The one most over-rated plane of WWII

[pbehn]

Hi
Not exactly 'new' but not as advanced as later sets. The British were using voice to and from its fighters (a requirement for the air defence system) from the Gloster Grebe (not counting WW1 use) HF T.25 transmitter and R.31 Receiver from the mid-1920, in the 1930s this was replaced by the TR 9 series. While I don't think the FAA Fairey Flycatcher was fitted with voice (R/T) its replacement the Hawker Nimrod was (by TR 9 according to various sources) in the early 1930s. I would presume the US Navy and US Army were doing the same so most 'veterans' should have been used to using it by WW2. Morse sets were longer ranged of course and they would have been in use by naval air throughout the inter-war period, although operator skill would have been a major factor plus reliability but still more reliable than in WW1.

Mike

Looking up other stuff I came across this
Entering active service in November 1942, a contingent of Thunderbolts was dispatched to England as part of the 56th Fighter Group, under the command of the 8th Air Force. It first saw combat in March 1943, during a mission over occupied France, but due to a radio malfunction, the mission turned out to be a catastrophe.
Very soon, the P-47s stationed in England were refitted with new, English-made radio equipment, resuming active service.

The "Jug" P-47 Thunderbolt - Workhorse of WWII in 30+ Photos

Republic's P-47 Thunderbolt was the backbone of the U.S. Air Force during Second World War and was certainly one of the most iconic American aircraft,

www.warhistoryonline.com

 

[NTGray]

I've been studying this for more than 50 years, and I don't believe that is the case. I could be mistaken. So could you.

Are any of your sources from the WWII era, or are they later than about 1955, when people started making things up about the war?

I agree; I could be mistaken. When you start with something you're pretty confident about, but then the discussion gets added to faster and faster and more and more things are being looked up on the fly, it is entirely possible that some of that new information should be modified thusly "I have read some claims that American gunnery was better than Japanese gunnery, even at the very beginning." Those claims could well be unreliable. I stand corrected.

Having said that, I think that R Leonard's remarks about cockpit visibility and shooting technique in a Zero are persuasive, and match with the schematic drawings that I have studied (a Wildcat nose has a definite downward slope forward of the canopy; a Zero's nose does not). Add that to what we know about the lower muzzle velocity (and therefore the need for a higher shooting angle, i.e. a slightly raised nose) of the Zero's 20mm cannon, and I will accept those remarks as reliable.

 

[NTGray]

. . .and it does not deserve the title the one most overrated plane of ww2.

I have been putting the emphasis on most. I don't mean to imply it is the only over-rated plane. It is just the most over-rated.
Take the P-51. It "won" the vote in that other thread, and the Spitfire placed third, but both of those planes are really good airplanes. Those who call them over-rated are, I'm pretty sure, willing to admit that they are good, with multiple strong points, but they are not as good as the hype. Therefore they are over-rated (in their opinion; I happen not to agree). The Zero, on the other hand, had strong and weak points that pretty much canceled each other out, but in early 1942 everybody was focusing on the strong points and hardly noticing the weaknesses. But with the benefit of hindsight we can see that the Zero really wasn't much, if any, better than the supposedly clumsy Wildcats that it flew against. Vastly different from the Widcat, but not better. Hence it wins the most over-rated prize.

 

[Just Schmidt]

Having said that, I think that R Leonard's remarks about cockpit visibility and shooting technique in a Zero are persuasive, and match with the schematic drawings that I have studied (a Wildcat nose has a definite downward slope forward of the canopy; a Zero's nose does not). Add that to what we know about the lower muzzle velocity (and therefore the need for a higher shooting angle, i.e. a slightly raised nose) of the Zero's 20mm cannon, and I will accept those remarks as reliable.

It's a valid point. However, i believe it is the Wildcat that is very much better than the average on this count, and so it's not as such an exceptional fault with the zero. I doubt very much that a Spitfire, a La-5 or a P-51 (to name a few) had a marked advantage over the zero in this respect.

 

[SaparotRob]

I have been putting the emphasis on most. I don't mean to imply it is the only over-rated plane. It is just the most over-rated.
Take the P-51. It "won" the vote in that other thread, and the Spitfire placed third, but both of those planes are really good airplanes. Those who call them over-rated are, I'm pretty sure, willing to admit that they are good, with multiple strong points, but they are not as good as the hype. Therefore they are over-rated (in their opinion; I happen not to agree). The Zero, on the other hand, had strong and weak points that pretty much canceled each other out, but in early 1942 everybody was focusing on the strong points and hardly noticing the weaknesses. But with the benefit of hindsight we can see that the Zero really wasn't much, if any, better than the supposedly clumsy Wildcats that it flew against. Vastly different from the Widcat, but not better. Hence it wins the most over-rated prize.

Nice post. I get what you are saying. As to that other thread, I still can't see anyone voting for the C-47 as overrated. Some of those things are still earning a paycheck.

 

[GregP]

Was not intending to contradict R Leonard in any specific way. His credentials and knowledge are not in question. He has his scorecard and I have mine.

My take is the Zero was a vastly superior dogfighter, particularly at under 280 mph, but if boom and zoom tactics were used, the F4F could and DID hold it's own. In the end, the Wildcat had a good kill-ratio. Of course, the Zero's kill ratio might be a surprise if we had the data to calculate it. Since we don't (or, more accurately, I don't), all I know for sure is that the Allies won the war, and the F4F Wildcat was all we had at the start. It didn't really shoot down many aircraft. The U.S. Navy and Marines shot down 10,581 enemy aircraft. Of these 1,327 were by Wildcats. That's 12.5% of the kills. The Hellcat got 48.8% of the kill and the Corsair got 20.2%. The rest were scattered over dive bombers, patrol bombers, torpedo bombers, etc. Of the three fighters (Wildcat, Hellcat, Corsair), the Wildcat scored the least by some 800+ kills.

To add some numbers, I combine all Wildcats, F4F and FM. Total sorties were 15,553. Total losses to enemy AAA were 86. Losses to enemy aircraft were 191. Operational losses were 124. Total losses (AAA, A/C, Oper) add up to 401. Total air and ground kills were 1,327. The kills are not broken out by air and ground. So, we have a problem calculating kill-to-loss ratio for air-to-air because we don't have the air-to-air kills. OK, figure total kill ratio including air-to-air, AAA, and operational losses as 1,327 kill to 401 losses. That is a kill ratio of 3.3 : 1.

The only Naval fighter with a worse overall kill-to-loss ratio is the F4U Corsair at 2.8 : 1. The Corsair was pretty good if you look at kills to air-to-air losses, but we don't really HAVE an air-to-air kill breakout. So, we are left with overall kills to losses and the Corsair had 349 losses to AAA and 230 losses on operational flights. AAA losses are not the fault of the aircraft. It's hard to dodge an AAA shell when you can't see it.

The Hellcat overall kill-to-loss ratio was 4.4 : 1 and that pretty much accounts for the U.S. Naval fighters.

You can't really compare Naval and Air Force fighters since they operated in wildly different scenarios. The Navy (and Marines) mostly fought over water with a few fighters against a few opponents. The Air Force mostly fought over land with sometimes as many as 100 - 600 - 800 fighters in the air against 20 - 200 opponents, most flying pretty high with the bomber streams. If they got down low, German AAA could and did take pot shots. They weren't bad shots, either. There was a LOT more opportunity for an enemy to sneak up on you and kill you over Europe than over the Pacific Ocean.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Having said that, I think that R Leonard's remarks about cockpit visibility and shooting technique in a Zero are persuasive, and match with the schematic drawings that I have studied (a Wildcat nose has a definite downward slope forward of the canopy; a Zero's nose does not).

You're not going to make an accurate assessment based on "a schematic." The only way you're really going to get a perspective if you actually SIT in the real aircraft, and your opinions about what you're seeing (or feeling) may be based on your height and body size. I've had the opportunity to sit in several WW2 fighters (P-51, P-38, Bf-109, and a Hawker Fury. My perspective of what I thought the cockpit would be like was totally different from what I experienced, now mind you I was in street clothes and not sitting on a parachute, even then totally different from what I envisioned.

