The Luftwaffe if Goering Died in WW1... (1 Viewer)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Also you brought up interesting points i too have commented in the past...why not to bounce or intercept P-51 formations before they fly over continental Europe, forcing them to drop their tanks in order to deprive them of one of their essential features: long range.
What you, and Bill, forget Udet is that it was Spitfires and P-47s which did the escorting for the first leg of the mission had already engaged the LW fighters over the Low Countries and western Germany. The P-51s, and P-38s, that were to do the relieving flew directly to the rendezvous point. Sure a few LW fighters might engage these P-51s, and P-38s, but most would be on the ground re-arming and re-fueling (basic flight time of the 109 and 190 was 1 hour - one does not cruise at most the economical settings in a combat zone). Don't forget that in early 1944 the 8th AF tactics changed with some escorts flying in front of the bombers to intercept and engage any LW fighters that appeared, and this would be well into Germany.

Germany did not have enough fighters to force all the long range escorts to drop their tanks especially if you have them over France in your 'what if'. From June 1944 there was airfields in France that the escorts could use if they ran short of fuel, and many did.
 
Slight correction Bill, the units you listed are Gruppen, not staffel. A Gruppe usually consisted of 3 staffels.

At the time of D-day,
II./JG1 was already in France (Montdidier, LeMans, Essay, Lonrai) and had to retreat

I./JG2 was already in France (Aix, Cormeilles-en-Vexin, Creil) and forced to retreat

III./JG2 was already in France (Beaumont-le-Roger, Cormeilles-en-Vexin, Fontenay-le-Comte, Creil) and forced to retreat

Stab II. III./JG4 were not formed til after D-day

I. II./JG11 were forced to retreat from France after being posted their from western Germany bases

III./JG53 was pulled out of Italy and back to Germany

Stab and III./JG53 were not formed til after D-day
I agree your points Al except the thesis of my point is where these guys were during Normandie - not necessarily on D-Day - I looked at what Udet was saying, and Erich, and you, and while I agreed with western movement I wanted to point out different Gruppen (each with 3 to four squadrons except Stab) weren't in France or Belgium for most of the Normandy campaign.

The reference I pointed you to could have errors but there was still one hell of a lot of LuftFlotte Reich in Germany during all or most of the Normandy campaign.

Yes JG4 and I think even 76 were formed after D-Day but were in ops in July which I consider part of the Normandy campaign.

So to re-iterate - my post is about the units that either were not in France, Belgium or Holland - or moved out (as you noted JG1 and JG2 for example, moved out, and were positioned to swing both ways but back to defend the Reich.

My father for example, tangled with 109s of JG 300 on 20 June way the hell up at Rugen and with JG53 east of Phorzeim on August 3, JG300 near Hamburg on 6 August, and possibly with elements of III./JG3 on 28 July near Mulhausen, all days I consider part of the Normandy campaign

Regards,

Bill
 
What you, and Bill, forget Udet is that it was Spitfires and P-47s which did the escorting for the first leg of the mission had already engaged the LW fighters over the Low Countries and western Germany. The P-51s, and P-38s, that were to do the relieving flew directly to the rendezvous point. Sure a few LW fighters might engage these P-51s, and P-38s, but most would be on the ground re-arming and re-fueling (basic flight time of the 109 and 190 was 1 hour - one does not cruise at most the economical settings in a combat zone). Don't forget that in early 1944 the 8th AF tactics changed with some escorts flying in front of the bombers to intercept and engage any LW fighters that appeared, and this would be well into Germany.

Germany did not have enough fighters to force all the long range escorts to drop their tanks especially if you have them over France in your 'what if'. From June 1944 there was airfields in France that the escorts could use if they ran short of fuel, and many did.

Actually I didn't forget. The sky is a very large place, German controllers were as good as ours.

First, sending the first fighter reaction in flight size units to bounce from very high altitude over a Penertration escort of P-47s does a better job even that bouncing 51 for a couple of reasons. 1.) until March 1944, 80% of 8th FC were P-47s. 2.) Until Mid May 50% of 8th FC were P-47s.

Bounce them early in the April 1943 through Feb 1944 and you force a significant percent to turn back - if the Germans were lucky enough to engage all - then woe to the B-17s and B-24s when they were midway in Holland because then there were few 47s to engage.

Second, while the Target Escort of 38s and 51s did fly a straight line to the R/V point, they a.) took off from England, b.) crossed the Channel in full radar coverage anc c.) flew within striking range of JG26 and JG2 anywhere they crossed.

Bounce them early and you have a disaster over the target where there are no P-47s going that far.

