Was that known during the war?
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Im not sure. A cousin or nephew of his also was involved with helping Jews and everythind hide and escape.
Read the passage again Udet. 12 P-51s of the 352FG were waiting to take off to escort some P-47s of the 266FG. Read Bodenplatte Chap 7, Dogfight over Auch. Those bomb laden P-47s, at low level, had good success against the LW fighters and we all know what a dog the P-47 was at low level.Now this visions that during Bodenplatte we had Mustangs shooting down Bf 109s and Fw 190s while still on the ground seems like more of the allied mythology that has been served on our plates for too long now. If someday i come across accounts suggesting P-51 pilots "shot down" german fighters resorting only to poontang i can say i will not be surprised.
Only several times? That leaves very very many times they did not.Luftwaffe controllers proved their worth several times during 1944 vectoring a German fighter force that would gut a heavy bomber formation.
The flak lines were breached anyways. Did you not say the interceptor force would be reduced in numbers. You forget that when it is said 600 escorts flew a bomber escort mission not all 600 were with the bombers at the same time. Only a 1/4 to 1/3 were and they did not have that much trouble with the larger number of LW fighters that tried to attack the bombers.Also, the bombers do not roam at will...they still have to make their way through the Flak lines of the Reich, including the fighter force that would still be committed for bomber interception duties.
Did you miss where I said less escorts would be required? That leaves those taken from escort duty to flying CAP over LW fighter airfields. Now that means a LW CAP over the bases and less LW fighters closer to the front.I said that since the bulk of the Jagdwaffe is committed for supporting the Wehrmacht, the fighters of the USAAF are deployed accordingly...if you bother to read what i said, nowhere it is suggested USAAF fighters remain committed to escort bomber streams in the numbers records show they did since there are not that too many German fighters trying to hit the bombers.
As i did say, with a man like Wolfram von Richtofen in command of the Luftwaffe, say, for the year of 1944 when the big aerial onslaught in the west was on its way, i see a more efficient allocation and utilization of the resources of the overstretched Luftwaffe.
No serious attempt, then why the transfer of LW units to the west which were decimated?The RAF and USAAF dealt "easily" with the Luftwaffe efforts to slow their advance for a very simple reason Mr. Schlageter: there was no serious attempt carried out during 1944.
Not so in 1944. All one has to do is look at a map and see the vast territory the Soviets retook til Apr 1945.the soviets who were overbled and exhausted
Yeah thats him Basket. Goering apparantly new and even helped him in some cases. That Herman Goering helped him in some cases cant be verified I think.
Here is a bit of info:
"Albert Göring
Albert Göring (1900 - 1966) was a German businessman, notable for helping Jews and dissidents survive in Germany during World War II. His older brother Hermann Göring held the rank of Reich Marshal of Nazi Germany and was a convicted war criminal.
Early life
Göring was born near Mauterndorf to a former cavalry officer and German consul general in Haiti Heinrich Ernst Göring and his wife Franziska "Fanny" Tiefenbrunn (1859-July 15, 1923), who came from a Bavarian peasant family. Among his paternal ancestors were the Eberle/Eberlin, a Swiss-German family who were Jewish converts to Christianity in the 15th century. Goring was a relative of numerous descendants of the Eberle/Eberlin in Switzerland and Germany, among them German Counts Zeppelin, including aviation pioneer Ferdinand von Zeppelin; German nationalistic art historian Hermann Grimm (author of concept of the German hero as a mover of history that was embraced by the Nazis); the great Swiss historian of art and cultural, political, and social thinker Jacob Burckhardt; Swiss diplomat, historian, and President of International Red Cross Carl J. Burckhardt; the Merck family, the owners of the German pharmaceutical giant Merck; major German Catholic writer and poet Gertrud von LeFort. (See Wolfgang Paul, "Wer war Hermann Goring. Biographie," Esslingen: Bechtle Verlag, 1983, p. 33.)
The Göring family lived with their children's aristocratic godfather of Jewish heritage, Ritter Hermann von Epenstein, in his Veldenstein and Mauterndorf castles. Von Epenstein was a prominent physician and acted as a surrogate father to the children as Heinrich Göring was often absent from the family home. Göring was one of five children, his brothers were Hermann Göring and Karl Ernst Göring; his sisters were Olga Therese Sophia and Paula Elisabeth Rosa Göring, the last of whom were children of his father's first marriage[1].
According to the author Leonard Mosley, who had interviewed Göring family members, von Epenstein began a long-term affair with Franziska Göring about a year before Albert's birth. Mosley also states that the strong physical resemblance between von Epenstein and Albert Göring led many people to believe that they were father and son. If this belief is correct, then Albert Göring had a Jewish paternal grandfather.
