ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
An interesting site that has information on the RAAF Beaufort & their torpedo experience.
"RAAF Nowra: A History"
"RAAF Nowra: A History"
The real combat history of the Ki-43
- Thread starter Wild_Bill_Kelso
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- #122
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
Yeah this is a bit confusing!! I specifically mentioned that because Claringbould says it on page 25 of South Pacific Air War, Volume V.
"However, the supply of aerial torpedoes was far from assured. Since the start of the Pacific War, there had been no direct supply of American aerial torpedoes to either the USAAF or the RAAF in the SWPA. Instead, control of local torpedo stocks was vested in the USN, and only a slim stock was available for the RAAF. The Beauforts were able to carry the Ameican Type XIII torpedo, albeit with some minor modifications. However, the Type XIIIs were heavier and bulkier than the British torpedoes for which the Beaufort had been designed. This meant that the Beaufort's flying performance was degraded due to the additional weight and drag of the American munition.
Instead, the RAAF preferred the British Mk. XII torpedo, of which the RAAF received 50 transferred via the RAn in 1942. Of this number, 15 were allocated to Nowra for training, leaving just 35 for operational use*. Given that the needs of a single torpedo squadron were estimated at 75 torpedoes per six months, the stock of 35 torpedoes would barely last No. 100 Squadron until the end of 1942. Indeed, by January 1943 the Australian Air Board was recommending the acquisition of many hundreds of torpedoes, both through local manufacture and from the US. However in the immediate term the supply of aerial torpedoes in the SWPA remained poor."
* he notes here that "Torpedoes for training had the warheads removed and were recovered and reused. The wastage rate was estimated at 5% of the number of torpedoes dropped."
So it sounds like they had a few.
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- #123
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
This is quite helpful, it gives a bunch of other info I didn't have including on the seaplane units like 107 Squadron with kingfishers. Those and the Japanese equivalent units were left out of my other sources.
He also mentions a Dutch unit, No 18 Netherlands East Indies squadron, which was flying B-25s. What a wild mix. Apparently they sunk a Submarine in June 1942 and then became operational in the Dutch Indies from January 1943.
He also mentions a second Beaufort unit, 7 RAAF that I didn't have on my list. Originally flying Hudsons , they transitioned to Beauforts in 1942. They were operating near Townsville and flew missions protecting convoys. "During these operations, the squadron's aircraft damaged another Japanese submarine, shot down two Japanese Aichi E13A "Jake" seaplanes and damaged several others.[5]"
Another question on both 100 RAAF and 7 RAAF, were these the Australian assembled Beauforts with the US made R-1830 Twin Wasp engines? Or British supplied ones?
This source notes that the Australian produced Mk XV arrived late and was not used operationally.
Bristol supplied a single Taurus engined Beaufort to Australia as a pattern aircraft which was re-engine with P&W Twin Wasps. All Australian production aircraft had Twin Wasps for which there was also Australian production.
collections.museumsvictoria.com.au
The story of the NEI units in Australia can be found here.
Pratt & Whitney R-1830 Twin Wasp Aero Engine
The Pratt & Whitney Wasp series are probably the most important piston aero engine designs ever built. They powered many of the record breaking aircraft of the 1930s and were produced in larger numbers than any other aero engine. The 14-cylinder R-1830 Twin Wasp was a development of the...
collections.museumsvictoria.com.au
The story of the NEI units in Australia can be found here.
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- #125
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
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- Mar 18, 2022
Wow interesting so these Beaufort already active in 1942-43 were the modified / Australian hack of the Beaufort?
Australia chose the Beaufort in 1938/39 as it seemed the best GR aircraft available at the time. The P&W engines was chosen in view of anticipated problems getting Taurus engines from Britain. These proved well founded with the outbreak of war when exports of Taurus engines from Britain were stopped. Later Bristol built P&W powered Mk.II/IIa in Britain.
The first 180 Australian Beauforts were ordered 1 July 1939 with DAP. 90 for RAAF & 90 for RAF to re-equip the 2 Vildebeest squadrons in Malaya. The first totally Australian production aircraft flew in Aug 1941. The first 5 arrived in Singapore in Dec 1941 for 100 sqn RAF, as we have discussed on previous threads. After the fall of Singapore all were passed to the RAAF. 100 sqn RAF then became 100 sqn RAAF.
Edit. Good history of Australian Beaufort here.
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- #127
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
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- Mar 18, 2022
it seems like later in the war (1943-44?) the Australian Beauforts, not sure if this was 100 Sqn or another, became rather effective in sinking Japanese ships. Not sure what torpeodes they were using by then. This is why I'm interested. They seem to have done a bit better than the ones in the Med, which were able to sink ships but at a heavy cost in losses.
The Beaufort became the main RAAF light bomber in 1942 not just an anti-shipping and GR aircraft. It replaced the Hudson. About 10 squadrons operated it as their main equipment at some point in WW2. There were still 7 in Aug 1945, most being in New Guinea.
By way of comparison only 1 sqn flew A-20 Bostons (until late 1944 replaced by Beaufighters), 5 flew Beaufighters (4 saw action), 2 flew FB Mosquitos in 1945 (1 saw combat), 1 flew B-25 Mitchells (plus 18 NEI) and 1 flew PV-1 Ventura.
Edit And 5 Vengeance sqns (4 saw combat) and which went on to become Liberator units in 1944/45.
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #129
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
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- Mar 18, 2022
Vengeance is another very interesting aircraft which seems to have had a moment in the Pacific and Burma.
Bostons were good but very short ranged, so I can see Beauforts being a better overall weapon for them. You needed long range in that zone for the kind of thing they needed twin engined bombers for.
Bostons were good but very short ranged, so I can see Beauforts being a better overall weapon for them. You needed long range in that zone for the kind of thing they needed twin engined bombers for.
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- #130
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
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- Mar 18, 2022
Do you have any performance stats for the Beaufort with the P&W engine?
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 802
- Sep 30, 2021
March 1937 Australia ordered 40 Bristol General Reconnaissance type 149 later called Bolingbroke, 10 more in November. December 1937 the Bolingbroke was cancelled (some changes and the type number used for Blenheim IV, Canada went with the name and some of the GR changes as well for their version of the Blenheim IV), February 1938 RAAF order changed to type 152 Beaufort, in August the order raised to 90, serials A9-1 to A9-90
Early 1939 a British Mission recommended Australia build Beauforts, report given 18 March, approved in principle by both governments on 24 March, Bristol had actually received an instruction to proceed on 26 January. There would be 180 built, the first 90 for the RAF the second 90 for the RAAF, 250 Taurus engines to be imported. Australia created the organisation to build the Beaufort on 1 July 1939, the Aircraft Production Branch of the Department of Supply and Development.