Why would it be difficult to alter tactics to put up one high cover flight per squadron to intercept from 35,000? If the Group they bounced flew after them so much the better but it's not difficult to imagine a section to a squadron punching tanks at first SIGHT of enemy fighters, much less a bounce.

Yes to Fighter Sweeps,but they would be no more immune to the above threat over the Channel or during Penetration? As to knowing kinda 'when and where' the 51s and 38s were going...?

German intelligence was very good - but how good did it have to be to a.) stand on a street corner in Royston and be in hearing distance of the 355th at Steeple Morden,the 4th at Debden and the 339th at Royston? 50 Merlins make a LOT of noise!

Then, b.) pass simple and short wireless to Deelen, or St. Omer or Abbeville or?? some other 'catcher', plot the bomber track - and voila you have your general heading from the Cambridge area to a point out in front of the bombers.. so T/O time is known, General intercept point is plotted, you hop in your 109G-6/AS, cruise to altitude, spot heavy hogs with internal fuel and wing tanks?

How much fun could a III./JG26 pilot have in one day - even if they just bounced and ran home to refuel for the returning bombers?

No, Al, before D-Day the Luftwaffe could have screwed up escort effectiveness very easily.. can you imagine having to dedicate either a Spit sweep or sections of your own Fighter Group to take off early with minimum fuel, climb to 35,000 feet and be vectored by Type 16 control to possible 'bogies' detected forming up over Holland as the rest of the wing is climbing to cruise altitude? Just the THREAT of a possible bounce as a steady diet over the Channel would have posed a big problem.

I know that was talked about many times over brews between German and US Fighter Aces at reunions I attended.. one of the great mysteries in air tactics.
 
Mr. Schlageter i let you enjoy your little victories here. Have fun.

Dragon: i can say i agree for the most part with what you said here. Keep in mind losses for 2nd TAF, 8th and 9th AFs over France in a period of ~5 weeks (June/July) 1944 reached nearly ~1000 planes...lost to Flak and Fw 190s and Bf 109s.

The 355th FG had it's highest losses of the war in June, July and August but only a few air to air - 90% to flak. But the 4th FG took two bad days, the 353rd one, and the 78th FG one in which they lost more than they shot down all at low level whil doing fighter bomber sweeps.

Also you brought up interesting points i too have commented in the past...why not to bounce or intercept P-51 formations before they fly over continental Europe, forcing them to drop their tanks in order to deprive them of one of their essential features: long range.

Lol Udet - these thoughts are not my 'originals' - the last time I saw Galland and actually had a chance to listen, he was at a American Fighter Aces Reunion as a guest along with Rall, Krupinski, Goerkhe (sp?), Stigler and several others - in a free for all discussion with Olds, Goodson, Gabreski and Hovde. Every point I laid out for Al was a combination of the discussion points.. along with the notion that in retrospect the LW should have dedicated huge s/e forces to go after the 51s in the Jan-May 1944 timeframe when target escort was 1-2 Groups maximum over the target and the LW could easily put up 200-300 in the same area.

Let´s bring von Richtofen back to the analysis.

I´d address one situation that occurred -under Richtofen- in the eastern front we could perhaps extrapolate to the West for 1944.

When commanding Luftflotte 4, during bloody Stalingrad, von Richtofen made emphasis on deploying the bulk of his dive bombers to attack the trains that were bringing soviet soldiers and war materiel forward for delivery to the opposite side of the Volga.

His recon planes flew thoroughly far beyond the city, and spotted the large numbers of trains the soviets were using for transporting troops that once delivered, would cross the Volga, enter the city, and engage the German troops positioned there. His recon planes would produce highly illustrative reports on the matter that were promptly submitted to Richtofen.

The decision was logical: let's hit them before they reach their unloading points...the more we hit them while still en route to the city, the less enemy soldiers our troops will have to confront.

The views and proceedings of a smart skilled commander. In addition to timely detect the Red Army assembly northwest of the city which i did mention -the Kruschev incident-, his eyes were also placed far east the city, from where soviet reinforcements for the battle were coming.

Several times his Stukas proceeded accordingly, hitting trains heavily laden with troops and materiel, causing sickening carnages of soviet soldiers...still this did not happen as often as the General wished for his command was frequently disrupted by both Hitler and even von Paulus who insisted BADLY on giving direct dive bomber support to German troops fighting in the rubble of the city, a task von Richtofen started considering pointless as the battle within the city showed clear signs of indefinite protraction.

Stalingrad was to a good point, the engagement between two massive egos: Hitler's and Stalin's.

