zetterling´s works might be of help.

I will refrain myself from saying "your allied planes", but anyway, the fact is all that overwhelming aerial superiority of the allied air forces over Normandy proved inadequate and uncapable to severe the German flow of reinforcements to the battle front. Hope this helps a bit in the effort of clearing your mental issues.

Their main achievement was to cause critical delays in the German moves; many times German columns would advance only at night, and if advancing during daytime, the slightest warning of enemy planes approaching would cause a prompt manouver to move off the road and remain hiding for as long as enemy planes roamed the sector.

Bringing the bulk of the aerial fight close to the deck implies a higher risk not only for the German fighters as you seem to believe...allied fighters, no matter their numbers, are now exposed to Flak batteries assigned to armored columns, and, again, the greater manouvering of the Fw 190s near the deck.

Also i did never say all German fighters would be "jabos" in this scenario. Some are "jabos" while a number would fly free fighter missions in the sector.

I said that since the bulk of the Jagdwaffe is committed for supporting the Wehrmacht, the fighters of the USAAF are deployed accordingly...if you bother to read what i said, nowhere it is suggested USAAF fighters remain committed to escort bomber streams in the numbers records show they did since there are not that too many German fighters trying to hit the bombers.

Your prediction this hypothetical scenario would have had an even greater disaster for the Luftwaffe does not hold any water to say the least. Since it is not being suggested the Germans achieve anything like "complete victory" in such scenario, suggesting the allied air forces have an even "easier" job here seems rubbish.

Also, the bombers do not roam at will...they still have to make their way through the Flak lines of the Reich, including the fighter force that would still be committed for bomber interception duties.

This is one of those times when making clarifications seems an awkward experiece.

I am saying it is Wolfram von Richtofen in command; a man with a strong tough and ruthless personality with a clear vision of business. Forget about Adolf Galland.

By suggesting the idea it would be Richtofen a change in "style" comes along with the package. Revamping deployment of fighters to their bases, Flak defences become stronger...

Luftwaffe controllers proved their worth several times during 1944 vectoring a German fighter force that would gut a heavy bomber formation.

The RAF and USAAF dealt "easily" with the Luftwaffe efforts to slow their advance for a very simple reason Mr. Schlageter: there was no serious attempt carried out during 1944.

Now this visions that during Bodenplatte we had Mustangs shooting down Bf 109s and Fw 190s while still on the ground seems like more of the allied mythology that has been served on our plates for too long now. If someday i come across accounts suggesting P-51 pilots "shot down" german fighters resorting only to poontang i can say i will not be surprised.

 

[Bf109_g]

That is an interesting article you have there, Comiso. I wonder what would have happened if he had landed in Germany?

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I recently found out that Goering's nephew was a B-17 pilot over Germany..

48 missions!

Werner G. Goering Crew

Werner Goering was born and raised in Salt Lake City, the young Goering spoke fluent German. After an extensive background check, he was assigned to the 303rd Bombardment Group -- Hell's Angels -- of the 8th Air Force, based at Molesworth, England.[1] This fact was kept secret by the Army Air Force during the time that young Goering flew missions against Nazi Germany. However, the AAF still assigned him a "uniquely qualified" co-pilot -- First Lt. Jack P. Rencher. Rencher was given orders to shoot him if he ever tried to land in Germany. According to Rencher, however, the only time young Goering wasn't eager to rain destruction on Nazi Germany was when he had to bomb Cologne, where his grandmother lived. "He was neat, clean, a sharp dresser and in every sense military minded," Rencher said. "While I served with him he and I got along well together and I believe made an excellent team. I know of no one I would rather serve as copilot with."

Yeah I found that out a few weeks ago and thought it was really neat. I posted something about in another thread.

 

[comiso90]

For me the kicker is 43 missions! That's a bunch..

I wonder if there any documented comments by Uncle Herman concerning the matter?

.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Im not sure. A cousin or nephew of his also was involved with helping Jews and everythind hide and escape.