 

[Snautzer01]

Yes but you know how to drive a plane. Modern that is if i am not mistaken. So how would you value the instrument lay out and ( hope it is a word) workability under stress? Modern vs WW2 war machines. Not in combat, but i am sure you can think up a scenario difficult just flying. Are the dials for a modern pilot in the right place..that kind of stuff.
So if you have a few minutes i would like to hear your opinion please.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Yes but you know how to drive a plane. Modern that is if i am not mistaken. So how would you value the instrument lay out and ( hope it is a word) workability under stress? Modern vs WW2 war machines. Not in combat, but i am sure you can think up a scenario difficult just flying. Are the dials for a modern pilot in the right place..that kind of stuff.
So if you have a few minutes i would like to hear your opinion please.

Actually compared to what I have flown, both general aviation and jet aircraft, I find the WW2 fighters I've sat in very simplistic. Once you learn to fly you'll easily recognize basic instruments for both flight and monitoring engine performance. For the most part most instruments and controls are similarly placed. After that it's a matter of training.

 

[MCamp]

Random thoughts

Zero pilots almost never wore parachutes

Radios also matter because you can be warned of an approaching plane by another distant plane

the USN did have the best deflection shooting, e.g. all shots not directly from behind, because they trained on it pre war and emphasized it more than others. IJN didn't do this much as they were expecting to get the much easier shot from directly behind the target

the zeros poor medium speed maneuvering and horrible high speed were a major factor. Also it's near inability to roll and turn right at medium+ speed was a major weakness. Lack of a pressurized carberator Was a massive weakness.

Zeros were also structurally weak allowing wing break Which the wildcats never suffered from. They also had extremely poor dive ability.

Zeros massive range, very low speed maneuverability, and climb rate were the only things it was clearly better at

wildcat survivability was a massive advantage

Wildcat had better supercharger system so if provided with enough early warning could get above zeros to start the fight. During guadcanal the coast watchers provided this. Radar helped a lot too, especially as the war went on.

Zeros cannon had low velocity and thus were bad at medium range and much worse at deflection shooting due to bullet drop. The high nose did impact the zeros deflection shots. 50 cal was much better in this regard and retained energy at greater distance. Wildcats often survived multiple hits from the zero cannon while the zero nearly never did the 50 cal.

the wildcats supposed lack of rear visibility is greatly overstated as the canopy was wide enough and the seat high enough to rotate your head and lean out and see more than it looks like to the rear. Zero was still better though. side note the F-15 has better rear visibility then the F-16 becuase the F-16 canopy is narrow and the helmet hits the window not allowing a full rearward look even though it's canopy seems to have great rear view.

IJN never focused on recovering downed pilots like the US did. This allowed surviving pilots to fight Again, at guadcanal this let shot down pilots to fight agsint often on the same day. US pilots were also sent home to train new aviators something the IJN didn't do.

IMO Japan was bad at war, they got lucky early but barely evolved their tactics. Infighting, logistics, and rigidity of dcotrine all helped cause their downfall

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Zeros were also structurally weak allowing wing break Which the wildcats never suffered from.

The Zero wing was one continual structure - I believe other components will fail before a wing would tear off. This has been discussed several times on this form. I have never seen combat reports of this continually happening and IMO if it did happen it was probably due to previous battle damage.

Design Analysis of the Zeke 32 (Hamp - Mitsubishi A6M3)

 

[PAT303]

I doubt very much that a Spitfire, a La-5 or a P-51 (to name a few) had a marked advantage over the zero in this respect.

The Spitfire 190 109 and P51 could both disengage and re-engage from a fight with an A6M when they chose too, all four had the speed to run from an A6M and likewise run an A6M down, all four were protected from the A6M's guns bar the latter's 20mm's AP ammunition yet it was venerable from every type of the formers guns, even the generic .303 30/06 8x57 ball ammunition. The A6M had very long range which seems to be it's selling point, the allies could have stripped any number of their planes down to the A6M's spec, I used a PR Spit as an example and could have also had its range and low speed agility but all that would have resulted in is more Marianas Turkey shoot's, the Luftwaffe's found that out when they stripped their 109's to make them competitive with the Mustang late in the war.

 

[MCamp]

The Zero wing was one continual structure - I believe other components will fail before a wing would tear off. This has been discussed several times on this form. I have never seen combat reports of this continually happening and IMO if it did happen it was probably due to previous battle damage.

View attachment 648377

Design Analysis of the Zeke 32 (Hamp - Mitsubishi A6M3)

I stand corrected

 

[GrauGeist]

The KI-43 (the "other" zero) is the one with structural issues with their wings. That problem was corrected in later variants.

And Japan did use it's aces as instructors. When the 251st (former Tainan Air Group) was recalled to Japan from Rabaul in '42, they were assigned to a flight school for about six months.
While this doesn't seem very long, it was still an opportunity for them to share their knowledge.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The KI-43 (the "other" zero) is the one with structural issues with their wings.

 

[R Leonard]

Lots of chatter touching on various subjects . . . a small contribution which I shall have to break into, oh, three pieces due to the 20,000 character limit . . .

Part the first

I am sometimes amazed at the survival of the 1950's era hoary tales of the vaunted China experience garnered by the IJN manages to permeate discussions unto today.

Most of this thought seems to have spread forth from the pop histories of the period and, like the internet, the repetition seems to make it true. However, studies conducted in the aftermath of the war clearly pose a different picture.

In December 1941, the Japanese Navy had some 3500 "front line" pilots (this comparing to some 2500 IJAAF available pilots) of whom about one half were carrier current, that is, assignable to carrier squadrons. The USSBS reports that of the 3500 or so IJN pilots, 600, with about 800 hours each on the average, were assigned to carrier groups. (See USSBS Report No. 62, Japanese Air Power, Pacific War, Military Studies, Military Analysis Division, July 1946, Appendix II, Japanese Air Personnel.) This proportion pretty much correlates with those of the USN/USMC. Just looking at active 1941 USN squadrons yields a similar number of available-right-now aviators. USN carrier squadrons, at the end of 1941 mustered about 580 flying slots in 38 squadrons. Land-based USMC VMF and VMSB squadrons probably accounted for another 200-250 readily available carrier qualified pilots. Certainly this was not the total pool of available carrier qualified USN/USMC pilots as it does not take into account carrier qualified pilots assigned to such mundane activities as training and staff positions, as well as land based squadrons. The same would be true of the IJN, there were undoubtedly many carrier qualified pilots not actually assigned to a carrier squadron and so operating. Around the start of the war a quick, dirty count comes up with about 4800 rated aviators in the USN (haven't gotten around to counting Marines), this includes USN and USNR officers as well as enlisted NAPs.

Additionally, it was a pre-war USN practice to move pilots from "community" to "community". Famed fighter pilot Jimmy Thach, for example, spent two or three tours in patrol planes, five to six years, if not more. All USN pilots, up until the rapid expansion of 1941, were carrier qualified at some point regardless of the community to which they were eventually assigned. One should remember that for the pre-war IJN, though, one was either a land based pilot or one was a carrier qualified pilot. Of course a carrier pilot could operate from shore stations, but the typical land-based IJN pilot was not carrier qualified.

In preparing for the war, the IJN brought its operational aircraft up to a level of about 1800 aircraft, with about 1200 of them shore based and 600 ship based (aircraft carriers and battleship and cruiser scouts). If there were, indeed, at least about 1500 carrier qualified IJN pilots, then, obviously they had twice as many pilots as carrier pilot slots.

As near as I can put together from various sources perused over the years, during the course of the war the IJN trained some 24,000 pilots of all stripes. Roughly 18,900 of them, and their pre-war compatriots, were killed, either in action, training, or operationally. Over 2500 of these were killed in suicide attacks.