Engineless pattern aircraft L4448 (A9-1001) shipped in October 1939, arriving December 1939, the only British built Beaufort to arrive in Australia, permission to assemble it to flying status given in May 1940, first flew with Twin Wasps 5 May 1941. The Bristol Twin Wasp prototype N1110 initially used the S1C3-G Twin Wasp version Australia was going to build when first flown on 23 November 1940, and after these test flights were completed switched to the S3C4-G version the RAF was going to use. The engines used for the Australian version tests are reported to have been shipped to Australia.
The decision to build the Pratt and Whitney R-1830 Twin Wasp in Australia was taken on 31 October 1939, Britain asked for this in September, was initially told no, asked for a reconsideration, was told yes on the same day Britain sent a no need for them message, but it had been announced to the public. Ideas for fitting it to the Beaufort date from March 1939 given reports of problems with the Taurus engine. The October decision assumed the first 50 Beauforts would have Taurus engines, the remaining 130 Twin Wasp (though in May 1940 there was an idea all RAF ones would have Taurus) but on 16 July 1940 the RAF agreed to accept all 90 with Twin Wasps, the formal RAAF order was made on 20 July 1940 for 90 Beaufort mark III with Twin Wasp engines (The formal British order for 90 Beauforts was made in 1939, requisition in November 1939). At that stage the mark I was for Beauforts with Taurus 2 engines, mark II for Taurus 3. In December 1941 the designations were mark II for RAF Beauforts fitted with S3C4G Twin Wasp engines and mark V for RAAF Beauforts fitted with SC3G Twin Wasps. Britain built 165 mark II September 1941 to July 1942 and 250 mark T.II August 1943 to November 1944. (The Mk.IV was to have been powered by the Taurus XX, have the Australian-type enlarged fin, etc. AW372 was modified as the prototype.)
The RAF issued 90 serials, T9540 to T9569, T9583 to T9608 and T9624 to T9657 and the RAAF initially allocated A9-91 to A9-180 for its aircraft, then A9-1 to 90 after the RAAF order for British built Beauforts was cancelled, then when all production was allocated to the RAAF T9540 became A9-1 and so on. Only 7 Beauforts were delivered to the RAF and these were quickly returned or crashed on delivery flights, but the first 58 initially used their RAF serials with some lost before an RAAF serial was applied.
The RAAF order from Britain was slowly reduced, firstly by 10 in June 1939 to help pay for 18 Beaufighters, another 50 cancelled in December 1939 to be replaced by 50 Hudsons plus another 16 to help pay for the increased costs of Hudson order, the remaining 14 were to be Twin Wasp powered with 8 Australian order engines sent to Britain for flight tests, these 14 were finally cancelled in April 1940, along with the Beaufighter order.
The RAAF proposed purchase of 90 more locally made Beaufort for its 32 Squadron plan, so taking the RAAF order total to 180, approved on 12 February 1941. However on 26 February 1941 the RAAF ordered 52 Lockheed Hudson and cancelled 52 of the just made Beaufort order but assumed more British orders were coming, so material gathering went ahead. On 20 May 1941 the remaining 38 Beauforts of the February 1941 order were cancelled, replacing them with another 94 Lockheed Hudson (Hopefully some to all Lend-Lease), making the total Hudsons on order 146.
In April 1941 Britain asked to increase their order from 90 to 180, which was agreed. In September 1941 the British said they would absorb up to 40 aircraft a month from Australia. On 2 February 1942 the Australian War Cabinet authorised Beaufort production of 20 per month expanding to 40 per month.
In early 1942 the Australian Prime Minister advised the High Commissioner for Australia in the United Kingdom that, in view of the conditions then existing, the Commonwealth Government considered it to be of vital importance that the first 180 Beauforts - other than the first six which had been flown to Singapore by RAF pilots - should be retained in Australia for local defence purposes and requested him to represent the position fully to the United Kingdom Government and obtain its concurrence.
On April 20, 1942 the High Commissioner for Australia replied in the following terms,
"In view recent inter-Allied arrangements for pooling resources and distributing in light strategic needs, the United Kingdom Government no longer regard as binding the arrangement to allocate to them 90 of the first 180 Beauforts manufactured in Australia. Air Assignments Sub-Committee has allocated 100 percent Australian Beauforts to Australia.
At the same time the United Kingdom Government does not officially endorse any proposal which amounts to withdrawing Australian Beauforts permanently from general pool. Short of considerable change of strategic situation practical considerations, however, make it most unlikely that the United Kingdom Government would wish for a share of this Australian Production."
Total on order became 450 Beauforts approved in July 1942, in January 1943 this became 700. Australian production was between August 1941 and August 1944 at Fishermen's Bend, Melbourne and Mascot, Sydney, A9-1 to 5 and then all odd numbered serials came from Fishermen's Bend while even numbered serials from A9-6 onward came from Mascot. Twin Wasp production began in November 1941 finishing in August 1945, 870 built for the 700 Beauforts and 250 Boomerangs, engine imports were needed including as spares/replacements for Hudsons. On 1 May 1941 report, 61 S3C4-G have arrived, 61 are en route
Australian Mark, Twin Wasp version
V, S3C4-G, A9-1 to 50, Curtiss Electric propellers
VA, S3C4-G, A9-151 to 180, Hamilton Standard Constant Speed propellers
VI, S1C3-G, A-51 to 90, Curtiss Electric propellers
VII, S1C3-G A9-91 to 150, Hamilton Standard Constant Speed propellers
VIII S3C4-G, A9-181 to 700, Curtiss Electric propellers
"Although nearly 1000 Twin Wasps were made in Australia, they never produced R-1830 with two stage or two speed supercharger. Australia was only building version R-1830 S1C3G with single speed single stage supercharger in two variants - engines serial Nos.1 to 581 inclusive were originally fitted with coupled (rigid) reduction gear drives (US designation for this variant was R-1830-82), engine serial No. 582 and subsequent were fitted with de-coupled (splined) reduction gear drives (US designation R-1830-90)."
RAAF Beaufort squadrons, No. 1 from December 1943 to January 1945 (Beaufort replaced by Mosquito), No. 2 from January to May 1944 (Beaufort replaced by Mitchell), No. 6 from August 1943 to October 1945, No.7 from August 1942 to October 1945, No. 8 from March 1943 to October 1945, No. 13 from August to December 1943 (Beaufort replaced by Ventura), No. 14 from December 1942 to October 1945, No. 15 from January 1944 to October 1945, No. 32 from February 1943 to October 1945, No. 100 (RAF until February 1942) February 1942 to July 1946.
There seems to be no evidence the RAAF Beauforts scored a torpedo hit in combat, after the Battle of the Bismarck Sea the Japanese normally withdrew the larger merchant ships from places the RAAF could attack them. The GR Beaufort units, torpedo capable, were changed to bombers as a result.