Anti-Nazi activity
Göring seemed to have acquired his godfather's character as a bon vivant and looked set to lead an unremarkable life as a filmmaker, until the Nazis came to power in 1933. Unlike his older brother Hermann, who was a leading party member, Albert Göring despised Nazism and the brutality that it involved. On one occasion he is reported to have gotten down on his hands and knees and joined a group of Jews who were being forced to scrub the street; the SS officer in charge, unwilling to see Hermann Göring's brother publicly humiliated, ordered the street scrubbing to stop.[citation needed]
Albert Göring also used his influence to get his Jewish former boss Oskar Pilzer freed after the Nazis had arrested him. Göring then helped Pilzer and his family escape from Germany. He is reported to have done the same for many other dissidents.[citation needed]
Göring intensified his anti-Nazi activity when he was made export director at the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia. Here, he encouraged minor acts of sabotage and had contact with the Czech resistance. On many occasions, Göring forged his brother's signature on transit documents to enable dissidents to escape. When he was caught, he used his brother's influence to get himself released. Göring also sent trucks to Nazi concentration camps with requests for labour. These trucks would then stop in an isolated area, and their passengers would be allowed to escape.[citation needed]
After the war, Albert Göring was questioned during the Nuremberg Tribunal. However many of the people whom he had helped testified on his behalf, and he was released. Soon afterwards, Göring was arrested by the Czechs but was once again freed when the full extent of his activities became known.
Late life
Göring then returned to Germany but found himself shunned because of his family name. He found occasional work as a writer and translator, living in a modest flat far from the baronial splendour of his childhood. Prior to his death, Göring was living on a pension from the government. He knew that if he was married, the pension would transfer to his wife after his death. As a sign of gratitude, Göring married his housekeeper so she could receive his pension and not have to work anymore. One week later, he died in 1966, without having his wartime activities publicly acknowledged."
Albert Göring - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A significant difference i see occurring with Richtofen at the controls is that that the bulk of the Jagdwaffe would instead have been committed to support the Wehrmacht and not to intercept/attack the numerous USAAF heavy bomber streams.
Saving the lives of innocent German civilians that would get killed by the thousands by enemy bombers was a noble plausible task for sure, but in my view it was not there where the war priorities were...the civilian population of the time was extremely resilient and there is no evidence to suggest any sort of civilian uprising came close to occur due to extenuation during those dark days of 1944 and 1945 when the heavies of both Spaatz and "Civilian Bomber" Harris gutted some major German cities.
Udet - I have read several times and in multiple publications that Goering rejected the notion of concentrating LuftFlotte Reich in a central area (for greater intercept efficiency) because his (or Hitler's) view was the the German people needed some tangible view that Luftwaffe was doing everything it could to stop Allied airpower? If this is true, 'zero' effort to stop Daylight bombing could, by their point of view, have been a bad morale factor?
With a greater number of Fw 190s and Bf 109s supporting the Wehrmacht during 1944, i see the allied advance on continental europe even slower than it was. Who knows, Paris is not taken until early 1945... but more importantly, now the truly heavy losses the USA would be suffering belong in the army, and not precisely in the ranks of the 8th Air Force, and high losses are -as i have suggested many times in the past- a significant issue in the military of the USA.
Let's take June-July 1944 as a scenario for discussion to consider possible consequences of putting perhaps 90% of LW Day Fighters on the West German/Ducth/Belgium region. This puts all of these trained pilots in striking range of All of UK based fighter forces - an event that I believe would have played more into Allied hands than German.
The 8th AF FC doctrine was protect the bombers and kill Luftwaffe. Luftwaffe controllers WERE skillful at finding weak spots and directing LW day fighters to them - but Allied Type 16 Control was also very adept at locating concentrations in the above areas - usually with disastrous effects to LW
From the small number of Luftwaffe fighters committed to deal with heavy bombers, one can expect the skilled performance of Luftwaffe controllers to vector those few fighters to slam in the proper moment and still cause significant losses.
Given that the Escort strength of 8th FC was about 50% Mustang and 15%Lightning, and no Jugs were goind deep, and generally bored with Penetration and Withdrawal support with no action, I believe your propsal would have had the following effect;
Virtually ALL of the 8th AF, and all of the 9th AF P-47s, who mostly had no air to air combat when engaged in Penetration and Withdrawal support are now effective against LW.. and the remaining LW available to attack bomber streams going heavily after oil are escorted by exactly the same amount of 8th AF P-51 and P-38s - meaning that when the LW found unguarded bomber wings (like July 7 - Leipzig area), that the same amount of US Escort fighters are there - creating overwhelming odds in those fights.