I know this thread goes on with Göring absent, but even with Göring who also had an ego, i can say that by 1944, and given the circumstances of the moment, he would have liked and approved the presentation of a scheme like the one we are talking about: attacking the long range escorts of the enemy to cause loss of long range capabilities.

If Dragon and myself are capable of seeing this today, i do not see why would von Richtofen not see it himself had he been in command of the Luftwaffe for 1944.

As i did say, the general was a man with a broad vision of things. That this was never really seriously considered by people like Galland seems surprising.

Like he saw it in the eastern front, let's hit them during the initial stages of their flight, and that long range issue becomes seriously affected. With a good part or with a greater part of their long range escort lost due to our fighters actions either shot down or being uncapable to follow the bomber streams due to loss of drop tanks, our fighters stationed inside Germany will have much less trouble when confronting the bombers.

I do not have the intelligence von Richtofen had; who knows what other interesting things that are well beyond me he could have considered.

Hitler didn't give his best commanders latitude, we were better in putting the decisions at the battlefield commander level but in retrospect could have been even better still.

I've often wondered about Soviet doctrine with Political Officer on near equal basis to battle commander?

Good to chat Udet!
 
Bill, Udet's 'what if' has von R moving units west to combat the Allied invasion at Normandy and this is what I am basing my arguments on.

Remember Udet has most of the LW fighters occupied with the Allied invasion and has reduced the number of LW fighters for Reich defense.

Do you remember what was said to counter the forcing of the escorts to drop their tanks?

In Aug 1943, the P-47s had a range of ~375mi with drop tanks compared to the range without tanks of ~230mi in June 1943. That allows the P-47s to fly to a line Hamburg, Hanover, Frankfurt, Strasbourg.

Udet said:
why not to bounce or intercept P-51 formations before they fly over continental Europe, forcing them to drop their tanks in order to deprive them of one of their essential features: long range.
This is 1944 not 1943.
 
Bill, Udet's 'what if' has von R moving units west to combat the Allied invasion at Normandy and this is what I am basing my arguments on.

OK with me. my only comment about that dialogue between you two was my uncertainty that pouring all of LuftFlotte Reich into Normandy campaign would have had much positive benefit and had a political downside.

I also felt that the notion that LW DID send all of them was overstated and pointed out the units that were not in France or Lowlands during June-August until breakout - as I recall you essentially agreed with the ones I talked about and corrected (correctly) my use of Staffeln when I was writing "gruppen"


Remember Udet has most of the LW fighters occupied with the Allied invasion and has reduced the number of LW fighters for Reich defense.

See above and see what my comments were. I actually believe putting them all in Normandy campaign would not have been wise for the reasons I stated..

Do you remember what was said to counter the forcing of the escorts to drop their tanks?

In Aug 1943, the P-47s had a range of ~375mi with drop tanks compared to the range without tanks of ~230mi in June 1943. That allows the P-47s to fly to a line Hamburg, Hanover, Frankfurt, Strasbourg.

Udet said:

This is 1944 not 1943.

Al, if you go back a little bit you will see that my comments re: bouncing escort on the way in (didn't matter to me whether P-47s or P-51s or P-38s) it was in context of dumb decisions that Goering made (or prevented)? It had nothing to do with D-Day or Normandie - it everything to do with the Luftwaffe permitting a free hand to escort fighters with a single minded focus on bombers..

I didn't see much that we could do to prevent frequent and persistent attacks by a few fighters on our inbound escorts, and have no reason to believe that fighter sweeps or line flights to target R/V by Target Escort avoids detection and interception over the Channel.

Neither did the assembly of fighter pilots that flew those missions. I have actually never had that conversation come up without our fighter pilots in the discussion say" Gee I'm glad they (LW) didn't do that (Bounce us on the way in)..

So permit me to drop back to 'what if' Goering wasn't head of Luftwaffe, and some clever other leader directed Germans to bounce P-47s at will over the Channel - from the first day 4th FG and then the 56th and then the 78th and then the 353rd and then both the 355th and 352nd flew ops into September and then 356th, 361st and 359th through Dec, 1943, and did the same to P-38s from 20th and 55th in the through 1943? Before 8th had 51s and nobody was escorting beyond Hannover except the 38s and the 354th FG Mustangs from the 9thAF.

We did not have 'overwhelming air superiority in escort fighters at target until after the Normandy campaign was long over. ANY reduction of escort over Merseberg, Leipzig, Berlin, Brunswick, Munich, etc would have been very painful.