JANAC Assessment sinkings
Australian Aircraft: 2 naval vessels 400 tons and 2 merchant ships 10,369 tons
Australian Mines: 3 naval vessels 6,492 tons and 6 merchant ships 14,541 tons
Australian and Indian Surface Craft 1 naval vessel 525 tons
United States and Australian Aircraft 4 naval vessels 7,550 tons and 7 merchant ships 37,072 tons
United States, Australian, and Netherlands Aircraft 2 merchant ships 16,362 tons
Total Japanese losses 686 naval vessels 1,965,646 tons and 2,346 merchant ships 8,618,109 tons
The RAAF A-20 Boston, Buffalo, Ryan and Kingfisher came from Dutch orders (along with some P-40E-1), the RAAF had to take what it could get 1942/43. In 1943/1944 the Ventura were 20 B-34 and 55 PV-1, thanks to the US production shift. The Dutch tried to form a second Mitchell squadron, number 119, it existed September to December 1943 but never became operational, replaced by 120 squadron with P-40.
One of the few times IJN submarines undertook commerce warfare was off the east coast of Australia, requiring the RAAF to do patrols, including by OTU based reserve squadrons flying Ansons.
Vengeance squadrons, No 12 from October 1942 to June 1944, No 21 from September 1943 to June? 1944, No. 23 from June 1943 to July 1944, No. 24 from June 1943 to March 1944, No. 25 July 1943 to December 1944, the latter stayed in Perth Western Australia. No. 12 was in Darwin until transferring to Merauke in southern then Dutch New Guinea, No. 21 was in New Guinea January to March 1944, No. 23 was in New Guinea January to March 1944, No. 24 was in New Guinea October 1943 to March 1944, but a detachment with aircraft had arrived in August.
Early 1939 a British Mission recommended Australia build Beauforts, report given 18 March, approved in principle by both governments on 24 March, Bristol had actually received an instruction to proceed on 26 January. There would be 180 built, the first 90 for the RAF the second 90 for the RAAF, 250 Taurus engines to be imported. Australia created the organisation to build the Beaufort on 1 July 1939, the Aircraft Production Branch of the Department of Supply and Development.
Engineless pattern aircraft L4448 (A9-1001) shipped in October 1939, arriving December 1939, the only British built Beaufort to arrive in Australia, permission to assemble it to flying status given in May 1940, first flew with Twin Wasps 5 May 1941. The Bristol Twin Wasp prototype N1110 initially used the S1C3-G Twin Wasp version Australia was going to build when first flown on 23 November 1940, and after these test flights were completed switched to the S3C4-G version the RAF was going to use. The engines used for the Australian version tests are reported to have been shipped to Australia.
The decision to build the Pratt and Whitney R-1830 Twin Wasp in Australia was taken on 31 October 1939, Britain asked for this in September, was initially told no, asked for a reconsideration, was told yes on the same day Britain sent a no need for them message, but it had been announced to the public. Ideas for fitting it to the Beaufort date from March 1939 given reports of problems with the Taurus engine. The October decision assumed the first 50 Beauforts would have Taurus engines, the remaining 130 Twin Wasp (though in May 1940 there was an idea all RAF ones would have Taurus) but on 16 July 1940 the RAF agreed to accept all 90 with Twin Wasps, the formal RAAF order was made on 20 July 1940 for 90 Beaufort mark III with Twin Wasp engines (The formal British order for 90 Beauforts was made in 1939, requisition in November 1939). At that stage the mark I was for Beauforts with Taurus 2 engines, mark II for Taurus 3. In December 1941 the designations were mark II for RAF Beauforts fitted with S3C4G Twin Wasp engines and mark V for RAAF Beauforts fitted with SC3G Twin Wasps. Britain built 165 mark II September 1941 to July 1942 and 250 mark T.II August 1943 to November 1944. (The Mk.IV was to have been powered by the Taurus XX, have the Australian-type enlarged fin, etc. AW372 was modified as the prototype.)
The RAF issued 90 serials, T9540 to T9569, T9583 to T9608 and T9624 to T9657 and the RAAF initially allocated A9-91 to A9-180 for its aircraft, then A9-1 to 90 after the RAAF order for British built Beauforts was cancelled, then when all production was allocated to the RAAF T9540 became A9-1 and so on. Only 7 Beauforts were delivered to the RAF and these were quickly returned or crashed on delivery flights, but the first 58 initially used their RAF serials with some lost before an RAAF serial was applied.
The RAAF order from Britain was slowly reduced, firstly by 10 in June 1939 to help pay for 18 Beaufighters, another 50 cancelled in December 1939 to be replaced by 50 Hudsons plus another 16 to help pay for the increased costs of Hudson order, the remaining 14 were to be Twin Wasp powered with 8 Australian order engines sent to Britain for flight tests, these 14 were finally cancelled in April 1940, along with the Beaufighter order.
The RAAF proposed purchase of 90 more locally made Beaufort for its 32 Squadron plan, so taking the RAAF order total to 180, approved on 12 February 1941. However on 26 February 1941 the RAAF ordered 52 Lockheed Hudson and cancelled 52 of the just made Beaufort order but assumed more British orders were coming, so material gathering went ahead. On 20 May 1941 the remaining 38 Beauforts of the February 1941 order were cancelled, replacing them with another 94 Lockheed Hudson (Hopefully some to all Lend-Lease), making the total Hudsons on order 146.
In April 1941 Britain asked to increase their order from 90 to 180, which was agreed. In September 1941 the British said they would absorb up to 40 aircraft a month from Australia. On 2 February 1942 the Australian War Cabinet authorised Beaufort production of 20 per month expanding to 40 per month.
In early 1942 the Australian Prime Minister advised the High Commissioner for Australia in the United Kingdom that, in view of the conditions then existing, the Commonwealth Government considered it to be of vital importance that the first 180 Beauforts - other than the first six which had been flown to Singapore by RAF pilots - should be retained in Australia for local defence purposes and requested him to represent the position fully to the United Kingdom Government and obtain its concurrence.
On April 20, 1942 the High Commissioner for Australia replied in the following terms,
"In view recent inter-Allied arrangements for pooling resources and distributing in light strategic needs, the United Kingdom Government no longer regard as binding the arrangement to allocate to them 90 of the first 180 Beauforts manufactured in Australia. Air Assignments Sub-Committee has allocated 100 percent Australian Beauforts to Australia.
At the same time the United Kingdom Government does not officially endorse any proposal which amounts to withdrawing Australian Beauforts permanently from general pool. Short of considerable change of strategic situation practical considerations, however, make it most unlikely that the United Kingdom Government would wish for a share of this Australian Production."
Total on order became 450 Beauforts approved in July 1942, in January 1943 this became 700. Australian production was between August 1941 and August 1944 at Fishermen's Bend, Melbourne and Mascot, Sydney, A9-1 to 5 and then all odd numbered serials came from Fishermen's Bend while even numbered serials from A9-6 onward came from Mascot. Twin Wasp production began in November 1941 finishing in August 1945, 870 built for the 700 Beauforts and 250 Boomerangs, engine imports were needed including as spares/replacements for Hudsons. On 1 May 1941 report, 61 S3C4-G have arrived, 61 are en route
Australian Mark, Twin Wasp version
V, S3C4-G, A9-1 to 50, Curtiss Electric propellers
VA, S3C4-G, A9-151 to 180, Hamilton Standard Constant Speed propellers
VI, S1C3-G, A-51 to 90, Curtiss Electric propellers
VII, S1C3-G A9-91 to 150, Hamilton Standard Constant Speed propellers
VIII S3C4-G, A9-181 to 700, Curtiss Electric propellers
"Although nearly 1000 Twin Wasps were made in Australia, they never produced R-1830 with two stage or two speed supercharger. Australia was only building version R-1830 S1C3G with single speed single stage supercharger in two variants - engines serial Nos.1 to 581 inclusive were originally fitted with coupled (rigid) reduction gear drives (US designation for this variant was R-1830-82), engine serial No. 582 and subsequent were fitted with de-coupled (splined) reduction gear drives (US designation R-1830-90)."