Quoting from the USSBS report No. 62:

"4. Expansion in 1942
"The Japanese Army had a prearranged plan for expanding the pilot training program to meet wartime needs. That plan was put into effect in December 1941 and became operative in early 1942. Under it, 18 new training units were formed for the purpose of providing about a year's flying training for reserve personnel, both officers and enlisted men. The program for regular officers and enlisted men remained about what it had been before the war.

"At the beginning of the war, the Japanese Navy was producing pilots at the rate of 2,000 a year as compared with the Army's 750, and accordingly it made no large changes in the structure or size of its training organization. Two new training air groups were, however, put into operation late in 1942 and early in 1943 respectively.

"The 1942 expansion gave the Japanese Army a training organization which produced more than 2,700 pilots in both 1942 and 1943. Meanwhile, the Navy training organization was operating at a slightly increased tempo, and it produced 2,300 pilots in 1942 and 2,700 in 1943.

"5. Expansion in 1943 and 1944
"During 1942 and 1943, the Japanese Army and Navy together lost about 10,000 pilots, mainly in the Solomons, Bismarcks, and New Guinea. Moreover, the air potential of the Allies had finally become apparent to the high command and a substantial expansion of the size of both air arms was decided upon. As a part of this program and also to replace their heavy losses, both Army and Navy made plans to expand their training programs more than three times their existing size.

"The Japanese Army plan for expansion called for several changes in the training organization. The units which had been formed in 1942 to train reserves were equipped to give only intermediate or basic training instead of all phases of training, and their number was increased from 18 to 48. New units were formed to give primary training. Perhaps the most important development was the formation of operational training units to provide training in combat aircraft. Those units were supposed to relieve tactical units of the responsibility for providing newly assigned pilots with such training, although actually they never functioned with any degree of efficiency.

"The Japanese Navy increased the number of its training air groups from 15 to 48, but it did not materially alter the structure of its training organization. These groups operated from 65 bases, 2 in the Philippines, 5 in Formosa, 5 in the Singapore area, and the remainder in Japan. The Army moved a much higher percentage of its training organization to the Philippines and the southern area with the intention of profiting by the proximity of aviation fuel, but the result was to expose training bases to Allied air attacks and ultimately to isolation from Japan.

"The expanded training programs were designed to produce a total of over 30,000 pilots a year. Actually, that rate was never attained, but a somewhat lower rate was reached by about September of 1944 and maintained past the end of that year. The fuel shortage, which began late in 1944, and the Allied attacks on training bases were the principal causes of the failure of the training program to achieve the scheduled output.

"After the expanded training programs began to operate, the quality of Japanese pilots continued to fall off considerably. The basic reason for the decline was the reduction in flying training hours, especially in tactical units. That reduction in turn was caused by shortages in aircraft, in fuel (after September 1944), in instructors and by Allied air attacks on training installations. In addition, the quality of the pilots declined because of a considerable lowering in the physical standards for recruits and the absence of any program for rotating and rehabilitating pilots. These factors all reflected a decision by the high command that a large number of pilots was necessary even if quality had to be sacrificed to produce them. In consequence, the Japanese Air Force always had enough pilots to man the increasing number of planes then being produced, but by June 1945 the average flying time of both Army and Navy pilots was about 100 hours when committed to combat.

"6. Suicide Training
"After the Philippines campaign, it became plain that Japanese pilots could not compete with Allied pilots, and the high command was forced into a decision to place its main reliance upon suicide attacks, which even unskilled pilots could perform. In the winter and spring of 1945 all orthodox training came temporarily to a standstill, and although it was later resumed, particularly in respect of regular Army officers, most training units concentrated on the development of suicide pilots alone. The Army decided that a minimum of 70 flying hours should be given a suicide pilot. The Navy thought from 30 to 50 hours sufficient if the attack were made in a training plane. In any event, in the spring and summer of 1945, an attempt was made to turn out pilots of these experience levels and to give them some training in dive bombing, the orthodox tactic most resembling the suicide attack." (see above citation.)

If you look at USN pilot training, in the years 1925 through 1941 (very few aviators from classes prior to 1925 were still in flying billets by 1941) 7,061 pilots had completed the program. Of these, 44 percent, 3,112 completed the program just in 1941. Those most likely to endure most of the early fighting were those who completed flight training between 1934 and 1941, some 5,687 pilots (including Marines) – significantly already outnumbering the IJN pool. How many of these were carrier qualified? Most of them were at some point or other. Certainly not all were current, but most of them had at least qualified at some point.

In 1942 USN pilot training programs started to ramp up; 10,869 aviators received their wings of gold, almost twice as many as had completed the program in the previous 8 years. In 1943 there were 20,842 graduates; 1944, 21,067; and, with then end of the war in sight, 1945 ended with 8,880 graduates. Thus, in the period 1942 to 1945, the USN produced more than 2.5 times the number of pilots as the IJN. While the USN training program quickly eschewed the concept of "everyone gets carrier qualified," each of those USN pilots went through a program of primary, intermediate, advanced training. For those destined to be carrier pilots, there was assignment to a VF, VB, or VT operational training unit, carrier qualifications, and then combat preparation in RAGs before heading west. New pilots were arriving for action in USN carrier squadrons with as many as 600 hours flying under their belts and as much as 200 hours of that in type.

This was a level of training and preparation to which the IJN could never dream of competing. As the war progressed the IJN training programs suffered from an insufficient number of qualified instructors, lack of fuel for extensive flying time, poor maintenance of training aircraft, and shortages of ordnance. The two most critically lacking areas were, first, a too long, into 1943, adherence to traditional adversarial nature of their programs (for every graduate, there were nine others who did not) and, secondly, of course, time. There was never enough time to develop the students' skills, to practice attack tactics or defensive actions. Most of them arrived in combat squadrons with less than 200 hours in all, by the very end of the war, less than 100 hours. Most had to learn combat skills on the job once assigned to a combat squadron. By then, it is too late and few survived.

This training program was the ultimate, final devastating factor for IJN aviation, both in carrier and land based programs, doomed by their inability to make good their losses. While some like to believe that the cream of the IJN carrier aviators were wiped out at Midway, that is not exactly true. The loss of the four carriers in this battle meant that, no matter what, all of their aircraft were lost; probably about 256 planes were lost. This does not equate to the loss of 256 pilots; rather, the Japanese only lost somewhat less than 100 pilots and aircrewmen in the battle, most of whom met their ends aboard sinking carriers as opposed to air combat operations. Where the curve of the loss of experienced pilots started to drop off the chart was in the Solomons where both land-based pilots and, thrown in as reinforcements, carrier pilot losses, went beyond the ability of the IJN's training programs to replace them with a quality product. The short hiatus from the Solomons campaigns to the Mariana's campaign allowed the IJN some training and preparation respite, but it really was never enough to build air groups of the pre-war caliber. A substantial majority of these newly trained pilots, the second generation of Japanese pilots, if you will, along with many of the residual experienced leaders, were lost in the Battle of the Philippines Sea, or as it is known, "The Great Mariana's Turkey Shoot." Somewhere around 270 IJN planes and their crews were shot down, with no hope of rescue (see comments on SAR, below) for any who might have been able to survive their downing. Essentially, this action eliminated what was a second generation of IJN carrier pilots and was a blow from which the IJN never recovered.

Others would harp on a supposed overall superiority of the start of the war in the ranks of IJN carrier pilots. At the risk of being trashed for writing heresy, I would suggest that this, too, is somewhat of an over simplified if not distorted view. Popularly – and ironically this view is mostly espoused post war in US writings - the pre December 1941 IJN pilots are given credit for racking up all this great combat experience in China. Well, so what about this great combat experience? This was exciting work, bombing raids blasting relatively, certainly by later wartime standards, undefended villages, towns, cities and then odd USN or RN river gunboat. Fighter plane wise, this meant flying strike escort for these mostly unchallenged air raids; shooting up an occasional column of troops or refugees; and, on very rare occasions, cornering a bunch of Russian built and Chinese flown I-15 biplanes or a rare I-16 monoplane.