It (early bounce) would have been less of an isssue for the P-47 groups on Withdrawal and Penetration in in 1944 (but huge in 1943) because a.) LW wasn't really resisting those much, preferring to concentrate over target, and b.) the number of 8th and 9th AF P-47 (short range D's) were still 2:1 over Mustang groups through April 1944 - so they would still have strong numerical advantage over Holland and France LW units anyway even if JG26 and JG2 could force an entire group (or more) to drop tanks..the Germans needed to ignore Penetration Support and go after the Target Support in 1944.

Al, I respect your opinion, but it doesn't change my own in this debate about 'early bounce'. Historically there were stated real concerns by Kepner, Blakeslee, Zemke, etc, etc. and those concerns were first manifested by orders from 8th FC to not drop tanks (cost/scarcity was also a factor)

You really don't think it (early bounces in 1943 even on on P-47s) would not have an effect on us getting to Munster, Koln - much less Hamburg, Dummer Lake, Stuttgart?

Regards,

Bill

PS - While the 8th AF FC HQ forbade dropping of tanks, each Group CO raised a single digit salute and said "do what ya gottta do to survive in a bounce".
 
This question of forcing the escorts to drop their tanks early has just been asked on the Ubi Il-2 forum.
Jagdwaffe vs Escorts - Topic Powered by eve community

A post by Kurfurst who posts here.

Here's the question:

Why did the Germans allow these forces to penetrate, and then attack them at the target? This was the method they used for the first half of 1944, the so-called point defence.


Because they couldn`t just 'spawn-in' large numbers fighters on single selected point. It took time to assemble a force to challange a large enemy force with success, and in this regard, the Allies were in an time-advantage (they already assembled the the large armada over Britiain).

During that time, the enemy bombers got closer, and also there`s additional problems how to navigate and concentrate the defending fighters in a single point. This could done if a fixed point is selected as reference, which all fighter group leaders can find and assamble at.

Pre-designated defensive areas also meant they could co-operate with the Flak that which would neccesarily soften/break up heavy bomber formations, making the fighter`s job easier to penetrate into their mutually supportive defensive fire system. It made maximum use of the available defensive resources.

Why did the Germans not place some of the Jagdwaffe forward to engage the escorts at the French cost thus forcing them to drop their tanks? With the tanks jettisoned early in the flight, none of the fighters would have been able to provide target support. It would have put the bombers back to the position they were in from August to October 1943: unescorted and faced with unmolested night and heavy fighters.

Because doing so would make absolutely no sense. Let`s recap the objectives of the two sides :

- Defending LW fighters ultimately had to protect the industries of the Hinterland, for that, they needed to shoot down bombers, preferably before they reached their target, or at the very least, do maximum damage to bombers.

- Escorting USAAF fighters had to protect the bombers, by not letting the attacking fighters to them.

To force the escorting USAAF fighters (all/most of them to be effective) into combat to jettison their droptanks and leave the bombers, you`d have to amass at least the number of LW fighters to bog down the escort fighters. Otherwise it just won` work, you`d be wasting senselessly your fighter pilots in unequal combat with no gain. It`s foolish to assume the whole escort fleet of Mustangs and 'Bolts would loose their minds upon to sighting of a single or two 109s/190s and chase them as far as Spain, leaving the bombers totally unprotected. You`d only have smaller detachments of escorts chasing you away, allowing then the rest of the LW fighters could get to the bombers more easily, but there would still be escort.

And here`s the problem No 1. The LW fighters simply did not have the numerical edge to do that.

Attacking in small formations to 'bait' the escorts over the sea/France would only waste a portion your main attacking force :

- they would be dealt with by short range outbound escorts like Spits and P-47s, most of which wouldn`t turn up over Germany anyway due to range issues. There`s no gain luring them away.

The LW 'bait' detachment otoh would certainly not attack the bombers that day though - they would be out of ammo, shot down, damaged, scattered, low on fuel, and mostly no idea where they are, and where the enemy formation is at. You can write them off for that day, all of them.

They would be at even greater disadvantage against escorts, being more isolated and heavily outnumbered, unless they could attack the escorts in even numbers - which they couldn`t. Chances are they`d suffer high losses for keeping a few escorts away and busy - something they can just as well over the target, and with less losses.

Even if you`d bait a part of the escorts to drop their tanks, it would ultimately mean the LW fighter detachment would fall out of that particular operation, and itself would be unable to attack the bombers. At this point, the escorts, even the ones dropping their tanks and turning back accomplished their mission without even being over Germany (they kept away a number of LW fighters from the bombers).

Overall, it made a lot more sense to focus fighters into a single point, and let some of them engage the escorts, and let the actual Strike get to the bombers for a single pass in the confusion. The relative numbers allowed for no more.
 