RAAF Beaufort squadrons, No. 1 from December 1943 to January 1945 (Beaufort replaced by Mosquito), No. 2 from January to May 1944 (Beaufort replaced by Mitchell), No. 6 from August 1943 to October 1945, No.7 from August 1942 to October 1945, No. 8 from March 1943 to October 1945, No. 13 from August to December 1943 (Beaufort replaced by Ventura), No. 14 from December 1942 to October 1945, No. 15 from January 1944 to October 1945, No. 32 from February 1943 to October 1945, No. 100 (RAF until February 1942) February 1942 to July 1946.
There seems to be no evidence the RAAF Beauforts scored a torpedo hit in combat, after the Battle of the Bismarck Sea the Japanese normally withdrew the larger merchant ships from places the RAAF could attack them. The GR Beaufort units, torpedo capable, were changed to bombers as a result.
JANAC Assessment sinkings
Australian Aircraft: 2 naval vessels 400 tons and 2 merchant ships 10,369 tons
Australian Mines: 3 naval vessels 6,492 tons and 6 merchant ships 14,541 tons
Australian and Indian Surface Craft 1 naval vessel 525 tons
United States and Australian Aircraft 4 naval vessels 7,550 tons and 7 merchant ships 37,072 tons
United States, Australian, and Netherlands Aircraft 2 merchant ships 16,362 tons
Total Japanese losses 686 naval vessels 1,965,646 tons and 2,346 merchant ships 8,618,109 tons
The RAAF A-20 Boston, Buffalo, Ryan and Kingfisher came from Dutch orders (along with some P-40E-1), the RAAF had to take what it could get 1942/43. In 1943/1944 the Ventura were 20 B-34 and 55 PV-1, thanks to the US production shift. The Dutch tried to form a second Mitchell squadron, number 119, it existed September to December 1943 but never became operational, replaced by 120 squadron with P-40.
One of the few times IJN submarines undertook commerce warfare was off the east coast of Australia, requiring the RAAF to do patrols, including by OTU based reserve squadrons flying Ansons.
Vengeance squadrons, No 12 from October 1942 to June 1944, No 21 from September 1943 to June? 1944, No. 23 from June 1943 to July 1944, No. 24 from June 1943 to March 1944, No. 25 July 1943 to December 1944, the latter stayed in Perth Western Australia. No. 12 was in Darwin until transferring to Merauke in southern then Dutch New Guinea, No. 21 was in New Guinea January to March 1944, No. 23 was in New Guinea January to March 1944, No. 24 was in New Guinea October 1943 to March 1944, but a detachment with aircraft had arrived in August.
- Thread starter
- #132
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
Yeah I was reading the operational history of the Australian Beauforts. It sounds like they got more mileage out of them as bombers. They had really poor luck as torpedo carriers, both in training and in actual combat.
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- #133
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
Ok back to Green Hell
New Guinea / Solomons
May 1943
Ki-43 units -1st Sentai (Ki-43-I, rotated out in September 1943), 11th Sentai (rotated out in May 1943) 24th Sentai (rotated out in October 1943), 59th Sentai (Ki-43-I, rotated out in October 1943, then again in Feb 1944), 14th Hikodan (arrived in September 1943), 13th Sentai (Ki-45 and Ki-43-I, withdrawn end of November 1943), 248 Sentai (arrived November 1943), 63rd Sentai (arrived January 1944), 33rd Sentai (arrived Feb 1944), 77th Sentai (arrived Feb 1944) (All Ki-43-II except where stated),
Other fighters - 68th Sentai (Ki-61), 78th Sentai (Ki-61)
The author sets the tone for the next section by noting: "JAAF fighter units were locked in a desperate battle with Allied air forces in the New Guinea area, and they would eventually suffer losses several times those sustained in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theatre. Their victory claims would also be over-inflated by a similar margin. JAAF fighter pilots would claim many victories at times when Allied losses were nil. As it happens, USAAF fighter pilots in New Guinea and the South West Pacific area also tended to over-claim to a greater extent than their counterparts in the CBI."
One comment on overclaiming by yours truly. I think a lot of the overclaiming was unintentional, and it was exacerbated in this area for a couple of reasons. First, aircraft like the Ki-43 were tougher than people generally assumed, and could be used evasively very effectively to escape from attack, thanks to their maneuverability. Same goes for planes like the P-40. Earlier aircraft on both sides in the region were more vulnerable to damage. The early Ki-43s did not have armor or self sealing tanks. Some Allied aircraft like the early A-20 also didn't have SS tanks, and others had less effective or only partly protected SS tanks, lighter armor, and / or lacked things like redundant control systems. So they were easier to disable with less rounds. Damage showing smoke, oil, or say, a fire which usually spelled doom for enemy aircraft in early 1942 may not bring down a similar looking aircraft in 1943. Evasion, such as erratic skidding, split-S into a power dive etc., may look like a doom plunge, when in fact it was just an escape.
An American 23rd FG P-40 pilot's account from China from another Osprey book (Ki-43 vs P-40 China 1944) on page 53 conveys how this may happen:
[the language may be offensive to some, it's a wartime combat pilot so take with a grain of salt]
"I fired at plenty of Jap fighters that day, and while I was squaring away for a sure kill a Nip let me have it with all he had. Holes appeared in the canopy, and oil and smoke filled the cockpit. In a flash I knew I had let myself become a 'sitting-duck' for some Jap pilot. I rolled the airplane over on its back and headed for Mother Earth, knowing that my would-be killer would not follow me down in a high dive, as the Jap aeroplanes were not capable of withstanding terrifically high diving speeds. I found that my wheels and flaps would still function, and I was able to make a safe landing on our own field. Not until I viewed the holes in my aeroplane did I realize what a lucky boy I had been. Except for five small needle-like steel splinters which had entered my right leg, I was still all in one piece."
So in this case, the JAAF pilot would be justified to assume he shot the plane down. He hit it multiple times, saw smoke and oil coming out of the plane, saw it flip over and head strait down at high speed in what looked like a death-plunge, but was really an escape maneuver. The plane did more or less make a forced landing, but because it landed under power and on it's wheels, it was not recorded as such, and it was apparently quickly repaired and put back into action. These WW2 combat aircraft, including the later Japanese ones, were tough. Quite often aircraft on both sides would sustain damage like that and their pilots would manage to limp them home long distances to fight again.