Also, consider that, as time went on, IJN air units had considerably less involvement in China than IJA air units. Also consider, then, that in virtually all, if not actually all, USN/USMC versus Japanese fighter encounters, in the 12/7/41 to 12/31/42 time period, were against IJN fighter planes and pilots; there were no encounters with the planes and flyers of the JAAF. This is not to say the IJN China exposed flyers had no combat experience, but to pose instead that it was, perhaps, a "lower quality combat experience" than that for which they are popularly given - not much more than overly realistic training. The entire argument of the IJN pilots having all this vast combat experience must rest on some fairly unlikely presuppositions, which anyone with a practical knowledge of military organizations and the vagaries of individual comings and goings would very aware, to wit, popularly but unlikely:

That all IJN pilots/air groups went off to China and obtained this combat experience; that all sorties resulted in air to air combat action; that all the IJN fighter pilots obtained air-to-air combat experience; and that all IJN fighter pilots' air-to-air combat experience was obtained flying the A6M2.

Further, for the popular argument to hold up, then all IJN pilots/air groups went off to fight the Americans with no pilot without this vast experience; that there were no transfers out of IJN air units; that there were no operational casualties; that there were no assignments of new pilots fresh from whatever advanced training; and that there were no transfers in from pilots who were busy elsewhere, like maybe training new pilots, during the China adventure. For all of these conditions to be met is extremely unlikely.

The reality was that there must have been new inexperienced IJN fighter pilots, there must have been some experienced pilots siphoned off to other duties, there must have been some injured or killed in routine flying accidents (remember carrier flying is more than just a little dangerous, easily a third or more of carrier planes lost were due to accidents or other mischance, without a shot being fired), there must have been some who chaffed at not flying in China, but then found themselves at the pointy end of the stick against the Americans.

USSBS comments specifically on the China experience level:
"Approximately 50 percent of Japanese Army pilots had had actual combat experience in China or in the border fighting against the Soviet Union which took place in 1939. About 10 percent of land based Navy pilots also had seen action in China. The experience in China was not particularly valuable in view of the lack of serious opposition provided by the Chinese Air Force, although bomber crews and ground support units received some training against live targets. In conflict with the Soviets, however, the Japanese Army Air Force met serious opposition and suffered heavy losses. Japanese Army Air Force officers now attribute a considerable part of the skill of Army pilots during the first days of the war to the lessons learned while fighting the Soviets." (see above citation.)

Significantly, whatever combat experience the IJN pilots did acquire in China would only stand them good stead if the USN pilots flew like the Chinese Air Force . . . which was, most definitely, not the case.

At the beginning of the war, depending on one's status a pilot, navigator, or observer trainee in pipeline of the IJN flight training program could expect to spend anywhere from 17 months up to as many as 42 months in training. Regular officers could expect the shortest training, 2 months in pre-flight (dropped in 1942), 6 months in Primary and Basic, 6 months in operational training and at least 3 months in tactical flight training. Reserve Officer Candidates (college grads less than 28 years old) could expect 4 months in preflight, 6 months in Primary and Basic, 6 months in operational and at least 3 months in tactical flight. Flying Technical Enlisted Trainees (serving personnel from surface forces) spent 6 months in preflight and similar tours lengths as the officers in the other categories. The longest training was endured by the Flying Branch Reserve Enlisted Trainees; these came from civilian life, had to be at least 14 years old and have at least 8 years of schooling. Their preflight training could be anywhere from a year to two years depending on age and school. Once their preflight was competed, the remainder of their training was as for the other categories above. There were no flying hours in preflight training. The syllabus called for a minimum 60 hours in trainers for regular and reserve officers during primary and basic flight training, 100 hours in combat types during operational training and 150 hours in assigned combat type during tactical training. Enlisted trainees (both types) were expected to acquire 44, 60, and 150 hours in the same categories.

 

[R Leonard]

Part the Second

I'll let LTC John C Marchant, USAAC, present the description of JAAF training at the start of the war, this from his article in Military Review, "The Development of Japanese Army Air Force Pilot Training" (Vol 25, #8, November 1945). This information correlates well with the postwar USSBS Report 62. See:
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p124201coll1/id/958/filename/959.pdf starting on page 52.

"In 1941, pilot training in the Japanese Army Air Force covered the four phases shown in the diagram, above (Figure 3). [ed. Which I have omitted from this tour-de-force]

"The following outline of the scope of this training indicates that the Japanese methods were quite comprehensive:

"PRE-FLIGHT. -
"1. Air Training Units (Koku Kyoiku Tai) consisted of civilians and volunteers who were permitted to transfer from other branches of the Army except military police. The training period for civilians lasted two years, and included basic military training and spiritual and psychological indoctrination. Military personnel transferring from ground units received eight months of training. No flying was taught. At the graduation they were classified as potential pilots, radio operators, etc., and entered the Air Service as superior privates.

"ELEMENTARY.-
"1. Elementary Air Schools (Hiko Gakko) received students from Air Training Units for primary and basic training. Primary training covered a period of six months, during which the student received twenty hours dual and seventy hours solo instruction. Aptitude tests were then given and the students designated as fighter, bomber, or reconnaissance pilots. Washouts, which averaged about seventy percent, had their choice of becoming radio operators, gunners, bombardiers, or navigators. For the successful students a basic training period of three months followed in which they received an additional thirty hours in advanced trainers. On graduation, pilots received a pilot's certificate equal to a peacetime pilot's license requiring a years' training.

"2. Air Academy (Koku Shikau Gakko). The Air Academy received officers and potential officers between the ages of sixteen and twenty-eight for the purpose of commissioning personnel for the Air Force. The academy consisted of twp sections:
a. Students: second lieutenants from other branches of the army who received one year of flight training.
b. Cadets: graduates of the Air Preparatory Schools who trained for thirty-two months and received commissions in the Air Force upon graduation.
The course at the Air Academy included flight training similar to that received at Elementary Air Schools.

" ADVANCED. -
"1. Advanced Air Schools (Hiko Gakko) Students proceeded to these specialized schools, located in Japan, from the Air Academy and the Elementary Air Schools. The peacetime course was for six months (shortened to four months during the war), during which fighter and reconnaissance pilots logged an additional 150 hours and bomber pilots about 200 hours in operational types of aircraft.
2. Flying Training Regiments (Kyoiku Hikonentai) were located overseas and provided advanced training in operational types of aircraft to graduates of the Air Academy and Elementary Air Schools. They served the same purpose as the Advanced Air Schools, fighter and reconnaissance pilots receiving 150 hours and bomber pilots 200 hours training in operational types of aircraft.

"OPERATIONAL. -
"Before being sent on an operation the pilot received from two to six months' further training within the unit to which he was assigned in a combat or overseas area. Here crews started training as a unit, pilots were instructed in local combat tactics, and the pilot was oriented on his area of operation."

So, what about all this superior Japanese training? Certainly, the Japanese Navy ran the most adversarial of training programs, and not just for pilots. Having had some small experience in participating, as both a trainee and a trainer, and in running training programs of a military nature, I agree that one must be firm on adhering to the training standard, i.e., a demonstration by the student that he can accomplish the task being trained. I am also absolutely, totally, certain that beating the daylights out of one's trainees is not conducive to optimal results.

So, the popular theory is that these green, inexperienced, fresh from training, USN/USMC pilots faced all these, to a man, combat experienced, multiple victory, mature late 20's to early 30's, rock steady, hardened professionals of the IJN. Not really true, statistically unlikely and largely stemming from 1950's mythology.

USN/USMC pilots of the period, while not combat experienced, were, in most cases, well trained, well led, and possessed of sound tactical doctrine (and, yes, I can point to units that perhaps did not meet that description, but they were a glaring and distinct minority). Squadron commanders and executive officers, for the most part, were experienced aviators who had received their wings by the early 1930's, the division and section leaders usually had anywhere from three years to slightly less than a year in type. What do you suppose the prewar USN/USMC pilots were doing while the 10% of IJN pilots were cavorting around in the air over China ... sitting around on their hands at the Kaneohe, Ford Island, or Norfolk NAS Officers' Clubs? No, they were flying and training, flying and training, flying and training, ad nauseum. They had a good idea who they were going to have to fight, and some, Lt Cdr's James Flatley and John Thach being the prime examples, had a pretty good idea how they were going to go about it.