This question of forcing the escorts to drop their tanks early has just been asked on the Ubi Il-2 forum.
Jagdwaffe vs Escorts - Topic Powered by eve community

A post by Kurfurst who posts here.

Here's the question:

Why did the Germans allow these forces to penetrate, and then attack them at the target? This was the method they used for the first half of 1944, the so-called point defence.


Because they couldn`t just 'spawn-in' large numbers fighters on single selected point. It took time to assemble a force to challange a large enemy force with success, and in this regard, the Allies were in an time-advantage (they already assembled the the large armada over Britiain).

Al, this defense worked just fine at Schweinfurt and Munster, etc. The point about bouncing US escort is all about stripping each Task Force of its Target Escort, not the Penetration Escort. In 1944 there were few Mustang groups (one Dec 1943, one 11 Feb, one more 22 Feb, one more 8 March, one more 10 April, 1944) to collectively protect 35-40 Bomb Groups beyond the rang of P-47s. The P38 groups were two in December and one in March.

So, back to the argument - 'spawn' one or more top cover squadrons above Channel Coast and attack one of those long range Escort. They had plenty of time to climb to altitude. Best defense would be fighter sweeps ahead and at low altitude but you would have to guess which airfields, then Germans pull back these guys to the Dutch border or French border and repeat the tactic




Why did the Germans not place some of the Jagdwaffe forward to engage the escorts at the French cost thus forcing them to drop their tanks? With the tanks jettisoned early in the flight, none of the fighters would have been able to provide target support. It would have put the bombers back to the position they were in from August to October 1943: unescorted and faced with unmolested night and heavy fighters.

Because doing so would make absolutely no sense. Let`s recap the objectives of the two sides :

- Defending LW fighters ultimately had to protect the industries of the Hinterland, for that, they needed to shoot down bombers, preferably before they reached their target, or at the very least, do maximum damage to bombers.

The Luftwaffe would never need to concentrate 'large numbers' in an early bounce.. in fact the Coastal guys could do the heavy lifting - leaving the central LuftFlotte Reich in same position of strength and controller directed masses. If JG26 or JG2 were reinforced with 109G-6/AS squadrons and positioned them along the Denmark/Munster/Koln/Stuttgart axis - the only thing they are doing differently is assigning these guys to NOT attack the bombers - go after the fighters aggressively and force them to engage 'heavy'..

- Escorting USAAF fighters had to protect the bombers, by not letting the attacking fighters to them.

True, although it was never really possible to stop a determined attack - just hurt the ones that didn't get away in dives.

To force the escorting USAAF fighters (all/most of them to be effective) into combat to jettison their droptanks and leave the bombers, you`d have to amass at least the number of LW fighters to bog down the escort fighters.

Why do you think so, Al? First, in most cases none of the Target escort Mustangs ever saw the other Target escort Mustangs during penetration until they got to R/V point - and rarely then until long after D-Day. For the first several months of 1944 one group of Mustangs (or P-38s) would be covering 4-6 Bomb Groups by themselves.

So how many Me 109s would it take - fighting in 4 plane flights to bounce three squadrons spread out over say 10 miles and either force the 51s to drop tanks and engage, or not drop and be forced to engage engage 'heavy'. I have talked to one hell of a lot of 51 drivers and none of them ever said they intentionally engaged with one or both drop tanks


Otherwise it just won` work, you`d be wasting senselessly your fighter pilots in unequal combat with no gain. Why would one squadron or one Group jumping a Mustang Group on the way to R/V point be considered 'uneven'

It`s foolish to assume the whole escort fleet of Mustangs

The 'escort' fleet of interest to these 'boncers' would be approximately 45-50 Mustangs in three separate squadrons, two sections each covering each other. During penetration to R/V before starting escort they would be roughly line abreast across a mile front. After escort started, it would be maybe one out in front , one in middle high with each 8 ship section weaving and one in trail - or one each on either side depending on whether or not they were working with another Mustang Group picking up a trailing Task Force

and 'Bolts No Bolt's, they have turned back..would loose their minds upon to sighting of a single or two 109s/190s and chase them as far as Spain, leaving the bombers totally unprotected.

True but that isn't the thesis. If you send one flight or one squadron of agile 109s from an altitude advantage and they look for and find one squadron and bounce them while they still have full drop tanks (remember you'll burn on the fuse tank for first hour)

You`d only have smaller detachments of escorts chasing you away, allowing then the rest of the LW fighters could get to the bombers more easily, but there would still be escort.

Unless for that Group of Mustangs you detached maybe a Gruppe of 109s and hit them piecemeal

And here`s the problem No 1. The LW fighters simply did not have the numerical edge to do that.