Finally, the hideously difficult terrain on land in New Guinea and many of the Solomon Islands, plus the fact that a large percentage of destroyed aircraft ended up sinking into the sea, meant followup verification of wrecks was a big challenge. Overclaiming was a problem that built upon itself. If you believed that a few bullet strikes that left an enemy aircraft smoking or leaking oil had actually brought it down, you would not necessarily try as hard (and put yourself at extra risk) to finish off an enemy aircraft that you may have only lightly damaged. Inflated claims for destruction of enemy aircraft affected planning and confused leadership. So it was a significant problem for both sides. Anyway, back to the story.
In May 11th Sentai rotated out of New Guinea, with the newly arrived 24th Sentai (equipped with the more capable Ki-43-II) taking the lead. One Warrant Officer from 24 Sentai named Ogura claimed a B -24 and two P-38s in May and June (the latter allegedly with the use of only 32 rounds), but was wounded in the latter fight and spent a month in the hospital. The 59th Sentai, operating out of Timor in Indonesia, was involved in the first JAAF raids against Darwin at this time. This was at the time when No 1. RAAF under the very capable ace Clive Caldwell was defending Darwin with Spitfire Mk Vs, and had so much trouble. On June 20, 22 x Ki-43s from 59 Sentai escorted 18 x Ki-48 on a raid against Darwin. RAAF Spitfires shot down 3 x Ki-48s, while the Ki-43 pilots shot down 2 x Spitfires, claiming 9. After this raid 59th Sentai was moved east to replace 11th Sentai.
The author notes here that 60% of JAAF aircrew at Wewak reported sick during summer 1943, most with malaria or aomebic dysentery.
On 15 August, 22 x Ki-43 from 59th Sentai plus 14 x Ki-43 from 24th Sentai escorted 7 x Ki-48 attacked Allied airfields at Fuba. (As with many of these raids it seems like more of a fighter sweep). They encountered 30 Allied fighters including P-38s, P-40s, and P-39s. Some C-47s transports were operating in the area and were also attacked by the Ki-43s. One P-38 and 4 x P-39 were shot down, plus 2 x C-47 of the 374 TCG (one 'vanished into the surrounding mountains and was never found'). Nango also claimed a P-40 which put oil all over his aircraft. He thought his plane was damaged and was going to make a suicide plunge, but he realized his aircraft was not actually damaged. No JAAF fighters appear to have been lost in this action. On 16 August there was another raid in which 24th and 59th Sentai claimed 39 kills, though no Allied losses are indicated here.
On the night of 16/17 August a large raid of over 50 x B-17s and B-24s raided the JAAF field at Wewak. This apparently was very accurate bombing and destroyed most of the 3rd Chutai of the 59th Sentai. A second wave of B-25s came early in the morning and destroyed even more from 1st Sentai, totalling in 50 aircraft destroyed and another 50 damaged. 1st Sentai returned to Japan for refit while 13th Sentai took over their remaining Ki-43s. In August fighting in the air was also intense with 3 Sentais losing a total of 20 pilots, making 34 claims, but apparently only shooting down 5 x P-38s.
On 2 September 1943 cargo ships unloading vital supplies at Wewak were attacked by 30 x B-25s escorted by 30 x P-38s. They were intercepted by Ki-43s and Ki-61s. One vessel was sunk and two others hit. 3 x B-25Ds were shot down (6 claimed, along with 5 P-38s) for the loss of 4 x Ki-43 and 2 x Ki-61. On 3 Sept - 22 Sept 1943 Allied forces landing at Finschafen were attacked by JAAF forces resulting in further losses for JAAF (he does not give details here). At the end of September 59th Sentai was pulled back to Manilla for refit, with 14 Hikodan taking over their remaining fighters. On 2 Oct 24th Sentai was pulled back to Japan and turned over their remaining 11 x Ki-43 to 13th and 68th Sentai.
On 11 Oct Ki-43s of 14 Hikodan were attacked by 4 x P-47s from the 348th FG. The author makes the evocative observation that "JAAF groundcrew who had been watching the air battle heard the rumbling of 0.50 -in machine guns and the sound of unfamiliar engines." This was the first action between Ki-43s and P-47s in this theater. 2 x Ki-43s were lost, one to future ace Neel Kearby (who claimed four!).
The author notes again that at this point most JAAF crews had malaria or dysentery but only those with a high fever were grounded. Morale was low.
On 16 Oct Ki-43s from 13th Sentai joined with Ki-61s from 68th Sentai to claim 5 x B-25, for 2 x Ki-43 and 1 x Ki-61 lost. From 20 Oct JAAF became involved in trying to supply IJA troops on Finschhafen. On 23-25 Oct JAAF bombers were dropping suplies at dawn, one was shot down on the 24th so they decided to use the 'heavy' Ki-49 bombers. On 27th 25 x JAAF fighters (Ki-43 and Ki-61) escorted 9 x Ki-49 bombers (carrying cargo), and were intercepted by P-39s. The JAAF lost 2 x Ki-43s from the 13th Sentai and 3 x Ki-49s, and claimed 13 US fighters but only one P-39 was lost. This shows the P-39 could be effective in this Theater!
On 31 Oct 59th Sentai returned with new Ki-43-II. On 6 Nov 22 x Ki-43-II from 59th Sentai and 30 x Ki-43-II from the newly arrived 248th Sentai, and another 15 from the 13th Sentai (67 x Ki-43 total) plus 9 x Ki-61 from the 78th Sentai, all escorting 10 x Ki-21 on a raid against Nadzab airfield. They engaged Allied fighters making several claims, and losing 1 x Ki-21.
On 9 November 20 x Ki-43 from 59th Sentai engaged 80 Allied bombers and fighters, while another group of 35 JAAF fighters engaged 40 Allied planes. They claimed 25 Allied planes destroyed, but 3 x Allied fighters were lost (type not indicated) for 7 x Ki-43s, with another 2 crash landing. One JAAF pilot WO Kazuo Shimizu attacked six P-40s single handedly, claiming one. More supply missions followed over Finschhafen from 22-26 Nov, claiming "a handful of Allied aircraft" and losing 6 x Ki-43s. 13th was withdrawn on Dec 1, with 16 pilots remaining.
On 1 Dec 20 x Ki-43 and 14 x Ki-61 intercepted 40 Allied heavy bombers escorted by P-47s. USAAF claimed 11 JAAF fighters, but only one was lost. On 15 Dec Allied forces landed at Arawe on New britain. JAAF bomber raid escorted by 59th Sentai attacked the transport ships, but were intercepted by P-38s. Capt Nango of 59th Sentai noted in his diary "We are being made fools of by the P-38s. it is difficult to keep on fighting them with the Ki-43s". On 16 Dec, 5 x JAAF bombers and 5 fighters (mix of Ki-43 and Ki-61) were shot down by P-38s. On 21 Dec 68th Sentai CO (and ranking ace) Capt Shogo Takeuchi was killed when his engined seized on the return flight home after fighting F4F pilots while flying a Ki-61 over New Britain.