An example of the USN squadrons would be the aviators from one fighter squadron, VF-42, who fought against the Shoho, Zuikaku, Shokaku, Akagi, Soryu, Hiryu, and Kaga air groups, as well as aircraft stationed at Tulagi. VF-42 had spent some 8 months on Neutrality Patrols in the Atlantic, flying F4F's (and before that in its previous identity of VS-41, SBUs) off Ranger, Wasp, and Yorktown before the attack on Pearl Harbor. In June of 1941, the squadron was attached to the Yorktown and, with the coming of the war, went to the Pacific aboard her. The experience level for the squadron, reported on 30 April 1942, ranged from a high of 3019.3 hours (Flatley, the XO) down to 274.4 hours (Ens Harry Gibbs, who joined the squadron on 8 December 1941, straight from ACTGLant just a week before the ship left Norfolk, VA for points west). The average pilot hours for the squadron were 989.4. A quick calculation shows us that 3.8 hours flying a day, 5 days a week, for a year would net you 988 hours flight time. In actuality, once assigned to a carrier squadron one could expect a pilot to acquire not more than about 10 hours a week if he really worked at it, or about 500 hours a year. Looking at reports of high tempo operations at the end of the war reveal the even in 1945, USN carrier pilots were still only averaging 10 hours a week in operational flying, this during the final July-August strikes. The squadron average, therefore, represents almost two years' worth of flying experience. All division and section leaders in the squadron had at least 600 hours recorded in their log books. One might want to compare the squadron average hours with the average IJN carrier pilot average quoted by USSBS and, usually, dredged up in discussions such as this . . . 800 hours.

The squadron suffered no combat casualties in the early raids, in fact, none until the Battle of the Coral Sea, where they lost two planes and one pilot in air-to-air combat. Another one plane and its pilot were lost operationally during the battle. The squadron was credited with 24 victories between 4 May 42 and 8 May 42. A month later, at Midway, where VF-42 pilots made up 64% (16 of 25) of Jimmy Thach's VF-3 pilots engaged on June 4th (and 59% of VF-3, overall), they lost 4 planes shot down and 2 pilots. Of claims credited to pilots flying with VF-3 at Midway, 17 of 27 went to the VF-42 contingent. Of a total of 21 pilots assigned to this squadron from 7 December, 1941 to the end of June 1942 when it was disestablished, only 6 planes and 3 pilots were lost in combat. This squadron was one of only two that flew at both at Coral Sea and at Midway (the other squadron being the Yorktown's VB-5, which was temporarily re-designated "VS-5" during the Midway period) and was the only US fighter squadron whose pilots fought at both battles. In an article in the Bureau of Naval Personnel Bulletin #318, August 1943, the VF-42 squadron commander, Lt. Comdr. Charles Fenton, remarked:

"This squadron was one of the finest of its day, was well trained under peacetime standards and the general flying experience of the pilots was wide. The squadron has an enviable record of victories at the time of its decommissioning in June 1942."

As an aside, in the same article, Fenton then went on to comment on his next assignment, that of commander of the newly established VF-11. (This, by squadron number count – VF-8 being the last of the prewar established squadrons – was the third new fighter squadron established since the start of the war. Fenton's comments are flavored of their times and may seem a little "rah-rah" to today's reader, but for the 1943 timeframe are fairly typical):

"Last fall, I was ordered to report as commanding officer of a new squadron, then forming at San Diego. With the exception of one officer from my old squadron, I had practically no one except new officers who had just completed training. It looked like it was going to be a terrific undertaking to train these apparently green fellows so that they would be ready for combat in a short time.
"They've been in the Pacific all this spring and you can judge how good they must be by the number of Japs being shot down these days. The Jap pilots are good, but they are far inferior to the pilots we are putting into combat. The success of our boys is due to their typical American courage backed up by the well rounded and complete training they receive."

Where the real difference lay, as I am always so quick to point out, was in tactics . . . and this is where the discussion wraps back around to training . . . without training and practice in tactics you are just boring holes in the sky until someone shoots you down. For example, while the USN/USMC fighter pilots specialized in deflection gunnery, the IJN pilots, while having some training in deflection gunnery, (do not for one second believe the Japanese knew nothing of deflection gunnery, they most certainly did) tended to prefer the high side rear or frontal attack. If their target turned away at the last instance before firing, as the USN pilots were trained to react, the attack was spoiled. It has been said that true deflection gunnery tactics ended forever the concept of the "dogfight" as it had been practiced since WWI and, to their detriment, preferred by the Japanese pilot ethos. If you do not train for and practice the art of deflection gunnery and you find yourself up against someone who does, you're already behind the curve and in deep trouble. When you add Thach's beam defense to deflection gunnery, you are close to a world-beater. Escorting the Yorktown's VT-3 on its strike on the Japanese carriers at Midway, Jimmy Thach led a 4-plane VF-3 division as cover. After losing one plane in the initial contact with the Japanese CAP, he initiated the beam defense tactic for the very first time with the remaining three planes of his division. They shot down at least four, and probably five, A6M2's with no further losses to themselves. In the process, they soaked up the attentions of some 12 of the Japanese CAP (almost a third of the airborne CAP) while the SBDs were gathering overhead. The Japanese reported that they had encountered some 18 Grumman fighters in this same action.

By late 1942 virtually all the USN/USMC fighter squadrons operated in two plane sections and four plane divisions, though some required some convincing to move away from the more traditional 3 and 6 formation . . . usually a practical demonstration was sufficient. Sections could be internally supportive one with one and externally supportive in divisions, two with two. The Japanese, on the other hand were saddled with the three-plane section, nine-plane division, a practice that looks nice in air shows and was more suitable for WWI type tactics. The 3-9 set up evolved during WWI as it provides a better lookout doctrine in the biplane world. The 2-4 set up takes advantage of the monoplane construction with no overhead and forward wing to block the view. While one might think that the greater numbers would work to the Japanese advantage, in practice it was hard to maintain section cohesiveness. Oft times the third man in a section turned out to be the odd man out and it was he who was sure to get burned in an approach on weaving F4Fs. The USN/USMC fighter pilots were already experimenting with, and some squadrons had firmly established, the 2-4 formations before they ever got into the war. VF-42 for example transitioned to F4Fs in March 1941 and by May they were using 2-plane sections and 4-plane divisions, exclusively, and never looked back. The Japanese maintained their 3-9 formations into 1944.

Bottom line is that the Japanese could not match the numbers of pilots trained and could not make good their own losses. In spite of whatever experience level they had acquired in China (and that argument is not very convincing) that experience did not prepare them for combat against the USN. While they did not do badly at first (and one must remember that the majority of the astounding success accorded to the A6M2 and its drivers, if you bother to look into it, was not against fighters; it was against, for lack of a better term, non-fighters and in shooting up parked aircraft) their inability to absorb losses and, importantly, combat lessons pretty much led them down a path to futility. I've always suspected that the inability of the Japanese to rapidly absorb combat lessons, beyond cultural reasons, was that those who could recognize what they were seeing and do something about in the long run were getting killed off before they could do so. And, certainly, a long road back for the USN, but one, especially as the Solomons campaign was drawing to a close, where a final victory lay as a prize at the end.

And, what of USN training? By mid-1942 with a massive construction effort to expand facilities, the wartime training process was fairly well established. The large difference between the wartime training process and the prewar was the advent of the operational training units. Prewar, a newly designated aviator, if headed for carriers, went to one of two advanced carrier training groups (ACTG), one based in Norfolk and the other in San Diego. For the patrol plane types there were the transitional training squadrons (TTS) one each at the same locations. The ACTGs slowly morphed into unit training programs under the Fleet Air commands rather than individual programs, the TTS eventually went away in late 1943.