They did in the first six monthd of 1944 in context of TARGET Escort

Attacking in small formations to 'bait' the escorts over the sea/France would only waste a portion your main attacking force :

- they would be dealt with by short range outbound escorts like Spits and P-47s, most of which wouldn`t turn up over Germany anyway due to range issues. There`s no gain luring them away.

Agreed for 1944, great value in 1943 when P-47s were all we had to get to Munster for example

The LW 'bait' detachment otoh would certainly not attack the bombers that day though - they would be out of ammo, shot down, damaged, scattered, low on fuel, and mostly no idea where they are, and where the enemy formation is at. You can write them off for that day, all of them.

Golly, these guys probably should never have been issued authority to fly? None of these guys could navigate back home?

So, they bounce and fight or they bounce and run - in either case they land, refuel, rearm and wait to catch the bombers coming back - they had zero problem performing the feats you cited on any of the really bad days we suffered on Aug 17 and Oct 14, 1943 for example when JG26 and JG2 were clobbering our B-17s inbound and outbound - they seemed to have little trouble in these tasks.


They would be at even greater disadvantage against escorts, being more isolated and heavily outnumbered, unless they could attack the escorts in even numbers - which they couldn`t. Chances are they`d suffer high losses for keeping a few escorts away and busy - something they can just as well over the target, and with less losses.

Al do you know the 8th and 9th AF Order of Battle for first half of 1944? If so, why do you keep referencing 'heavily outnumbered'??

Even if you`d bait a part of the escorts to drop their tanks, it would ultimately mean the LW fighter detachment would fall out of that particular operation, and itself would be unable to attack the bombers. At this point, the escorts, even the ones dropping their tanks and turning back accomplished their mission without even being over Germany (they kept away a number of LW fighters from the bombers).

So, if you could trade one for one 'ineffective' between the 'bounce force 109s and the Target Escort 51s or P-38s and enable large forces of otherwise vulnerable Me 110's and Hogged out Fw 190s to attack the 'vacant spot' would you not consider that a fair trade

Overall, it made a lot more sense to focus fighters into a single point, and let some of them engage the escorts, and let the actual Strike get to the bombers for a single pass in the confusion. The relative numbers allowed for no more.

Mustang Force
Dec 1943 - 354FG - 9th
Feb 1944 - 363rd FG (early) - 9th and 357 FG(middle) and 4th (late) - 8th
March 1944 - 355th FG - 8th
April 1944 - 352FG - 8th
May 1944- 339 FG (april 30), 361st and 359th (late) - 8th AF

35-40 effective per group in Dec 1943 - March 1944, 45-50 (April-May) based on better reliability

Three Groups of P-38s (20 and 55 in late 1943) 364FG in March 1944.

This is whatcha got to cover three Bomb Divisions of 12-15 Bomb Groups each for Target Support between Dec 1943 and May 1944.

Tell me why, under perfect conditions, that during Big Week for example, two Mustang and two Lightning groups can cover 40 Bomb groups in three separate tracks, constitute 'overwhelming numbers"' against LuftFlotte Reich that had 500+ effectives and could put 200-250 effectives in the same area as ONE Fighter group over a target?

I don't get it?
 
What if the Red barron had lived

a good question.. I wonder 'what if' Galland had more authority, or what if Kesslering had been in command. I am unfamiliar with German aviation 'visionaries' in the context of a US Billy Mitchell, etc.

Who, in your opinion would be the German leader that could step away from Wermacht doctrine and forge both a tactical and strategic capability?
 
Dragon...fair points.

I am sure there were other choices for the Germans to choose.

If to this i add some other points i have stated regarding the types of planes the Germans were still producing during the closing months of 1943, and throughout 1944, that were not really required given the gravity of the circumstances and that when cleared for combat implied a greater consumption of fuel and crews, such as bombers (He 111s, Ju 188s) and twin-engined fighters (Bf 110s, Me 410s) for daylight operations as used by units such as ZG 1, ZG 26 and ZG 76, perhaps things fare somewhat better for Germany.

With the human and material resources Germany allocated for producing ~800 He 111s, ~600 He 177s, ~600 Ju 88s and ~350 Ju 188s during 1944, how many single engined fighters Bf 109s, Fw 190s, and even jets could instead have been produced? Things become worse when we add fuel, ground crews and aircraft crews equired to maintain, operate and man such planes.

From this number, an approximate ~2,350 planes that had two engines, and required a crew of 2 men -at minimum for twin-engined fighters-, and 4 men in the case of the German medium bombers, nearly half (~1,175) were produced during January-June of 1944...a time when it was clear to those in the High Command of the Luftwaffe the main enemy to German fighters would be the USAAF escorts.