More allied amphibious landings followed in Dec 1943 and Jan 1944, which were attacked by JAAF forces. At this point the author notes JAAF was often at a numerical disadvantage. On 15 January four JAAF Sentais made a fighter sweep over Nadzab. JAAF figher pilots claimed eight kills, including three P-40s, but there were no actual losses on the Allied side. On 16 January there was another major clash, in which JAAF claimed 2 but lost 5 x Ki-43s. On 23 January Capt Nango, CO of 59th Sentai was killed fighting a big formation of B-24s and their escorts. JAAF claimed 18 Allied aircraft but lost 7 fighters. On 14 February a Ki-43 Ace WO Kazuo Shimizo scored two unusual kills using Ta Dan incendiary / framentation bombs in mid air, claiming 2 x B-25 and 2 x P-47 (it's unclear if any Allied planes were actually lost here). 59th was rotated out back to Japan after this on 16 Feb.
On 5 March 77th Sentai engaged 3 x P-47s over Wewak, shooting down US 21 victory ace Col Neel Kearby as he was trying to shoot down a Ki-48 bomber. His wiki (linked) confirms he was shot down and killed by a Ki-43 on 5 March. From 11-15 March 77th Sentai claimed nine Allied planes, losing 4 pilots. The author notes that 63rd and 77th Sentai lost most of their Ki-43s to bombing attacks while they were on the ground. On 16 March, Wewak was considered to be overwhelmed by constant Allied air attacks and was evacuated, with the remaining JAAF units relocating to Hollandia.
On 11 April 20 x JAAF Ki-43s and Ki-61s engaged B-25s and P-47s over Wewak. They claimed 3 x P-47s from the 58th FG (new in Theater) which seem to be actual victories.
On 12 and 16 April Hollandia was bombed by USAAF heavy bomber. Then on 21 April USN aircraft bombed the field. Only 6 x Ki-43s came up to fight and 5 were destroyed. The surviving Ki-43 was then destroyed by bombing. USN warships also shelled Hollandia on the 21st, followed by an amphibious landing on 22 Apirl 1944. The author notes that 7,000 IJA troops fled Allied troops and went into the New Guinea jungle, of whom 5,000 troops and 70 pilots died trying to escape new Guinea. 63rd, 68th, 77th, 78th and 248th Sentai were all disbanded with the fall of Hollandia.
In April 1944 13th Sentai got some new Ki-43-II and moved to Noemfor Island. These were mostly destroyed during Allied landing operations on Biak. 13th and 24th Sentai, both heavily reduced, were evacuated to the Celebes in the East Indies in July. 13th Sentai was issues some Ki-84s and then sent to the Phillipines in July.
New Guinea / Solomons
May 1943
Ki-43 units -1st Sentai (Ki-43-I, rotated out in September 1943), 11th Sentai (rotated out in May 1943) 24th Sentai (rotated out in October 1943), 59th Sentai (Ki-43-I, rotated out in October 1943, then again in Feb 1944), 14th Hikodan (arrived in September 1943), 13th Sentai (Ki-45 and Ki-43-I, withdrawn end of November 1943), 248 Sentai (arrived November 1943), 63rd Sentai (arrived January 1944), 33rd Sentai (arrived Feb 1944), 77th Sentai (arrived Feb 1944) (All Ki-43-II except where stated),
Other fighters - 68th Sentai (Ki-61), 78th Sentai (Ki-61)
The author sets the tone for the next section by noting: "JAAF fighter units were locked in a desperate battle with Allied air forces in the New Guinea area, and they would eventually suffer losses several times those sustained in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theatre. Their victory claims would also be over-inflated by a similar margin. JAAF fighter pilots would claim many victories at times when Allied losses were nil. As it happens, USAAF fighter pilots in New Guinea and the South West Pacific area also tended to over-claim to a greater extent than their counterparts in the CBI."
One comment on overclaiming by yours truly. I think a lot of the overclaiming was unintentional, and it was exacerbated in this area for a couple of reasons. First, aircraft like the Ki-43 were tougher than people generally assumed, and could be used evasively very effectively to escape from attack, thanks to their maneuverability. Same goes for planes like the P-40. Earlier aircraft on both sides in the region were more vulnerable to damage. The early Ki-43s did not have armor or self sealing tanks. Some Allied aircraft like the early A-20 also didn't have SS tanks, and others had less effective or only partly protected SS tanks, lighter armor, and / or lacked things like redundant control systems. So they were easier to disable with less rounds. Damage showing smoke, oil, or say, a fire which usually spelled doom for enemy aircraft in early 1942 may not bring down a similar looking aircraft in 1943. Evasion, such as erratic skidding, split-S into a power dive etc., may look like a doom plunge, when in fact it was just an escape.
An American 23rd FG P-40 pilot's account from China from another Osprey book (Ki-43 vs P-40 China 1944) on page 53 conveys how this may happen:
[the language may be offensive to some, it's a wartime combat pilot so take with a grain of salt]
"I fired at plenty of Jap fighters that day, and while I was squaring away for a sure kill a Nip let me have it with all he had. Holes appeared in the canopy, and oil and smoke filled the cockpit. In a flash I knew I had let myself become a 'sitting-duck' for some Jap pilot. I rolled the airplane over on its back and headed for Mother Earth, knowing that my would-be killer would not follow me down in a high dive, as the Jap aeroplanes were not capable of withstanding terrifically high diving speeds. I found that my wheels and flaps would still function, and I was able to make a safe landing on our own field. Not until I viewed the holes in my aeroplane did I realize what a lucky boy I had been. Except for five small needle-like steel splinters which had entered my right leg, I was still all in one piece."
So in this case, the JAAF pilot would be justified to assume he shot the plane down. He hit it multiple times, saw smoke and oil coming out of the plane, saw it flip over and head strait down at high speed in what looked like a death-plunge, but was really an escape maneuver. The plane did more or less make a forced landing, but because it landed under power and on it's wheels, it was not recorded as such, and it was apparently quickly repaired and put back into action. These WW2 combat aircraft, including the later Japanese ones, were tough. Quite often aircraft on both sides would sustain damage like that and their pilots would manage to limp them home long distances to fight again.
Finally, the hideously difficult terrain on land in New Guinea and many of the Solomon Islands, plus the fact that a large percentage of destroyed aircraft ended up sinking into the sea, meant followup verification of wrecks was a big challenge. Overclaiming was a problem that built upon itself. If you believed that a few bullet strikes that left an enemy aircraft smoking or leaking oil had actually brought it down, you would not necessarily try as hard (and put yourself at extra risk) to finish off an enemy aircraft that you may have only lightly damaged. Inflated claims for destruction of enemy aircraft affected planning and confused leadership. So it was a significant problem for both sides. Anyway, back to the story.