Officers of the regular Navy, after two years of sea duty, could apply for aviation training. Enlisted men of the regular Navy who, in the opinion of their commanding officers had the potential to qualify, could request aviation training and, upon completion, would be designated as Naval Aviation Pilots - by the middle of the war, such enlisted personnel were sometimes rolled into the Aviation Cadet (AvCad) program and commissioned as Ensigns, USNR or USCGR or 2d Lieutenants, USMCR, upon completion of intermediate flight training.

Civilians were enrolled through the V-5 program as AvCads and commissioned in Reserves upon completion of flight training. These civilians were the source of the vast majority of the USN and USMC aviators. The Navy's pilot training program, as it evolved, was designed to bring in up to 2500 pilot candidates a month, certainly far more than could be drawn from the regular naval establishment. Between 1940 and 45 a total of 65,478 individuals were designated as Naval Aviators or NAPs (enlisted aviators). On 1 Jul 41 there were 4,617 naval aviators on active duty (3,936 officers & 681 NAPs); on 1 Jul 45 there were 60,095 naval aviators on active duty (59,609 officers & 486 NAPs).

The V-5 program provided for qualified civilians to enlist in the Navy for the purpose of attending flight training. The training of AvCads, as developed in the first year of the war, provided for selected applicants to attend a flight preparatory course for three months at one of 20 colleges across the country. This was an academic program preliminary to actual flight training. Upon completion, another two months was spent learning to fly light aircraft at one of 250 training centers operated by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Upon completion of this basic course, the AvCad then attended a pre-flight training course that largely consisted of physical and military training lasting about 3 months. This was followed by 2 months at a Naval Air Station or a Naval Air Reserve Base in Primary Flight Training. Collectively these preliminary training steps were referred to as elimination training. Prior to the war, should a student be eliminated he had the choice of continued enlisted service or separation, once the war started, if eliminated one was sent to other enlisted assignments. The Primary Flight Training portion was divided into six stages:

1. Primary Dual: in company with an instructor - basics of taxiing, take-offs, climbs, turns, spirals, glides, landings, stalls, spins and primary emergency procedures. Upon completion of this first stage, the AvCad performed a solo check flight.
2. Primary Solo: following a general review dual instruction, advanced tasks and techniques. With both dual and solo demonstration, covered in this phase were steeply banked turns, high altitude slips and spirals, spins, wingovers and reactive emergencies. Instruction included small field landings and slips to a landing, both dual and solo.
3. Advanced solo: both dual instruction and solo demonstration - loops, split-S, snap roll, pylons, precision landings with slips, spin recovery and field procedures.
4. Final: both dual and solo demonstration - General review stressing smoothness, reaction to strange field procedures with power, instruction in inverted stalls and spins and progressive spins.
5. Formation: Instruction and practice in formation flying techniques.
6. Night flying: Dual and solo night flying instruction.

At each of these 6 stages the AvCad had to receive a satisfactory check off before proceeding to the next stage. While all this was going on, there was also a ground training school which occupied about half of the AvCad's time, including study of power plants, photography, gunnery, aerology, aircraft structures, navigation and communications.

 

[R Leonard]

Part the Third

Upon successful completion of his primary training, the AvCad moved on to Intermediate Flight Training. This training was usually conducted at naval air training centers such as NAS Corpus Christi or NAS Pensacola. In his intermediate training the AvCad flew service type aircraft (types in squadron service as opposed to simpler training aircraft). Students were given the opportunity to request the type of aircraft in which they wanted to specialize. These types generalized as carrier (CV), patrol (VPB), utility (VJ/VR) or scout/observation (VO/VCS). There was no guarantee that one would be assigned as requested.

Initial intermediate training consisted of a refresh of skills taught in Primary Training in order to indoctrinate the AvCad in the operation of heavier, more powerful aircraft. Instrument training was heavily emphasized with the use of Link trainers and "under-the-hood" flying. The instrument flying program began with basic familiarization with instruments and their part in trimming; straight, smooth flight; climbs, glides, spirals, stalls and spins; intricate patterns; recovery from unusual situations; and rough air procedures. This phase also covered radio ranging, beam navigation, and methods of orientation. The satisfactory check for this phase included demonstration of primary skills, instrument flight and navigation, and instrument guided landing.

The next phase of intermediate training was Specialized Intermediate Training based on the AvCad's by now expected community assignment and centered on specific operational types. For carrier based types: VF training was 100 hours and included familiarization, acrobatics, formation tactics, primary and advanced fixed gunnery, combat tactics, glide bombing, navigation, night flying and carrier operations. VB training was 100 hours including familiarization, gunnery, as well as carrier operations and with the greatest emphasis placed on glide and dive bombing, navigation, scouting, communications and formation tactics. VT training was similar to VSB with the elements of the torpedo attack being the emphasis vice dive bombing. Intermediate ground school subjects included engineering and maintenance, navigation, communications, aerology, survival, and organization and operations of squadrons.
At the completion of Intermediate Flight Training the Aviation Cadet was awarded his wings, was assigned a permanent Naval Aviator number and, except for a very small number of NAPs, was commissioned in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. By now, the new naval aviator has spent seven or so months in the training pipeline.

The next step in Naval Aviator training was assignment to an operational training unit of the Naval Air Operational Training Command, NAS Jacksonville (NAOTC). It was at the Operational Training Unit (OTU) level that air crews were established, with enlisted aircrewmen being assigned with pilots in VB and VT aircraft types. These personnel assignments generally continued through the OTU period and on into operational squadrons. Prior to the Apr 42 establishment of the NAOTC, advanced training was accomplished at the Advanced Carrier Training Groups located at NAS Norfolk and NAS San Diego. OTUs were where most of the newly designated aviators received their training associated with his type assignment. Between one third and one half of each intermediate training class, the new naval aviators, were selected for carrier training.

Focusing on training of carrier pilots, those of the VF, VB, and VT variety of the species, operational training exposed the new aviator to in-type training in an environment not dissimilar to an active squadron. OTUs were deliberately organized as nearly as possible along the lines of an operational squadron.

In carrier-type OTUs there were approximately 100 aviators, with a sufficient number of instructors and service type planes. Each OTU was commanded by a Training Officer with the rank of lieutenant or above. Among his training staff were a ground training officer, a flight officer, a navigation officer, and officers bearing titles and responsibilities similar to those typically assigned to aviators in squadrons operating from a carrier.

Operational training was eight weeks in length. The average CV type aviator would accumulate about 110 flight hours during this time. In the typical training day, aviators were scheduled for not more than 4 hours flying a day with the remainder of the day's activities involving ground training activities.

In general, CV type OTU training instructions included five major points: (1) The use of the type's primary weapon, (2) Tactics and formation Flying, (3) Navigation, (4) Carrier operations – landing and launching, and, (5) Instrument-flying.

As training progressed, increasing emphasis was given to the employment of the primary offensive weapons of the type (VF, VB, or VT) to which the aviator was specializing; VF Fixed Guns, VB Bombs (by diving), VT Torpedoes and glide and level bombing. The CV bound aviator, before assignment to a fleet carrier squadron, was required to demonstrate their mastery of taking off from and landing aboard a floating airfield. In preparation for that milestone, experienced landing signal officers trained the fledglings on airfield marked to resemble the flight deck of a carrier, using the same signals that are used in the fleet. Following this ground training the aviator students, usually as a unit, were normally sent to the Carrier Qualification Training Unit located at NAS, Glenview, Illinois. There, using the available training carriers, USS Wolverine and the USS Sable the prospective carrier pilot performed the required number of take offs and landing to be certified as carrier qualified. On some occasions, a regular line carrier might be available in the waters near the OTU base allowing carrier qualifications to be performed without traveling to NAS Glenview. Completion of OTU was followed by assignment to an active squadron or back into the training command as an instructor.

Continuing with carrier types, it should be kept in mind that as much as possible, the Navy and Marines preferred to keep personnel together in their organizations rather than the individual missions accounting often found amongst the USAAF.