Let´s not forget the critical impact fuel had on Luftwaffe´s operations during the last year of the war...and they were still using bombers and twin-engined fighters.

The fuel load dispatched to put a Me 410 in the air during 1944 could have been useful to put 2 Bf 109s or Fw 190s in the air -at minimum- if we consider the actual number of liters filling the large tanks of a Me 410. I would love to see some logs/reports made by ground crews from any of the ZGs operating during 1944, with regard to the number of fuel liters dispatched to one of those planes prior to combat missions.

I wonder if a man like von Richtofen could have played any influence that would be significant to either re-direct or stop this mis-management of Germany´s resources.

In my view this scenario could have commenced implementation during the closing months of 1943, when the losses in the ranks of the Jagdwaffe were still somewhat reasonable, and completely set up for the summer of 1944, when the main deployment of long range P-51s took place.

This will prompt a reaction from some fundamentalists here: "What of the pilots to man those extra single engined fighters available?" In the view of some of these pro-Allied priests, Germany had "ZERO" possibilities for producing new pilots with adequate training for the first half of 1944.

With a disbadment of the majority of the Kampfgeschwadern and Zerstörergeschwadern, a large number of men become available for proper screening prior to being sent to fighter pilot schools. But the fundamentalists do not stop here...they immediately resort to another allied type of mantra: "Bomber pilots make poor fighter pilots". I wonder how come? I do not see any difference between said mantra and saying "Not any man would qualify to become a fighter pilot". If a guy lacks the skills for flying a fighter in combat, send him somewhere else: the Flak defences of the Reich, or the Wehrmacht...anywhere but inside a He 111 or a daylight Bf 110 that can easily get shot down by enemy fighters in a time when resources are critical.

Any men who died as rear gunner on a Bf 110 or crewmen other than pilot inside a He 111 during 1944 was a foolish loss.

A significant reduction in the number of bombers and twin-engined fighters in service, would represent fuel saved that can be re-distributed for fighter pilot training school and Jagdgeschwadern deployed for combat.

One thing is 100% true, Germany carried on with a completely unwise stytle for managing its dwindling resources.
 
Dragon...fair points.

I am sure there were other choices for the Germans to choose.

If to this i add some other points i have stated regarding the types of planes the Germans were still producing during the closing months of 1943, and throughout 1944, that were not really required given the gravity of the circumstances and that when cleared for combat implied a greater consumption of fuel and crews, such as bombers (He 111s, Ju 188s) and twin-engined fighters (Bf 110s, Me 410s) for daylight operations as used by units such as ZG 1, ZG 26 and ZG 76, perhaps things fare somewhat better for Germany.

With the human and material resources Germany allocated for producing ~800 He 111s, ~600 He 177s, ~600 Ju 88s and ~350 Ju 188s during 1944, how many single engined fighters Bf 109s, Fw 190s, and even jets could instead have been produced? Things become worse when we add fuel, ground crews and aircraft crews equired to maintain, operate and man such planes.

From this number, an approximate ~2,350 planes that had two engines, and required a crew of 2 men -at minimum for twin-engined fighters-, and 4 men in the case of the German medium bombers, nearly half (~1,175) were produced during January-June of 1944...a time when it was clear to those in the High Command of the Luftwaffe the main enemy to German fighters would be the USAAF escorts.

Let´s not forget the critical impact fuel had on Luftwaffe´s operations during the last year of the war...and they were still using bombers and twin-engined fighters.

The fuel load dispatched to put a Me 410 in the air during 1944 could have been useful to put 2 Bf 109s or Fw 190s in the air -at minimum- if we consider the actual number of liters filling the large tanks of a Me 410. I would love to see some logs/reports made by ground crews from any of the ZGs operating during 1944, with regard to the number of fuel liters dispatched to one of those planes prior to combat missions.

These are all excellent points, particularly for all of 1944 and most certainly post March when the attrition on LW day fighters was starting to get critical..

I wonder if a man like von Richtofen could have played any influence that would be significant to either re-direct or stop this mis-management of Germany´s resources.

In my view this scenario could have commenced implementation during the closing months of 1943, when the losses in the ranks of the Jagdwaffe were still somewhat reasonable, and completely set up for the summer of 1944, when the main deployment of long range P-51s took place.

This will prompt a reaction from some fundamentalists here: "What of the pilots to man those extra single engined fighters available?" In the view of some of these pro-Allied priests, Germany had "ZERO" possibilities for producing new pilots with adequate training for the first half of 1944.