In May 11th Sentai rotated out of New Guinea, with the newly arrived 24th Sentai (equipped with the more capable Ki-43-II) taking the lead. One Warrant Officer from 24 Sentai named Ogura claimed a B -24 and two P-38s in May and June (the latter allegedly with the use of only 32 rounds), but was wounded in the latter fight and spent a month in the hospital. The 59th Sentai, operating out of Timor in Indonesia, was involved in the first JAAF raids against Darwin at this time. This was at the time when No 1. RAAF under the very capable ace Clive Caldwell was defending Darwin with Spitfire Mk Vs, and had so much trouble. On June 20, 22 x Ki-43s from 59 Sentai escorted 18 x Ki-48 on a raid against Darwin. RAAF Spitfires shot down 3 x Ki-48s, while the Ki-43 pilots shot down 2 x Spitfires, claiming 9. After this raid 59th Sentai was moved east to replace 11th Sentai.
The author notes here that 60% of JAAF aircrew at Wewak reported sick during summer 1943, most with malaria or aomebic dysentery.
On 15 August, 22 x Ki-43 from 59th Sentai plus 14 x Ki-43 from 24th Sentai escorted 7 x Ki-48 attacked Allied airfields at Fuba. (As with many of these raids it seems like more of a fighter sweep). They encountered 30 Allied fighters including P-38s, P-40s, and P-39s. Some C-47s transports were operating in the area and were also attacked by the Ki-43s. One P-38 and 4 x P-39 were shot down, plus 2 x C-47 of the 374 TCG (one 'vanished into the surrounding mountains and was never found'). Nango also claimed a P-40 which put oil all over his aircraft. He thought his plane was damaged and was going to make a suicide plunge, but he realized his aircraft was not actually damaged. No JAAF fighters appear to have been lost in this action. On 16 August there was another raid in which 24th and 59th Sentai claimed 39 kills, though no Allied losses are indicated here.
On the night of 16/17 August a large raid of over 50 x B-17s and B-24s raided the JAAF field at Wewak. This apparently was very accurate bombing and destroyed most of the 3rd Chutai of the 59th Sentai. A second wave of B-25s came early in the morning and destroyed even more from 1st Sentai, totalling in 50 aircraft destroyed and another 50 damaged. 1st Sentai returned to Japan for refit while 13th Sentai took over their remaining Ki-43s. In August fighting in the air was also intense with 3 Sentais losing a total of 20 pilots, making 34 claims, but apparently only shooting down 5 x P-38s.
On 2 September 1943 cargo ships unloading vital supplies at Wewak were attacked by 30 x B-25s escorted by 30 x P-38s. They were intercepted by Ki-43s and Ki-61s. One vessel was sunk and two others hit. 3 x B-25Ds were shot down (6 claimed, along with 5 P-38s) for the loss of 4 x Ki-43 and 2 x Ki-61. On 3 Sept - 22 Sept 1943 Allied forces landing at Finschafen were attacked by JAAF forces resulting in further losses for JAAF (he does not give details here). At the end of September 59th Sentai was pulled back to Manilla for refit, with 14 Hikodan taking over their remaining fighters. On 2 Oct 24th Sentai was pulled back to Japan and turned over their remaining 11 x Ki-43 to 13th and 68th Sentai.
On 11 Oct Ki-43s of 14 Hikodan were attacked by 4 x P-47s from the 348th FG. The author makes the evocative observation that "JAAF groundcrew who had been watching the air battle heard the rumbling of 0.50 -in machine guns and the sound of unfamiliar engines." This was the first action between Ki-43s and P-47s in this theater. 2 x Ki-43s were lost, one to future ace Neel Kearby (who claimed four!).
The author notes again that at this point most JAAF crews had malaria or dysentery but only those with a high fever were grounded. Morale was low.
On 16 Oct Ki-43s from 13th Sentai joined with Ki-61s from 68th Sentai to claim 5 x B-25, for 2 x Ki-43 and 1 x Ki-61 lost. From 20 Oct JAAF became involved in trying to supply IJA troops on Finschhafen. On 23-25 Oct JAAF bombers were dropping suplies at dawn, one was shot down on the 24th so they decided to use the 'heavy' Ki-49 bombers. On 27th 25 x JAAF fighters (Ki-43 and Ki-61) escorted 9 x Ki-49 bombers (carrying cargo), and were intercepted by P-39s. The JAAF lost 2 x Ki-43s from the 13th Sentai and 3 x Ki-49s, and claimed 13 US fighters but only one P-39 was lost. This shows the P-39 could be effective in this Theater!
On 31 Oct 59th Sentai returned with new Ki-43-II. On 6 Nov 22 x Ki-43-II from 59th Sentai and 30 x Ki-43-II from the newly arrived 248th Sentai, and another 15 from the 13th Sentai (67 x Ki-43 total) plus 9 x Ki-61 from the 78th Sentai, all escorting 10 x Ki-21 on a raid against Nadzab airfield. They engaged Allied fighters making several claims, and losing 1 x Ki-21.
On 9 November 20 x Ki-43 from 59th Sentai engaged 80 Allied bombers and fighters, while another group of 35 JAAF fighters engaged 40 Allied planes. They claimed 25 Allied planes destroyed, but 3 x Allied fighters were lost (type not indicated) for 7 x Ki-43s, with another 2 crash landing. One JAAF pilot WO Kazuo Shimizu attacked six P-40s single handedly, claiming one. More supply missions followed over Finschhafen from 22-26 Nov, claiming "a handful of Allied aircraft" and losing 6 x Ki-43s. 13th was withdrawn on Dec 1, with 16 pilots remaining.
On 1 Dec 20 x Ki-43 and 14 x Ki-61 intercepted 40 Allied heavy bombers escorted by P-47s. USAAF claimed 11 JAAF fighters, but only one was lost. On 15 Dec Allied forces landed at Arawe on New britain. JAAF bomber raid escorted by 59th Sentai attacked the transport ships, but were intercepted by P-38s. Capt Nango of 59th Sentai noted in his diary "We are being made fools of by the P-38s. it is difficult to keep on fighting them with the Ki-43s". On 16 Dec, 5 x JAAF bombers and 5 fighters (mix of Ki-43 and Ki-61) were shot down by P-38s. On 21 Dec 68th Sentai CO (and ranking ace) Capt Shogo Takeuchi was killed when his engined seized on the return flight home after fighting F4F pilots while flying a Ki-61 over New Britain.
More allied amphibious landings followed in Dec 1943 and Jan 1944, which were attacked by JAAF forces. At this point the author notes JAAF was often at a numerical disadvantage. On 15 January four JAAF Sentais made a fighter sweep over Nadzab. JAAF figher pilots claimed eight kills, including three P-40s, but there were no actual losses on the Allied side. On 16 January there was another major clash, in which JAAF claimed 2 but lost 5 x Ki-43s. On 23 January Capt Nango, CO of 59th Sentai was killed fighting a big formation of B-24s and their escorts. JAAF claimed 18 Allied aircraft but lost 7 fighters. On 14 February a Ki-43 Ace WO Kazuo Shimizo scored two unusual kills using Ta Dan incendiary / framentation bombs in mid air, claiming 2 x B-25 and 2 x P-47 (it's unclear if any Allied planes were actually lost here). 59th was rotated out back to Japan after this on 16 Feb.