A carrier air group would work up at one or more shore installations with a targeted ready date firmly fixed on the horizon. From initial establishment or reforming from a previous deployment an air group might spend six to eight months working up for its next deployment. Once the air group is ready for deployment, presuming the availability of a flight deck, it heads off to combat aboard a carrier. It would remain in the combat theater until its scheduled replacement air group was ready for deployment at which point it would be withdrawn for reforming ashore. Replacement pilots and crews joining over the course of a deployment might, or might not, go ashore with the rotation; most did although there are certainly cases, though generally so unusual as to be remarked upon in the literature, of individuals being transferred to the incoming air group or to another in-theater air group altogether.

Once back ashore following a deployment there was usually a period of leave with the squadrons in a caretaker status until reformed. During that period as many as 60% of a squadron's pilots and crews or more might be transferred to another squadron or activity. It was in these periods that one sees pilots moving back to the training commands as instructors or for additional training, or for the more senior, as commanders and execs of still new squadrons being formed.

The US practice of moving folks from combat zones to training or other activities is well described in the literature and can be illustrated. Take as examples, depending on one's orientation some well-known or, perhaps, less well-known, and their wartime assignments:

Louis L Bangs:
Aug to Sep 1940 - AvCad, NRAB Kansas City elimination training
Oct to Nov 1940 - AvCad, NRAB Kansas City solo flight training
Jan to Aug 41 - AvCad, NAS Pensacola
Aug 41 to Feb 42 - ENS, Instructor Primary Flight Training NAS Pensacola
Feb to Dec 42 - LTJG, Instructor, Primary Instructors School NAS Pensacola
Dec to Apr 42 - LT, Chief Flight Instructor - Instructors School NAS Pensacola
Apr 43 - LT, Student Instrument Refresher Course
May to Jul 43 - LT, VF Instructor NAS Pensacola
Aug 43 to Jul 44 - LT, VB-10 (FO) USS Enterprise
Aug 44 - Leave
Sep 44 to Jun 45 - LT & LCDR, VB-98 (XO) NAS Los Alamitos
Jun 45 to Sep 46 - LCDR, VB-80 (CO) USS Boxer
Louis Bangs retired as a Captain in the 1962.

Howard J Boydstun:
Oct 1940 to May 41 - Seaman, USS New York
Jun 41 to Sep 41 Midshipman, V-7 program Northwestern University
Sep 41 ENS - resigned commission to enter V-5 program
Sep 41 to Nov 41 - S1c, elimination training NAAS Opa Locka. Boydstun was able to skip some of the non-flying portions of elimination training based upon his prior service.
Dec 41 to Apr 42 - AvCad, NAS Pensacola
May 42 to Jun 42 - AvCad & ENS, VF Training NAS Miami
Jul 42 to Oct 42 - ENS, ACTG NAS San Diego
Nov 42 to May 43 - ENS, VF-10 USS Enterprise
Jun 43 Leave
Jul 43 to Dec 44 LTJG & LT, VF-8 NAF Pungo, USS Intrepid, USS Bunker Hill
Dec 44 Leave
Jan 45 to Feb 45 - LT, Student, Primary Flight Instructors School NAS New Orleans
Mar 45 to Aug 45 - LT, Primary Flight Instructor NAS Dallas
Howie Boydstun retired a Captain in 1972.

Richard Emerson Harmer
Dec 41 to Aug 42 - LTJG, VF-5 USS Wasp
Aug 42 to Oct 42 - LT, VF-5 (XO) USS Saratoga
Oct 42 to Mar 43 - LT, Project AFFIRM NAS Quonset Point
Mar 43 to Dec 43 - LT, VF(N)-75 (XO) NAS Quonset Point
Dec 43 to Feb 44 - LCDR, VF(N)-101 (CO) NAS Barbers Point
Feb 44 to Sep 44 - LCDR, VF(N)-101 (CO) USS Enterprise
Sep 44 to Sep 45 - LCDR, NAS Vero Beach (Chf TrngOff - VF(N))
Chick Harmer retired a Captain in 1961

Arthur Ray Hawkins
May 42 to Jan 43 - AvCad, Flt Trng NAS Dallas
Jan 43 to Apr 43 - ENS, Opnl Trng NAS Miami
Apr 43 to Apr 43 - ENS, Car Qual USS Charger
Apr 43 to Sep 43 - ENS, VF-31 NAS Atlantic City
Sep 43 to Dec 44 - ENS & LTJG, VF-31 USS Cabot
Dec 44 to Jul 45 - LTJG, VF-31 NAAS Hollister
Jul 45 to Sep 45 - LTJG, VF-31 USS Belleau Wood
Ray "Hawk" Hawkins retired a Captain in 1973.

Maxwell Franklin Leslie
May 1940 to Dec 41 - LT & LCDR, VB-3 (XO) NAS San Diego
Dec 41 to Feb 42 - LCDR, VB-3 (XO) USS Saratoga
Feb 42 to Apr 42 - LCDR, VB-3 (CO) NAS Kaneohe Bay
Apr 42 to Jun 42 - LCDR, VB-3 (CO) USS Enterprise
Jun 42 to Jun 42 - LCDR, VB-3 (CO) USS Yorktown
Jun 42 to Nov 42 - CDR, CEAG USS Enterprise
Nov 42 to Jan 43 - CDR, NAS Jacksonville staff
Jan 43 to Mar 43 - CDR, NAS Daytona Beach (CO)
Mar 43 to Nov 43 - CDR, later CAPT, Naval Air Gunners School (CO) NAS Hollywood
Nov 43 to Apr 44 - CAPT, Student Army-Navy Staff College
Apr 44 to Jun 44 - CAPT, Instructor, Command & General Staff School
Jun 44 to Aug 44 - CAPT, ComAirForWestCarolines staff (OpnsO)
Aug 44 to Dec 44 - CAPT, 2 MAW staff (OpnsO) NOB Espiritu Santo
Dec 44 to Aug 45 - CAPT, ComPhibForPac (OIC Air Support Control)
Aug 45 to Sep 45 - CAPT, ComPhibForPac (CO Air Support Control 8)
Max Leslie was advanced to Rear Admiral upon his retirement in 1956.

I cannot think of, nor have I ever found mention, of any single US naval aviator in any of the operational communities who flew in action from the very beginning of the war to the very end. Certainly, there were those who were on active flying duty on 7 Dec 41 who were in operational squadrons at the end of the war and some of those squadrons were in combat. One that immediately comes to mind is Cleo Dobson. As a Lieutenant (jg) in Enterprise's VS-6, he was shot down over Pearl Harbor by Japanese fighters on 7 Dec. He went on to serve in combat in the early carrier raids of 1942 and by the time of the Battle of Midway he was serving as an LSO, still aboard Enterprise. From there he went to training duties at VTB-OTU-2 at NAS Jacksonville. He moved on to become exec of VF-86 and then, in Jan 45, when his VF-86 CO took over the newly formed VBF-86, Dobson became the VF-86's second skipper. As a Lieutenant Commander and CO of VF-86 he deployed aboard USS Wasp and by the end of the war was flying combat missions over the Japanese home islands.

Not all early war aviators were in flying billets at the end. When the Japanese finally threw in the towel, Captain John S Thach - as in "Thach Weave" - a new Lieutenant Commander running VF-3 in Dec 41, was by then a Captain, off the coast of Japan aboard USS Shangri-La, the operations officer for the 2nd Fast Carrier Task Force (TF-38), working for Vice Admiral John McCain. His assistants were a couple of lieutenant commanders with whom he had served early in the war, Noel A M Gayler - who had been in Thach's VF-3 at the start of the war before being sent over to VF-2 as XO just before Coral Sea in May 42 - and William N Leonard - who was the senior of Yorktown's resident VF-42 pilots assigned to VF-3 for the Battle of Midway deployment and filled the VF-3 XO slot during that deployment.

For those with an interest in USAAF training programs – I have very little such interest and so do not presume to comment on same – you may wish to take a look at this link. I am sure there would be something of interest. Numbered USAF Historical Studies

 

[R Leonard]

And a little fluff on comparative search and rescue, IJN v USN

Another great failure on the part of the IJN was something as fundamental as search and rescue. In fact, due to their organization, doctrine and resources the Japanese were never in a position to implement an effective search and rescue.