With a disbadment of the majority of the Kampfgeschwadern and Zerstörergeschwadern, a large number of men become available for proper screening prior to being sent to fighter pilot schools. But the fundamentalists do not stop here...they immediately resort to another allied type of mantra: "Bomber pilots make poor fighter pilots". I wonder how come? I do not see any difference between said mantra and saying "Not any man would qualify to become a fighter pilot". If a guy lacks the skills for flying a fighter in combat, send him somewhere else: the Flak defences of the Reich, or the Wehrmacht

I think the Scouts of the 8th AF are an excellent illustration that a good pilot can adapt. Lt Col John Brooks III, a 44th BG B-24 squadron leader at Ploesti, was CO of 2SF which was equipped with P-51Ds. He, along with his wingman were out in front during a weather scouting mission for 2AD and jumped 25+ Me 109s flying top cover for Fw 190A8s heading for the bombers. He shot down 2 along with his wingman Whalen who got another, breaking up the formation. This was Feb 1945 so the quality of the opposition was questionable.

This same Scout force, supported by 355th with ground crews and a/c, also destroyed several Me-262s in air combat - not catching them over airfields.


One thing is 100% true, Germany carried on with a completely unwise stytle for managing its dwindling resources.

Excellent observations.

I really had never thought about the potential for putting say 500-1000 skilled pilots into fighters in January 1944. They could NOT have done worse than the 50-100 hour wonders that were being sent to the squadrons in August. At least they would be excellent navigators, good instrument pilots and be totally familiar with radio and landing procedures - all confusing for new pilots, detracting from tactical and ACM training.
 
I was wondering what would have happened to Manfred von Richthofen too, would he have been in a position of power like Goering???

But what the LW really needed prior to the BOB, besidedes the stratigic points, was someone who respected the use of dive-bombers but was smart enough not to force such a requirement on a HEAVY bomber. Also someone willing to look elsewhere than Messersmitt for fighters and not force rediculous reqirements like a rear-gunner for a fighter and not reserve all the DB 600 series engines for Messersmitt fighters. Maby then they could have had the excelent Fw 187 and He 100 at the BOB. Can you immagine the effect these craft could have had?

The 187 had performance equal or better (faster, better climb and dive, maneuverabillity: slightly worse roll-rate and turn-radius) then the 109 with the same engines and with 2x the range, the He 100 had a shorter range, but still longer than the 109 and should have been able to escort in the BOB as well. The 187 was like a German equivelent to the P-38.

Plus the Fw 187 would have been an awsome interceptor and fast enough to kill Mossies. It would have been the only fighter capable of carring a 30mm cannon (Mk 101) prior to the advent of the Mk 108. (and Mk 103) The He 100 would have made a good one too if provisions for larger weapons were made.

Perhaps give more support to the Heinkel Jet program too. Keep the HeS-30 (109-006) from being canceled and maby the HeS-8 too, as both could have been ready for full production before the 004 and (especially) 003. And the HeS-8 was a good engine for the He 280 and could have served until the Me 262 could enter service (likely with HeS-006 engines) and would be a good transition to the 262 and still be deadly t bombers. (albeit with a lighter armament) If this had been done the 280 might have seen service by early-mid 1943 and the 262 could enter limited service by late 1943 and see service in numbers by early-mid '44. With such engines fuel consumption would be much lower too (and ~half the weight of the 004B) giving added range (maby 1000+ miles for the 262) and endurance with less detriment to the fuel situation and better performance to boot. (lighter weight and smaller size of engine) This would have been very bad for allied bombers to say the least!
 
The Basket said:
oering had a pet lion cub called Ceaser...he created the GESTAPO and the first concentration camps...his huge house was call Karinhall after his first wife...He may/may not have burnt down the Riechstag...Prime minister of Prussia...First hunter of the Riech...stole art treasures from all over Europe...loved jewels...drug addict from taking morpine from the injury he sustained in the Beer hall Putsch...Hitlers 2nd command...leading officer of the German military...Had a big bowl of diamonds which he used to run his hands through to make him feel better....

...And his own 'Parachute Panzer Division'. Kinda makes you wonder how someone so lacking in self-/impulse-control ever made it to flag rank in the first place. Oh wait, 'political appointee'.


Eighth
 
That and he wasn't as detached from reality. That didn't start to get really bad until after the BOB and the US joining the war. Probably really noticeably by late 1942-early 1943. As others have stated here. Goering, I mean.

Rommel was good, I'm not sure how he'd have handeled the LW, he'd have a lot on his plate...
 
But are the tactics of running an Air Force the same as an Army? I'm sure he could've handled Hitler....."Don't retreat!" "F You!" :lol: But are they the same in terms of planning?
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back