On 5 March 77th Sentai engaged 3 x P-47s over Wewak, shooting down US 21 victory ace Col Neel Kearby as he was trying to shoot down a Ki-48 bomber. His wiki (linked) confirms he was shot down and killed by a Ki-43 on 5 March. From 11-15 March 77th Sentai claimed nine Allied planes, losing 4 pilots. The author notes that 63rd and 77th Sentai lost most of their Ki-43s to bombing attacks while they were on the ground. On 16 March, Wewak was considered to be overwhelmed by constant Allied air attacks and was evacuated, with the remaining JAAF units relocating to Hollandia.
On 11 April 20 x JAAF Ki-43s and Ki-61s engaged B-25s and P-47s over Wewak. They claimed 3 x P-47s from the 58th FG (new in Theater) which seem to be actual victories.
On 12 and 16 April Hollandia was bombed by USAAF heavy bomber. Then on 21 April USN aircraft bombed the field. Only 6 x Ki-43s came up to fight and 5 were destroyed. The surviving Ki-43 was then destroyed by bombing. USN warships also shelled Hollandia on the 21st, followed by an amphibious landing on 22 Apirl 1944. The author notes that 7,000 IJA troops fled Allied troops and went into the New Guinea jungle, of whom 5,000 troops and 70 pilots died trying to escape new Guinea. 63rd, 68th, 77th, 78th and 248th Sentai were all disbanded with the fall of Hollandia.
In April 1944 13th Sentai got some new Ki-43-II and moved to Noemfor Island. These were mostly destroyed during Allied landing operations on Biak. 13th and 24th Sentai, both heavily reduced, were evacuated to the Celebes in the East Indies in July. 13th Sentai was issues some Ki-84s and then sent to the Phillipines in July.
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- Thread starter
- #134
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
The last section (next) is a short one on the Philippines. Then I'm going to do a little analysis.
Wildcat
Major
The 59th Sentai lost a Ki-43-II (Lt Shigeto Kuwata) shot down by a spitfire (F/O Mawer) over Darwin on the 20 June 43 raid.
- Thread starter
- #136
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
Huh... maybe I missed it, I'll go back and give it another look.
- Thread starter
- #137
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
I went back and looked, it doesn't seem to mention any Japanese losses except the three Ki-48s. I guess he left that part out.
J.A.W.
Banned
Norman Franks included several topic relevant quotes from a Spitfire VIII pilot (& veteran of combat in the MTO) in his Aircraft vs Aircraft book.
As preamble, he wrote:
"...another exceptional Japanese fighter, the Nakajima Ki 43 - codenamed 'Oscar'. By late 1943, they totally outclassed the RAF Hurricanes..."
Alan Peart was a New Zealander flying with 81 Squadron RAF, & he quickly utilized the German techniques he'd experienced in the Med'.
"The Mk VIII had a considerable advantage over the Oscars... being armoured, more highly powered, faster, & better armed. The Japanese
on the other hand were extremely manoeuvrable, had great endurance in the air, & generally outnumbered the intercepting Spitfires.
Our tactics were to position ourselves above the Oscars, attack at speed using the sun, surprise if possible, & power climb out of range.
Thus we could mount continuous attacks with relative immunity. The Japanese tactic was to fly in circles, each fighter covering the one
in front & taking snapshots at the Spitfires as they passed."
Peart remarks further:
"They were not heavily armoured, & our .303s could put a lot of destructive metal into them. The cannons caused obvious & serious damage.
This was not the case with Me 109s, where I have hit one with machine guns from behind, only to see the bullets ricocheting off.
In such cases we could only claim a 'damaged'. Similarly with the Japanese aircraft, unless it was badly on fire, or seen to crash,
or the pilot baled out, it could not be claimed as destroyed. I never did see a Japanese pilot bale out!
As preamble, he wrote:
"...another exceptional Japanese fighter, the Nakajima Ki 43 - codenamed 'Oscar'. By late 1943, they totally outclassed the RAF Hurricanes..."
Alan Peart was a New Zealander flying with 81 Squadron RAF, & he quickly utilized the German techniques he'd experienced in the Med'.
"The Mk VIII had a considerable advantage over the Oscars... being armoured, more highly powered, faster, & better armed. The Japanese
on the other hand were extremely manoeuvrable, had great endurance in the air, & generally outnumbered the intercepting Spitfires.
Our tactics were to position ourselves above the Oscars, attack at speed using the sun, surprise if possible, & power climb out of range.
Thus we could mount continuous attacks with relative immunity. The Japanese tactic was to fly in circles, each fighter covering the one
in front & taking snapshots at the Spitfires as they passed."
Peart remarks further:
"They were not heavily armoured, & our .303s could put a lot of destructive metal into them. The cannons caused obvious & serious damage.
This was not the case with Me 109s, where I have hit one with machine guns from behind, only to see the bullets ricocheting off.
In such cases we could only claim a 'damaged'. Similarly with the Japanese aircraft, unless it was badly on fire, or seen to crash,
or the pilot baled out, it could not be claimed as destroyed. I never did see a Japanese pilot bale out!
- Thread starter
- #139
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
Yeah thanks, I certainly agree with just about all of that. It's very clear that the Ki-43s totally outclassed the Hurricanes even back in 1942.
It's really interesting that he brings up the endurance and defensive flying, since that is exactly what the Ki-43 pilots said was their tactic against the Spitfire VIII. It's basically the same tactic, as he says, that the Luftwaffe used but in reverse.
Pilots on both sides usually thought they were getting victories when in fact they had only damaged the enemy aircraft. But the Ki-43 was surprisingly deadly, it turns out, even with just the two guns.
It's really interesting that he brings up the endurance and defensive flying, since that is exactly what the Ki-43 pilots said was their tactic against the Spitfire VIII. It's basically the same tactic, as he says, that the Luftwaffe used but in reverse.
Pilots on both sides usually thought they were getting victories when in fact they had only damaged the enemy aircraft. But the Ki-43 was surprisingly deadly, it turns out, even with just the two guns.
J.A.W.
Banned
Indeed, as you've noted earlier in the thread, the RAF 'Brass' was in 'denial' over the hapless Hurricane situation, much earlier.
The late 1943 date mentioned was about the soonest the RAF could get a Spitfire with both the range & performance in the CBO.
Alan Peart does however state the impact the confident Spitfire VIII units had:
"In the Arakan... the Japanese suffered severe fighter losses, & lost a lot of their aggressiveness.
Until then, they appeared to roam at will over Allied territory."
(Off topic, but relevant to just how out of their depth by 1943 Hurricanes were, they were cruelly employed against 'Festung Europa',
an account of the 'withering losses' they suffered is well related by another Spitfire pilot, P. Clostermann, perhaps for another thread).