Look, for example, at the Solomon's campaign. From the start, Japanese air operations were primarily staged out of Rabaul, striking southeast towards Guadalcanal. These operations were at the far reach of effective strike range offering but scant minutes of combat time before one's ability to return was seriously compromised. Presuming one survived a ditching, there were simply no assets available to affect a rescue and, more importantly even if there were, there were no combat assets available to cover such operations. For the US types in the same situation, in more than just a few cases, the opposite was true . . . absent the presence of Japanese strike air, the US controlled the air at all other times, especially as the preponderance of increasing US air assets began to exert more pressure on the Japanese. Patrol planes, American and Commonwealth, in ever increasing numbers, could often find themselves in serendipitously in company with patrolling fighters as they went about their search routines, or, just as often, fighters were specifically tasked to provide coverage. Coupled with the possibility of fetching up on a shore where one might find oneself spirited off to a ragged coast watcher with a radio, one's chances of being returned were considerably better than a Japanese pilot in the same situation . . . indeed, making it ashore for a Japanese pilot might just be a case of simply another way to die.

Midway, is another example; US patrol planes operating out of Midway were part of a two week plus effort to scour the seas in the vicinity of the action. Not just a few US pilots and air crew owe their lives to this effort, not to mention a boat load of Japanese survivors of Hiryu to whom a patrol plane directed a USN ship to rescue.

The same thing happened in the Marianas where USN patrol planes and searching ships were able to rescue numerous pilots and crew floating about in the ocean. It was not a case of just picking up the Americans; there were not a whole lot of Japanese to be found.

Air-sea rescue became a specialty with USN and USAAF patrol squadrons being specifically tasked to the effort – there were, by the end of the war, beyond the typical VP/VPB patrol plane squadrons, specifically designated air-sea rescue squadrons, VH in USN squadron designations – as well as submarines and individual scout planes from surface warships. A US pilot ditching in the course of combat operations had a better than 50% chance of rescue. The Japanese pilot in the same situation was pretty much a write off because his compatriots were not in a position to make the same effort. Certainly some Japanese benefitted for the proximity of Japanese vessels which might be near-by when he went in the water, but if no one saw him go in, his chances were pretty slim unless spotted by an Allied search and he found it in himself to be willing to be picked up – sometimes getting found resulted in suicide.

Plucking downed aviators from enemy held waters, under fire, was not all that unusual, even in the confines the waters surrounding the Japanese home islands. Planning and coordinating air-sea rescue operations early-on became a routine, but significant piece of operations plans for strikes, with specific patrol plane assets covering known areas and submarines stationed at known points for easy contact and rescue coordination.

Lastly, one might consider the basic equipment, the airplane. It was a readily observed phenomenon that Japanese planes, when solidly hit, had an oft remarked upon tendency to explode, fall apart, or simply catch fire in a spectacular manner. One might presume that disastrous and fatal results from such instances might limit the number of potential survivors of an encounter. Not to say that US aircraft did not suffer similar effects, but equally remarked upon was the ability of US planes to absorb more damage and thus be able to depart the area of combat and wing their way closer to US forces and the potential for rescue.

If one looks at the record of USN combat type planes, for example, known to be lost from air action against Japanese aircraft, Japanese anti-aircraft fire, or some other combat related operational loss, one can find a rough total, combining all types, of about 3,367. Since most, but most certainly not all, USN pilots were officers, we can get a rough idea of survivability by looking at USN pilot officer losses from the same effects. Those 3,367 aircraft when taking into account pilots, co-pilots, and such (remembering that some of the VP types routinely carried as many as three pilots) the least number of pilots involved comes to about 3,611. USN pilot deaths from enemy action including operational losses in combat operations came to about 1,602, less than half the number of pilots involved in the aircraft losses. How many of the balance of some 2,000 were plucked from the water, I could not begin to guess, but I would not be at all surprised if a rather large, majority percentage of them, went for a swim.

Further, if one wants to restrict the research to the use of flying boats for SAR purposes, a significant piece of the puzzle would be production versus losses, that is how many of the service types of flying boat type aircraft (US = PBY, PB2Y & PBM series; IJN = H6K, H8K & H9K series were produced, say, from January 1940 to the end of the war, versus how many were lost in operations. (We might want to remember that the H9K series was primarily for training purposes, but since a not inconsiderable number of the USN types were used for training, the H9K is included.)

Total US production
PBY series*: 1,556
PBM series*: 1,269
PB2Y series*: 174
Total: 2,999
Gross total reported losses combat and operational: 215
Percent of production reported lost in combat or operationally 7.1%
* note that production numbers do not include models destined for lend-lease nor produced before 1940.

Total Japanese production and their reported combat losses
H6K series*: 181
H8K series: 167
H9K series: 31
Total: 379
Gross total reported losses combat and operational: 315
Percent lost of production reported lost in combat or operationally: 83.1%
* note that production numbers do not include models produced before 1940.

One might note that the end of war the inventory of Japanese flying boats, that is those still operational in the Japanese home islands at the end of the war totaled 9, yes, nine; that would be 5 H6Ks and 4 H8Ks, that could still get into the air in September 1945. Any surviving H9K series, or their losses for that matter, are not specifically mentioned in the available reports. Of these, today, I believe but a single H8K survives, located in Japan. This particular aircraft was held as captured war material by the USN until when it was returned to Japan in 1979 for restoration. The USN kept it parked at NAS Norfolk during most of the time in its possession. I remember, I was 9 or 10 at the time, actually looking inside (my memory: dark, cavernous and musty) when it was once briefly opened in the early 1960s. Oh, yeah, what happened to the other 55? Your guess is as good as mine, probably fetched up on a beach someplace inoperable or, equally likely, flew off somewhere and never returned and was never reported.

The inference to be drawn, though, just from production numbers, is that the Japanese did not ever have sufficient inventory at any one point in the war for dedicated SAR mission tasking as compared to available inventory of US production. Adding to those numbers the losses incurred by the Japanese, and the lack of SAR, especially the "S" search part becomes painfully obvious. Just another case of the greater production – in this case aircraft AND pilots – having a greater impact on operations, both in terms of operations, generally, and greater mission flexibility. Carried a step further, if one were to look at the end of the war, the USN had six dedicated SAR squadrons (VH-1 through VH-6) in the Pacific Theater, operating 6 flying boats (usually of the PBM variety) each. These squadrons were specifically tasked with SAR in support of and co-located in combat operations. At the same time there were some 25 other flying boat type equipped squadrons in the Pacific, to the west, northwest, and southwest to the far reaches of the USN operational theater, operating some 390 plus aircraft, any one of which were operated by folks trained and prepared to render rescue service or coordination. That's looking only at August 1945; some 425 plus available aircraft, more than the total Japanese production of flying boats for the entire war. This does not count the VPB squadrons stateside reforming nor the 8 VPB squadrons operating flying boats in the Atlantic, nor replacement or OTU training squadrons, nor transportation and utility squadrons, nor aircraft in maintenance and repair units, nor those assigned to headquarters commands, nor special development squadrons, nor general pool aircraft nor flying boat types assigned to any of a plethora of other activities.

For some basics on SAR orientation in the Pacific pages 97 through 104 of
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p4013coll8/id/2397/filename/2386.pdf this, entitled "War Zone Familiarization – Pacific Ocean Areas"

USAAF SAR history can be found described in "Air-Sea Rescue, 1941-1952" by Frank E Ransom, USAF Historical Study # 95, found at

https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Studies/51-100/AFD-090602-014.pdf

Chapter 5, beginning on page 76 covers the Pacific and CBI theaters. If you read the orientation in the first link, you'll be happy to find some of the exact wording in this same chapter. Always nice to know they were consistent. Brief (very) description of USN SAR starts on page 102.

The Air Force Historical Research Agency - Numbered USAF Historical Studies (Numbered USAF Historical Studies) as mentioned in a previous post has some pretty interesting documents for folks who might have an interest in the USAAF and WW2.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Rich - as always excellent stuff!