If 10% of LuftFlotte Reich is left behind that means perhaps 50-60 effectives to meet perhaps 50-100 escort fighters in any one area.. but you could argue that 10 times that much didn't hurt the 8th AF so many times after May 12 - so it has merit,,
The flights of P-51s and P-47s are for sure committed to the sectors where the bulk of the German fighters are operating. So we would have the same bloody aerial battles taking place but this time right over the heads of the Panzer Lehr, 12 SS.Pz.Gr and other powerful German units in Normandy and not in the high skies over Europe.
What this strategy gives you is an edge in performance where the P-47 was not as manueverable - but still they did well overall during the Normandy campaign (as well as took some hits, proportionately, more often than high altitude engagements) and ALL of RAF TAC is in position to engage. Perform the same interdiction when no LW air cover present, drop loads and egage 109s and 190s w/Spit, Typhoons and Tempests and RAF Mustangs.. I suspect that Allied Tactical Air contribution somewhat reduced but believe far too many losses for LW against the value of shooting down more Allied Fighters and enabling more (uncertain quantitative positive effect) mobility
The Wehrmacht units deployed to deal with the D-day offensive, and their supply lines, suffered critical delays due to the action of RAF and USAAF planes. With a significant part of the Jagdwaffe involved in this front, one can expect the delays to be less significant in their impact, enabling thus the Heer to arrive to the front sectors in a stronger position. It´s also possible to suggest that with the presence of friendly planes in numbers over their heads, the soldiers of an army are injected with a plus in terms of morale and performance.
I suspect this to be true Udet, but equally suspect horrendous LW Day Fighter losses at a much faster rate than over Central Germany. Allies would also take corresponding losses but negligible effect at this stage of war for Allies?
Also, near the deck, the Fw-190s give the P-51s a more bitter time during the fight.
True, but in your scenario - the 51's are more likely doing target escort, although June, July and August had far more Area Support missions over France - and the LW did clobber the 4th FG on 18 August for their worst air to air loss of war, when the 51s had their noses in the ground.
I do not see the British, U.S. and allied armies reaching the German border before the end of 1944...so perhaps the futile Ardennes Offensive is not even seriously contemplated, so more German forces are available for launching against the soviets who were overbled and exhausted.
So, what would the Luftwaffe have been like if Hermann Goering died during World War 1??? Would things have worked out differently???
Glad you finally see what your 'what if' will accomplish.So in conclusion...what you seem to suggest here is that the Germans chose the most adequate course of action to attempt dealing with the USAAF -outcome known- and that any other scheme which might differ from that would have done nothing but accelerating the German defeat. Very interesting.
I have read almost every book available that directly or indirectly deals with Bodenplatte, and all i am going to say about them is that i find them confusing to say the least. The Allies failing to put their stuff together, something that is not rare by the way.
With regard to your conclusions reached after reading my comments all i will say is i am not responsible about them, at all.
posted by Erich on another forum here:
frontal attacks on bombers ceased almost immediately after May of 44 when nearly all the Geschwader were posted to the Normandie battles, a change occurred and attacks from the rear were standard from mid July till wars end
So Udet, it seems the Germans did exactly what you said von R should do.
>Goering had a pet lion cub called Ceaser...he created the GESTAPO and the first concentration camps...
One mean cub!
Slight correction Bill, the units you listed are Gruppen, not staffel. A Gruppe usually consisted of 3 staffels.Al I have deep respect for Erich's knowledge but here is a website with the Luftwaffe Geschwader equipment, commander and bases. Erich is completely correct that the Luftwaffe shifted most of LuftFlotte Reich westward and a significant population in Western and SW Germany.
The Luftwaffe, 1933-45
Near as I can tell however, here are the Staffeln that did not move into France or were there only a short time
II./JG1, I.&III./JG2, I. IV./JG3, II./JG5, Stab II. III./JG4, Stab I. II./JG11, II./JG27, Stab and III./JG53, Stab and III./JG76, JG300, Stab JG301
Having said this, a lot of those bases were in Koln, Frakfurt, Wunsdorf and therfore flexible in reacting to daylight bombing or attacks on beach head.
Regards,
Bill
What was the German losses? You tell only 1/2 the story Udet.Dragon: i can say i agree for the most part with what you said here. Keep in mind losses for 2nd TAF, 8th and 9th AFs over France in a period of ~5 weeks (June/July) 1944 reached nearly ~1000 planes...lost to Flak and Fw 190s and Bf 109s.